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ABSTRACT 
 
Legitimacy is mostly how institutions and polities ensure compliance / endorsement in the 
absence of coercion. Looking at the European Union’s actorness in crisis management, since 
the creation of the CFSP and of the ESDP in the 1990s until the 2016 Global Strategy, we 
analyse how it seeks to legitimate its identity and actions by justifying them normatively 
through discourse. We highlight the importance of normative justification in ensuring actorness 
legitimacy, as not a lot of attention is paid to the EU’s discursive ability to convince other actors 
in the international system of its appropriateness to engage in external action, especially when 
strong normative components are involved. The area of crisis management is marked by its 
emergency and crisis nature and deployment on a case-by-case basis, unlike most external 
policies, so the EU’s normative justification narratives focus on its own potential role, identity, 
and value-added, rather than on countries that might receive this help. Thus, we focus on how 
the EU convinces others and itself (including the governments and wider public in its Member 
States) to validate and endorse it, rather than on the receiving end of the policy. We use critical 
discourse analysis (CDA) embedded in post-structuralism due to their focus on deconstruction 
and critique of asymmetric power relations, their effort to ‘denaturalise’ meta-narratives that 
shape the social world, and due to the importance of language and discourse for the legitimation 
of organised power relations. The identified narratives reveal an asymmetry between the EU 
and its interlocutors: the EU assumes that others want to emulate its standards, brands itself as 
an ideal model, and places itself at a superior level. Thus, by attempting to make others ‘normal’ 
and ‘adequate’ by organising and modernising them according to the standards that the EU 
considers ideal or universal, the EU assumes a ‘civilising’ attitude that goes beyond crisis 
management. 
 
Key words 
 
Actor, actorness, Common Security and Defence Policy, crisis management, critical discourse 
analysis, European Union, legitimacy, post-structuralism 
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RESUMO 
 
Legitimidade é o principal meio para instituições e entidades políticas garantirem validação na 
ausência de coerção. Focando a ‘actorness’ da União Europeia na área de gestão de crises, desde 
a criação da PESC e da PESD nos anos 90 até à Estratégia Global de 2016, analisamos o modo 
como procura legitimar a sua identidade e acções, justificando-as normativamente através do 
discurso. Enfatizamos a importância da justificação normativa na garantia de legitimidade da 
‘actorness’, já que pouca atenção é prestada à capacidade discursiva da UE na procura de 
convencer outros actores no sistema internacional da sua adequação para desenvolver uma 
acção externa, especialmente quando esta envolve fortes componentes normativas. A gestão de 
crises caracteriza-se por uma natureza de emergência e crise, e é desenvolvida e implementada 
caso a caso, contrariamente à maioria das políticas externas, portanto as narrativas de 
justificação normativa da UE focam-se no seu próprio potencial papel, identidade, e valor 
acrescentado, e não nos eventuais países receptores. Portanto, centramo-nos em como a UE 
convence outros e a si mesma (incluindo governos e público dos Estados Membros) a validar e 
sancioná-la, em detrimento da recepção desta política. Recorremos à análise crítica do discurso 
orientada pelo pós-estruturalismo, dado o enfoque desta abordagem na desconstrução e crítica 
de relações assimétricas de poder, o seu esforço de ‘desnaturalização’ de meta-narrativas que 
moldam o mundo social, e a importância da linguagem e do discurso para a legitimação de 
relações de poder organizadas. As narrativas identificadas revelam uma assimetria entre a UE 
e os seus interlocutores: a UE assume que os outros querem emular os seus padrões, marca-se 
como modelo ideal, e coloca-se num patamar superior. Ao procurar fazer os outros ‘normais’ e 
‘adequados’, organizando e modernizando-os de acordo com os padrões que a UE considera 
ideais e universais, a UE assume uma atitude ‘civilizadora’ que ultrapassa a gestão de crises. 
 
Palavras-chave 
 
‘Actorness’, actor, análise crítica do discurso, gestão de crises, legitimidade, Política Comum 
de Segurança e Defesa, pós-estruturalismo, União Europeia   
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CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION AND SCHOLARLY STATE OF PLAY 
 
The main goal of this study is to conduct a post-structuralism-inspired critical discourse analysis 
(CDA) of the European Union’s (EU) normative1 justification narratives as a central element 
in its legitimation efforts as a crisis management actor since the creation of the Common 
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) in 
the 1990s, up until the launch of the 2016 EU Global Strategy. The focus of our analysis falls 
on how the EU legitimates itself as a crisis management actor through discourse, rather than on 
how this policy is received. 
The area of security and defence in the context of the EU has had a fast yet oftentimes 
underwhelming evolution. Unlike what the name might suggest, the core of the EU’s Common 
Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)2 remains crisis management rather than a more traditional 
territorial defence policy, such as the ones states usually have in place. The initial page of the 
CSDP on the website of the European External Action Service (EEAS) briefly states what is 
encompassed in the concept of crisis management, and what the EU’s ambitions in this area 
are: 
 
The Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) enables the Union to take a leading 
role in peace-keeping operations, conflict prevention and in the strengthening of the 
international security. It is an integral part of the EU’s comprehensive approach towards 
crisis management, drawing on civilian and military assets.3 
 
                                               
1 “‘Normative’ is the adjective derived from the noun ‘norm’, which signifies either the average or 
usual level of attainment or performance for an individual or a group; or and more usually in 
philosophical discussion, a standard, rule, principle used to judge or direct human conduct as 
something to be complied with” (Honderich, T., 1995, ed., The Oxford Companion to Philosophy, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, p.  626, cited by Manners, 2006d: 117). 
2 The ESDP was renamed CSDP following the Lisbon Treaty. We may refer to this policy as E/CSDP 
in general terms throughout the thesis for practical purposes, while occasionally making a 
distinction when referring to specific time periods. 
3 https://eeas.europa.eu/topics/common-security-and-defence-policy-csdp_en. 
 
  2 
A key difference between crisis management4 and a more traditional territorial defence is where 
the policy takes place. In case of the former, that is predominantly outside of the actor’s 
territorial sphere, while the latter, by and large, takes place within its territory. Although this 
distinction is somewhat artificial, the underlying idea is that a traditional defence is more often 
linked with ensuring territorial security in the context of an external threat or attack, whereas 
the concept of crisis management linked to security and defence is more commonly applied to 
external emergencies. This raises different questions regarding legitimacy. For territorial 
defence, domestic legitimation is what is mostly required, while for external crisis management 
both domestic and external legitimation are required. In both cases there are other 
considerations – such as the degree of civilian and military input – that also affect legitimacy. 
The evolution of the EU has triggered extensive academic debates about its legitimacy 
and actorness practically since its inception, and especially since the entering into force of the 
Maastricht Treaty. These debates, however, have been developing mostly separately. In this 
study, we pinpoint the usefulness of looking at both debates and highlight the importance of 
ensuring legitimacy for the EU’s actorness by analysing a core component of the EU’s 
legitimation efforts as a crisis management actor, namely the discourses and narratives that 
provide normative justification for the EU’s identity and involvement in this policy area. 
The study of EU actorness and the legitimacy thereof is primarily justified by the EU’s 
frequent affirmation of an ambition to be a full-fledged international player. This aspiration is 
visible in EU treaties, official documents and statements, where the EU engages in practices of 
purposeful construction and dissemination of a common identity as a global actor with a ‘vital 
interest’ and a ‘responsibility’ to get involved in conflicts and crisis situations outside of its 
territorial sphere, or in efforts of promotion of allegedly universal norms and values (e.g. 
European Council, 1999b; European Council, 2003a: 5; Solana, 2004: 20; Council, 2004b: 1; 
Solana, 2009b: 74; Ashton, 2010: 26; European Council, 2012: 8; HR, 2013a: 3; HR, 2013c: 1; 
EP, 2013: 3; Council, 2015: 2).  
                                               
4 When we speak of ‘crisis management’ we essentially refer to the actions and positions assumed by 
the EU in the area of security and defence, under the aegis of the CSDP, as this terminology is often 
used by the EU’s institutions and bodies to illustrate what it does in the context of this policy.  
Examples of the use of the general expression ‘crisis management’ in the context of the CSDP 
include the crisis management procedure (i.e. the CSDP’s decision-making procedure), the crisis 
management concept, or the EU’s comprehensive approach towards crisis management. Thus, for 
practical purposes, we will use both terms – crisis management and CSDP – interchangeably. 
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On its own, the study of EU legitimacy as a crisis management actor can be justified by 
both domestic and external aspects. Legitimacy is usually mostly brought up in academic 
debates when it is deemed to be missing, and the academic debate concerning the legitimacy of 
the E/CSDP seems to suggest that this is the case (e.g. Cutler and Von Lingen, 2003; Wagner, 
2005, 2006, and 2007; Mittag, 2006; Stavridis, 2006; Bono, 2006; Oppermann and Höse, 2007; 
Brummer, 2007; Sjursen, 2008, 2011, and 2015; Comelli and Zanon, 2009; Stie, 2010; Comelli, 
2011; Kaldor, 2012; Wouters and Raube, 2012; Schlomach, 2014; Peters, 2014). Nonetheless, 
this policy is different from the ‘Community method’ policies, not to mention that it is entirely 
externally oriented. So, the fact that the E/CSDP legitimacy debate focuses almost exclusively 
on domestic aspects of legitimacy – important as they may be – can be problematic and leave 
a gap in the literature. 
The study of the EU’s legitimacy in this or any other policy area matters because of how 
it affects the attitudes and behaviours of citizens within (and outside) the EU “to the extent that 
people acknowledge power as rightful, as validly acquired and properly exercised, they will 
feel a corresponding obligation to obey and support it without having to be bribed or coerced 
into doing so” (Beetham, 2013: xi). This applies both domestically and externally, even to a 
policy like the E/CSDP, with a markedly external orientation, as validation comes from both 
directions.  
Domestically, the EU’s broad foreign policy framework – the CFSP – has been 
undergoing gradual changes that have been dissolving its initial strict intergovernmental 
features that draw on the indirect democratic accountability of the members of the Council and 
other national delegations and representatives in Brussels. There has been a progressive 
introduction and reinforcement of supranational elements within its functioning and decision-
making with the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty which have had an impact on the way 
foreign policy at the EU level is perceived and have rendered its internal legitimating 
mechanisms subject to a deeper examination and discussion.5 
                                               
5 Some examples of the introduction of supranational elements within the CFSP by the Lisbon Treaty 
include the extension of the possibility of QMV for a Council decision regarding an EU action or 
position based on a proposal presented by the High Representative on his/her own or at the request 
of the European Council; or the possibility of extension of QMV in the Council to other matters by 
unanimous decision by the European Council (although the possibility of extension of QMV to 
decisions with military or defence implications is, for now, out of the question). Other elements 
with supranational traits (albeit more vaguely and superficially so) can also be found in the increase 
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Endeavours to make the EU appear stronger, more coherent, more visible, and more 
effective in this area (HR, 2013a: 3) have often resulted in a delegation of competences to non-
elected EU institutions and bodies, especially within the context of the recently created EEAS. 
In addition, there has also been a growing tendency and even an active effort on behalf of the 
Member States, towards the pooling of efforts, resources, and capabilities, including the 
creation of multinational battle groups. This tendency is partly due to crisis-driven cutbacks in 
national defence expenditure and to an increasing understanding that a growing number of 
crises can no longer be tackled alone. Moreover, despite the fact that the military component of 
crisis management is less visible than the civilian one, it is nevertheless present and openly 
being developed, which raises additional legitimacy concerns (Franck, 2002; Buchanan, 2010; 
Kantner, 2014; Martin, 2011: 195). 
The most visible aspect of the academic debate concerning the legitimacy of the 
E/CSDP has been its focus on domestic (EU) institutions and the democratic credentials thereof, 
in particular the inconsistency of parliamentary scrutiny (both at the EU and national levels). 
This arguably weak input legitimacy6 allegedly stems from the indirect legitimacy of the main 
decision-makers (national Member State representatives in the Council) since they are elected 
by national constituencies primarily to carry out national office functions. This situation is 
supposedly worsened by what some scholars have labelled a ‘double democratic deficit’ 
(Comelli, 2010: 84). The latter allegedly results from the increased difficulty of national 
parliaments to scrutinise the E/CSDP, as each parliament can only oversee actions taken by 
their own government, and thus cannot oversee the policy as a whole. Furthermore, there has 
not been an increase in the European Parliament’s (EP) responsibilities and powers in this area 
                                               
of the EP’s annual debate on CFSP to twice a year and the extension thereof to CSDP; in the 
Member States’ duty to try to find a common approach on foreign and security policy issues; and in 
the requirement of consultation in the European Council or Council regarding individual Member 
States’ foreign policy options that may affect the interests of the EU. 
6 Fritz Scharpf distinguishes between input and output-oriented legitimacy sources. On one hand, 
‘input legitimacy’ is understood as mainly procedural, i.e., isolated from cost/benefit control by the 
parties, and ultimately regards the democratic accountability of those making decisions. On the 
other hand, ‘output legitimacy’ is based on the maximisation of common welfare and the fair 
distribution of costs and benefits, and rests on the quality of the results produced by the decisions 
made. Ultimately, the author claims that not all EU policies require (democratic) input legitimacy, 
and that some policies that require less democratic support, can rely on output legitimacy. Bartolini, 
2005: 168-169, citing Scharpf, F.W. (1970), Demokratietheorie zwischen Utopie und Anpassung, 
Konstanz, Universitnderstood. 
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to potentially compensate for the national parliaments’ limitations, as these remain extremely 
residual and the EP’s engagement in the E/CSDP remains far from systematic (Riddervolda and 
Rosén, 2016: 693). Although the Lisbon Treaty changed many aspects of the EU’s external 
action, it did not bring much change to its parliamentary scrutiny (Huff, 2013). While the EP 
has had, since the Lisbon Treaty, to ratify Association Agreements containing stipulations on 
CFSP and third countries’ participation in E/CSDP missions, it remains quite peripheral and 
informal in the E/CSDP’s formal decision-making procedures (Herranz-Surrallés, 2011; 
Wouters and Raube, 2012). When it comes to the E/CSDP there is “no explicit delegation, 
neither of decision-making authority nor of parliamentary control and scrutiny, to the European 
level” (Peters et al., 2014: 444). In addition, the EP (alongside national parliaments) becomes 
mostly involved ‘only after key political decisions had already been made’ (ibid.: 430; 
Riddervolda and Rosén, 2016). 
As for other dimensions of actorness legitimacy beyond domestic democratic 
accountability – which include the EU’s legitimation narratives as a global or regional actor –, 
they have been largely overlooked by the academic debates looking into EU or E/CSDP 
legitimacy, as well as the EU actorness debate. The study of actorness legitimacy matters in 
particular because it is vastly understudied, and also because legitimation is mostly how non-
state international institutions, such as the EU, ensure compliance or endorsement in their 
external relations in the absence of enforcement through coercion (which is seldom present at 
the international level) (Beetham, 2013: 270). This means that legitimacy is intricately related 
to the concept of ‘actorness’. This is where our study seeks to make a contribution to the 
debates: we highlight the importance of legitimacy for ensuring and strengthening EU 
actorness, while focusing in particular on the link between legitimacy and both inward- and 
outward-oriented EU legitimation discourses. This focus helps advance the academic debates, 
especially because the relation between external legitimacy and actorness has been generally 
neglected by both academic debates even in the case of EU studies where so much attention 
has been given to both these concepts separately, as the link between the two concepts has 
primarily focused on domestic legitimacy (e.g. Sjöstedt, 1977a; Allen and Smith, 1990; Jupille 
and Caporaso, 1998; Bretherton and Vogler, 2006; Hettne, 2008; Čmakalová and Rolenc, 
2012). 
The crisis management area is “widely marked by a lack of critical distance towards its 
research object as well as a lack of reflexivity towards practices of knowledge production” 
(Chamlian, 2016: 394); moreover, when it comes to studying the EU’s legitimacy in foreign 
relations, not a lot of attention is paid to its discursive ability (Jørgensen, 2015: 503; Diez, 
  6 
2014a: 27; Chamlian, 2016) to convince other actors in the international system of its 
appropriateness to engage in external action – including crisis management – especially when 
strong normative components are involved. The EU’s narratives as a ‘responsible’ actor and a 
‘model’ of ideals and norms constitute one of the most important components of its external 
legitimation process (Diez, 2005; Manners, 2009b; Føllesdal, 2006; Pace, 2007; Martin, 2011; 
Ferreira-Pereira, 2010; Schumacher, 2015; Chamlian, 2016). 
Our thesis is structured as follows: in order to understand how our study can contribute 
to the academic debates concerning EU legitimacy and actorness, we will begin by identifying 
the scholarly state of play (chapter 1). This implies identifying the main authors and debates, 
and how analyses concerning this field have evolved and ramified. We will essentially look at 
two scholarly debates, one concerning EU actorness, and another one concerning EU 
legitimacy. Our examination of the actorness debate will include both actorness 
conceptualisations and power-related role conceptions, and how these two branches are lacking 
a focus on legitimacy tout court, and particularly on normative justification through discourse 
concerning EU foreign policy in general and specifically crisis management. Our examination 
of the scholarly debate around EU legitimacy will help us identify the normative standards used 
to assess legitimacy at the EU level and at the specific level of the E/CSDP, and the problems 
that result from borrowing state-like standards and applying them to the EU level. The 
identification and exploration of these scholarly debates will allow us to identify not only where 
our study fits, but also potential gaps in the literature that it may help to fill, or at least contribute 
towards narrowing.  
Throughout the subsequent chapter (chapter 2), we will explain the conceptual and 
analytical orientation that will guide us throughout our analysis, and we will identify the main 
goals of the thesis and certain key ideas vehiculated by the scholarly debates that we will 
attempt to either confirm or refute. Even though our study is methodologically grounded in 
CDA and post-structuralism, and thus has a post-positivist nature, we found it useful to look at 
some of the key claims found in the scholarly literature and attempt to either corroborate or 
counter them, at least temporarily. This does not mean that we will be testing hypotheses, but 
rather that we mean to link our study to the current scientific literature in this area, and thus 
contribute towards the advancement of the corresponding scholarly debates.  
Our analysis begins in chapter 3 with the identification of the discursive corpus that will 
be subject to CDA, and the identification and explanation of the respective characteristics and 
contexts of the actors that create and reproduce the EU’s normative justification discourses and 
narratives in the area of crisis management. Afterwards, throughout chapter 4, we analyse the 
  7 
historical and semiotic development of crisis management as a policy field at the EU level, with 
a focus on discourses and narratives and the key moments that drove the development and 
practical implementation of this policy area. This historical focus in our analysis has multiple 
purposes: it is useful in understanding how and why the EU’s discourses evolved the way they 
did; it provides a context for ‘textual’7 production, i.e. it indicates the set of conditions and 
circumstances that frame and structure the production of discourses; and it also helps to frame 
and understand the intertext, i.e. the discourses’ relation with other discourses and predominant 
narratives.  
This chapter will follow a chronological sequence since the establishment of the CFSP 
and of the ESDP in the 1990s until the launch of the EU Global Strategy in 2016. The beginning 
of the chosen timeframe for our analysis coincides with the formal establishment of the EU in 
1992, which is relevant considering that our analysis focuses on the EU’s discourse as an actor 
in a given policy field. As such, it is logical and coherent to set the beginning of our analysis at 
the very inception of the EU as such. The end of our chosen timeframe coincides with the EU’s 
revision of its main strategic document for external action, which provides a framework for the 
EU’s understanding of its own ontological security and its intentions towards the rest of the 
world. The 2016 Global Strategy represents a turning point in the EU’s strategic thinking 
(which nonetheless happened progressively), marking a new set of paradigms, including a focus 
on resilience and stability, a closer link between domestic and external security, and a redesign 
of the EU’s framing of its own role as a global actor. Even though the policy in focus – crisis 
management – has evolved since the launch of the 2016 Global Strategy, it has not changed 
substantially in overall conceptual and strategic terms. The main change that has occurred at 
the level of this policy that has had an effect on the EU’s projected or perceived actorness 
concerns the launch of the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) mechanism in 
December of the subsequent year (2017). Yet, as, at the time of the writing of this thesis, the 
PESCO projects were only in their early stages of implementation, and the Global Strategy 
remained the EU’s main strategic document, we opted for focusing on the latter as the end of 
our timeframe. Thus, the collected data from discourses produced throughout the chosen 
timeframe is not only appropriate, but also pertinent, current, and illustrative, allowing us to 
further the understanding of the EU’s normative justification discourses as an actor in the policy 
field of crisis management.  
                                               
7 Text / textual is used here in the semiotic sense of discursive instance, a verbal recording which can 
take the form of written or oral discourses, or other manners of conveying messages. 
  8 
Throughout chapter 4, the importance of the EU’s normative justification discursive 
corpus in the area of crisis management actorness is emphasised, and the main discursive 
patterns, hierarchizations and omissions which will be further addressed in the subsequent 
chapter are identified. As such, in chapter 5 we identify, analyse, and discuss these elements 
that have resulted from (and in continuation of) the CDA applied to the previous chapter and 
put them in relation to the wider scholarly debate. The thesis concludes with chapter 6, where 
we present our conclusions while revisiting our research questions. 
More than repeating the process of simply assessing whether or not the EU is a global 
actor (regardless of the policy area), in what would potentially result in a poor (or at least 
repetitive) contribution to the EU actorness debate, this study intends to make a scholarly 
contribution by emphasising the importance of legitimacy as a central and (so far) widely 
neglected dimension of actorness, through the critical analysis of the EU’s discursive efforts to 
provide normative justification, and thus legitimate, its crisis management actorness. This is 
important because, regardless of whether or not the EU possesses capabilities, as long as it is 
perceived as a crisis management actor, it can be said to be one. Consequently, the EU’s 
discourses are crucial in influencing how it constructs itself and is seen by others. This thesis is 
not primarily about how others perceive and thus legitimate the EU’s crisis management 
actorness, but rather about the EU’s own normative justification discourse. Nonetheless, we 
maintain the importance of external perceptions, which is reinforced by the post-structuralist 
tenet that defining the ‘Self’ requires an ‘Other’, as the construction of the EU’s creation of an 
identity as a crisis management actor reflects the ‘othering’ of many of its interlocutors. 
As mentioned, we will begin in the subsequent sections by critically engaging with the 
scholarly state of play concerning the EU legitimacy and actorness debates, in order to identify 
what has been written so far about these subjects and what gaps or problems remain unsolved, 
as well as to identify our study’s contribution to the academic discussion. 
 
1.1 - The EU legitimacy debate 
 
Nowhere in the field of legitimacy studies is there more disagreement than about legitimacy 
in the European Union (Beetham, 2013: 279). 
 
Legitimacy depends on different (academic, historical, cultural, and social) contexts, and has 
acquired different collective meanings for different sets of actors throughout history (Clark, 
2005: 13). It is typically referred to in political, sociological, and philosophical contexts, and it 
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has mostly been reflected upon in reference to nation states (ibid.: 14). However, due to this 
focus (and possibly even due to a deliberate disregard) there has not been, in the past, much 
written about legitimacy in the specific context of International Relations (Hurd, 2007: 29; 
Clark, 2005: 11), and only recently, especially with the emergence of the EU, has this debate 
began to grow outside of the national sphere. The academic debate about EU legitimacy has 
generated a widespread discussion that stems largely from the existence of fundamental 
disagreements regarding the very nature, purpose, and reach of the EU – not to mention 
disagreements concerning the normative standards underlying the concept of legitimacy itself 
– not only on behalf of practitioners, but also (and perhaps especially) scholars. The vast 
majority of studies regarding EU legitimacy produced in the last decades focus either on policy 
areas that fall under the scope of the so-called community method, or on the EU’s domestic 
legitimacy in general. 
If legitimacy at the EU level is a complex and contentious subject, legitimacy at the 
E/CSDP level is perhaps even more so. This policy takes place at the international level, where 
the EU as a complex multilevel actor assumes a relationship with third countries in a field that 
is itself often labelled ‘sensitive’, and where the EU frequently tries to project its values and 
norms, such as liberal democratic legitimacy standards, for example through the construction 
of state institutions in the context of peace building (Bouris and Reigeluth, 2012; Bouris, 2012; 
Turner, 2012). In addition, this policy does not involve the supranational decision-making 
structures of the EU as much as other areas, as it concerns mostly the European Council and 
the Council deciding unanimously. It is important to highlight in the existing literature about 
EU and E/CSDP legitimacy not only the diversity and subsequent lack of coherence in 
determining how to assess the EU’s legitimacy, but also the transfer of analytical standards and 
conceptualisation difficulties from the domestic to the external level. This transfer, in turn, 
stems from the effort to mimic liberal democratic nation-state-type legitimacy standards in the 
EU context, and to extend these domestic community-method-type democratic scrutiny 
practices (themselves borrowed from nation states) to the EU’s external action. All the claims 
and analyses presented in this subchapter must be looked at in the context of the time period 
that they were proposed or developed in, as both the EU and the E/CSDP are constantly 
changing, and legitimacy-related considerations are contingent upon these changes. 
In what concerns EU legitimacy, the views are many and diverse. Some authors consider 
the EU to be a predominantly regulatory polity (Majone, 2006; Eriksen and Fossum, 2002) 
without any real commitment regarding the establishment of a supranational constitutional 
order (Majone, 2006; Scharpf, 2007). Others do not even consider this debate to be necessary, 
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as the indirect democratic scrutiny provided by national governments is seen as sufficient and 
the functions delegated to the EU as requiring low direct popular participation (Moravcsik, 
2002: 605-6). It is logical to assume that those scholars who claim that the EU does not need to 
be further politicised to become legitimised also think in similar terms when it comes to foreign 
policy or security and defence policy, particularly as the latter are even more intergovernmental 
than most EU policies. However, this is a mere assumption, as it is not that simple to find 
scholarly works that explicitly address the CFSP / E/CSDP in these terms. Moravcsik, for 
example, argued – before the Lisbon Treaty came into force – that legitimacy in EU foreign 
policy was not an issue at all and claimed that foreign and defence policies at the EU level were 
quite modest when compared to the powers held by the Member States at the national level 
(2008: 333).  
Authors that reject a ‘democratic deficit’ often do so while claiming that the EU draws 
from ‘different’8 sources of legitimacy that suit its specificities and are often related to the EU’s 
effectiveness and efficiency (Héritier, 1999; Micossi, 2008; Scharpf, 2007; Menon and 
Weatherill, 2008; Eriksen and Fossum, 2002; Schmitter, 2001). Opposite views, arguing that 
the EU’s putative move towards multilevel governance and policy networks leads instead to a 
decrease in democratic accountability, thus jeopardising its legitimacy, are also present in the 
literature (Papadopoulos, 2010; Hurrelmann, 2007; Bartolini, 2008: 15). Other perspectives 
claim a synergetic relationship between input and output sources of legitimacy (Hurrelmann, 
2007: 23-25; Lindgren and Persson, 2010: 452-453; Schmidt, 2010; Wagner, 2005). 
The most widespread and discussed claim in the EU legitimacy debate argues that the 
EU suffers from a democratic deficit and must be politicised in order to be fully legitimised 
(Føllesdal and Hix, 2005; Eriksen and Fossum, 2002: 22; Thomassen and Schmitt, 2004; 
Decker and Sonnicksen, 2011; Bogdanor, 2007; Schmidt: 2010; Lord: 2003, to name just a 
few). This is the most evident case of a tendency not only of transfer of nation state domestic 
legitimacy standards to the EU’s domestic legitimacy, but also to the EU’s external action. 
Strategies suggested by authors for an application to the EU’s domestic sphere of normative 
democratic legitimacy standards that usually apply to nation states include contestation for 
political leadership through an increase in the EU’s ‘partisanship’ features and an amplified 
focus on the EP (Føllesdal and Hix, 2005: 4; Thomassen and Schmitt, 2004: 383-395), or the 
                                               
8 This claim focuses on legitimacy sources that are different from the democratic-oriented sources 
traditionally associated with ‘Western’ nation states, even though it does not exclude the latter. 
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possibility of contestation of the post of president of the European Commission and the tying 
thereof to the EP elections9 (Decker and Sonnicksen, 2011; Bogdanor, 2007; Schmidt, 2010; 
Lord, 2003).  
In the academic debate about E/CSDP legitimacy, this is also the most frequent claim, 
and it is mostly coupled with the argument that output-oriented legitimacy appears to no longer 
be sufficient on its own (Bickerton, 2007), not unlike Christopher Hill’s criticism about a 
‘capabilities-expectations gap’ in EUFP (Hill, 1993). In this sense, some authors argue that the 
‘permissive consensus’ that was once in place in this area is progressively dissolving, thus 
calling for an increase in input legitimacy (Wagner, 2005, 2006, and 2007; Sjursen, 2011 and 
2015; Stie, 2010; Bono, 2006; Stavridis, 2006; Kaldor, 2012). In fact, a growing number of 
authors tend to share a concern for the need for an overall reinforcement of the democratic 
channels of legitimacy not only within the EU as a whole, but also within the CFSP and the 
E/CSDP in particular. When searching for academic publications related to E/CSDP legitimacy, 
the vast majority we found focused on this policy’s alleged democratic legitimacy 
shortcomings. Most of the authors that claim that the E/CSDP suffers from a democratic 
legitimacy deficit argue, in general, that in order to be able to develop legitimately, these 
policies (CFSP and E/CSDP) call for an increase in democratic legitimating mechanisms, either 
through an increase in democratic participation in the decision-making process, with a 
particular focus on the role of the EP (Comelli and Zanon, 2009; Comelli, 2011: 54-56; 
Schlomach, 2014; Cutler and Von Lingen, 2003; Mittag, 2006; Wouters and Raube, 2012) or 
through a boost in overall public support for this policy (Brummer, 2007; Peters, 2014; 
Oppermann and Höse, 2007: 156-159), sometimes coming as close as admitting the possibility 
of applicability of federal state legitimacy models to the EU framework (Sjursen, 2008: 13).  
This latter view does not diverge substantially from other frequent views in these 
debates, for the simple reason that there is a general tendency for applying liberal democratic 
nation state type legitimacy models and ideals – even if only partially or implicitly, such as the 
claim for the need to increase democratic scrutiny – to the EU and, consequently, to its polices 
(including the E/CSDP). 
 
  
                                               
9 Evidence of which was seen during the 2014 European Parliament elections. 
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1.1.1 - Limitations and weaknesses in the EU legitimacy debate 
 
The scholarly debate concerning EU legitimacy reveals a clear lack of consensus on what the 
EU is and on how its legitimacy can be assessed. It also demonstrates the difficulties most 
authors seem to experience in distinguishing domestic and external legitimacy – vastly derived 
from the EU’s uniqueness and lack of direct normative model upon which to base itself and 
thus replicate ‘appropriate’ legitimacy standards. The perspectives presented here show a strong 
inclination towards prescription, as authors mostly seem to attempt to show how the EU should 
be legitimated. This debate also reflects a general concern that there might be a problem with 
the EU’s legitimacy, which, again, stems from lack of consensus on what the EU is, or should 
be. It also stems from an overall propensity towards equating democracy with legitimacy (either 
directly or indirectly), and with the application of liberal democratic nation state type legitimacy 
standards to the EU, likely reproducing the researchers qua individuals’ biased normative 
repertoire of beliefs. Interestingly, the vast majority of these studies do not even provide a 
straightforward definition of legitimacy, which is a serious weakness. 
The fact that the EU is neither a state nor an international organisation, but rather includes 
traits of both and traits of regional integration organisations as well, it is under construction, 
with supranational and intergovernmental characteristics, and with an extensive measure of 
international legal personality (Article 47 TEU), has resulted in a lack of consensus regarding 
the kind of legitimacy it has, needs, or should strive for. Even if we were to apply to the EU the 
same legitimacy standards that apply to nation states, we would still have to select one of many 
models with differing strategies (Schmitter, 2001: 2). In fact, the attempt to draw a distinctive 
line between the EU and the nation state, by assuming the premise that the state is not a suitable 
comparative model to assess the legitimacy of the EU, is in itself a difficult dilemma to solve. 
This is due to the fact that the EU is made-up of distinct and (for the most part) independent 
states, was created by the latter to cater to their needs, and shares many of their features, while 
remaining, however, a distinct and rather new type of polity (Kaldor, 2012; Čmakalová and 
Rolenc, 2012: 261). The legitimacy criteria dilemma only becomes closer to being solved if we 
take a few steps back and identify the core criteria of the concept of legitimacy tout court. 
Even though our focus is not the EU’s domestic legitimacy as such, but rather an 
externally-oriented intergovernmental EU policy, the complexity of the topic of legitimacy in 
the overall context of the EU, and especially the lingering academic inclination towards the 
transfer of solutions from the domestic to the international sphere, make this dimension of the 
debate unavoidable. It is mostly useful in order to understand how scholars view legitimacy in 
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the EU context, and, perhaps more importantly, how they define the concept of legitimacy (or 
rather how, as mentioned, a clear definition is lacking in the literature). Although EU legitimacy 
has been widely discussed in recent times, EU foreign policy and particularly the E/CSDP are 
not common subjects in this debate. As referred to previously, the existing discussion 
concerning E/CSDP legitimacy appears to be excessively Eurocentric – it is an EU policy after 
all – and almost exclusively focused on EU domestic democratic legitimacy. Authors repeatedly 
mention the importance of (domestic) public perceptions and support (e.g. Brummer, 2007; 
Peters, 2014; Oppermann and Höse, 2007), yet there is an overwhelming disregard for how the 
EU seeks to ensure such support by convincing both domestic and external actors to endorse its 
positions and actions and thus to legitimate its external policies. 
In order to better understand what is entailed by this effort of legitimation of external 
policies, we must look at how “member state governments work towards the creation of a 
‘common’ policy but eschew the traditional means by which such policies have been 
legitimated within the EU” (Tonra, 2011: 1190-1) by means of discursive action and narrative 
construction. In the subsequent section we broaden the scope of the academic debate concerning 
the concept of legitimacy beyond the EU debate and explore the notion of normative 
justification as a central legitimation tool in the context of foreign policy. 
 
1.1.2 - Legitimacy and actorness 
 
As we have seen, the concept of legitimacy is quite complex, and there is not much consensus 
on what it entails, at least at the EU level, hence the need to take a step back. Legitimacy is a 
socially constructed concept (Beetham, 2013: 100-114; Suchman, 1995: 574) that refers to a 
specific kind of power relationship between different groups of actors (Beetham, 2013: x) about 
shared expectations in asymmetric relations (Schmitter, 2001: 2). Similarly to actorness, 
legitimacy is not an entirely consensual concept: it can be interpreted in diverse ways, it can be 
applied to several different objects of study, and it largely varies according to the observer and 
the latter’s specific context (Beetham, 2013: x, xi; Hurd, 2007: 34). 
One recurrent aspect that we found in various conceptualisations of legitimacy is this 
concept’s link to perceptions and beliefs, which makes it potentially subjective (Suchman, 
1995: 574, Wallner, 2008: 423). Many authors – including, perhaps most notably, Max Weber 
– have emphasised this idea (Hurd, 2007: 31). However, defining ‘legitimacy’ as the same as 
the ‘belief in legitimacy’ can be problematic, as emphasising beliefs or opinions takes away the 
focus from issues or problems concerning structural aspects of the system of government itself 
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(Beetham, 2013: 9). This subjective focus reveals a lack of objective standards with which to 
assess legitimacy. Beetham criticised this sort of limited view, arguing that the focus should 
not fall on the beliefs themselves, but rather on how a given power relation can be justified in 
terms of the beliefs of those that take part in it (ibid.: 11). 
Legitimacy influences individual behaviour, as individuals respond differently to rules or 
institutions whether or not they consider them to be legitimate (Hurd, 2007: 30; Tyler, 2006: 
378). In terms of individual conduct, if a rule or institution’s legitimacy is behaviourally 
significant (Hurd, 2007: 31) it is complied with voluntarily and based on the conviction in its 
appropriateness, desirability, meaningfulness, predictability, and trustworthiness in the context 
of a “socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions” (Suchman, 1995: 
574-575), without the presence of coercion (Franck, 1990: 16) or self-interest (Hurd, 2007: 35). 
So, legitimacy is not only about the authority that the rulers exert upon the ruled, but especially 
about why this authority is attributed to those in power in the first place, and how this 
relationship is not only perceived but also (and especially) acted upon by those affected by it.  
Another recurring aspect in the academic literature concerning legitimacy is its tendency 
towards prescription. Many authors frequently refer to democracy as something like a ‘gold 
standard’ for legitimacy in the context of the state (Buchanan and Keohane, 2006: 416). In fact, 
many authors tend to propose how a system should be shaped or arranged in order to be 
legitimate. As seen in the EU legitimacy scholarly debate, authors oftentimes seem to either 
directly equate legitimacy with the concept of democracy, or argue that this is the most relevant 
standard of legitimacy (e.g. Bogdanor, 2007; Brummer, 2007; Comelli and Zanon, 2009; 
Comelli, 2011; Cutler and Von Lingen, 2003; Decker and Sonnicksen: 2011, Eriksen and 
Fossum, 2002; Føllesdal and Hix, 2005; Lord, 2003; Mittag, 2006; Oppermann and Höse, 2007; 
Peters, 2014; Schlomach, 2014; Schmidt, 2010, Sjursen, 2008; Thomassen and Schmitt, 2004; 
Wagner, 2005, 2006, and 2007; among others). 
As mentioned previously, non-coercive compliance with a rule, norm, or policy is usually 
based on a conviction that it is appropriate, desirable, meaningful, predictable, and trustworthy 
(Suchman, 1995: 574-575). In the specific context of liberal democracies, this is most evidently 
displayed in the individuals’ behaviour towards rules and institutions through democratic 
practices. However, the assumption that democracy is a core standard of legitimacy often relates 
to the researchers’ own contexts, biases, and normative beliefs. Following this criticism, 
Beetham attempts to go beyond what is taken for granted in specific contexts and identify major 
commonalities between different types of legitimate administrations. Not all states or 
governmental institutions are set in democratic contexts, yet they are considered valid and 
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legitimate by their intended audiences. This means that this kind of assumption is not only 
limited and biased, but it overlooks other structural dimensions that are common to legitimate 
forms of government (democratic or otherwise). As such, it is possible to identify certain 
features that form a core definition of legitimacy that can be applied to different types of power 
relations. According to Beetham, the core structure of legitimacy is comprised of three basic 
principles: legality, normative validity or justifiability, and actions towards those in power – 
including consent or compliance (Beetham, 2013: 64-99). We interpret them, in this study, as 
legitimation principles, in the sense that they constitute the process through which an entity, 
institution, or policy achieves a state or condition of legitimacy. 
The first legitimation principle – legality – implies that “any form of power should be 
acquired and exercised in accordance with established rules” (ibid.: 64). Legality and 
legitimacy are distinct concepts – as are legality and justice, for example. What is legal may 
not necessarily be legitimate (Franck, 1990: 37; Coicaud, 2004 [1997]: 22), since a legal rule 
can, for example, stem from a government that enforces it through coercion. However, legality 
does form a fundamental part of legitimacy and reinforces it (Warning, 2009: 184; Coicaud, 
2004 [1997]: 23; Føllesdal, 2006: 154), since it both justifies and limits rules and policies. 
Generally, legality is what regulates and predicts (Beetham, 2013: 65) the conduct of 
individuals and establishes its appropriateness and boundaries, and ultimately boosts the 
probability that rules are complied with. 
The second legitimation principle – normative validity or justifiability – mainly 
concerns the beliefs of the affected populations in the rightfulness of the source of authority 
and the purposes of the system. The ultimate source of authority can be internal or external, and 
it can be a number of things. In the specific case of liberal democracies, for example, such a 
source is popular will. Nonetheless, this does not mean that democracy is any sort of universal 
basis for legitimacy, nor that this is applicable to any context. Other examples of sources of 
authority include tradition, divine command, or scientific doctrine, among others. It is this 
ultimate source of authority that provides the validity for the political sphere that, in turn, 
creates the laws in a given society. Thus, the political sphere is dependent upon that ultimate 
source of authority for its legitimacy (ibid.: 69-70).  
The third legitimation principle – performative endorsement – concerns actions towards 
those in power, namely the latter’s ultimate legitimation through expressed consent. According 
to Beetham, it is not easy to determine whether consent is voluntary or otherwise, and especially 
how this can be assessed, so a researcher is more likely to focus on actions that publicly 
demonstrate such agreement because they visibly bestow legitimacy upon those in power – they 
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are a manifestation of the underlying agreement. Despite these actions not being the only source 
of legitimacy for those in power, they are nonetheless important (ibid.: 91). One example of 
such actions of public validation of power is the aforementioned practice of elections in the 
context of liberal democracies, where the people choose candidates or parties among 
alternatives. This is, however, one among many kinds of such actions. Other types include 
swearing an oath of loyalty, taking part in consultations or negotiations with those in power, or 
public acclamation of leadership, to name a few examples (ibid.: 92-94).  
Beetham’s legitimacy conceptualisation was mainly developed considering the 
domestic context of the state. As such, like many other authors, it refers mostly to the 
relationship between the dominant and the subordinate. As this sort of asymmetric binary 
conceptualisation was envisaged for the nation state framework, it is not evident that it can be 
applied for an assessment of the EU’s domestic legitimacy. The use of these terms becomes 
even less evident in the case of international relations – or in this specific case, in the context 
of the EU’s external relations and the legitimation of practices and policies in that context. In 
fact, Beetham argues that there is a general agreement that legitimacy at the international level 
differs substantially from that at the level of nation states – not least because the actors, contexts, 
delegated sovereignty, etc. are different for domestic and external policies. 
The creation of asymmetric relationships between the EU and other actors in the 
international system through the EU’s discourses, actions, and legitimation thereof is an 
important element of our study; and the fact that this asymmetry is less evident in the context 
of EU foreign policy than in the context of relations between actors inside the state is what 
makes it powerful. Beetham (2013: 269-294) raises the issue of international and European 
legitimacy, in reference to the legitimacy of authority systems with limited means of 
enforcement, and the latter’s reliance upon the different audiences thereof for ensuring 
legitimacy. In the case of institutions at the international level (similarly to the state level) 
perceptions of legitimacy matter considerably. However, the international level differs from the 
state context in that power is more dispersed, and international institutions require separate and 
continuous legitimation (ibid.: 270). 
Another substantial difference – perhaps the most evident – lies in the audiences. Unlike 
in the context of states, where citizens are the main legitimating audiences, in the international 
context, this role falls mostly (though not exclusively) on the states themselves and their 
respective audiences (ibid.: 271). In the case of the EU’s domestic level and in the context of 
community method policies, however, this is not as straightforward, since there is much more 
interaction between the national and international level than in most cases – derived from 
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sovereignty and competence delegation – meaning that both political elites from the Member 
States, citizens at the national level, and even other actors are involved in the internal 
legitimation of the EU (ibid.: 280). However, in the case of external policies – particularly in 
the case of the E/CSDP – there is a much greater level of independence of the Council in making 
decisions from other domestic institutions and actors, that nonetheless respects established EU 
requirements and legal procedures. The Council’s centrality in the E/CSDP decision-making is 
the main reason why Council (and European Council) decisions are at the core of the discursive 
corpus that we will be analysing in this study. 
Yet the main audience for actorness legitimacy claims are not only third states (or rather 
state authorities) with which the EU engages in missions and operations and other international 
organisations, but also EU Member States themselves, as the latter’s representatives are 
simultaneously part of national governments and members of the Council, representing both 
national and EU interests. Due to the near absence of an ‘authoritative interpreter’ of rules at 
the international level, states are able to interpret laws and policies more in line with their 
interests, sometimes even subverting them. This means that, in the context of international 
relations, normative justification acquires a greater importance. This principle is precisely the 
main focus of our study. 
Despite repeatedly affirming that there are substantial differences between the state and 
international levels when it comes to legitimacy, Beetham does argue in favour of the usefulness 
of the three principles of his core definition, with the necessary adaptations, thus highlighting 
the validity of his conceptualisation (ibid.: 271-272). As mentioned, the author proposes three 
principles – legal authority, normative justifiability, and performative endorsement. In applying 
them to actorness legitimacy, as demonstrated in figure 1, we identify these principles as 
different stages in a process.  
The process begins with an actor that holds legal authority (first principle) to act in a 
given area – as the EU does, as authorised by the treaties and by the representatives of the 
legitimate governments of the Member States in the Council – attempting to have its actions 
and positions validated and endorsed by its interlocutors, including those for whom the policy 
is made and domestic actors as well (third principle). So, as coercion is not a suitable nor 
recurrent means of enforcement at the international level, the most important legitimacy 
principle for an international actor like the EU is the normative justifiability principle (second 
principle), which entails the actor’s convincing of its domestic and external interlocutors of why 
the EU is the appropriate actor to perform in the name of common purposes, and of how what 
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it does is done in accordance with procedures accepted as fair (ibid.: 271-272), in order to obtain 
their endorsement and validation. 
 
 
Figure 1 - Visual representation of the actorness legitimation process, based on David Beetham’s 
conceptualisation 
 
As mentioned previously, this study is not concerned with whether or how this validation occurs 
in the end, but rather on the EU’s process to convince domestic and external actors to ensure 
that it does, through normative justification. This process is especially important because 
without normative justification it is very difficult to convince other actors in the international 
system to do something, or comply with something (be it a policy, a position, a narrative, an 
action, etc.) without the use of coercive means (either force or conditionality). And while the 
results and outputs that come out of the practical application of a policy can also contribute 
towards its legitimation, these can only be considered an additional contribution to the 
legitimation of a policy that is already in place, because for a policy to be in place, it is likely 
to already have some sort of legitimacy (Cerutti, in Cerruti and Lucarelli, 2008: 10-11; Schmidt, 
2010: 13, 16). Furthermore, the purpose of an actor’s normative justification works at a more 
fundamental level than the practical implementation of a policy, since it encompasses aspects 
of the actor’s identity and claims of actorness that seek validation. Føllesdal identifies 
justifiability as a conception of legitimacy, arguing that  
 
(…) some are concerned about the normative legitimacy [of the EU], often expressed in 
terms of justifiability among political equals, for instance by appealing to hypothetical 
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notions of acceptance or consent. (…) Laws (or authorities) are normatively legitimate 
insofar as they can be justified to the people living under them, and impose a moral duty 
on them to comply. Normative theorists often judge normative legitimacy to be 
fundamental (Føllesdal, 2006: 156). 
 
In our analysis, we look at the discursive component of the EU’s legitimation efforts in the area 
of crisis management. While we recognise that the process of legitimation does include other 
elements, our analysis will focus on the EU’s discursive endeavours to normatively justify its 
crisis management actorness (i.e. more than just the policy, or a specific mission or operation), 
in an effort to ensure the policy’s legitimacy. We seek to contribute to the enrichment of the 
actorness and legitimacy academic debates in the EU context, and also to contribute to the 
expansion of the study of discourse in the context of EU foreign policy, and in particular crisis 
management. 
As such, the subsequent section considers the scholarly state of play regarding EU 
actorness, paying attention to criteria, definitions, and the evolution of conceptualisations of 
actorness applied to the EU, including criteria linked to legitimacy. This will help us to better 
understand not only to what extent the EU is a crisis management actor, but also the importance 
of the EU’s legitimation efforts for ensuring actorness, and the importance of studying the EU’s 
normative justification narratives for ensuring the legitimacy of its external action in a given 
area. 
 
1.2 - Actorness, legitimacy, and normative justification 
1.2.1 - Actorness conceptualisations 
 
Our study seeks to emphasise how legitimacy and actorness, despite being mostly debated 
separately, are deeply rooted in one another and mutually constitutive. While discussing the 
same basic idea, different authors refer to the central concept in this debate in different manners 
– agency, actor capability, actorness, actorhood, actor capacity, etc. In our study, we 
deliberately opted for referring consistently to this concept as actorness, not only because it is 
one of the more common designations, but also because of the simplicity and practicality of 
this description, as, linguistically speaking, when the suffix ‘ness’ is added to an adjective or a 
noun in the English language, the resulting word quite literally becomes the state of the original 
word. In the case of actor + ness, it becomes the state of being an actor, which essentially entails 
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not necessarily the process that leads to becoming an actor (although this is very important), 
but rather the condition(s) for an actor to be an actor. 
The EU actorness debate is as old as the European integration project; however, it has 
been gaining new momentum with the Lisbon Treaty. In fact, this debate was largely developed 
because of the European integration project and the inherent difficulties in conceptualising this 
unique and distinct non-state actor. This debate concerns mostly the EU’s ability to act on the 
global stage, its performance, and its effectiveness, and focuses on various areas of EU external 
action: “the dominant discourse on the Union as an international actor with its proper interests 
is reflected in the Union having a policy line across a whole range of functional and 
geographical areas, although of varying intensity and detail” (Larsen, 2004: 70). The scholarly 
debate on EU actorness concerns not only conceptualisations of ‘actorness’ itself, but also 
different types of roles assumed by, or ascribed to, the EU on the international scene. The 
conceptualisations of actorness are generally based on criteria that the EU needs to fulfil, 
according to scholars, in order to achieve this status. Although some of these studies include 
aspects of legitimacy (essentially domestic legitimacy), none directly proposes legitimacy as a 
condition for actorness per se, and none that we found focuses predominantly on this topic in 
the context of crisis management actorness. Much like the EU legitimacy debate, it is important 
to note that these conceptualisations were elaborated during different stages of the European 
integration project. This, in turn, reflects the appropriation and evolution of some concepts by 
scholars throughout time so as to adapt them to new circumstances, as the interpretation of the 
EU’s fulfilment of certain criteria is contingent upon issues such as its legal diplomatic status, 
the level of delegated competences, and even the global environment at any given time. As our 
study focuses on the EU’s actorness in the field of crisis management, we will use this example 
as we go through the evolution of the scholarly debate and make a preliminary assessment 
thereof which will be beneficial for our study of the EU’s discursive construction thereof. 
One of the first attempts to conceptualise actorness in the context of the European 
integration process, which became one of the most widely cited and recognised 
conceptualisations to date, was developed by Gunnar Sjöstedt, as he argued that the term ‘actor’ 
had been, up until then, either rarely or poorly defined (Sjöstedt, 1977a: 5). The author proposed 
to establish an operational definition based on the concept of ‘actor capability’, defined as the 
“capacity to behave actively and deliberately in relation to other actors in the international 
system” (ibid.: 16). By means of a collective crisis management policy that has been developed 
under the aegis of the EU (albeit predominantly intergovernmental), the EU currently can be 
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said to have ‘actor capability’ in this field (however vague and ambiguous this may be at this 
point in our assessment of the EU’s crisis management actorness).  
Sjöstedt argued that a key trait that determines a unit’s actorness is its autonomy, which, 
in turn, is present upon fulfilment of two basic conditions: separateness from the external 
environment, and internal cohesion. As we will see in our brief assessment of both these criteria 
as they were further developed by James Jupille and Joseph Caporaso (1998), the EU also does 
greatly fulfil them (despite many conceptual difficulties which will be pointed out further ahead 
in this chapter). Sjöstedt argued that what makes an autonomous unit an actor is having ‘actor 
capability’ (ibid.: 15). The idea of capability – including the ability to act and draw on resources 
to do so – is attributed to the EC by its Member States, and thus it is presented as a dynamic 
concept that entails a set of ‘structural prerequisites’ for actorness which “can be expected to 
grow over time” (ibid.: 143). This implies that certain conceptual limitations that the author 
experienced could be blamed on the low level of integration experienced at the time. As the EC 
and the EU evolved in legal and practical terms, the academic debate evolved as well, so as to 
accommodate these changes and developments.  
Due to the volatility of these structural prerequisites, Sjöstedt argued in favour of adding 
another indicator for actor capability: the ‘performance of actor behaviour’, i.e. “the actual 
execution of unitary outward-directed actions of the EC” (ibid.: 17), that is an “expression of 
the identity of the European Commission as a whole and not of one of its constituent parts” 
(ibid.: 20). The idea that the EC was already perceived as having its own identity in the late 
1970’s enhances the idea that the EU currently also has an identity that eventually evolved from 
that one, and it reiterates the importance of ‘identity’ for the study and conceptualisation of 
actorness. This idea is reinforced by Sjöstedt’s argument that these transactions, that are part of 
the performance of actor behaviour, must conform to the EC’s own stated external relations 
goals (ibid.: 24). Sjöstedt’s ‘performance of actor behaviour’ criterion is also important in the 
sense that it involves an external dimension of actorness that implies an interaction – or 
transaction – between the EC and its external interlocutors, which goes beyond the Rome 
Treaty’s (limited) judicial criterion for the EC’s competences in the field of foreign affairs 
(ibid.: 20-21). In this sense, the author includes diplomatic interaction within the range of 
performance of actor behaviour, which is quite similar to Jupille and Caporaso’s 1998 
recognition criterion. Despite being considered innovative, Sjöstedt’s conceptualisation 
focused predominantly more on internal aspects, to the detriment of external ones (even though 
the latter are present), which can be viewed as a shortcoming (Bretherton and Vogler, 2006: 
16). Nonetheless, all aspects of the actorness conceptualisation – especially the criteria of 
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autonomy and actor capability – developed by Sjöstedt have been frequently revisited and 
improved upon by numerous authors, validating their quality and usefulness, but also the 
author’s innovative effort in developing an important and (up until then) neglected concept in 
IR literature. 
David Allen and Michael Smith, in 1990, proposed another dimension to the ‘actorness’ 
debate. Although the authors pointed out the many conceptual and analytical difficulties 
underlying the idea of a ‘Western Europe’, namely with regard to the extent of the existence of 
a foreign policy thereof and to the ambiguity of its status and impact, they argued that its ‘multi-
dimensional’ presence and consequence in the international arena were undeniable, and more 
important than actorness per se (Allen and Smith, 1990: 20). ‘Presence’, a predominantly 
externally oriented concept, was defined as “(…) the ways in which a particular notion or set 
of expectations is shaped by the attention of policy and institutions can itself enter the realm of 
political reality and play a consequential role in unfolding events” (ibid.: 21). According to the 
authors, factors such as credentials and legitimacy, the ability to act and muster resources, as 
well as the way it is perceived, define a particular ‘presence’ (ibid.). In fact, Allen’s and Smith’s 
concept of ‘presence’ allows us to think differently about issues such as international legitimacy 
with regard to non-traditional actors, suggesting that it may be applied to ‘ideas, notions, 
expectations and imaginations’, and thus to ‘Western Europe’ (ibid.: 22). The idea of EU-led 
crisis management, particularly considering that is it well embedded in the spread of EU values 
and norms such as democracy and the rule of law, illustrates the EU’s perception of the link 
between institution building and security. The requests that the EU receives for engaging in 
crisis management practices under these terms validate certain aspects of the EU’s ‘presence’, 
such as the impact and consequence of its identification as a standard bearer for these values or 
the expectations, on behalf of E/CSDP host countries, as to how mimicking the EU’s loose 
model may result in greater security and prosperity. 
Allen and Smith’s external focus in their conceptualisation of ‘presence’ somehow 
overlooked domestic actors and factors that determine if and how the unit acts (by providing 
resources and ascribing authority, i.e. by legitimating it internally). Nonetheless, the authors 
did mention fleetingly that the idea of legitimacy (namely related to the attribution of authority 
by European states to a European entity) was determining for Western Europe’s presence (ibid.: 
25, 36). Thus, even though this was not straightforwardly meant as an actorness 
conceptualisation, it greatly enriched the actorness academic debate, as it came to complement 
Sjöstedt’s conceptualisation, and the concept / criterion of ‘presence’ itself has been reproduced 
and improved upon (and thus validated) multiple times since. Ultimately, ‘presence’ itself is a 
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legitimating factor for the EU’s actorness, in the sense that that the EU’s presence shapes 
perceptions of others and reinforces EU actorness.  
The signing of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 gave way to a ‘second wave of conceptual 
works’ (Ginsberg, 1999: 432) on issues related to EU actorness and European Union Foreign 
Policy (EUFP) behaviour. In a 1993 article, Christopher Hill introduced the idea of a 
‘capability-expectations gap’ in the EC’s actorness. The author’s goal with this article was not 
necessarily to create a normative conceptualisation of the EC/EU’s actorness, but he did borrow 
from, and added to, the existing concepts of actor capability (Sjöstedt, 1977a) and presence 
(Allen and Smith, 1990). Consequently, Hill ended up not only consolidating these concepts, 
but also proposing and strengthening (from an analytical point of view) the idea that internal 
and external factors can be mutually reinforcing in establishing a units’ overall actorness. 
In 1998, Jupille and Caporaso proposed a new conceptualisation of actorness, or ‘actor 
capacity’, based on a number of domestic and external criteria that are “observable, 
continuously variable, and abstract from any particular institutional form” (Jupille and 
Caporaso, 1998: 214). These criteria, which the authors proceeded to apply to the EU, are 
recognition, authority, autonomy, and cohesion.  
Recognition refers to the external acknowledgement of the EU’s (or any other actor’s) 
presence. It is considered by the authors to be the most basic condition for a unit to be 
considered an actor in the international system (ibid.: 215). The authors distinguish between de 
jure and de facto recognition, despite considering both types to be intricately linked. They 
define de jure recognition as involving “either diplomatic recognition under international law 
or formal membership in international organisations” (ibid.). At the time, the authors pointed 
out that the EU had some problems with diplomatic recognition, as it was not a state nor was it 
sovereign, and thus it did not benefit from the norm of automatic diplomatic recognition 
attributed to states. Nonetheless, these problems were mitigated after the 2009 Lisbon treaty’s 
attribution of de jure legal personality to the EU as a whole, and after the establishment of the 
EEAS in subsequent years. On one hand, despite not being a state, the EU in its entirety (rather 
than just a specific pillar or institution) can currently be treated by other actors in the 
international system as an actor, by being able to establish bilateral diplomatic relationships 
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and signing treaties with the latter. On the other hand, the EEAS was created to operate as a 
kind of Foreign Affairs Ministry of the EU, thus imitating state structures.10  
As for membership in international organisations, the authors argued that it was 
problematic precisely due to the (then) absence of diplomatic recognition (ibid.: 215). This 
situation has changed with regard to diplomatic recognition and also, somewhat, in the context 
of the EU’s relationship and membership of IOs.11 Despite the persistence of some reluctance 
in attributing membership status to the EU in many cases, the EU’s profile has, nonetheless, 
improved in this regard since Jupille and Caporaso’s chapter was published. This is also 
exemplified by the more than 30 E/CSDP missions and operations that would not have 
happened or have been possible if the EU’s presence was not recognised by the E/CSDP host 
countries. And although formal EU membership in IOs is still not the norm, there is a visible 
effort to convey unity and common positions, through internal arrangements and informal 
means. According to the authors, the EU’s de facto recognition, on the other hand, is different, 
taking place when “third parties that decide to interact with the EU implicitly confer recognition 
upon it” (ibid.: 215-216). This idea draws from Allen and Smith’s ‘presence’, as the validation 
of the fulfilment of these criteria is put on third parties’ engagement with the EU as such. In the 
case of crisis management, for example, this type of recognition is mostly evident in the formal 
                                               
10 This administrative and diplomatic service had, by 2016, amounted to 139 EU Delegations and 
Offices all over the world, and a diplomatic corps composed of more than 3.400 people that were 
initially transferred either from the Commission’s former DG RELEX, from the Council Secretariat, 
or seconded from EU Member States. 
11 The EU is a full member of the WTO, like its 28 Member States, and the Commission speaks on 
behalf of all the latter. In the context of the UN, the EU has a status of ‘enhanced observer’ but has 
no vote, and it is party to more than 50 UN multilateral agreements as the only non-State participant 
in a number of important UN conferences, nonetheless, the EU has obtained a special ‘full 
participant’ status, and EU representatives can present common positions to the UN General 
Assembly. NATO formally regards the EU as a partner (sharing both responsibilities and 
capabilities), and out of its 28 Member States, 22 are EU Member States. In the context of the ICC, 
all EU Member States are signatories to the Rome Statute (i.e. the document that established the 
ICC), and despite the EU being unable to be considered a State Party to the ICC per se, there is an 
EU-ICC Cooperation and Assistance Agreement in place, and the EU drafts common positions in 
this context. The OECD has 34 participating states, out of which 21 are EU Member States, and the 
European Commission participates as a representative of the EU. The OSCE has 57 Member States, 
including all EU Member States; and the EU Delegation in Vienna represents the EU, usually 
speaking on behalf of all EU Member States. 
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invitations made by host countries, and further confirmed in the signing of SOMAs and SOFAs, 
for example. 
The criterion of authority was defined by Jupille and Caporaso as “the EU’s legal 
competence in a given subject matter” (ibid.: 216). According to the authors, authority is 
delegated to the EU by the Member States, following a principal-agent logic (ibid.). While this 
is fairly evident in areas where there is straightforward authority delegation for the EU to act 
collectively, such as trade, the same cannot be said for the area of crisis management. One 
cannot consider the Council and the Member States (collectively) to be entirely distinct entities, 
which means that, from a strictly technical point of view, an EU institution (the Council) has 
been delegated authority to be the main deciding body in the area of crisis management, but 
that same institution is made up of members that are simultaneously principals and agents. On 
the other hand, there has been some competence delegation to non-elected EU institutions and 
bodies in the context of crisis management, although we cannot argue that this is the same as 
authority delegation since most decisions (and all major decisions) are still made unanimously 
by the Member State representatives in the Council. Nonetheless, the crisis management 
procedure is, in practice, increasingly dominated by those E/CSDP institutional bodies, and this 
area is “deep into the practice of constructive abstention, where you don’t stand in the way (...) 
if others want to go forward.”12 So, authority in the area of crisis management is a complex 
matter. It is essentially guaranteed by the fact that political and strategic issues are decided 
unanimously by the Council, and technical competences are delegated to the EU bodies and 
institutions involved in the crisis management procedure. In addition, we argue that a part of 
the EU’s authority to act externally in the area of crisis management is deeply linked to both its 
domestic and external legitimacy, as it also stems from international legal instruments 
(including UNSC resolutions) and formal invitations on behalf of countries requesting 
assistance in the form of E/CSDP missions or operations. 
The criterion of autonomy (as inspired by Sjöstedt’s work) is very much linked with the 
authority criterion, in the sense that it displays similar conceptualisation problems when applied 
to the EU, especially due to the aforementioned ‘hybrid’ position of Council Members between 
an EU institution and Member States’ governments. According to the authors, this criterion 
requires institutional distinctiveness (i.e. a distinctive institutional apparatus) and independence 
(ibid.: 217). The authors argued that these difficulties can affect the assessment of the EU’s 
                                               
12 Interview with a senior EU official working in a Council body related to the civilian dimension of 
crisis management, 2013. 
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actorness (ibid.: 218), even though the simple fact that the EU has its own institutional apparatus 
is extremely relevant. While in some areas, some EU institutions, such as the EP or the 
Commission, can be considered autonomous to a certain degree, the case of crisis management 
is more complex. The main difficulty in assessing the EU’s autonomy in this area lies, as 
mentioned, with the fact that the main institution in charge of making decisions therein is the 
Council, which is made up of representatives of the Member States that concurrently assume 
national and EU functions. When the EU Member State representatives in the Council, with the 
support of EU crisis management institutional bodies, unanimously decide to launch an 
E/CSDP mission or operation, they do so in the name of the EU as a whole, even if not all 
Member States actually participate in the mission or operation in practice.  
In such instances, we can identify some distinction between the Member States’ 
representatives qua members of national governments and qua members of the Council of the 
EU. The same can be said for the signing of SOMAs and SOFAs, which is done between the 
EU as a whole and host countries. On the other hand, when in the Council, members of Member 
States’ governments still represent national interests, rendering the issue of distinctiveness 
somewhat challenging to determine. The Council’s independence from third actors, on the other 
hand, is likely to be less problematic. We can also argue that socialisation practices in the 
context of EU institutions (and especially in the context of the Council) can aid in creating or 
reinforcing some distinctiveness or separation of roles. In fact, some EU actors argue that the 
EU’s institutional framework – namely the PSC – is meant to “generate the kind of atmosphere 
where the ambassadors are sending back the message that ‘we need to move our [national] 
position in order to achieve the consensus.’”13 
This issue is also very much linked with the criterion of cohesion (also likely inspired by 
Sjöstedt’s work). While acknowledging the difficulties associated with the definition and 
assessment of the criterion of cohesion, the authors defined it as having four dimensions: value 
or goal cohesion, tactical cohesion, procedural cohesion, and output cohesion. The Lisbon 
treaty has created mechanisms to ensure that, in most areas (including crisis management), the 
EU has the tools to act as a cohesive actor. The attribution to the EU of de jure legal personality 
is, in this context, one of the most important features of this treaty. This means that the EU is 
implied as a whole in the activities and policies that it develops and implements. Such activities 
include what takes place within the framework of its crisis management policy, namely civilian 
missions and military operations. Member States involved in the launch of civilian missions 
                                               
13 Interview with a senior EEAS and PSC official, 2013. 
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and military operations ultimately do so bearing the EU flag, they do so in the name of the 
EU,14 and they agree upon the crisis management concepts by following EU decision-making 
processes (i.e. the crisis management procedure) alongside EU institutional bodies. 
The EU sometimes launches E/CSDP missions and operations with ad hoc coalitions of 
smaller groups of willing and able Member States and even in cooperation with third states 
(Tardy, 2014). While the latter do not have the same weight with regard to decision-making, 
they also end up acting on behalf of the EU (European Council, 2000: 24). Both situations, 
however – smaller ad hoc groups of Member States and third states participating in E/CSDP 
missions – reflect, on one hand, the fluidity of the EU’s presence and identity as a crisis 
management actor, and, on the other hand, the relative rigidity of its authority, as the decision-
making has to be subject to unanimity among all Member States regardless of the number of 
Member States actually participating, stemming from the fact that it is an EU 
(intergovernmental) policy, using mostly EU tools and instruments, and determined by EU 
objectives. In addition, SOMAs and SOFAs, as well as other related agreements, are signed 
between the countries hosting E/CSDP missions and operations and the EU as a whole (rather 
than an ad hoc group of Member States).  
Moreover, the introduction of the concepts of ‘comprehensive’ and ‘integrated’ approach 
to external conflicts and crises means that the E/CSDP ceases to be a completely isolated policy. 
Nonetheless, it does maintain a singular character largely dominated by intergovernmental 
cooperation, in the sense that no major decision (especially those with political consequences) 
is made, in the context of this policy field, without unanimity. Unanimity may mean that 
decisions sometimes result in the lowest common denominator, but it also ensures that, 
whatever the decision, it is agreed upon equally by all members, in the sense that none is 
unwillingly subject to collective decisions with which they may not agree, thus ensuring 
cohesion in the process of launching missions and operations. 
In 1999, when EUFP was taking its first steps, the actorness debate revisited the need 
to look also into practice and effectiveness (after Hill’s 1993’s article), in addition to theory 
(Ginsberg, 1999), as well as an increasing concern with identity and discourse linked to 
practice. Charlotte Bretherton and John Vogler developed one of the most widely cited and 
recognised conceptualisations of EU actorness to date based on a set of interconnected 
                                               
14 Article  44  TEU  allows  for  a  group of  willing  and  Member  States to  launch  a  mission  under  
the EU flag (the decision-making, however, has to be collective and subject to unanimity). 
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concepts: opportunity, presence (drawing from Allen and Smith’s 1990 article), and capability 
(amply based on Sjöstedt’s 1977 conceptualisation of actor capability).  
The criterion of opportunity essentially indicates the ‘structural context of action’ where 
actorness may occur, which encompasses dynamic processes of shared understandings and 
attribution of meanings that constitute intersubjective structures and interpret material 
conditions, where the EU’s discourses of construction and projection of a collective identity are 
especially relevant (Bretherton and Vogler, 2006: 23). In this context, the EU’s enlargements 
and discourses concerning the growing interdependence that stems from globalisation have 
contributed to shaping the environment that has enabled the opportunity for the EU to be an 
actor, and simultaneously influenced the construction of its identity.  
According to the authors’ definition, the presence criterion is quite broad in scope, 
encompassing more than just presence tout court, as it also contains elements of identity (i.e. 
what the unit is, or rather, how it portrays itself), recognition (i.e. how it is seen), and also of 
some kind of external normative capacity (i.e. how it can influence others). Moreover, it is not 
obviously, nor necessarily, linked to external action, but rather to the consequences that derive 
from the EU’s mere existence and its understanding on behalf of itself and others (ibid.: 22). In 
fact, the idea of an identity that is constructed and projected by the EU was one of the key 
factors in Bretherton and Vogler’s conceptualisation (ibid.: 26), and one of the main differences 
between the latter and Allen and Smith’s conceptualisation. The EU’s presence results in an 
‘attractiveness’ (Chebakova, 2008: 5; Bretherton and Vogler, 2006: 211) that often 
(purposefully) leads other actors in the international system to seek to emulate the EU 
(Bretherton and Vogler, 2006: 54) or even, as far as E/CSDP missions are concerned, participate 
in EU crisis management actions and subordinate themselves to the EU’s command. This is 
manifest, for example, in the many requests for membership (Risse, 2004: 154), partnerships, 
in requests for assistance in civilian or military matters, and also in the participation in EU-led 
crisis management missions and operations. In this latter case, a growing number of third 
countries – including FYROM, Montenegro, Serbia, Turkey, Georgia, Ukraine, Iceland, among 
others (Tardy, 2014) – cooperate with the EU to participate actively in E/CSDP missions and 
operations with the purpose of increasing their membership prospects. These actions reflect 
logics of appropriation or emulation of certain norms, institutions, and standards set by the EU 
on behalf of other actors of the international system who request or participate in such support 
and assistance, somewhat validating the EU’s claim as an actor with some degree of normative 
influence. They also reflect a logic of consequences, particularly in the cases where these 
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actions are “driven by subjective assessments of outcomes of alternative courses of action” 
(Schulz, 2014: 1). 
Bretherton and Vogler’s capability criterion concerns both internal and external elements, 
and it encompasses both material conditions and the meanings and understandings associated 
with them. In particular, issues such as internal and external perceptions of the EU’s 
effectiveness and the appropriateness of its instruments are especially relevant. Bretherton and 
Vogler proposed four basic conditions for the capability criterion: a shared pledge to a set of 
values; domestic legitimation of foreign policy procedures and priorities; the capacity to 
identify priorities and formulate policies with consistency and coherence; and the access and 
ability to use (diplomatic, economic, military, etc.) policy instruments, which is not only 
contingent upon the mere willingness of the Member States, but also very much dependent 
upon achieving coherence and consistency in the identification of priorities and policy 
formulation. 
After the entering into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, the EU actorness debate gained 
new momentum, not least because one of the apparent main goals of this treaty was to improve 
the EU’s actorness by “reinforcing the European identity and its independence in order to 
promote peace, security and progress in Europe and in the world” (TEU preamble). 
Nonetheless, the focus shifted more towards the EU’s (regional or global) performance in 
practice, or in theory (Baird, 2015; Barrinha, 2016) to the detriment of new actorness 
conceptualisations and criteria. This shift towards performance was done either by revisiting 
previously established criteria, such as recognition or autonomy (Gehring, Oberthür, and 
Mühleck, 2013), or by proposing additional dimensions linked to the concept of actorness, such 
as effectiveness or internal cohesiveness (Groen and Niemann, 2013; Da Conceição-Heldt and 
Meunier, 2014), and especially by looking at the latter’s empirical assessment (Niemann and 
Bretherton, 2013; Hoffmann and Niemann, 2017), as well as the link between theory and 
practice (Bretherton and Vogler, 2013). 
As with legitimacy, defining actorness in the field of IR – as was demonstrated by the 
discussion above – is not a straightforward task, and there are numerous conceptualisations 
available. However, there seems to be a commonality between the latter, as conceptualisations 
of actorness are often motivated by claims of the EU’s uniqueness as an entity, or polity, i.e. by 
the fact that it is neither a state nor an International Organisation, that it is constantly evolving 
and changing, and that it includes supranational, technocratic, and intergovernmental 
characteristics (Jupille and Caporaso, 1998: 214). The different actorness conceptualisations 
are made up of different benchmarks or criteria that have been proposed by scholars throughout 
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time (and throughout the EU’s process of evolution), yet these criteria have been progressively 
either improved or linked to one another by subsequent scholars, or simply reproduced to 
display many common aspects. We thus argue that there is sufficient consensus to claim that 
the EU is an international actor in general – and that it is also a crisis management actor – 
although this actorness is multidimensional, as it includes both internal and external aspects 
and the EU acts concurrently as a security provider and consumer (Barbé and Kienzle, 2007); 
and it is complex, as it does not depend solely on the EU’s actorness claims, but also on many 
other factors, such as the nature and appropriateness of its external action, how it justifies the 
latter, how decisions are made, how effective it is, or on how it is perceived as an actor.  
While we reiterate the claim that aspects of legitimation that surpass domestic democratic 
legitimacy are missing in the actorness debate, there is a strand of literature, within (or rather 
intertwined with) the EU actorness debate, which approximates these aspects more than the 
actorness conceptualisations do. In this literature strand, scholars attempt to discover what kind 
of actor the EU is, strives to be, or has the potential to be, and attempt to establish a link between 
role attributions and the concept of power. This debate has produced dozens of attempts to 
conceive of the EU as some sort of power. Against this backdrop, the subsequent section 
explores types of power-related role conceptions that have been (re)claimed by the EU or 
attributed to the latter by scholars. This strand of the EU actorness debate is useful in 
understanding the dynamics that surround the construction and projection of an EU identity as 
a global actor (in many areas, including crisis management), and its efforts to legitimate that 
identity. 
 
1.2.2 - The EU’s power-related role conceptions  
 
One of the most recognised and influential power-related role conceptions ascribed to the 
European project (Western Europe, the EC, or the EU) is that of civilian power, first introduced 
by François Duchêne (1972, 1973). Despite the latter “only offer[ing] a short and descriptive 
account of Europe’s possible role in the world” (Orbie, 2006: 123), Duchêne’s vague and 
ambiguous conceptualisation (and thus flexible for multiple interpretations) (ibid.: 124) 
remains extensively used in both academic and policy contexts. The premise underlying 
Duchêne’s civilian power Europe concept was that the EC was a “civilian group of countries 
long on economic power and relatively short on armed force” (Duchêne, 1973: 19). Though the 
EC did not have a security and defence crisis management policy in the 1970’s when this 
concept was developed, it was, nonetheless, engaged in the solving of disputes between the 
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Member States. Duchêne used this concept to explain the EC’s focus on civilian means of 
solving such conflicts. For Duchêne, conflict solving on behalf of the EC would only happen 
in this specific context, as he did not envisage that this entity might become engaged, decades 
later, in crisis management of a different kind outside of its territorial sphere. In other words, 
Duchêne looked into explanations that would help understand why conflict between Member 
States had allegedly become unthinkable. Thus, the EC, in his view, represented a ‘crisis 
management’ tool to the extent that it helped Member States to resolve their conflicts peacefully 
and in a civilian way. Duchêne’s contributions indicate that the EC’s civilian role in the world 
was what made it different and potentially normatively strong, especially in matters of 
economic interests (Orbie, 2006: 124-125). Duchêne’s original idea of a ‘civilian power 
Europe’ was later picked up and further advanced by subsequent authors, in light of the EC’s 
own development as an actor (Sjöstedt, 1977b; Padoa-Schioppa, 2004), as well as by the EU 
itself. 
Orbie points out that Duchêne’s focus on “low politics, non-state actors, ideational 
influences, international interdependence” made it fall into a “‘pluralist’ tradition” which was 
vehemently opposed by Hedley Bull’s realism-inspired ‘military power’ concept (Orbie, 2006: 
124). In 1982, Bull proposed a vision of a military power Europe that was, on one hand, the 
result of the state of affairs of the international system at the time, where a ‘return to power 
politics’ dynamic was gaining strength (Bull, 1982: 150); and, on the other hand, a proposed 
solution for Western Europe’s dependence on the USA and NATO for military defence in face 
of the then ‘Soviet threat’ (ibid.: 154-156). Nonetheless, Bull did not consider the EC to be able 
to develop any kind of actorness per se, but only the Member States as a collective (ibid.: 151). 
In response to growing criticism that began to rise in the mid-1990s to Duchêne’s civilian power 
concept in the midst of the emergence of a military component in EU foreign policy – namely 
the Petersberg Tasks – other concepts appeared, such as militarised yet civilian power Europe 
(Stavridis, 2001), or a revised idea of soft power Europe (Nielsen, 2013).  
Another extremely influential and much debated power-related role conception ascribed 
to the EU – and one that is especially relevant for this study – is Ian Manners’ normative power 
Europe (NPE) (Manners, 2000, 2002, 2006a, 2006b, 2006c, 2006d, 2006e, 2008a, 2008b, 
2008c, 2009a, 2009b, 2010, 2013a, 2013b; Diez, 2005; Diez and Manners, 2007; Pace, 2007; 
Tocci, 2007; Merlingen, 2007; Gerrits, 2009; Whitman, 2011; Bickerton, 2011a, 2011b; 
Manners and Whitman, 2013; Gordon and Pardo, 2014; Del Sarto, 2016, etc.). NPE was first 
conceptualised by Manners in 2000 and in 2002 in reference to Bull’s 1982 military power 
Europe’s opposition to Duchêne’s 1972 civilian power Europe, and as a new approach to the 
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evolution of EUFP during the late 1990s. The NPE emerged as “an attempt to suggest that not 
only is the EU constructed on a normative basis, but importantly that this predisposes it to act 
in a normative way in world politics” (Manners, 2002: 252). According to Manners, during the 
1990s the EU became a promoter of norms, and able to (or, at least, convinced that it could) 
“shape conceptions of ‘normal’” (ibid.: 240) in international relations. According to Manners, 
“the reinforcement and expansion of the [EU’s] norms (…) allows the EU to present and 
legitimate itself as being more than the sum of its parts” (ibid.: 244). This ‘normative power’ 
approach led to a shift of focus away from the state, and from the binary concepts of military 
and civilian power, as “the EU’s normative difference comes from its historical context, hybrid 
polity and political-legal constitution” (ibid.: 240). 
The concept of Ethical power Europe – derived from the EU’s self-image and discourses 
– was proposed by Lisbeth Aggestam (2008) as resulting from a conceptual shift in the EU’s 
actorness from what it is (an attractive role model) to what it does, or rather to what it should 
allegedly be doing (being a proactive actor), and the author links the concept with the EU’s 
foreign policy legitimation efforts. Aggestam’s conceptualisation was expanded by other 
authors like Tim Dunne’s (2008) Good Citizen Europe, Adrian Hyde-Price’s (2008) depiction 
of the EU as a Tragic actor, Ian Manner’s normative ethics of the EU, as well as a recurrent 
use of the idea of Europe’s discourse as a force for good (Aggestam, 2008; Hyde-Price, 2008; 
Barbé and Johansson-Nogués, 2008). 
Somewhere in between NPE and Empire Europe (Zielonka, 2006), Del Sarto identifies 
the EU as normative empire Europe. In her theory-informed article of 2016, she argues that the 
EU displays, in the context of the ENP, a norm-based constructivist-type behaviour, which is, 
nonetheless, motivated by utility maximising rationalist-type motivations (Del Sarto, 2016: 
216-217). This conceptualisation reveals the fragilities of separating theoretical approaches and 
practice in dichotomist ideas that do not consider the nuances of a complex multi-layer actor 
such as the EU. Del Sarto argues that the EU, in this sense, is constructing a ‘normative’ identity 
(ibid.: 216). By using the concept of ‘empire’ in her conceptualisation effort, Del Sarto is 
inherently assuming a critical position, as this term “captures the configuration of unequal 
power relations between the EU and its borderlands” (ibid.: 222). Even though the author argues 
that the promotion of norms is not always a priority for the EU, she positions herself critically 
vis-à-vis the inequality of power relations generated by the EU’s normative attitude in the area 
of crisis management policy (similarly to our study). The author claims that the EU engages in 
a ‘civilising mission’ that “contributes to the EU’s perception of itself as a benevolent 
‘normative power’” (ibid.). 
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Like Manners, several authors have either described or prescribed the EU as a post-
modern entity, actor, or power with regard to different policy fields (Caporaso, 1996; Gress, 
1997; McCall, 1998; van Ham, 2001; Cerutti, 2003; Dunne, 2008; Ivik and Lakicevic, 2011; 
Ferhati and Tarifa, 2014). Other proposed role conceptions include the EU as a regional 
international society (Jovanovic and Kristensen, 2015), the EU as a naïve and idealistic Idiot 
power (Carta, 2014), or Transformative power Europe (Leonard, 2005; Börzel and Risse, 
2009). Many other power-related role conceptions have been ascribed to (and appropriated by) 
the EU over the years, and new ones still come up with a remarkable variety and frequency. 
Other examples include Chad Damro’s idea of Market power Europe (Damro, 2015; Kelstrup, 
2015), introduced in 2015, and described as a dynamic conceptual framework (rather than an 
explanatory theory) that establishes a link between comparative and international political 
economy, and the academic debates about EU power-related roles and identities; Joachim 
Koops’s (2011) application of Kenneth Boulding’s idea of Integrative power to the EU; 
Wolfgang Wagner’s (2015) Liberal power Europe, motivated by Europe’s composition of 
liberal democracies and the consequences thereof for EU policy-making; or Ramon Pardo’s 
(2012) Normal power Europe, an idea that argues that the EU simply does not need to be 
categorised as distinct from other powers, as it is as self-interested and security-centred as any 
other actor in the international system, whether the means it uses for ensuring security are 
civilian or otherwise.  
In the subsequent section we delve deeper into the NPE concept and return to David 
Beetham’s legitimation principles in identifying normative justification as a key element in the 
EU’s legitimation of its actorness, and as a key analytical tool for the present thesis. 
 
1.3 - Normative justification as a means to achieve actorness legitimacy 
 
From a discourse analytical point of view, the most interesting question about normative 
power therefore is not whether Europe is a normative power or not, but how it is constructed 
as one (Diez, 2005: 626). 
 
Looking at the scholarly debates on EU actorness (including conceptualisations and power-
related role conceptions) is useful in exploring how the EU’s identity and role as an actor have 
been conceptualised by scholars throughout their evolution. The academic literature on power-
related role conceptions that we briefly went through in the previous section is much more 
inclined to try to understand how the EU portrays itself, and to look at its intrinsic 
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characteristics. Similarly to what our study attempts to do, these power-related role conceptions 
do not focus so much on explaining why others may endorse the EU on specific policy areas, 
but more on how the EU attempts to convince them to do so. However, the overall lack of 
critique over the asymmetric power relations generated by the superior hierarchic positioning 
of the EU as a power of any kind (civilian, normative, ethical, model), a force for good, a 
provider of norms and rules, on behalf of scholars and practitioners, in turn, reveals another 
gap in the actorness literature which the present study intends to address.  
We acknowledge the importance of the NPE approach, which has been extensively 
revised, debated and improved by both Manners and other authors in several instances, in light 
of developments in EUFP and criticisms in the context of the relevant academic debate. We 
particularly acknowledge the importance of the notion of normative justification that stemmed 
from Manners’ attempts to clarify the NPE approach. Manners establishes “a distinction (…) 
between a normative form of power, or pouvoir, and normative ideal type of actor, or 
puissance” (Manners, 2013b: 39; 2013a). In the first instance, Manners points out the 
importance of normative justification vis-à-vis the ability to use material incentives or physical 
force and describes pouvoir normative as “normative justification in action” by means of norms 
diffusion (Manners, 2013b: 39-40). This ‘normative justification’ that Manners refers to 
(Manners, 2006d, 2009b, 2013a, 2013b, Manners and Whitman, 2013; Manners, 2011) 
concerns “attempting to ensure that EU relations and policies with the rest of the world are 
explicable and justifiable to first, second and third parties – the EU, its citizens and other non-
EU parties” (Manners, 2009b: 2). This is closely related to what we address in our thesis, as we 
seek to analyse the EU’s discursive endeavours in normatively justifying its actorness in a given 
policy field (as well as the accompanying normative attitude and corresponding legal 
obligations) in the context of its legitimation efforts. 
Manners (possibly as a response to some criticisms over the ‘power’ dimension of NPE, 
such as Diez, 2005), reiterates that the ‘purest / ideal’ form of the concept of NPE is ideational 
and not material or physical, meaning that 
 
(…) [NPE’s] use involves normative justification rather than the use of material incentives 
or physical force. (…) [Which] implies a very different timescale and form of engagement 
in world politics. In this respect, relations and policies with the rest of the world should be 
‘normatively sustainable’ – i.e. ‘normatively’ explicable and justifiable to others; 
‘sustainable’ into the next generation (Manners, 2009b: 3).  
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Manner’s normative justification approach draws from Helene Sjursen’s analysis of the EU’s 
enlargement policy, which, in turn, is inspired by Max Weber’s idea that legitimacy is 
fundamental for the continuation of government and authority, and Jürgen Habermas’ 
communicative action theory (Manners, 2006d; Sjursen, 2002). This idea is quite similar to that 
presented by Beetham (2013) and Føllesdal (2006), in that it emphasises the importance of 
normative justification as a key element in ensuring legitimacy, in the sense that it is used as a 
mechanism for ensuring sustainability in power relations without coercion. Our focus on 
discourse and on a post-structuralist-inspired CDA is precisely grounded on this core idea that 
normative justification through communication is crucial for an actor’s external legitimation 
process, especially concerning a foreign policy with a strong normative dimension. 
As such, NPE is a useful concept for our project, even though we would not use it quite 
as Manners and others have. Instead of arguing that the EU is a normative power in the area of 
crisis management, we argue that the EU has a normative attitude that results from self-imposed 
ambitions and obligations stipulated in the Lisbon Treaty and ‘rhetorical entrapments’ (i.e. 
constraints resulting from an actor’s previous identification with certain discourses that may 
cease to be entirely relevant or applicable in current circumstances) (Niţoiu, 2013: 242), 
regardless of its actual performance. We do not argue, in this study, that the EU necessarily has 
the ability to ‘shape conceptions of normal’; instead we argue that the EU acts and ‘speaks’ as 
if the norms and values it promotes were universally accepted, which are fundamental 
differences from the arguments offered by most of the proponents of the NPE concept. 
Nonetheless, this approach proves quite useful in understanding the idea of having a normative 
attitude, ambition, and self-conception. As such, we agree with the idea that “[the NPE] concept 
is better seen as a discursive self-construction, imbuing the integration project with new force 
and establishing an EU identity against Others, rather than an objective analytical concept” 
(Diez and Pace, 2007: 1).  
The approaches that classify the EU as a model or an ideal power (Ferreira-Pereira, 
2010; Cebeci, 2012, 2017; Chamlian, 2016: 396-7) result from discourses and an identity that 
has been constructed primarily by the EU to legitimate itself as an actor – often regardless of 
the effectiveness of its norms exports – and by scholarly research, and the examples presented 
in this subchapter systematically reinforce this kind of rhetoric. 
Our post-structuralist theoretical guidance leads us to critique the EU’s ‘civilising’ 
normative attitude that characterises its actorness discourses rooted in its own identification as 
any one of the above-mentioned power related roles (Bretherton and Vogler, 2006: 40; Del 
Sarto, 2016: 222; Kutter, 2014: 151; Zielonka, 2013; Mitzen, 2006). This ‘civilising’ normative 
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attitude refers to the EU’s discursive construction of its identity as an international actor as the 
‘best’ and an ‘ideal model’ that needs to export its allegedly superior standards and way of life 
to less ‘developed’ or less ‘civilised’ others, regardless of its actual efficiency or performance 
(Nicolaïdis and Howse, 2002; Jørgensen, 2015: 499-500; Niţoiu, 2012: 69).  
 
(…) the constructed NPEU ethos defines a standard of legitimacy (of preferences and 
policies) that EU Member States have to take into account if they are to achieve their 
political goals: their high interaction density with conflict parties provides for informal, 
social mechanisms to encourage conflict parties to comply with EU norms. This high level 
of activity may, in the minds of EU actors (…) enable them to justify their actions on the 
basis of a common ethos, a common reference point emanating from constructions of 
NPEU (Pace, 2007: 1053). 
 
The main criticism that we make (alongside other authors, e.g. Bickerton, 2011a, 2011b; 
Aggestam, 2008; Sjursen, 2002, 2006) towards the arguments of some of the NPE proponents 
concerns the claim that the legitimacy of the NPE approach stems from the principles and norms 
being promoted 
 
(…) if normative justification is to be convincing or attractive, then the principles being 
promoted must be seen as legitimate, as well as being promoted in a coherent and consistent 
way. Legitimacy of principles in world politics may come from previously established 
international conventions, treaties, or agreements, particularly if these are important within 
the UN system (Manners, 2009b: 3). 
 
In this context, we follow Diez’s (2005) critique of the assumption of legitimacy and 
universality underlying the principles being promoted in the first place, which lead us to identify 
the EU as having a ‘civilising’ normative attitude rather than power. 
 
(…) the projection of European norms and values (in both policy and analysis) needs to be 
subjected to continuous deconstruction through the exposition of contradictions within this 
discourse, and between this discourse and other practices. This would by no means 
undermine, but rather rescue, normative power from becoming a self-righteous, 
messianistic project that claims to know what Europe is and what others should be like 
(Diez, 2005: 636). 
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The EU attempts, through its various foreign policy tools, to make ‘others’ – especially states, 
state actors, and state institutions – behave in a way that the EU sees as normal and adequate, 
by organising and modernising them according to the standards deemed by the EU to be ideal 
or universally valid, stemming from its legal obligations to act normatively, as determined by 
the treaties. The expression ‘civilising attitude’ is meant to be read as a critical view of the EU’s 
apparent tacit assumption that everybody else wants to emulate the norms and standards it 
projects and that the EU itself is an ideal model to be replicated and emulated. Through this 
attitude, the EU places itself at a superior level in comparison with the ‘other’, in a logic that 
exposes its ‘postcolonial’ context (Staeger, 2016). The EU’s neighbourhood is often the object 
of this kind of discourse on behalf of the EU, and there is a growing academic debate 
surrounding this topic (e.g. Malmvig, 2004; Pace, 2005; Bicchi, 2006; Pace and Schumacher, 
2007; Cebeci and Schumacher, 2016; Cebeci, 2017). Our analysis of the EU’s normative 
justification discourses and narratives as a crisis management actor is oriented towards 
identifying and deconstructing this ‘attitude’ and the inherent legal obligations to act 
normatively in the context of this policy. 
In this study, it is argued that legitimacy – both at the domestic and international levels 
– forms an integral part of a unit’s actorness, but it is contended that domestic and external 
legitimacy of external policies, while based on similar legitimation principles, must be looked 
at differently because they involve different players and work at different levels. When it comes 
to external policies, all three legitimation principles in Beetham’s conceptualisation are 
important and closely linked to the actorness conceptualisations. In order to justify our 
analytical focus on normative justification, we will consider the multiple conceptualisations 
and criteria of actorness that have been established and validated in the last decades and link 
them with Beetham’s principles. 
The first legitimation principle – legality, authorisation – is directly linked to the 
domestic legitimacy of an actor, and to the internal criteria that allow them to act in the 
international system. If we consider Sjöstedt’s internal cohesiveness dimension and actor 
capability concept; Hill’s capability-expectations gap problem in EUFP (especially the 
capabilities part, as they come within the EU, from the Member States, including resources and 
assets, and the ability to use them); Jupille and Caporaso’s authority, autonomy, and cohesion 
criteria; Bretherton and Vogler’s capability criterion; and Conceição-Heldt and Meunier’s 
internal cohesiveness concept, we conclude that all of the latter criteria and concepts are 
embedded in a legality and authority dimension, and, as such, have  primarily a domestic focus. 
In other words, these criteria essentially fall into the scope of the first principle, or what we 
  38 
would call the first stage of the process of legitimation of the EU’s actorness. These criteria 
refer primarily to the elements (including legal instruments, domestic legitimacy, capabilities, 
competences) that the Member States provide the EU so that it may act as an international actor. 
They do comprise aspects of political legitimation of external policies and instruments, but only 
domestic democratic ones, omitting the EU’s efforts to ensure legitimacy through other means 
and from other actors, as well as neglecting the role that discourse and identity play in ensuring 
overall legitimacy for the EU’s actorness claims. 
The third legitimation principle – performative endorsement – has been attributed a 
significant importance by authors that have conceptualised actorness with a focus on the EU’s 
recognition by, and positive or non-coercive engagement and interaction with, other actors in 
the international system. Examples include Sjöstedt’s performance of actor behaviour; Jupille 
and Caporaso’s recognition criterion (particularly the de facto dimension); Allen and Smith’s 
presence concept; Hill’s capability-expectations gap problem in EUFP (especially the 
expectations part); or Bretherton and Vogler’s presence criterion. We can determine that, in all 
of these cases, the focus and validation of the fulfilment of these criteria is primarily put on 
third parties’ non-coercive engagement or compliance with the EU, i.e. in ensuring 
performative endorsement, which we refer to as the ‘end-stage’ of the process of external 
legitimation. 
However, in order to achieve this third principle, especially when a strong normative 
component is involved, the persuading / convincing domestic and external actors of the EU’s 
and the E/CSDP’s validity – i.e. normative justification – is crucial. The use of the NPE concept 
as ‘normative justification in action’ is where its major strength lies: 
 
Normative power should (…) be perceived as persuasive in the actions taken to promote 
such [EU] principles. If normative justification is to be convincing or attractive, then the 
actions taken must involve persuasion, argumentation, and the conferral of prestige or 
shame. Persuasion in the promotion of principles in world politics involves constructive 
engagement, the institutionalisation of relations, and the encouragement of multi- and pluri-
lateral dialogue between participants (…) (Manners, 2009b: 4). 
 
But who are these ‘actors’ whose endorsement the EU seeks in order to obtain legitimacy in its 
foreign policy, and in particular crisis management? It is important to identify the targets of the 
EU’s normative justification discourses as a crisis management actor. 
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The internal / domestic dimension [of EUFP narrative] is about making sense of what EFP 
is for to those inside the EU who implement it, fund it and lend it credibility. It informs 
national and EU policy-makers and planners, it appears within military and civilian 
doctrines, rules of engagement, operating manuals and organizational frames for policy 
initiatives. It also supplies the fabric for building public knowledge and views about EFP 
and is the means by which public support for the EU’s external activities might be won, 
lost or recaptured (…). The external factors to which a strategic narrative must respond are 
its capacity to express and project the Union’s intentions towards third parties – most 
usually, although not exclusively, states. A strategic narrative can articulate a rationale for 
intervention, and for acting in concert with others. It can help make sense of the EU’s 
international presence for outsiders and has the potential to determine the terms of 
communication with them, and in doing so, define and change relationships (Martin, 2011: 
192-3). 
 
The authorities of the third countries that participate in cooperation with the EU, and / or host, 
E/CSDP missions and operations – insofar as they sign agreements with the EU for the purpose 
of cooperating, inviting, and requesting (or allowing) the latter to engage in crisis management 
practices in their territory – are both a source of the EU’s legal authority and, to a larger extent, 
‘validators’ or ‘endorsers’ of E/CSDP instruments. The EU sometimes launches E/CSDP 
missions and operations in cooperation with third states (as mentioned previously), and while 
these countries do not have nearly the same weight with regard to any decision-making 
(European Council, 2000: 24), in the context of their cooperation with the EU under the 
E/CSDP, they act on behalf of the EU alongside the willing and able EU Member States, 
reflecting the fluidity of the EU’s presence as a crisis management actor.  
In countries in crisis that request the EU’s assistance in crisis management and 
eventually become E/CSDP host countries, the presence of lawlessness and corruption is not 
uncommon. If these circumstances affect the host countries’ populations’ trust in, and 
legitimation of their authorities or governments, then, perhaps indirectly, this resulting lack of 
trust may also affect the legitimacy of the legal agreements created and signed by the latter and 
the EU. This problem is likely to be found in cases where the host country’s governmental 
institutions do not work properly (at least according to EU standards). Nonetheless, the EU is 
not likely to refuse a plea to act in the context of a crisis simply because the requesting country 
or territory does not have a functioning or legitimate government, since countries in crisis 
oftentimes do not. In fact, most E/CSDP missions (particularly civilian) are commonly related, 
in some way, to the establishment, reinforcement, or recreation of structures that reflect EU 
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values (such as democracy or the rule of law), and that, in principle, contribute to an increase 
in the legitimacy of local authorities – and paradoxically, thereby, often even contribute to the 
consolidation of non-democratic structures. We acknowledge this issue, and its potential 
implications for at least part of the legitimacy of the E/CSDP (namely the legal authority that 
stems from agreements with host countries). However, we will not emphasise this matter 
disproportionately, as our focus is on the EU’s – rather than host countries’ – legitimation 
efforts. 
As such, the absence of coercion (e.g. in the form of executive mandates, conditionality, 
or sanctions) in the vast majority of cases in the context of the E/CSDP – unlike other externally 
oriented EU policies whose distinction may become, however, increasingly blurred with the 
application of the comprehensive or integrated approaches to external conflict and crises – is 
likely to increase the probability of endorsement and validation, based on the belief in the 
validity of the E/CSDP and its instruments. However, endorsement can have many nuances and 
be fuelled by different incentives unrelated to the host country’s authority’s belief in the EU’s 
actorness and its policy’s validity and desirability, such as the existence of interests or trade-
offs related to the EU’s presence in their country for other reasons, or in the context of other 
policies. Other issues, such as (lack of) interest, (poor) communication, (low level of) 
ownership, etc., can also affect the host country’s reasons for endorsement (of lack thereof).  
So, can endorsement for reasons other than the belief in the policy’s validity and 
desirability limit the latter’s legitimacy? Perhaps only in a strictly technical and abstract sense. 
We certainly recognise that the endorsement aspect of legitimacy in this context is a complex 
matter, especially because the EU makes use of other ‘forcible persuasion’ tools, such as 
sanctions or conditionality, in other policy contexts in its relationship with countries where it 
also engages in E/CSDP missions and operations.15 No matter how desirable it may be to 
establish a clear distinction between the EU’s actorness in different domains and policies (and 
local perceptions thereof) in a given country, this is not likely to happen – especially with the 
practical application of the EU’s ‘comprehensive’ and ‘integrated’ approaches to external crises 
and conflicts. Nonetheless, what becomes more important is how host countries (and other 
                                               
15 Such as, for example, the cases of Niger (EUCAP Sahel Niger), Chad (EUFOR Tchad/RCA), 
Georgia (EUJUST Themis, EUMM Georgia), or to a certain extent Congo (Artemis, EUFOR DR 
Congo, EUSEC DR Congo, EUPOL Kinshasa, EUPOL DR Congo), among others, where the EU 
has E/CSDP missions and operations and simultaneously engages in political conditionality (in 
various policy contexts) and / or democracy promotion-related sanctions with more or less success 
(Del Biondo, 2015; Arnould and Vlassenroot, 2016; Ketevan, 2016). 
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actors) behave publicly in the context of the EU’s legitimation process, as beliefs are extremely 
difficult to determine (Beetham, 2013: 91; Martin, 2011: 199). Although this is not the focus 
of our study, both the first and third principles of Beetham’s legitimation process are important 
to identify, as they help to contextualise and set the boundaries for the link between them – 
normative justification – particularly in what concerns the identification of both the sources and 
targets of the latter. 
Contrary to what it may appear, the external dimension of legitimacy does not relate 
solely to third parties / external actors outside the EU sphere. It does include these actors, but 
domestic EU players are also involved. Overall, actors (both domestic and external) involved 
in the legitimation of the EU’s crisis management actorness include the EU Member States, EU 
institutions, International Organisations, as well as third countries (including E/CSDP host 
countries or those the EU calls its ‘strategic partners’).16 When it comes to being the target of 
discourse, in the case of the state, we also consider the citizens of that state. Perhaps not 
necessarily the general public, but a more ‘attentive’ public alongside a ‘policy and opinion 
elite’ (Almond, 1950: 138), including politicians, diplomats, journalists, and scholars “who 
understand, to various degrees, the insights and rationales of policies and are thus in a perfect 
position to interact within the elite, as well as with the attentive public” (Jørgensen, 2015: 493-
4). So, the external dimension of the EU’s legitimation efforts as an international actor has to 
do with the actorness aspect, i.e. the external dimension of the EU’s action and identity in the 
context of policies that take place outside of an actor’s strictly domestic sphere. 
As mentioned previously, we do not focus on the third principle of legitimation, as 
proposed by Beetham, and we do not make an effort to establish whether or not it is fulfilled, 
as it is amply dependent upon the second principle (normative justifiability), not to mention 
that its effectiveness / impact is extremely difficult to assess, both domestically and externally 
(Martin, 2011: 199). Our study’s focus is precisely on the EU’s process of legitimation – 
specifically what we identify as the most important element of this process, i.e. normative 
justification –, and not on the EU’s potential achievement of the state of legitimacy. The 
important (and understudied) aspect of the EU’s efforts to ensure endorsement mainly concerns 
how the EU influences and convinces E/CSDP host countries, as well as its own Member States 
and other actors in the international system that it is a suitable actor, that it has the appropriate 
                                               
16 When we speak of states or institutions in this context, we mean the authorities or representatives 
thereof. 
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tools and solutions for a given crisis, that the E/CSDP is the appropriate policy to use, and even 
why or how the EU should even be involved in crisis management. 
Neither of Beetham’s legitimation principles is entirely without contention or 
disagreement, and they are intricately linked to the beliefs of those who take part in this 
relationship, which are primarily the political elites and decision-makers from the EU and its 
Member States as well as those from the countries that host and participate in E/CSDP missions 
and operations. This means that justifying the appropriateness and validity of these instruments, 
materialised as missions and operations, and thus convincing others to endorse the EU’s 
actorness and comply with its instruments is the most important step, because it is how the EU 
achieves legitimacy for its actorness claims.  
 
(…) normative ideas and normative justification have not been considered as important, 
but their role and deployment as normative power is critical if the EU’s role, perception, 
strategies and actions are to become more meaningful and more normatively sustainable 
in changing world politics (Manners, 2009b: 13). 
 
Performative endorsement complements normative justification as the most visible components 
of the legitimation process at the international level, as compliance validates as much as non-
compliance may delegitimise a given international institution. Without normative justification 
in the absence of coercion – without convincing others – there is likely to be no compliance nor 
endorsement, and thus no legitimation. Therein lies an important link between international 
actorness and legitimacy, as this reflects the intricate link between power and legitimacy at the 
international level (Beetham, 2013: 274). This is also why normative justification is the most 
important out of the three legitimating principles, and consequently why our study focuses on 
analysing this element in particular: legitimacy does not exist without non-coercive 
endorsement or compliance; and non-coercive endorsement or compliance, in turn, does not 
exist without proper normative justification. Thus, a non-coercive engagement and interaction 
– where either public endorsement or compliance occurs – is both a core proof of actorness and 
of external legitimacy.  
Now that we have highlighted and justified the importance of linking external 
legitimacy and actorness through normative justification (Beetham, 2013; Sjursen, 2002; 
Føllesdal, 2006; Manners, 2006d, 2009b, 2013b; Manners, 2011; Manners and Whitman, 
2013), we will explain the conceptual and analytical orientation that will guide us throughout 
our analysis and we will identify the main goals and claims of our thesis. 
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CHAPTER 2 - FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS 
 
(…) without theory there is nothing but description, and without methodology there is no 
transformation of theory into analysis (Hansen, 2006: 1). 
 
2.1 - Post-structuralism 
 
In our endeavour to understand the EU’s legitimation efforts of its crisis management actorness, 
we have opted for embedding our CDA within a post-structuralist17 approach. If we look at the 
broad spectrum of IR theories and theoretical approaches, we see the post-structuralist 
‘analytical orientation’ (Burke, 2010: 360) as a critical approach to constructivism, as the latter 
can be seen as a critical approach to more rationalist theories. Post-structuralism “is used 
critically to investigate how the subject – in the dual senses of subject-matter and the subject-
actor – of international relations is constituted in and through the discourses and texts18 of world 
politics” (Der Derian and Shapiro, 1989: ix). Even though post-structuralism shares 
constructivism’s emphasis on identities, ideas, language, and overall discourse (including non-
linguistic semiotic elements), the former attempts to interpret and critique the normative link 
between power and knowledge in relations between actors in the international system. Adding 
a post-structuralist dimension to our CDA can help us to critique how the EU’s legitimation 
rhetoric hides power asymmetries. 
 
The ontological starting point for post-structuralist discourse analysis is a 
conceptualization of policy as always dependent upon the articulation of identity, while 
identity is simultaneously produced and reproduced through the formulation and 
legitimation of policy (Hansen, 2006: 187). 
 
                                               
17 There is often some level of confusion between post-structuralism and post-modernism, with some 
authors using both terms interchangeably or simply describing both approaches similarly. In most 
recent IR conceptualisations, the tendency seems to be an increase in the use of the first to the 
detriment of the latter: this is perhaps related to an attempt to avoid confusion with the idea of post-
modernism as a literary, artistic, or historical moment. Nonetheless, the nomenclature itself matters 
less than the tools and strategies it entails (Devetak, 2009: 183; Burke, 2010: 359-360). For 
practical purposes, we will use the term post-structuralism. 
18 As mentioned previously, the use of the word ‘text’ or ‘textual’ in a semiotic sense refers to any 
discursive instance, i.e. a verbal recording (written, oral, or other types of discourses). 
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Similarly to constructivism, post-structuralism is concerned with the trap of ‘reification’ of 
discourses and meanings (Hurd, 2010: 300). In other words, post-structuralism argues that 
reality is not what it appears to be: it is a ‘naturalised’ version of discourses that make up the 
social world that, in turn, hides asymmetric power relations, while being taken for granted as 
‘natural’ and ‘normal’. The goal of post-structuralism is precisely to ‘denaturalise’ the social 
world and IR, and to critically interpret the latter’s constitutive discourses and texts (Gregory, 
1989: xiv). Post-structuralism goes a step beyond constructivism’s assumption of the human 
construction and management of knowledge and structures in the social world, as it critiques 
and questions assumptions of meaning, origins, and representations thereof. It argues that all 
power-knowledge relations are deliberately made, ascribed meaning and significance to, and 
are perpetuated by humans (Burke, 2010: 359). 
 
Poststructuralism (…) can be drawn upon to show not only that identities matter for foreign 
policy, but also how they can be studied systematically through the adoption of a theory of 
discourse. In doing so it pursues a particular set of research questions, centered on the 
constitutive significance of representations of identity for formulating and debating foreign 
policies, and it argues that adopting a non-causal epistemology does not imply an 
abandonment of theoretically rigorous frameworks, empirical analyses of ‘real world 
relevance,’ or systematic assessments of data and methodology (Hansen, 2006: 4). 
 
Within post-structuralism, diverse ‘philosophical and intellectual practices’ have been 
developed in the study of IR and the social relations therein to “challenge the cognitive validity, 
empirical objectivity and universalist and rationalist claims of idealist, realist, and neorealist 
schools alike of international relations” (Der Derian and Shapiro, 1989: ix). One example is the 
Nietzsche-inspired genealogical approach to history, amply explored by Michel Foucault,19 
whereby perpetuated representations and dominations are exposed and relativized in face of the 
‘historicisation’ of elements that may have been excluded or hidden from mainstream history 
(Foucault and Gordon, 1980: 83; Devetak, 2009: 185-190; Powers, 2007). 
In our research, we are especially interested in another post-structuralist practice – 
deconstruction – developed as a response to structuralist language theories from the beginning 
of the 20th century, initially developed from Ferdinand de Saussure’s work on linguistics. 
                                               
19 Foucault is often associated with post-structuralism, even though not exclusively, as his work is 
quite interdisciplinary (Kendall and Wickham, 2004: 129). 
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Jacques Derrida was behind a strong criticism to Saussure’s structuralism, especially 
concerning “how and where ‘meaning’ resided in language” (Gregory, 1989: xv). 
Deconstruction looks at concepts that are known only by what they are not, and identifies the 
hierarchical struggle within: 
 
(...) conceptual oppositions are never simply neutral but are inevitably hierarchical. One of 
the two terms in the opposition is privileged over the other. This privileged term 
supposedly connotes a presence, propriety, fullness, purity, or identity which the other 
lacks (...) (Devetak, 2009: 191). 
 
In other words, the stronger thing / concept needs the weaker thing / concept – and its 
contrasting meaning – in order to perpetuate the hierarchy between them. In Derrida’s approach 
to post-structuralism these kinds of oppositions are not seen as strictly linguistic – as Saussure’s 
structuralist ‘logocentric’ approach would suggest (Saussure, 1966) – but rather contingent 
upon a cultural and social context, whereby meaning is seen as a dynamic and interactive 
process (Gregory, 1989: xvi). All discourse is artificial. This does not mean that it is always the 
case that discourses are deliberately and carefully curated in their entirety (although some are 
definitely so), but simply that they are a fruit of, and shaped by contingencies such as interests, 
political / social / cultural contexts, institutions, etc. Derrida’s work on the practice of 
deconstruction was amply influenced by Martin Heidegger, who also wrote about the 
importance of difference in the establishment of identity (Heidegger, 2004). In his essay 
‘Differance,’ Derrida addresses the distinction between written and spoken communication and 
language, arguing that the latter is overwhelmingly preferred to the detriment of the former, in 
a paradigm opposition – like many other hierarchical oppositions that disregard the virtues of 
the disfavoured concept or paradigm. By creating what appears to be a new word or concept 
(differance) – which the author states is neither – Derrida claims that it does not exist, and thus, 
in order to possibly identify what it means, we must look at what it is not. It is interesting – and 
likely not accidental – that Derrida chose the base word ‘difference’ to formulate this proposal 
and reach these conclusions. 
 
To be sure, a subject becomes a speaking subject only by dealing with the system of 
linguistic differences; or again, he becomes a signifying subject (generally by speech or 
other signs) only by entering into the system of differences. In this sense, certainly, the 
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speaking or signifying subject would not be self-present, insofar as he speaks or signifies, 
except for the play of linguistic or semiological difference (Derrida, 2004: 289). 
 
‘Otherness / alterity’ – another dimension of ‘difference’ – is also an important concept in post-
structuralist thought. In fact, in IR (as in semiology) the idea of a ‘self’ as opposed to the ‘other’ 
is quite visible, and it always inherently reflects a latent conflict or struggle for dominance and 
identity definition. This ontological uncertainty and potential threat leads to the establishment 
of hierarchies, whereby the ‘self’ sees itself as superior to, and the opposite of the ‘other’, as 
“the ‘foreign policies’ of nation states are based on what have been shown to be representational 
practices through which various forms of global otherness have been created” (Shapiro, 1989: 
15). In constructivist thought, identity is described as “relatively stable, role-specific 
understandings and expectations about self” (Wendt, 1992: 397). This means that, more than 
being something that is perceived (according to the understandings, beliefs, and context of the 
observer), identity is something that is primarily constructed and projected from within.  
In post-structuralist thought, on the other hand, identity is seen as largely built on the idea 
of difference vis-à-vis the ‘other’, as the ‘self’ is as much what it is, as what it is not: “the 
definition of the internal other and the external other compound one another, and both of these 
seep into the definition given to the other within the interior of the self” (Connolly, 1989: 326). 
So, how does the EU’s normative justification discourse relate to its (crisis management) 
actorness? According to Hansen (2006: 1), “the relationship between identity and foreign policy 
is at the center of poststructuralism’s research agenda: foreign policies rely upon 
representations of identity, but it is also through the formulation of foreign policy that identities 
are produced and reproduced.” 
In this sense, another post-structuralist concept intricately linked to Derrida’s 
deconstruction practice – ‘textuality’ – is fundamental to our analysis of the EU’s normative 
justification discourses (or any discourse analysis, we would argue). Textuality means that all 
dimensions of discourse are taken into consideration in a thorough analysis and meaning-
making that looks well beyond just its linguistic aspects: 
 
As coined by Roland Barthes, the “textuality” of an essay includes historical and rhetorical 
dimensions as legitimate parts of the essay’s semic and epistemic potential. (...) to see the 
textuality of discourse is, in part, to recognize that a given text contains, or catalyzes, a 
surfeit of meanings beyond what the author wanted to say (Gregory, 1989: xviii). 
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Some dimensions that are intertwined in the EU’s discourses, building up the latter’s textuality, 
include the discursive struggles within institutions and Member States underlying the EU’s 
common discourses; the historical, political, social, geographic context surrounding the 
production and dissemination of those discourses; the channels through which they are 
disseminated; or the targets thereof. This idea of textuality is embedded in the post-structuralist 
practice of semiotics (the study of meaning-making) that includes discursive and non-discursive 
mediums, both included in the post-structuralist concept of ‘text’. 
 
Barthes thus shows how things come to have meanings by virtue of their being part of a 
culture and how meanings oftimes precede the thing. He shows how ideologies serve as an 
interpretive frame through which we tacitly know and thus can “read” the meanings that 
culture gives to objects, and he shows that the knowability and apparent incontestability of 
these meanings can only be accounted for via frames of reference that are necessarily 
ideological in the Althusserian sense (ibid.: xix). 
 
The post-structuralist practices of textuality (i.e. the relationship between the text and the 
context) and intertextuality (i.e. the relationship between concepts and meanings in different 
texts and within each text) are thus important for IR because they provide “(…) critical inquiry 
into an area of thought where there is no final arbiter of truth, where meaning is derived from 
an interrelationship of texts, and power is implicated by the problem of language and other 
signifying practices” (Der Derian, 1989: 6).  According to post-structuralism, the element of 
power in discourses and narratives in the social world is often overlooked because some of 
these discourses are seen as objective universal truths and absolutes by some groups of humans, 
and thus assumed to be not just ‘real’, but also ‘normal’ and even ‘natural’. Post-structuralism 
challenges and critiques the factual nature of such ‘truths’ (Gregory, 1989: xiv). The problem 
is that only some groups view these ‘truths’ as such, and when others show a different 
perspective on reality, they are deemed to be not only different, but also inferior (e.g. potentially 
‘underdeveloped’ or ‘uncivilised’). This, in turn, produces an asymmetric power relationship 
between ‘winners’ and ‘losers’.  
Power is most commonly associated with the idea of coercion, especially in IR literature, 
and defined as one actor having the ability to make another do what they otherwise would not 
do (Lake, 2013: 55-6). In post-structuralist thought, however, power is seen as more 
undetectable, yet potentially more influential, as it entails the ability to determine what is 
‘normal’ or ‘natural’ in social relations, which, in turn, generates asymmetrical relations 
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between actors qua winners or losers (Powers, 2007). Yet the post-structuralist 
conceptualisation of power is not a one-way street, unlike the idea of top-down coercive power. 
For this power to be successfully exerted, it requires an actor or group of actors that produce 
discourse and use it as if it were ‘normal / natural’, and another actor or group of actors that 
acquiesce, internalise, and thus validate this discourse’s alleged ‘truth’ and ‘normalcy’. Instead 
of paying attention only to discourses that relate to visible power or coercion, post-structuralism 
looks especially at, and attempts to deconstruct, those discourses that encompass common 
assumptions, i.e. discourses that appear ‘innocent’, ‘reasonable’, ‘unproblematic’, or ‘normal’: 
 
Whether a given aspect of social reality is a matter of contention or is regarded as natural 
and unproblematic, meaning is always imposed, not discovered, for the familiar world 
cannot be separated from the interpretive practices through which it is made (Shapiro, 
1989: 11). 
 
According to Foucault, the inherent power of the ‘normalcy’ attributed to certain discourses 
stems from modern ‘Western’ societies’ increasing concern with surveillance and enforcement 
of what is deemed to be ‘normal’, and subsequent rejection or marginalisation of individuals 
that do not fit this category (Powers, 2007). Using the Panopticon analogy, Foucault (1995: 
200) made the argument that these surveillance and enforcement practices would eventually 
result in certain norms, ideas, or discourses being internalised and adopted by the members of 
that society in such a way that would ultimately render such surveillance and enforcement 
practices unnecessary in the long run (ibid.: 202, 207). Post-structuralism assumes the existence 
– and perhaps even the necessity – of these discourses in the functioning of the social world, 
but it criticises their claims to objectiveness, absoluteness, or universality, as well as the 
asymmetrical power relations that these claims generate. So, rather than attempting to improve 
or correct them (like, for example, critical theory might), post-structuralism seeks to question 
and critique such discourses and narratives in order to deconstruct and ‘denaturalise’ them 
(Gregory, 1989: xiv). 
Now that we have identified the theoretical underpinnings of our analysis, we will 
explain the type of discourse analysis that we will conduct and the principles that guide this 
analysis. 
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2.2 - Critical discourse analysis 
 
Language is also a medium of domination and social force. It serves to legitimize relations 
of organized power. Insofar as the legitimizations of power relations (...) are not 
articulated, (...) language is also ideological (Wodak, 2004: 187).20 
 
As mentioned previously, we have opted for conducting a critical discourse analysis of the EU’s 
normative justification as a crisis management actor, informed by post-structuralism. 
According to Wodak (ibid.: 185-186), CDA is not exactly a specific methodology, but rather a 
‘school’ or ‘paradigm’ that is based on a series of principles that seek to critique21 ideologies 
and power by analysing discourses. Very much like post-structuralism, CDA is “interested in 
analysing opaque as well as transparent structural relationships of dominance, discrimination, 
power and control as manifested in language” (ibid.: 187). This similarity reflects CDA’s 
rootedness in, and compatibility with, post-structuralism (Diez, 2014a: 29; Aydın-Düzgit, 2014: 
133-135), and why it is particularly advantageous for us to make use of this combination of 
theoretical and analytical tools in our research. CDA’s focus on discourse stems from the 
ideological weight that discourses can have in establishing or reproducing unequal power 
relations between actors in the social world (Wodak, 2004: 186; Milliken, 1999), in a logic that 
closely resembles post-structuralist thought. In foreign policy CDA, as in post-structuralism, 
the idea of ‘difference’ in power relations stands out as especially relevant (Wodak, 2004: 187). 
According to Diez, this is because 
 
(...) foreign policy does not start from a given subject of the state, but rather (re)constructs 
the identity of the state through representing something or someone else as ‘foreign’ and 
thereby also setting out what counts as ‘not foreign’ – or, in other words, setting out the 
attributes of the ‘self’ (Diez, 2013: 7).22  
                                               
20 The author was citing Jürgen Habermas (1967), Erkenntnis und Interesse [Knowledge and Interest], 
Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp, p. 259. 
21 Wodak defines ‘critique’ as ‘making visible the interconnectedness of things’ (Wodak, 2004: 187, 
citing Norman Fairclough (1995), Critical Discourse Analysis: The Critical Study of Language, 
Harlow, Longman, p. 747.) 
22 This idea is also present in Saussure’s definition of concepts tout court, from a linguistic point of 
view, whereby the latter are “purely differential and defined not by their positive content, but 
negatively by their relations with other terms of the system. Their most precise characteristic is in 
being what they other are not” (Saussure, 1966: 117). 
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In our study, this is most evident in how the EU’s actorness is normatively justified in the EU’s 
portrayal of itself as a model and ideal vis-à-vis the ‘other’ who needs to be democratised and 
overall ‘civilised’ to come closer to the EU’s ‘superior’ standards. Conducting CDA on the 
EU’s normative justification of its crisis management actorness allows for a deeper 
comprehension of not only how the EU identifies itself, but also how this identity and the 
representation thereof translates into a complex and unequal relationship with the ‘other’ that 
stems from a specific (social, cultural, and political) context and the EU’s self-placement 
therein. In fact, “understanding foreign policy as a discursive practice, poststructuralism argues 
that foreign policy discourses articulate and intertwine material factors and ideas to such an 
extent that the two cannot be separated from one another” (Hansen, 2006: 1). 
Since we are looking to understand how the EU normatively justifies its actorness in a 
specific area in an attempt to legitimate it, we will analyse its discourses – the means through 
which it convinces other actors within and outside its structure to endorse it. Stuart Hall defines 
language as “the privileged medium in which we ‘make sense’ of things, in which meaning is 
produced and exchanged” (Hall, 1997: 1), whereas Saussure even goes as far as saying that “in 
the lives of individuals and societies, speech is more important than anything else” (Saussure, 
1966: 7). In CDA, as in post-structuralism, the importance of language stems from its 
relationship to power: 
 
(...) language indexes power, expresses power, is involved where there is contention over 
and a challenge to power. Power does not derive from language, but language can be used 
to challenge power, to subvert it, to alter distributions of power in the short and the long 
term. Language provides a finely articulated vehicle for differences in power in hierarchical 
social structures (Wodak, 2004: 187). 
 
Yet language is just one part of discourse. Following Wodak, we argue that the concept of 
discourse is more encompassing than just language, as context plays a fundamental role in the 
latter’s analysis and understanding (ibid.: 185), in line with the post-structuralist ‘textuality’ 
practice that we have previously described. Discourse is usually defined as how language is 
used to convey ideas and construct meanings: “discourses are diverse representations of social 
life which are inherently positioned – differently positioned actors ‘see’ and represent social 
life in different ways, as different discourses” (Fairclough, 2001: 235). Narratives, in turn, result 
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from an ‘overlap’ of different ‘fluid’ discourses, that are “institutionalised through social and 
political practice” (Niţoiu, 2013: 240). 
General CDA principles include an interdisciplinary character; a problem-orientation; a 
theoretical and methodological eclecticism; a fieldwork and ethnographic basis; an abductive 
character (i.e. the constant interchange between theory and data); genre re-contextualisation 
efforts; historical contextualisation efforts; eclecticism and pragmatism in the definition of 
analytical categories and tools; a preference for middle-range theories; and an orientation 
towards change and practice (Wodak, 2004: 187-188).  
 
2.2.1 - Research questions and analytical framework 
 
For practical purposes, our analysis is inspired by Fairclough’s analytical framework for CDA, 
which we found to be quite clear, well organised, and transparent. We have adapted this 
framework to our project’s objectives and to post-structuralist premises and analytical practices. 
In our introductory chapter, we have identified ‘a social problem with a semiotic aspect’, which 
constitutes the basis for any post-structuralist analysis or CDA in general. This is deemed more 
relevant to CDA’s ‘critical’ dimension than a research question simply meant to produce 
knowledge (Fairclough, 2001: 236-237). In the first chapter, we identified a discourse-related 
social problem, which is the central component of the link between actorness and legitimacy, 
namely how an actor (in this case the EU) that has legal authority tries to achieve performative 
endorsement through normative justification (Beetham, 2013; Sjursen, 2002; Føllesdal, 2006; 
Manners, 2006d, 2009b, 2013b; Manners, 2011; Manners and Whitman, 2013). The core of an 
actor’s normative justification is done mainly through discourses aiming at persuading / 
convincing domestic and external actors to validate the EU’s actorness, thus legitimating it. 
Our project’s main research questions are our starting point: 
 
• Is the EU a crisis management actor? 
• How does the EU’s normative justification discourse relate to its (crisis management) 
actorness? 
• How does the EU frame / construct and justify normatively its perceived crisis 
management actorness? 
• What words, concepts, and assumptions constitute the EU’s discursive framework for 
speaking about crisis management and its projected role therein? 
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• How do the EU’s discourses as a crisis management actor structure its ambitions and 
positions in the international system, and shape representations therein?  
• What discursive and power asymmetries, if any, are embedded in the EU’s crisis 
management discourses?  
 
Our analysis is based on these broad and encompassing main research questions. We have 
already responded to the first question in chapter 1.2, where we made an assessment of the EU’s 
crisis management actorness as we went through the various actorness criteria developed 
throughout the course of the scholarly debate on EU actorness. We briefly went through the 
second research question as well in general terms as we explained the link between normative 
justification and actorness in chapter 1.3 and more specifically when we addressed the 
importance of discourse in the context of foreign policy in chapter 2.2. 
As mentioned, we began this thesis with the identification, in chapter 1, of a social problem 
with a semiotic dimension. Following this, we will proceed to identifying the network of 
practices where the problem occurs. Here, we seek to answer the following questions:  
 
• What network / structure / context of social practices is this problem rooted in? 
(Fairclough, 2001: 237).  
• What discourses constitute the normative justification of the EU’s crisis management 
actorness? 
 
In chapter 3, we identify the context of the problem, namely what and whose discourses are 
being studied. We identify the actors and discursive corpus (including documents / texts and 
speech acts) that make up the EU’s normative justification as a crisis management actor that 
will be subject to CDA. We explore the characteristics of EUFP discourses, namely their multi-
layered nature, as well as the discursive struggles, heterogeneity, and fragmentation that take 
place therein. 
In chapter 4, we follow a chronological overview of the historical and semiotic evolution 
of the EU’s crisis management policy and discourses, starting with the inception of the EU’s 
CFSP and ESDP in the 1990s, and finishing with the launch of the 2016 EU Global Strategy. 
The justification for the beginning and end of this chosen timeframe has already been provided 
in chapter 1. Throughout chapter 4 we will identify these discourses’ messages, the authors’ 
concerns, motivations, definitions, targets, as well as main discursive patterns, hierarchies, 
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discursive continuities and discontinuities, and discursive omissions, emphases, absences, 
contradictions, and discrepancies. We bring attention to textual excerpts and expressions that 
convey particular ideas either because they appear repeatedly in the analysed discourses; 
because we find them to be unpredicted; because they confirm or challenge claims brought up 
in the academic debates concerning EU actorness or EU/CSDP legitimacy; if a discourse 
specifically indicates that a certain idea is important; because we identify aspects that validate 
or contradict our assumptions, our claims, or our framework of analysis; or because they help 
us answer or understand our study’s objectives.  
In this context, we will explore the semiotic development of the EU’s normative 
justification as a crisis management actor, following a chronological organisation in order to 
provide a better understanding of the evolution of the EU’s discourses throughout time, and to 
better understand how contexts and practice both affect, and are affected by, the EU’s discourse. 
Here, we will substantiate the choice of our discursive corpus by showing its importance in 
context, and we will provide practical examples of the EU’s discursive patterns. In this chapter, 
context is fundamental. As such, in order to examine the relationship between the semiosis / 
text and other elements in the identified context where the social practices occur, we will engage 
in what Fairclough refers to as interactional analysis, which is meant to “show how semiotic, 
including linguistic properties of the text connect with what is going on socially in the 
interaction” (Fairclough, 2001: 240). This is where the post-structuralist concepts of 
deconstruction and textuality will be applied. In this context, some of the research questions 
that we will try to answer include the following: 
 
• How and why did the EU come to develop a crisis management policy? What are the 
historical / social contexts underlying the EU’s discourses? 
• How do the EU’s discourses as a crisis management actor relate with the practical 
implementation of the CSDP? 
 
Our CDA entails a linguistic aspect with paradigmatic and syntagmatic components. When we 
speak of including a paradigmatic component in our analysis, we refer to ‘paradigms’, or “the 
range of alternative possibilities available, and the choices that are made amongst them” (ibid.). 
The syntagmatic component of our analysis refers to the text’s phrasing, or the combination of 
textual and discursive elements and genres that result in what Fairclough labels as specific 
‘textures’, whereby “local social structurings of semiotic difference” are produced (idid.: 240-
241). These textures are analysed by looking at various elements of social practices, such as 
  54 
representations of the world, social relations, social identities, and cultural values (idib.: 240, 
244-245). Our analysis also features an examination of the discourses’ structure, organisation, 
and specific characteristics. We seek to identify the arguments / reasoning being used to propose 
or persuade certain ideas (in this case, the main idea that the EU should be perceived as a 
legitimate crisis management actor). In addition, we will look at how sentences are connected 
and combined, looking also at grammar and semantics, as well as vocabulary choices, 
meanings, and metaphors (ibid.: 241-242). Some of the research questions that we will seek to 
answer in this context include:  
 
• What are the key semiotic and linguistic features of the EU’s discourses? What kind of 
concepts / terminology / vocabulary is used?  
• What (if any) are the discursive continuities and discontinuities? 
 
This contextual and semiotic / linguistic aspect of our analysis of the EU’s discourses allows 
us to understand not only how the policy evolved in time, but how the discourses evolved with 
it and connect with the practice, and ultimately how the EU’s portrayal of itself and the rest of 
the world developed and evolved in the context of this policy. We will engage in Derridaean-
inspired deconstruction, whereby concepts will be analysed by looking at the contrasting or 
hierarchical opposition that they encase not only in the strictly linguistic / logocentric sense, 
but also (and especially) in a contextual sense – political, social, cultural – both aspects being 
essential to derive meaning from discourse. We will also critique, in a Foucauldian sense, ideas 
that may appear ‘normal’, ‘natural’, ‘expected’, ‘obvious’, or ‘innocent’ in the EU’s discourses, 
in addition to identifying the discursive and power asymmetries between the actor producing 
the discourse and others that are being represented therein.  
Following what Fairclough refers to as a structural analysis of the order of discourse, 
we will investigate “how the ‘order of discourse’ is structured – how semiosis itself is structured 
within the network of practices” (ibid.: 237). As mentioned previously, the EU’s discourses and 
narratives in external action are, in a semiotic sense, an ‘order of discourse’ (i.e. the ‘semiotic 
aspect of a social order’, ibid.: 235) where certain international actors – like the EU itself or 
certain countries or regions – are consistently represented in specific ways that may be 
favourable or unfavourable; and where some discourses dominate, overshadowing other 
discourses. This discursive hierarchy has to do with how discourses are made and disseminated 
by the EU, but also with how they are received by the latter’s interlocutors – bringing us back 
to the importance of these discourses for the EU’s legitimation efforts as an actor. In this sense, 
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Fairclough points out the importance of looking at interaction, as discourses are created for 
specific targets, and thus intrinsically envisage – and often even deliberately attempt – a 
reaction (ibid.: 239-240). Thus, we seek to answer the following research questions:  
 
• Is there a discursive hierarchy? If so, what are the dominant discourses and narratives, 
and what are the marginalised or concealed ones? 
• Are there elements that allow us to identify a ‘civilising’ attitude on behalf of the EU?  
• How are actors, including the EU, E/CSDP host countries, and other actors, represented 
in the EU’s discourses? 
• How are the EU’s crisis management discourses disseminated, and for whom are they 
meant? Are there signs that the discourses are directed towards specific actors?  
 
The main discursive patterns, narratives, representations, hierarchizations, and omissions found 
throughout chapter 4 will be debated and analysed in more detail in chapter 5, in light of the 
post-structuralist tenets adopted in the thesis, in light of the prevailing literature about discourse 
analysis in the contexts of (EU) foreign policy, and especially in light of our project’s research 
questions.  
Now that we have explained the conceptual and analytical orientation that will guide us 
throughout our analysis, we will now proceed to identifying some key claims stemming from 
the scholarly debate which we will attempt to verify or falsify, at least temporarily, in order to 
make a valid and useful contribution thereto. 
 
2.3 - Main objectives and claims 
 
The main goal of this study is to highlight the link between the EU’s legitimacy and its actorness 
in the field of crisis management by analysing the EU’s normative justification as a central 
element in its legitimation efforts (Beetham, 2013; Sjursen, 2002; Føllesdal, 2006; Manners, 
2006d, 2009b, 2013b; Manners, 2011; Manners and Whitman, 2013). Applying a post-
structuralist-inspired CDA, which entails that discourse, language, meaning, and representation 
are intricately linked to interpretation, is just one possible pathway to analysing the EU’s 
normative justification discourses as a crisis management actor in the context of the latter’s 
legitimation, rather than a definite or final analysis. CDA does not suit a positivist methodology 
(Hall, 1997: 42), as “it is (…) impossible to define identity as a variable that is causally separate 
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from foreign policy or to measure its explanatory value in competition with non-discursive 
material factors” (Hansen, 2006: 1). Even though we will conduct a discourse analysis and thus 
do not intend to identify causalities, we do start our analysis by identifying a set of recurrent 
claims that appear in the scholarly debate which we will, following our analysis, try to 
corroborate / verify or refute / falsify:  
 
• Following the post-structuralist tenet that proposes that the self constructs its identity 
and its definition by opposition, and that this opposition, in turn, generates an 
asymmetry of winners and losers (Devetak, 2009; Heidegger, 2004; Derrida, 2004; Der 
Derian and Shapiro, 1989; Diez, 2005, 2013), we argue that the EU, in its normative 
justification as a crisis management actor, places itself in a superior hierarchical 
positioning vis-à-vis those for whom the policy is meant (namely the E/CSDP host 
countries);  
• In line with criticisms made in the EU actorness academic debate, especially since the 
entering into force of the Lisbon Treaty (Baird, 2015; Barrinha, 2016; Gehring, 
Oberthür, and Mühleck, 2013; Groen and Niemann, 2013; Da Conceição-Heldt and 
Meunier, 2014; Niemann and Bretherton, 2013; Bretherton and Vogler, 2013), we argue 
that the EU gives more importance to curating its own identity and presenting itself as 
bringing value-added, than on its effectiveness, neglecting the latter in its normative 
justification as a crisis management actor (Bickerton, 2011b); 
• We claim that the EU’s alleged ‘responsibility’ to not only manage others’ crises, but 
also – and especially – to do it by upholding what it considers to be ‘normal’ and 
‘natural’ in the social world (i.e. its own values, ideals, and standards), reflects an 
underlying ‘civilising’ attitude (Manners, 2002, 2006, 2008, 2013; Pace, 2007; 
Bretherton and Vogler, 2006: 40; Del Sarto, 2016: 222; Kutter, 2014: 151; Zielonka, 
2013; Mitzen, 2006). 
 
As stated previously, we are well aware of the post-positivist nature of CDA and post-
structuralism, and thus their incompatibility with the testing of hypotheses. Our efforts in 
corroborating or refuting certain claims in the scientific literature serve the purpose of making 
a useful contribution to the scholarly debates on EU actorness, legitimacy, and discourse.  
Our analysis’ embeddedness in post-structuralist practices is useful due to their focus on 
the deconstruction and critique of asymmetric power relations, and their effort to ‘denaturalise’ 
meta-narratives that shape the social world. Using a Derridaean-inspired deconstructive 
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approach to our discourse analysis allows us to identify and understand dominant narratives 
and discourses, as well as underlying meaningful contradictions and differences that shape the 
EU’s discourses. Adding a Foucauldian-inspired approach, on the other hand, helps us to 
critique the apparent ‘normalcy’ or ‘universality’ and acknowledge the artificial nature of the 
EU’s discourses, and the power asymmetries they conceal. Thus, we will examine the EU’s 
normative justification narratives as a crisis management actor, i.e. how the EU portrays and 
justifies itself as having the responsibility to prevent, manage, and solve crises outside of its 
territorial sphere, mostly through the advancement of European norms, values, and institutions, 
whereby the latter’s alleged universality and appropriateness is somehow meant to legitimate 
the EU’s actorness.  
 
It is the dominant, surviving textual practices that give rise to the systems of meaning and 
value from which actions and policies are directed and legitimated. A critical political 
perspective is, accordingly, one that questions the privileged forms of representation whose 
domination has led to the unproblematic acceptance of subjects, objects, acts, and themes 
through which the political world is constructed (Michael J. Shapiro, in Der Derian and 
Shapiro, 1989: 13). 
 
In this study, we will attempt to identify the ontology and teleology of the narratives 
underpinning and thus leading to the notion of EU actorness in the field of crisis management, 
as constructed and projected by the EU through discourses. We will look at the evolution of the 
EU’s discourses since the inception of the CFSP and the ESDP, up until the launch of the EU 
Global Strategy. In the subsequent chapter, we begin our analysis by discussing aspects 
pertaining to authorship and discursive struggles that characterise the EU’s foreign policy 
discourses, and by identifying the discursive corpus that will be considered. 
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CHAPTER 3 - THE NETWORK OF PRACTICES: THE CONTEXT OF THE EU’S NORMATIVE 
JUSTIFICATION AS A CRISIS MANAGEMENT ACTOR 
 
In the absence of a sharp sword, does the EU possess something equally pointed, in which 
norm diffusion can create more than feelings of attraction towards the EU, but is carried 
out in ways which are less benign and consensual? At the very least this ambiguity suggests 
that narrative is a key component of normative power whose mechanics deserve closer 
examination (Martin, 2011: 190). 
 
As we have mentioned, discourse and narratives are fundamental in providing normative 
justification (Beetham, 2013; Sjursen, 2002; Føllesdal, 2006; Manners, 2006d, 2009b, 2013b; 
Manners, 2011; Manners and Whitman, 2013; Carta and Wodak, 2015) for actorness and for 
policy implementation at the international level, especially when a strong normative component 
is involved, and coercion is absent. To understand and deconstruct a discourse’s content, 
looking at context is fundamental. This chapter deals with an important part of the 
contextualisation and structural aspects of the semiosis underpinning the normative justification 
sustaining the EU’s crisis management actorness, namely the actors and discursive corpus that 
compose it. We begin by contextualising the network / structure / context of social practices 
where the identified problem stems from, and is rooted in. Throughout this contextualisation, 
we attempt to identify and understand the sources that construct the EU’s crisis management 
normative justification discourses by identifying, on one hand, the actors that ‘speak’ on the 
EU’s behalf and, on the other hand, the actual corpus of documents and speeches that contain 
normative justification elements in the context of the EU’s crisis management actorness. 
 
3.1 - Discursive struggles in EU crisis management policy 
 
Diversity – for which we might plausibly read incoherence – is part of European DNA, but 
it poses problems for any attempt to fashion a consistent narrative of normative power, 
even if there may be consensus for the idea that a narrative is indispensable for such power 
to function. While there may be agreement on narrative as process, content may prove to 
be more divisive (Martin, 2011: 190). 
 
In recent years, the EU has made visible efforts to present a well-curated, clean, unified image 
in external action, especially through the various EEAS channels and the High Representative’s 
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public diplomacy endeavours (Jørgensen, 2015: 493). Yet, the EU itself is not a unitary actor 
with a consistent single voice, but rather a complex and fragmented actor with different and 
varied discursive sources and channels – in terms of type of discourse, in terms of sources that 
produce them, and in terms of dissemination (Carta and Morin, 2014: 303-7). EU policy 
documents and public discourses are inherently ‘fluid’ (Niţoiu, 2013: 240), as they stem from 
complex bargaining processes at the national and European levels that take into consideration 
different governmental and non-governmental interests and actors, popular support, and other 
national and European level dynamics. Wodak, in explaining CDA, brings attention to the 
recurrence of the idea of ‘discursive struggles’ in such contexts: 
 
An important perspective in CDA related to the notion of ‘power’ is that it is very rare that 
a text is the work of any one person. In texts discursive differences are negotiated; they are 
governed by differences in power, which is in part encoded in and determined by discourse 
and by genre. Therefore, texts are often sites of struggle in that they show traces of differing 
discourses and ideologies contending and struggling for dominance (Wodak, 2004: 187). 
 
Constructivist-oriented research proposes that the construction of an EU identity as a global 
actor and projection and justification thereof onto the rest of the world is mostly developed 
through practices of ‘purposeful construction’ (Risse, 2004: 154; Bretherton and Vogler, 2006: 
37). These practices are carried out by both the EU institutions and bodies in charge of EUFP 
(and E/CSDP) and by the representatives of these bodies and EU Member States, and that 
ultimately form discourses made in the name of the EU or labelled with the EU’s common 
authorship, which, as they overlap, are institutionalised into narratives (Niţoiu, 2013: 240). In 
practice, such discourses and narratives are formed by proposing or endorsing collective 
statements that conceptualise and reiterate the EU’s identity and the standards and principles 
upon which this identity is based, or at least establish the latter’s limits (Diez, 2014b). These 
practices of purposeful construction result from collective action, which stems from 
socialisation practices, which in turn lead to internalisation – i.e., “the adoption of social beliefs 
and practices into the actor’s own repertoire of cognitions and behaviours” (Schimmelfennig, 
2000: 112), and which ultimately leads to widespread appropriation and outward projection of 
narratives – albeit heterogeneous – that qualify the EU as having such an identity. Yet, like all 
discourses, the EU’s discourses are full of discrepancies, contradictions, and conflicting 
definitions, more so because of the EU’s complex and composite nature as an actor that is made 
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up of different actors and is constantly evolving, resulting in an increased proclivity towards 
heterogeneity, fragmentation, and fluidity. 
Linked to this is also the connection between different discursive levels and the meanings 
and purpose of the discourses. Diez argues that there is a difference between an effort of 
coordination to communicate policies ‘in order to legitimise them’ and the actual meanings 
behind these practices (Diez, 2014a: 28-29). These struggles operate at three levels, according 
to Diez: the individual level, the collective level, and the ‘level of the overall discourse’, 
whereby “the picture is one of competing discursive positions that are not only actively pursued 
by collective actors, but also shape the latter’s identities” (ibid.: 29). It is mostly with this third 
level – the level of the overall discourse – that our study is concerned, in the sense that we are 
looking primarily at the main narratives that are made public in the name of the EU about what 
the world is or should be, according to the EU, its institutions and Member States, and especially 
what the EU’s role therein is or should be when it comes to crisis management.  
Our primary focus on the level of the overall discourse has to do with its purpose of 
shaping the collective actor’s identity (ibid.), as it makes up the more visible and public aspect 
of the actor’s discourse, as it evolves into narrative. Yet, due to their interconnectedness, we 
also consider the collective and individual levels of discourse, or rather different levels of 
collective and individual discourse – as both these concepts are difficult to discern when it 
comes to a Member State representative or an EU institutional representative (such as the High 
Representative), since their speeches and other texts that bear their authorship result from the 
collective work of entire teams of individuals (themselves not bereft of normative beliefs and 
individual experiences and cognitions), or they are made individually but in the name of a 
collective (a state, an institution, the EU structure, etc.) about the EU’s actorness in a given area 
(Carta and Morin, 2014: 303-5).  
Actors that speak publicly in the name of the EU, meaning that they produce and also 
reinforce the EU’s narratives in matters of foreign policy, including those that sustain the EU’s 
crisis management actorness, include the European Council, the Council, representatives of the 
Member States, the HR, the EEAS, the Commission, among others. Despite the EP’s distance 
from the E/CSDP’s decision-making, this political institution is also responsible for the 
discursive construction and reproduction of the EU’s identity and actorness in crisis 
management, and thus of the narratives that constitute the latter. As such, we have decided to 
include in our study the main EP resolutions that relate to the development of this policy, and 
to try to grasp the EP’s understanding and reproduction of the language and normative 
justifications used to sustain the EU’s actorness in crisis management. The mere variety of 
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actors that speak on the EU’s behalf is enough to generate the discursive struggles briefly 
explained in this section.  
The discursive corpus under analysis in this study is made up of the discourses (in the 
form of official and unofficial documents and statements of different types, as well as speeches) 
produced by these actors that contain elements that justify the EU’s crisis management 
actorness from a normative standpoint, and whence stem the narratives that underpin the EU’s 
identity in this field. Even though our study does not focus as much on how these discourses 
are formed, but more so on how they are used publicly in the name of the EU, as this is an 
aspect of our research that simply cannot be ignored. In fact, discursive struggles are relevant 
for the analysis and understanding of discourses made by a collective actor, insofar as they 
result in differences, incoherence, and inconsistencies, as we have pointed out before. In 
addition, the discursive struggles underlying a collective actor’s discourses also serve another 
purpose, according to Diez (2014a: 29; 2014b): they continuously set, reset, and validate the 
limits ‘to what is considered legitimate and practicable’: 
 
(…) meaning does not simply exist as a given, but that it has to be fought over and 
negotiated – there is a struggle over meaning: a struggle that takes place between discourses 
that construct and delineate meanings – for instance of what European identity is or where 
its boundaries lie – in different ways (Diez, 2014a: 28). 
   
In foreign policy discourse analysis – especially one that relies on a Derridaean deconstruction 
approach – it is not just a presence (of an expression, a concept, a commitment, a narrative) that 
is worth notice; asymmetries, hierarchies, opposites, absences, and vagueness can also be 
meaningful and serve different purposes (Diez, 2014b, 2016; Schumacher, 2015). Diez (2014b: 
325) points out that, according to this logic, meaning ‘is produced through difference’ and that 
this is a fluid process. The idea of meaning-making through difference – previously explained 
in the section about post-structuralist practices – postulates that a concept and its opposite co-
construct one another, in the sense that a concept or an identity is built upon what the ‘self’ is 
and is not (i.e., the ‘other’). An often-cited example is the co-construction of the concepts of 
sovereignty versus anarchy (ibid.). Another example is the use of the expression ‘failed states’ 
in the EU’s discourses, which is determined by a verb (fail) whose core definition is embedded 
with difference not only at a mere linguistic level, but at a political and social level as well, 
since it means not to succeed (at being whatever a state should be). So, by defining a ‘failed’ 
state – even if the definitions may vary slightly from discourse to discourse –, the EU is also 
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inherently providing its definition of ‘successful’ state, i.e. the opposite. In other words, the EU 
is setting, or at least trying to set, the limits to what is acceptable, recognisable, and practicable. 
Yet, meanings are contingent upon context, which is continuously changing. This, in 
turn, results in a sort of permanent state of dispute over the meaning of central concepts, as 
“social and political core concepts (…) tend to be ‘essentially contested’ exactly because they 
take on the function of a nodal point, drawing different meanings together and therefore 
stabilising broader conceptions of society” (ibid.). Because of this, in addition to being 
characterised by the heterogeneity and fragmentation that stems from inherent discursive 
struggles, discourses composed by various actors / individuals often result in the lowest 
common denominator, which results in the frequent use of expressions and concepts – as well 
as the collective actor’s expressed proposed commitments to this or that policy objective / goal 
/ target – that are more often than not fluid, vague, and ambiguous. In the case of the EU, this 
leaves room for policy development without compromising the Member States’ individual 
positions or the latter’s potential option to reduce the EU’s engagement in a given area. This 
fluidity, vagueness, and ambiguity is what makes the process of meaning-making through 
difference and delimitation especially relevant. On the other hand, it emphasises the importance 
of the converging discourses that are reproduced to the point of becoming distinguishable 
narratives. 
Before we look into the EU’s discourses and narratives, we need to identify the sources 
and data (including official and unofficial documents and statements, as well as speeches) that 
comprise what we identify as the EU’s normative justification discursive corpus as a crisis 
management actor, which is the object of the subsequent section. 
 
3.2 - Selection of an EU crisis management normative justification discursive corpus 
 
(…) if the analysis is to be about social signification, a discourse analysis should be based 
upon a set of texts by different people presumed (according to the research focus) to be 
authorized speakers / writers of a dominant discourse (…) (Milliken, 1999: 233). 
 
The goal of this thesis is to conduct a CDA of the EU’s normative justification as a central 
element in its legitimation efforts as a crisis management actor. We share the belief that “across 
EU documents a discourse can be identified according to which the Union is constructed as a 
unit which defends its own interests and has an obligation to take on responsibilities in the light 
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of international challenges” (Larsen, 2004: 69).23 As such, in order to compile a suitable 
discursive corpus to conduct our analysis, we established a set of criteria and priorities: 
 
• Texts24 must contain elements of normative justification and substantiation of the EU’s 
actorness ambitions, actions, and identity in the policy field of crisis management; 
• Priority should be given to texts drafted or uttered at the highest possible political 
official EU level; 
• Texts should form, as much as possible, a basis for policy development; 
• Texts must be drafted or uttered by the EU institutions, organs, representatives, or 
Member State representatives involved in the development and implementation of the 
E/CSDP. 
 
The core of our discursive corpus, which amounts to more than half of all analysed discursive 
instances, is comprised of all the European Council and Council decisions and other discourses 
which fit the abovementioned criteria produced in the designated timeframe (between 1992 and 
2016), including discourses labelled with the EU’s common authorship (such as treaties and 
strategic documents). To enrich and complement our core discursive corpus, we included 
discourses produced by each High Representative to date (namely Javier Solana, Catherine 
Ashton, and Federica Mogherini), as well as key discourses produced by other EU institutions 
and institutional actors, including some (like the EP or the Commission) that play a less 
prominent role in this policy field in terms of actual decision-making, but that nonetheless 
engage in the discursive construction of the EU’s identity as a crisis management actor. As 
such, we have added discourses produced by the European Commission that contain elements 
of normative justification of the EU’s crisis management role, including discourses produced 
by the institution as a whole and by each one of its Presidents during the designated timeframe 
(namely Jacques Delors, Jacques Santer, Romano Prodi, José Manuel Barroso, and Jean-Claude 
Juncker). We have also included all resolutions produced by the EP that fit into our criteria in 
the chosen timeframe for our analysis.  
                                               
23 Larsen, 2004: 69, citing Henrik Larsen (2000), ‘Europe’s Role in the World: The Discourse’, in 
Birthe Hansen and Bertel Heurlin (eds), The New World Order: Contrasting Theories, London: 
Macmillan. 
24 Text / textual is used here in the semiotic sense of discursive instance, a verbal recording which can 
take the form of written or oral discourses, or other manners of conveying messages. 
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In addition, we added discourses produced by some individual Member State 
representatives outside of their EU institutional roles (i.e. neither in the context of a European 
Council or Council meeting) that contain elements of normative justification of the EU’s crisis 
management actorness. The analysis of statements made by representatives of the individual 
Member States in these circumstances is helpful in understanding if there is corroboration 
and/or reproduction of the key narratives produced by the EU’s core official institutional 
discourse at the national level, even though this is not the primary focus of our research. In this 
context, we did not include discourses produced by all current (at the time of the writing of this 
thesis) 28 Member States. This is because the purpose of our thesis does not focus on having 
all Member States represented in our corpus regardless of what their representatives had to say, 
but rather discourses produced by Member State representatives that contributed to the 
construction of the EU’s identity as a crisis management actor by means of normative 
justification that were relevant for our study. Our study’s historical dimension weighed in our 
decision to include certain discourses produced by Member State representatives: on one hand, 
the EU did not always have the same number of Member States; and, on the other hand, not all 
Member States have always necessarily been equally discursively engaged in this policy field. 
As mentioned, we looked specifically for discourses that contained normative 
justification elements, i.e. elements that could help us understand how the EU justifies and 
substantiates its actorness ambitions and actions in the area of crisis management. As such, 
we did not look for just any random discourse that concerned crisis management in the context 
of the EU, and we acknowledge that there are other discourses concerning EU-level crisis 
management in addition to the ones that we have used in this project; instead, we purposefully 
incorporated discourses that contained normative considerations about the EU’s identity and 
ambitions as a crisis management actor – how it portrays its role, its potential, its 
responsibilities, the role of other actors, and ultimately form narratives regarding the ontology 
and teleology of its actorness in this area that justify and drive the development thereof.  
All studies have limitations, and most data collection in qualitative analysis, in 
particular, has limitations. By limitations we mean certain features that may hinder the analysis 
in some way, in terms of comprehensiveness or depth. Ultimately, it is important to ask 
ourselves and be aware of the level of impact that the limitations that we here identify have in 
the achievement of our specific research objectives, however important and deserving of due 
consideration and examination they may be beyond our thesis’ particular goals. There are 
significant advantages to using the data that we have collected in this study, namely in terms of 
the latter’s validity, reliability, and high quality.  
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Even though we believe that “there is a dominant EU discourse which articulates the 
EU as an international actor” (Larsen, 2004: 69), many other actors besides the ones that we 
have included speak on the EU’s behalf, including representatives of the Member States at 
various governmental levels, or representatives in EU delegations, for example. In other words, 
“in the making of EU’s foreign policy, the number of independent national and institutional 
actors that converge into the EU’s many and frequently contradictory voices accounts for an 
inherently pluralistic choir” (Carta and Wodak, 2015: 2). So, why certain discourses and not 
others? Where do we draw the line with regard to EU agency? How do we avoid a selection 
bias? These are not simple questions, reflecting the complexity and broadness of our object of 
study. Determining a corpus based on a sample is neither appropriate for the universe in 
question, nor for the methodology we have opted for. Does this mean that we must use all 
available discursive instances in existence produced by all actors that speak on behalf of the 
EU in a given area, since our study is meant to be representative of the EU’s discourse therein? 
Not necessarily, as we have established certain criteria for limiting the discursive corpus that 
we mean to analyse, that fit into to our study’s specific objectives and that seek to prevent us 
from incurring in a selection bias. Thus, our corpus includes all available discourses that meet 
the criteria that suit our study’s objectives (rather than a sample thereof). We acknowledge that 
both the criteria for determining our corpus and the actual choices of the discourses that 
comprise the latter are not absolute and may still be subject to criticism. The issue of EU agency 
and discursive identity is complex and deserves thorough critical thinking (Larsen, 2004; Carta 
and Morin, 2014; Carta and Wodak, 2015). But an advantage of doing research (and a constant 
inherent consequence thereof) is that the identification of limitations oftentimes generates 
opportunities. In this case to widen both the critical thinking about the EU’s agency and the 
scope of the EU’s discursive corpus in future research.  
Similarly to the diversity in our analysed discourses’ authorship, there is also variety in 
the type of discourses. This diversity has been included in our study, reflecting the multiplicity 
of discursive channels and instruments in the construction and justification narratives 
supporting this policy and of the EU’s constructed actorness and identity in this context. The 
following table lists the discursive corpus that will be subject to analysis, comprised of 138 
discursive units – including speeches, statements, treaties, policy documents, resolutions, and 
declarations – where we identify the institution or actor that produced the discourse, the type 
of discourse, and the year in which it was produced, ranging from 1992 to 2016.  
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AUTHOR TITLE / CONTEXT TYPE YEAR 
EU  Treaty on European Union (Maastricht) Treaty 
1992 
WEU Council of 
Ministers  
Petersberg Declaration Declaration 
Jacques Delors 
(Commission President) 
Address to the CSCE Summit - Helsinki Speech 
Jacques Delors 
(Commission President) 
Address to Special Session of EP 
Committees on the Former Yugoslavia 
Speech 
European Council Presidency conclusions, Brussels Policy Document 1993 
Jacques Santer 
(Commission President) 
Address to EP, Strasbourg Speech 
1995 
WEU Council of 
Ministers 
European Security: A Common Concept of 
the 27 WEU Countries 
Declaration 
European Council Presidency Conclusions, Turin Policy Document 
1996 
European Council Presidency Conclusions, Dublin Policy Document 
EU Treaty on European Union (Amsterdam) Treaty 1997 
Jacques Santer 
(Commission President) 
The EU in the 21st century: political dwarf 
or world actor? 
Speech 
1998 
Tony Blair (UK Prime 
Minister) 
Informal European summit in Pörtschach, 
Austria 
Press statement 
European Council Presidency Conclusions, Vienna Policy Document 
Jacques Chirac & 
Gerhard Schröder, HSGs 
of Germany & France 
Franco-German Summit Final Declaration Declaration 
Tony Blair & Jacques 
Chirac, HSGs of the UK 
& France 
Joint Declaration, delivered at the British-
French Summit, Saint-Malo 
Declaration 
European Council  
Annex III: Cologne European Council 
Presidency Report on Strengthening of the 
ESDP 
Policy Document 
1999 German Council 
Presidency 
Informal reflection at WEU on Europe’s 
security and defence 
Draft Policy 
Document 
German Foreign Ministry 
Informal meeting of EU foreign ministers 
Eltville, German proposal 
Draft Policy 
Document 
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Jacques Chirac & 
Gerhard Schröder, HSGs 
of Germany & France 
Franco-German Defence and Security 
Council Declaration 
Declaration 
Tony Blair and Massimo 
D’Alema, HSGs of the 
UK & Italy 
Joint Declaration Launching European 
Defence Capabilities Initiative, British-
Italian summit, London 
Declaration 
European Council Presidency Conclusions, Helsinki Policy Document 
European Council 
Presidency Conclusions, Santa Maria da 
Feira  
Policy Document 
2000 
Romano Prodi 
(Commission President) 
Message on the 50th anniversary of the 
Schuman Declaration 
Statement 
EP 
Resolution on the establishment of a 
common ESDP after Cologne and Helsinki  
Resolution 
European Council  Presidency Conclusions, Nice Policy Document 
HR & Commission 
Report with recommendations for 
improving coherence & effectiveness of 
conflict prevention 
Draft Policy 
Document 
Council 
Council Common Position concerning 
conflict prevention, management & 
resolution in Africa 
Policy Document 
2001 
Romano Prodi 
(Commission President) 
After Reform: a future strategy for Europe 
as a whole 
Speech 
Council 
Draft EU Programme for Prevention of 
Violent Conflicts 
Draft Policy 
Document 
European Council Presidency Conclusions, Göteborg Policy Document 
European Council 
Conclusions & Plan of Action, 
Extraordinary European Council meeting, 
Brussels 
Policy Document 
European Council 
Follow-up to the September 11 Attacks & 
the Fight Against Terrorism 
Policy Document 
European Council Presidency Conclusions, Laeken Policy Document 
EP 
Report on the progress achieved in the 
implementation of the CFSP 
Report 
European Council Presidency Conclusions, Seville Policy Document 
2002 Romano Prodi 
(Commission President) 
A stronger foreign and security policy for 
Europe 
Speech 
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EP 
Resolution on the state of the ESDP and 
EU-NATO relations 
Resolution 
EP Progress in implementation of CFSP Resolution 
EU and NATO EU-NATO Declaration on ESDP Declaration 
Council 
Council Decision on the launching of the 
EU military operation in the DRC 
Policy Document 
2003 
European Council European Security Strategy Policy Document 
European Council 
Document on EU-NATO Consultation, 
Planning and Operations 
Policy Document 
European Council 
Extraordinary European Council 
Conclusions, Brussels 
Policy Document 
European Council 
Athens Declaration, Informal European 
Council, Athens 
Policy Document 
European Council Presidency’s Statement on Iraq, Athens Policy Document 
European Council Presidency Conclusions, Brussels (March) Policy Document 
European Council Presidency Conclusions, Thessaloniki Policy Document 
EEAS Fact sheet on EUPM BiH Factsheet 
EU Treaty on European Union (Nice) Treaty 
Javier Solana (HR) 
Ceremony marking the end of EUFOR 
Artemis DRC 
Press statement 
European Council 
Presidency Conclusions, Brussels 
(December) 
Policy Document 
Javier Solana (HR) & 
George Robertson 
(NATO SG) 
Press point Press statement 
Council Headline Goal 2010 Policy Document 
2004 
Council 
Council Joint Action on the extension of 
EUPOL PROXIMA 
Policy Document 
Council Council Joint Action on EUJUST THEMIS Policy Document 
Council Council Joint Action EUFOR BiH Policy Document 
Council 
Common Position on conflict prevention, 
management & resolution in Africa, 
repealing Common Position 
2001/374/CFSP 
Policy Document 
Council Council Joint Action on EUPOL Kinshasa Policy Document 
Council Secretariat Fact sheet on EU EUFOR ALTHEA 3 Factsheet 
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Javier Solana (HR) 
Launch of the mission EUJUST THEMIS 
in Georgia 
Press statement 
Council Declaration on Combating Terrorism Policy Document 
Javier Solana (HR) The European Strategy – The Next Steps? Speech 
José Manuel Barroso 
(Commission President) 
The European Union and the Emerging 
World Order: Perceptions and Strategies 
Speech 
Javier Solana (HR), 
Declain Kelleher (PSC 
Chaiman) & Jaap de 
Hoop Scheffer (NATO 
SG) 
Joint press point with NATO SG, PSC 
Chairman, & EU HR 
Press statement 
Council Council Joint Action on EU SSR DRC Policy Document 
2005 
Javier Solana (HR) Shaping an effective EU Foreign Policy Speech 
EP 
Resolution on the European Security 
Strategy 
Resolution 
Council Council Joint Action on EUJUST LEX Policy Document 
Council 
Council Joint Action on the EUPOL 
COPPS 
Policy Document 
Council Council Joint Action on EU BAM Rafah Policy Document 
Council Council Joint Action on AMM Policy Document 
Javier Solana (HR) 
Ceremony marking the end of the EUPM 
FYROM 
Press statement 
EEAS Press Document EUPOL-Kinshasa Press statement 
2006 
Council Presidency Report on ESDP Policy Document 
Commission 
‘Europe in the World’, Practical Proposals 
for Coherence, Effectiveness & Visibility 
Communication 
EP 
Resolution on the implementation of the 
ESS in the context of the ESDP 
Resolution 
European Council Presidency Conclusions, Brussels Policy Document 
Javier Solana (HR) 
From Cologne to Berlin & Beyond: 
Operations, Institutions & Capabilities 
Speech 
2007 
Angela Merkel (German 
Chancellor & 
representing the 
European Council 
Presidency), Hans-Gert 
Declaration on the Occasion of the 50th 
Anniversary of the Signature of the Treaties 
of Rome 
Declaration 
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Pottering (EP President), 
and José Manuel Barroso 
(Commission President) 
Council Council Joint Action on EUPOL RD Congo Policy Document 
Council 
Council Joint Action on EUPOL 
AFGANISTAN 
Policy Document 
Council 
Council Joint Action on EUFOR CAR 
Tchad 
Policy Document 
PSC Civilian Headline Goal 2010 Policy Document 
David Miliband (UK 
Foreign Secretary) 
Europe 2030: Model Power Not 
Superpower 
Speech 
José Manuel Barroso 
(Commission President) 
The European Union after the Lisbon 
Treaty  
Speech 
Council Security and Development Policy Document 
Council EU Concept for Force Generation Policy Document 
2008 
Council 
Council Joint Action EU SSR GUINEA-
BISSAU 
Policy Document 
Council Council Joint Action on EUMM Georgia Policy Document 
Council Council Joint Action on EULEX Kosovo Policy Document 
Council 
Council Joint Action on EUNAVFOR 
Somalia 
Policy Document 
EU Report on the Implementation of the ESS Report 
Council 
General Affairs & External Relations 
Council 
Press statement 
2009 
European Council Presidency Conclusions (June) Policy Document 
EP Resolution on the ESS and the ESDP Resolution 
Council Report on the ESDP Report 
Council 
EU Concept for the Use of Force in EU-led 
Military Operations 
Policy Document 
Council Secretariat Fact sheet on EU EUFOR ALTHEA 16 Factsheet 
Council Secretariat Fact sheet on EU EUFOR ALTHEA 19 Factsheet 
EEAS Fact sheet on EUFOR Tchad/RCA Factsheet 
EU Treaty on European Union (Lisbon) Treaty 
Javier Solana (HR) Mobilise now to stabilise Somalia Opinion article 
Javier Solana (HR) Together we are Stronger Speech 
Council Secretariat  Fact sheet on EU EUFOR ALTHEA 20 Factsheet 2010 
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European Council Presidency Conclusions (September) Policy Document 
Catherine Ashton (HR) Munich security conference Speech 
Council Council conclusions on conflict prevention Policy Document 
2011 
EEAS Annual Activity Report Report 
EP 
Resolution on the development of the 
CSDP and the Lisbon Treaty 
Resolution 
Council Secretariat  Fact sheet on EU EUFOR ALTHEA 27 Factsheet 
2012 
EEAS Fact sheet on EUSEC RD CONGO Factsheet 
Council Council Conclusions on CSDP Policy Document 
EP 
Resolution on the development of the 
CSDP 
Resolution 
Herman Van Rompuy & 
José Manuel Barroso 
(Presidents of the 
European Council & 
Commission) 
Joint statement on the award of the 2012 
Nobel Peace prize to the EU 
Statement 
European Council European Council Conclusions  Policy Document 
Council Council conclusions on the EEAS Review Policy Document 
2013 
Catherine Ashton (HR) 
Comprehensive approach to external 
conflict & crises 
Joint 
communication 
Catherine Ashton (HR) EEAS Review Report 
Catherine Ashton (HR) 
Final report on the CSDP: Preparing the 
European Council on Security & Defence 
Report 
EP 
Resolution on the implementation of the 
CSDP 
Resolution 
European Council 
European Council Conclusions 19/20 
December 
Policy Document 
Council 
Council conclusions on comprehensive 
approach 
Policy Document 
2014 
EEAS Fact sheet on EUJUST LEX-Iraq Factsheet 
EEAS 
Civilian Operations Commander 
Operational Guidelines for Monitoring, 
Mentoring & Advising in Civilian CSDP 
missions 
Policy Document 
José Manuel Barroso 
(Commission President) 
Strengthening Europe security and defence 
sector 
Speech 
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Council 
Conclusions on implementation of EU 
Strategy for Security and Development in 
the Sahel 
Policy Document 
Council Council conclusions on CSDP Policy Document 
2015 
Federica Mogherini (HR) 
Joint Consultation Paper ‘Towards a new 
ENP’ 
Consultation paper 
Commission  
Capacity building in support of security & 
development - Enabling partners to prevent 
& manage crises 
Joint 
communication 
EP Resolution on the HR’s Annual Report Resolution 
Commission  The European Agenda on Security 
Joint 
communication 
Council Conclusions on the Review of the ENP Policy Document 
Jean-Claude Juncker 
(Commission President) 
& Jens Stoltenberg 
(NATO SG)  
  
Written joint statement Statement 
European Council European Council conclusions, Brussels Policy Document 
EP 
Resolution on the implementation of the 
CSDP 
Resolution 
Federica Mogherini (HR) 
Report ahead of the June 2015 European 
Council on security & defence 
Report 
Jean-Marc Ayrault & 
Frank-Walter Steinmeier 
(Foreign Ministers of 
France & Germany) 
A strong Europe in a world of uncertainties Statement 
2016 
EU 
Shared Vision, Common Action: A 
Stronger Europe - a Global Strategy for the 
EU’s Foreign and Security Policy 
Policy Document 
 
Table 1 - EU crisis management normative justification discursive corpus 
 
As far as language is concerned, even though we are aware that the EU’s discourses are 
constructed and divulged in several languages, we have opted for working mostly with the 
English language, even though we do engage with writings and speeches in other languages (in 
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particular French). This is not free of implications for CDA, especially for its more specific 
linguistic aspects, such as vocabulary or metaphors. We acknowledge that this is a deliberate 
choice that results in an incomplete analysis of the EU’s discourses because it does 
communicate in other languages. However, we did not select this language randomly, as 
English is one of the three official working languages of the EU – alongside French and German 
– which means that while not all documents are translated into every single EU language, they 
are always made available in one or the three working languages.  
In the following chapter we proceed with the CDA by analysing the historical and 
semiotic evolution of crisis management at the EU level, so that we may, in the subsequent 
chapter, identify and analyse the characteristics of the EU’s main normative justification 
narratives as a crisis management actor. 
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CHAPTER 4 - THE SEMIOTIC EVOLUTION OF THE EU’S NORMATIVE JUSTIFICATION 
DISCOURSES AS A CRISIS MANAGEMENT ACTOR 
 
Throughout the present chapter we will present a chronological overview of the historical and 
semiotic evolution of the EU’s crisis management policy and discourses, starting with the 
inception of the EU’s CFSP and ESDP in the 1990s, and finishing with the launch of the 2016 
EU Global Strategy. The goal of this chapter is to provide an understanding of the evolution of 
the EU’s discourses as a crisis management actor throughout the identified period, in order to 
identify normative justifications for engaging in this policy area and for developing a sense of 
actorness therein, and also comprehend the context of discourse and practice and how they are 
mutually constitutive. In a codification-type logic, we aim to present the constituent elements 
of our discursive corpus, to identify their connections with one another, their contexts, while 
simultaneously justifying their choice and providing practical examples. In this chapter, we 
intend to identify the EU’s main recurrent discursive and narrative patterns, the underlying 
asymmetries and hierarchies, the discursive continuities and discontinuities, as well as 
omissions and discrepancies, which will be further discussed and analysed in chapter 5. For 
practical purposes, we have divided this chapter into several subchapters that focus on different 
periods of the development of the EU’s crisis management actorness. 
 
4.1 - The genesis and first steps towards the establishment of the ESDP 
 
The present section analyses and contextualises the discourses produced or divulged in the 
period comprehended between 1992 and 2003 by European institutions and actors involved in 
the development of the establishment of the ESDP that contain elements of normative 
justification. This period represents the early steps in the formation of the ESDP and, as such, 
is particularly rich in discursive elements that provide normative justifications for the 
establishment and early development of this policy area and the EU’s actorness therein, amply 
influenced and driven by their specific historical, social, and institutional context. Here, we are 
already able to identify the genesis of some of the main narratives that mark the EU’s discourse 
and normative justification as a crisis management actor that will be further analysed in chapter 
5. 
The EU, established in 1992 with the Maastricht Treaty, included a ‘pillar’ of security 
known as the CFSP. The aim of this policy was to coordinate common positions and joint 
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actions of EU Member States, while the implementation of decisions with defence implications 
was dealt with by the WEU.25 A paragraph in the Maastricht Treaty preamble reads: 
 
RESOLVED to implement a common foreign and security policy including the eventual 
framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence, 
thereby reinforcing the European identity and its independence in order to promote peace, 
security and progress in Europe and in the world (EU, 1992: 2). 
 
Here, we notice that there is an explicit mention of promotion of progress outside Europe in 
the context of an ‘eventual’ (renamed ‘possible’ since the Amsterdam Treaty) future defence 
policy. This explicit mentioning of progress promotion in the treaty preamble – which has 
maintained, by-and-large, its phrasing up until the Lisbon Treaty – suggests a dichotomist 
distinction between progress and stagnation vis-à-vis other countries and regions, in a logic of 
winners and losers. However, as the same expression is directed at Europe, the potential idea 
of a contrast / opposition disappears as such. Nonetheless, the normative premise in the EU’s 
discourse of a link between a future common defence policy and the reinforcement of ‘the’ 
European identity as a means of promoting peace, security, and progress as a justification for 
the former is well-defined from the beginning. 
The Maastricht Treaty lists five objectives for the newly created Union (Article B), 
whereby the second one – preceding the protection of Member State nationals’ rights and 
interests, or the maintenance of the acquis communautaire – is to ‘assert its identity on the 
international scene’ through the implementation of a CFSP and the ‘eventual framing’ of a 
common defence policy (ibid.: 5). This demonstrates that the goal of establishing an ‘actorness’ 
identity in the area of security and defence is considered not only intentional but also important 
and has been explicitly present in the EU’s discourse since its inception, rather than being an 
unintended consequence. Within the specific provisions on a common foreign and security 
policy (title V), unlike in the preamble, there is explicit mention of a mission to “develop and 
consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental 
                                               
25 The WEU, created in 1954, was an intergovernmental organisation, independent from the European 
integration process, composed of ministers of defence and foreign affairs of several European 
states. However, due to its co-existence with the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), the 
WEU’s role was, in practice, mostly limited to that of “a discussion forum for European NATO 
members where the presence of US representatives was considered undesirable” (Bretherton and 
Vogler, 2006: 187). 
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freedoms” (ibid.: 94) indicating the genesis of a politically oriented normative attitude towards 
external actors, and a normative justification for the development of the CFSP. Nonetheless, in 
this treaty this is not, in any way, related to a defence policy (which, at this point, is merely 
referred to as ‘eventual’), nor is it, for that matter, linked to crisis management. 
The political shift that led to the establishment of the EU and its foreign and security 
policy is linked to a series of events and discourses that took place in the late 1980s and early 
1990s, namely the end of the Cold War and the subsequent emergence of doubts regarding 
NATO’s purpose and future, as well as the outbreak of armed conflict within continental 
Europe, specifically in (then) Yugoslavia, which called for European attention and action 
(European Council, 1993: 29-30; Bretherton and Vogler, 2006: 187). These events ultimately 
led to the WEU’s Petersberg Declaration, whereby the WEU confirmed its will to engage in 
humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks, as well as “tasks of combat forces in crisis 
management, including peacemaking” (WEU Council of Ministers, 1992: 6). None of these 
concepts is defined in the declaration, which indicates a recurrent and deliberate ambiguity and 
vagueness in European discourse in what concerns the actual undertakings that these tasks / 
missions might entail in the future. As the Petersberg Declaration shows, the development of a 
security and defence area in the context of the EU has been linked, from the beginning, to crisis 
management outside of the EU’s territory, instead of a more traditional territorial defence type 
of arrangement (this would remain NATO’s task).  
The constant use of nomenclatures such as ‘Ministers’ or ‘WEU Member States’ as the 
leading actors in the document (to the detriment of using simply WEU or EU) suggests that 
neither the WEU nor the EU were seen as full actors, reflecting the embryonic stage of the 
“defence component of the European Union” (ibid.: 6, 9), and highlighting the 
intergovernmental nature of this area. Nonetheless, there is mention of the “ongoing 
development of a European security identity” in the context of the activities of the WEU 
Institute for Security Studies (ibid.: 6), although the document does not elaborate on what that 
may entail either. Throughout the declaration, the normative justifications provided for the 
development and launch of the ‘Petersberg tasks’ are constantly linked to ensuring and 
reinforcing European stability and security. This indicates that the tasks, and thus the origin of 
EU crisis management actorness, were linked to territorial defence, even if only indirectly.  
In this document, there is not much specific mention of the potential recipients of the 
newly created tasks; nonetheless, it refers to the importance of a sub-group’s work on ‘security 
in the Mediterranean’ and on the WEU’s “dialogue with the Maghreb countries, taking into 
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account the political developments both in these countries and in the region” (ibid.: 5) in what 
may be identified as an early idea of what would later become the ENP. 
On July 10, 1992, European Commission President Jacques Delors addressed, in 
Helsinki, the HSGs present at a Summit of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in 
Europe (CSCE), a precursor to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(OSCE). Delors starts by arguing that “peace, security, cooperation and economic growth - 
those, along with the social dimension, are the major challenges facing the continent of Europe 
today, no less than in the past” (Delors, 1992a). In describing the European Community, Delors 
emphasises ‘post-war backdrop’ that led to its establishment, whereby “a group of states which 
had only recently been at war with one another came together of their own free will, resolved 
to share a common destiny (…) sharing common values” (ibid.). The Commission President 
calls the CSCE a “genuine forum for cooperation between states that now profess to share the 
same values” as the EU, and brings attention to the EU’s ‘complementary’ to the CSCE (ibid.), 
emphasising the importance of a transatlantic community of values, which would become a 
leitmotif in EUFP discourse (Larsen, 2004), as would the EU’s role as complementary to other 
international organisations due to its uniqueness. 
One month later, on August 10, 1992, Jacques Delors addressed a special session of EP 
committees on the former Yugoslavia to discuss the possibility of a role for the EC/EU as a 
conflict mediator therein. To clarify this position, the Commission President begins by stating 
that “the Community is not sufficiently integrated or sufficiently powerful to (…) impose itself 
as a mediator in a conflict whose tragic effects are being felt only two hours away from 
Brussels” adding that “only Political Union, built on the dual foundation of  monetary 
integration and a common  foreign  and  security policy, will put us in a position to assume our 
global responsibilities boldly and lucidly” (Delors, 1992b). In other words, what Delors is 
saying is that the EC/EU may not be ready, but there are, nonetheless, ‘global responsibilities’ 
that must be assumed, even if only at a later stage. A clue to why such responsibilities exist is 
presented subsequently, when the Commission President states that without the efforts already 
made in the establishment of the EU, “the tragedy of Yugoslavia could well have spelled serious 
political tension for Western Europe” (ibid.), meaning that ensuring EU security is a key driver 
for both integration and a foreign and security policy. 
After describing the conflict in the Western Balkans, Delors argues that “it seems clear 
enough that in the absence of a credible (…) prospect of military intervention, there is nothing 
to halt the subtle, murderous strategy of the Serbian leaders,” and subsequently poses 
provocative questions to the members of the EC/EU: “do the Twelve agree to create this 
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credible prospect on a realistic, demonstrative operational basis? Or can they not agree to go 
that far?” (ibid.). The speech finishes with a statement recalling the EC/EU’s historical domestic 
peace-oriented nature and resulting external finalité, which characterises the ‘EU as a model’ 
narrative (Ferreira-Pereira, 2010) that would come to mark EUFP in decades to come: “for fifty 
years we have been struggling to build a united Europe, to outlaw civil strife between 
Europeans. We have a degree of success to our credit. But we are in duty bound to militate for 
recognition of the same values throughout the greater Europe. That is the new challenge of 
History” (Delors, 1992b). 
On January 17, 1995, Jacques Santer, as newly appointed President of the European 
Commission, addressed the EP in Strasbourg. After praising his predecessor’s work, Santer 
confronts the Commission’s (and the EU’s) tasks in the years to come, including the situation 
in former Yugoslavia. In this context, the Commission President frames the EU’s legacy and 
role as coinciding in ontology and teleology as a peace project: “this tragedy teaches us one 
fundamental lesson: it is more important than ever that the Union remain an axis of peace and 
prosperity for the continent of Europe” (Santer, 1995). Santer highlights the importance of the 
EU not becoming a “haven of peace in a troubled sea,” thus explaining “the importance of 
developing a genuine foreign and security policy (ibid.). The Commission President then lists 
a set of questions concerning the EU’s domestic and external role, including questioning what 
the EU is doing “to make Europe’s voice heard in the rest of the world” (ibid.), in the sense of 
determining the Commission’s tasks for the subsequent years. Here, Santer uses Europe as a 
metonym for the EU, ascribing it an abstract political and cultural value-based identity (which 
is institutionalised as the EU), but is not limited to a strict geographic concept (Kuus, 2011). 
Santer advocates in favour of a strong CFSP, urging the Member States to determine 
their common interests so that the pursuit of the latter may be more effective. He argues that 
that which is stopping the EU from having a ‘real’ CFSP is “the lack of a global and coherent 
vision” (Santer, 1995), adding that what is missing is concerted effort and planning as well as 
a strategic dimension. The CFSP, according to Santer, “should apply to the whole world,” even 
though he focuses primarily on the EU’s neighbourhood (which, at the time, included the 
Central and Eastern European countries that came to be a part of the EU following the Nice 
Treaty). The Commission President states that “we are already closely involved in developments 
in the Middle East and naturally have a vital interest in actively promoting the peace process 
there” (ibid.). Regarding the transatlantic relationship, Santer claims that the EU and the US 
“are and will remain very close partners (…) think of our common interests in security and 
defence. My view of our relationship is not pessimistic but lucid and realistic: Europe must be 
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united if it is to stand as an equal to the United States” (ibid.). Here we emphasise the idea of 
equating the EU with the US as an actor (so long as it is united), reflecting actorness 
expectations for the newly created EU, and bringing attention to the importance of the 
transatlantic relationship. 
Concerning security and defence, Santer recalls that “the Treaty also commits us to a 
common security policy and, eventually, to a common defence”, adding that “this will 
undoubtedly be one of the key issues at the intergovernmental conference” (ibid.). Although 
Santer does not make many normative considerations about the EU’s envisaged role as a crisis 
management actor, at this point he asks about the tactic to link the WEU and the EU, as well as 
the configuration of the EU’s relationship with NATO. The EU’s role is merely referred to, in 
this context, as regional, as Santer argues that “we have to build a system which will foster 
balance and peace across the whole continent” (ibid.).  
On November 14, 1995, an Extraordinary Council of WEU Ministers met in Madrid and 
agreed upon a document called ‘European Security: A Common Concept of the 27 WEU 
Countries.’ The document, a precursor to the 2003 European Security Strategy and to the 
institutional development of a security and defence policy at the EU level, contained “a first 
limited attempt to draft a distinctive European security strategy” (Biscop, 2004: 11), whereby 
the WEU sought to 
 
(…) identify the common interests of Europeans, the risks and potential threats, but also 
Europe's new responsibilities in a strategic environment in which Europe's security is not 
confined to security in Europe, and in which Europe has acquired the capability to make its 
own contribution to the building of a just and peaceful world order (WEU Council of 
Ministers, 1995: 1). 
 
The WEU ministers acknowledge a new security environment as a result of the end of the Cold 
War and seek to identify the European states’ place therein. There is an assumption of 
‘indivisibility’ of European security and “that a comprehensive approach should underlie the 
concept of security and that cooperative mechanisms should be applied in order to promote 
security and stability in the whole of the continent” (ibid.). One of the means through which the 
ministers propose to carry out this task is “the establishment of international organizations 
based on common values of democracy, human rights and the rule of law” (ibid.). The document 
emphasises Europe’s efforts “towards building an international order based on legal 
instruments”, adding that “no other region of the world has gone so far” in doing so (ibid.). 
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 The document ‘analyses the wide range of security challenges that confront Europe’ in 
the mid-1990s. Europe’s interests are identified as the upholding of ‘democratic values and 
human rights, the defence of peace, international order and the rule of law’; Europe’s economic 
interests; and the security of European citizens. The risks faced by Europe are identified as 
‘potential armed conflicts’; the proliferation of WMDs; ‘international terrorism, organized 
crime, drug trafficking and uncontrolled and illegal immigration’; as well as ‘environmental 
risks.’ The ‘transatlantic relationship’ is emphasised as particularly relevant in the post-Cold 
War world, where a community exists that is “guided by their faith in the values of human 
dignity, intellectual freedom and civil liberties and in the democratic institutions” (ibid.: 11). 
The discourse of an “enduring validity and indispensability of the Alliance” (ibid.: 12) is 
frequently asserted throughout the document (in line with subsequent discourses, forming a 
recurrent narrative), and the development of a European security actorness ambition is framed 
within its context: 
 
Bearing in mind the radically altered security environment, the further development of 
European cooperation in the field of security and defence and the broader definition of 
what constitutes a security challenge, proposals have been made for a further strengthening 
of transatlantic ties and a broader framework to express the solidarity and commonality of 
values and interests that constitute the link between the European and North American 
partners (ibid.). 
 
The emphasis for the development of a security policy in the European context is put not only 
in the European continent itself, including the Balkans and Eastern Europe, but also on the 
regions to the East and to the South that would come to be encompassed by the future ENP, 
referred to as areas ‘of strategic interest for Europe’. The Mediterranean basin in particular is 
identified by the WEU ministers as being ‘a high priority for European security’, with the EU 
characterised as “play[ing] a significant role in the Middle East peace process” (ibid.: 16). 
Africa is also identified as an ‘area of interest for Europe’ and a potential field for the 
development of European-led crisis management as “further deterioration of the social, 
economic and political situation on the African continent would aggravate the risk of 
permanent instability and increase migratory pressure from the Africans”, and that “further 
instability is generated by a lack of adherence to democratic principles, widespread, unchecked 
corruption and violations of human rights” (ibid.: 17). 
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The document also identifies the contribution that the WEU countries propose in order 
to ensure ‘security and stability in Europe, in neighbouring areas and in the wider world’, 
emphasising crisis prevention and management efforts. The ministers highlight the importance 
of the institutional developments within the EU, in coordination with the WEU, NATO, and 
the OSCE. The WEU ministers – repeatedly describing the WEU as ‘the defence component of 
the EU’ and ‘a means to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance’ – bring 
attention to the importance of the Petersberg Declaration for the development of EU-level crisis 
prevention and management. Nonetheless, they admit that while “considerable progress has 
been made over the past few years in strengthening the ability of WEU nations to respond to 
crises, (…) it is undeniable that the achievements do not as yet match up to the objectives that 
have been set” (ibid.: 25), naming the example of ex-Yugoslavia.  
The idea of developing an EU crisis management policy begins to be discussed a few 
years later, at the European Council meeting in Turin, in 1996. In the meeting proceedings, the 
EU Member States’ HSG argue in favour of a ‘strengthened capacity for external action of the 
Union’, whose necessity is justified by stating that “the international situation increases the 
responsibilities of the Union and the need to strengthen its identity on the international scene 
with the aim of promoting peace and stability” (European Council, 1996a: 2). In this discourse, 
there is already an underlying assumption of an existing EU responsibility as well as a need to 
project and strengthen its identity, both of which are increased by the international situation. 
The ‘international situation’, thus, serves as an additional justification for the EU to strengthen 
its identity and external action, but it is preceded by an assumption that these are needed 
regardless. Here, the objective that ‘the EU has set itself’ “of implementing a common foreign 
and security policy, including the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might 
in time lead to a common defence” (ibid.) is identified, which gained importance in subsequent 
years with the drafting and signing of the Amsterdam Treaty.  
A similar discourse is adopted in the Irish Presidency Conclusions of the December 
1996 European Council in Dublin, where European HSGs state that “the Union must enhance 
its capacity to ensure that its external action is coherent and effective in all its aspects, and it 
must improve its decision-making procedures, if it is to play a role in the world commensurate 
with its responsibilities and its potential” (European Council, 1996b: 4). Underlying this 
discourse is again an assumption that the EU does have the responsibilities and potential to play 
a role in the international scene and engage in external action, and it is suggested that this also 
applies to crisis management, as a mention is made to “the strengthening of links with the 
WEU” (ibid.). Yet, because the WEU was dependent on NATO capabilities for military 
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operations, the questioning of NATO’s raison d’être along with the growing desire of the EU 
to become an international actor in its own right made it turn towards the ‘Petersberg tasks’, 
which were signed at the same time as the Maastricht Treaty, but were only launched with the 
Amsterdam Treaty (signed in 1997).  
As mentioned, the Amsterdam Treaty’s preamble contains a paragraph relating to the 
CFSP with similar phrasing as the Maastricht Treaty, whereby a common defence is no longer 
referred to as ‘eventual’, but becomes ‘progressive’, and a specific article offering provisions 
for this ‘progressive framing’ is explicitly mentioned. Again, the idea of ‘promotion of peace, 
security and progress’ is used in reference to Europe, as well to the ‘world’ (EU, 1997: 149). 
The apparent hierarchy in the listing of the EU’s objectives (Article 2) that was seen in the 
Maastricht Treaty remains, with the goal of ‘asserting its identity on the international scene’ by 
means of a CFSP and ‘progressive framing’ of a common defence policy (ibid.: 152) remaining 
almost the same, reflecting only the minor changes observed in the preamble. In the Amsterdam 
Treaty’s specific provisions on CFSP (title V) we noticed a difference in the phrasing of the 
second CFSP objective in comparison to the Maastricht Treaty that reveals a growing 
confidence in the EU’s actorness and cohesiveness in this area, as the sentence “to strengthen 
the security of the Union in all ways” (ibid.: 155) used to include “and its Member States” (EU, 
1992: 58). The goal to “develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for 
human rights and fundamental freedoms” remains unchanged (ibid.: 155), reflecting some of 
the EU’s core normative justifications for the establishment of the CFSP. The future possibility 
of incorporation of the WEU into the EU is mentioned, and specific tasks regarding the ‘defence 
aspects’ of the CFSP are listed (Article 17). This is the genesis of the European Security and 
Defence Policy (ESDP). The tasks listed therein include: ‘humanitarian and rescue tasks, 
peace-keeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking,’ 
reproducing the exact phrasing of the WEU’s Petersberg Declaration, and, similarly to the latter 
document, without explicating exactly what these tasks entail.  
In the context of the Amsterdam Treaty, the post of High Representative for CFSP (HR) 
was created (Articles 18 and 26), which proved instrumental in driving the idea of EU actorness 
in the subsequent years. The creation of a post with diplomatic features linked to decision-
making in the area of foreign policy (much like a less powerful Foreign Affairs Minister) in a 
regional integration organisation with supranational traits like the EU was as unparalleled as 
the Union itself, and, to a certain extent, it confirmed the EU’s actorness ambitions: it reflects 
the “efforts to instantiate a European ‘voice’ and to personalize EU foreign policy (…), 
illustrat[ing] further the underpinning logic of the identification of EU foreign policy” (Tonra, 
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2011: 1195). In fact, Javier Solana revealed himself as a relevant player in the development of 
the ESDP, as well as in the EU’s relationship with NATO. Not only was Solana Secretary 
General of NATO between 1995 and 1999, but immediately following that he was appointed 
the EU’s first HR for CFSP and Secretary General of the Council (as well as WEU Secretary 
General) from 1999 until the Lisbon Treaty in 2009. The inter-institutional nature of this key 
figure in EUFP was instrumental in ensuring the basic coherence and consensus that allowed 
for the development of this area in practice, as well as for the development of the public 
diplomacy and discourse that accompanied it, which greatly thrusted the EU’s visibility as an 
actor in the area of security and defence. 
The perceived failure of European / EU action vis-à-vis the conflict in the Balkans 
during the 1990s (EP, 2000: 175, 178), together with a political environment in the United 
Kingdom (UK), which, with the election of a Labour government, became amenable to 
developments in the security and defence area at the European level, led to several bilateral and 
European summits in 1998, the year of the ratification of the Amsterdam Treaty. These summits 
included the informal European summit in Pörtschach, the Franco-German summit in Potsdam, 
the British-French summit in Saint-Malo, as well as several subsequent European Council 
meetings amply dedicated to the development of the area of security and defence at the EU 
level. These meetings and resulting discourses manifested the subsistence of political will on 
behalf of EU Member States for furthering the pursuance of a common security and defence 
policy and strongly reinforced the idea that the EU ought to play a role as an international actor. 
It is important to highlight that this has been, since the beginning, an intergovernmental policy, 
which reflects the importance of the Member States in constructing – both in terms of structures 
and capabilities, as well as discursively – the EU’s identity as a crisis management actor and 
the EU’s normative justification discourse underpinning its actorness in this field.  
On April 23, 1998, the President of the European Commission, Jacques Santer, 
addressed the Bologna Centre of the Johns Hopkins University with a speech entitled “The EU 
in the 21st century: political dwarf or world actor?” The speech begins with two assumptions. 
The first assumption is that “the Union’s action on the international scene is a test of European 
identity (…). The peoples of the Union clearly believe that we do not carry the political weight 
we could and should carry” (Santer, 1998). This assumption entails several relevant statements, 
namely that the EU’s actorness and its identity are rooted in one another, and that the EU has a 
‘responsibility’ to be an international actor (even though there is no mention here of specific 
policy areas). The second assumption is that “there is a crying need for a strong Union on the 
international scene (…). In the Middle East, in Asia, in Eastern Europe, in the Balkans, we 
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need a confident Union working with other partners”. Here, as in other instances in the EU’s 
discourse, there is an abstract call for EU collective action, a ‘crying need’ for the EU to be a 
strong international actor. Concerning the second sentence, which refers to the regional areas 
where such actorness would occur, Santer appears to detach those regions from the concept of 
‘partners’, in line with the discursive tendency to attribute this epithet to non-EU European or 
North-American countries and international organisations.  
Later in the speech, Santer raises the issue of the EU’s capabilities-expectations gap 
(Hill, 1993), by stating that “when Europe lacked ambition, it could hardly be taken to task for 
failing to achieve anything. Now, however, there is a growing danger that Europe will 
disappoint” (Santer, 1998). Concerning defence, the Commission President argues that 
“compared with our greatest ally, we seem to lack one fundamental component of integration: 
a European military decision-making capability” (ibid.). Even though he does not (at least at 
that stage) advocate in favour of an EU army as such, he brings attention to the importance of 
‘the deployment of forces abroad’ and ‘the concept of common defence.’ In this sense, he raises 
some crucial questions: 
 
How, as Europeans, do we take decisions on military intervention outside Europe? Will 
they be taken by the European Union? By the European allies acting within the structures 
being established in NATO? Or in WEU? Or in all these places at one and the same time? 
Will the Union Member States really rule out the idea of ever taking a joint military 
decision? (ibid.). 
 
These questions reflect the EU’s political environment concerning the development of a 
security and defence policy with the Amsterdam Treaty. Santer adds that “in some conflicts, 
diplomacy can succeed only if there is a united political front backed up by military means” 
(ibid.) in line with the prevailing EU defence-related discourses in that same year. He adds that 
“those conflicts which can be resolved by the threat of military force alone are the ones which 
are most visible to European and international public opinion. And which lead to a disastrous, 
albeit mistaken, impression of our role in international affairs” (ibid.). Although Santer is not 
visibly opposed to a development of the EU’s military capabilities, he is implying that the EU’s 
role may diverge from this and still be relevant, drawing on the idea of the EU’s uniqueness 
and value-added as a diplomatic actor. Santer finishes his speech by recalling the EU’s history 
as a peace project and the ‘responsibility’ that ensues from that concerning its role as an 
international actor.  
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From the October 1998 informal European summit in Pörtschach resulted a series of 
press conferences where then British Prime Minister Tony Blair already indicates the UK’s 
shift in favour of greater European integration in the area of security and defence, by stating 
that “there was a strong willingness, which the UK obviously shares, for Europe to take a 
stronger foreign policy and security role” (Blair, 1998: 1). In fact, Blair refers to a CFSP at the 
EU level as ‘necessary’, ‘overdue’, ‘needed’, and “it is high time we got on with trying to 
engage with formulating it” (ibid.: 2). This reiterates the idea that the EU’s engagement in crisis 
management outside its strict territorial sphere (the case of Kosovo comes up in the discussion) 
began not just as an ambition or a choice but was discursively marked as an obligation. This 
idea is reinforced when he adds that “Kosovo simply underlines the need for Europe to take a 
very hard-headed review of this and to make sure that it can fulfil its obligations and 
responsibilities properly” (ibid.: 3). As we have already noticed (and will continue to point out 
in other documents throughout this analysis), the idea of a European ‘responsibility’ to engage 
in crisis management is one of the most frequent justifications for the development of this policy 
and for sustaining the EU’s perceived actorness therein and it is always phrased as if it were 
normal or expected, deriving from the EU’s own experience as a ‘peace project’. When 
questioned about the EU’s lack of military capability vis-à-vis NATO in order to ‘speak more 
forcefully on the international stage’, Blair replied that “the security and defence identity within 
NATO for Europe is an acceptance that there will be circumstances in which it is right to have 
that identity for Europe” (ibid.). This response reflects the underlying complementarity 
between the two organisations and the EU’s perceived value-added for justifying its 
engagement in specific circumstances where NATO’s action is less appropriate. 
In the same year (1998), the Franco-German summit in Potsdam produced a declaration 
where, among covering other areas in quite general terms, Jacques Chirac and Gerhard 
Schröder, then HSGs of both countries, pledged the “définition d’actions concrètes en vue de 
la mise en œuvre de la politique étrangère et de sécurité communes y compris la politique 
européenne de défense commune” (Chirac and Schröder, 1998: 4), with a focus on “la 
prévention et la gestion des crises régionales” (ibid.). Again, the underlying discourse is that 
the EU is to have a crisis management role outside its territorial sphere (albeit here presented 
with a primarily regional, rather than global, reach – the examples referred to are ‘ex-
Yougoslavie et le Proche-Orient’). The identified means for the EU to carry out this role include 
‘moyens européens propres’ particularly through the ‘intégration de l’UEO dans l’Union 
européenne’, the creation of ‘des forces multinationales européennes tel que le corps européen’ 
as well as the EU’s agreements with NATO (ibid.). Again, the mention of NATO emphasises 
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the idea of complementarity with the EU, thus highlighting both organisations’ usefulness and 
validity in dealing with different kinds or dimensions of crises. 
The British-French summit in Saint-Malo resulted in the renowned Saint-Malo 
Declaration, in which Tony Blair and Jacques Chirac, then HSGs of both countries, start out by 
reinforcing the narrative of urgency / necessity and responsibility for the EU’s actorness, by 
stating that the EU “needs to be in a position to play its full role on the international stage,” 
emphasising the importance of “the full and rapid implementation of the Amsterdam provisions 
on CFSP,” including the defence aspects thereof (Blair and Chirac, 1998: 1). Again, we notice 
the recurrent underlying discourse of expectedness or normalcy in assuming that the EU is 
supposed to have a role. Blair and Chirac argue that the EU “(...) must have the capacity for 
autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and 
a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises” (ibid.). This sentence is quite 
unprecedented in the context of the discursive development of the CFSP and the E/CSDP. The 
repeated use of the term ‘military’ throughout the declaration indicates that this is the preferred 
(or perhaps the only) means with which the EU can effectively respond to international crises 
– the latter also reinforcing the narrative of an inherent European responsibility. The declaration 
repeatedly emphasises the idea of ensuring that “Europe can make its voice heard in world 
affairs” (ibid.). This stresses the prominent role that discourse plays in establishing the EU’s 
identity as a crisis management actor. While in the beginning of the declaration the idea of 
responding to international crises appears to be a priority, it is followed, a few paragraphs later, 
by a ‘need’ for “strengthened armed forces that can react rapidly to the new risks” (ibid.: 2). 
Whether these risks are located in the EU’s territory or elsewhere is not clear, but the overall 
discourse points predominantly to EU (military) action outside of its territorial sphere for 
ensuring its own territorial security (even if indirectly so). 
The European Council meeting in Vienna in December 1998 produced a document with 
the Austrian Presidency Conclusions, where the appointment of ‘a personality with a strong 
political profile’ for the post of HR and the setting up of a Policy Planning and Early Warning 
Unit within the Council General Secretariat were identified as priorities (European Council, 
1998: 13). In this document, the European HSGs praise the Saint-Malo Declaration and 
highlight and welcome the ‘new impetus given to the debate on a common European policy on 
security and defence’, stating that “in order for the EU to be in a position to play its full role on 
the international stage, the CFSP must be backed by credible operational capabilities” (ibid.). 
Again, there is a degree of expectedness underlying the discourse that the EU is ‘meant’ to play 
a role on the international stage, used in practice as one of the most important and recurring 
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normative justifications for the development of the CFSP and of the E/CSDP. The focus on 
‘credible’ capabilities for the achievement of the EU’s actorness reflects the scholarly debate’s 
focus on this actorness criterion (Sjöstedt, 1977a; Hill, 1993; Bretherton and Vogler, 2006). 
The German Council Presidency, as were the subsequent Council Presidencies, was 
very active in debating issues relating to the development of the EU’s crisis management policy. 
In February 1999, it produced a Presidency paper entitled Informal Reflection at WEU on 
Europe’s Security and Defence. This paper mentions the imminent implementation of the 
Amsterdam Treaty, which represented significant advances for the area of security and defence 
at the EU level, stating that “the prime focus of our debate should be on how Europe can possess 
appropriate structures and capabilities (which obviously need to include military capabilities) 
to conduct crisis management in the sense of the Petersberg tasks” (German Council 
Presidency, 1999: 14). This focus on capabilities as key enablers for EU actorness is mirrored 
in the academic literature (Sjöstedt, 1977a; Hill, 1993; Bretehrton and Vogler, 2006). The 
document repeats the prevailing narrative of ‘need’ and ‘urgency’ for EU-led crisis 
management and lists several options for the use of military means involving different 
participants and differing degrees of European involvement (German Council Presidency, 
1999: 14-15). The options concerning EU or WEU-led operations with or without the use of 
NATO assets and capabilities deserved the most attention. In this context, the German Council 
Presidency proposed a series of questions regarding the EU’s envisaged aim and role in this 
area, as well as the latter’s operationalisation, including questions about the merging of WEU 
within the EU structure (ibid.). The questions remain unanswered in the document, serving as 
a starting point for furthering the debate, which was meant to conceptualise and operationalise 
the EU’s crisis management policy and encourage a normative justification debate for 
supporting its potential actorness in this area. 
In March of 1999, the EU foreign ministers met at an informal meeting in Eltville, where 
German representatives continued the debate through a proposal for the strengthening of the 
Common Policy on Security and Defence. The German proposal addressed concerns about EU 
autonomy in security and defence vis-à-vis NATO, which “remains the foundation of the 
collective defence of its members,” (German Foreign Ministry, 1999: 18) while going back to 
the questions raised in the informal reflection made in the previous month. The proposal focuses 
very much on institutional structures for decision-making and arrangements concerning 
capabilities, pointing out that the European Council in Cologne (held three months after), would 
reflect on common principles for the future of European security and defence. The idea of 
capabilities as central for actorness is reflected in the scholarly literature (Sjöstedt, 1977a; Hill, 
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1993; Bretherton and Vogler, 2006). Similarly to the previous reflection, this German proposal 
comes up with a set of questions to be answered at subsequent European Council meetings, 
including questions relating to the creation of conditions for the ESDP, the consequences of the 
WEU’s integration into the EU, as well as the development of military capabilities and a 
European defence industry. 
In May 1999, a Franco-German Defence and Security Council took place in Toulouse. 
This meeting generated a declaration where Jacques Chirac and Gerhard Schröder, then HSGs 
of both countries, recalled the symbolism of their cooperation for the European project and 
pledged a joint commitment to ensuring the necessary conditions for the development of “une 
Europe de la sécurité et de la défense” based on “une base industrielle et technologique, forte, 
dynamique et performante” (Chirac and Schröder, 1999: 40). It is, however, not clear if the 
intention was to stimulate the creation of an actual defence policy for the EU, instead of a 
security and defence policy based solely on crisis management outside of the EU territorial 
sphere, but the context of this statement and the continued pledge to maintain NATO in a logic 
of complementarity indicates the latter. 
In June 1999, the European Council in Cologne formally established the ESDP (later 
renamed CSDP, with the Lisbon Treaty),26 which would become part of the CFSP and in which 
the WEU later came to be incorporated. This event also paved the way for a gradual 
strengthening of the institutional dimension of the ESDP in the years that followed, in order for 
the EU to fulfil its purported ‘responsibilities’ as an international actor, including the 
aforementioned appointment of the EU’s first HR for CFSP. The German European Council 
Presidency Report on ‘Strengthening of the Common European Policy on Security and 
Defence’ that came out of the Cologne European Council meeting reinforces very closely the 
discourse articulated in the Saint-Malo declaration of the previous year, especially with regard 
to the ‘urgency’ of establishing this policy. Yet, unlike the Saint-Malo declaration, the 
European Council Presidency report does not limit the EU’s instruments to military capabilities, 
instead proposing that the Council be able to take decisions “on the whole range of political, 
economic and military instruments at its disposal when responding to crisis situations” 
                                               
26 Even though formally there is a distinction between the ESDP and the CSDP, we noticed that in 
several discourses from the late 1990s and early 2000s there is mention to a Common European 
Security and Defence Policy, or to a Common Security and Defence Policy. Throughout this 
project, however, we will mostly strive to maintain the distinction regarding the two official 
nomenclatures, relating each one to their respective time period. When speaking in broad terms, for 
practical purposes, we will use the acronym E/CSDP. 
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(European Council, 1999a: 1). This focus on the EU’s authority and autonomy reflect the 
scholarly debate’s focus on these ideas as key criteria for actorness (Sjöstedt, 1977a; Jupille 
and Caporaso, 1998). In fact, the Presidency report appears to diminish the role of military 
capabilities to the detriment of other types of capabilities, in stating that 
 
The focus of our efforts therefore would be to assure that the EU has at its disposal the 
necessary capabilities (including military capabilities) and appropriate structures for 
effective EU decision making in crisis management within the scope of the Petersberg 
tasks. This is the area where a European capacity to act is required most urgently 
(European Council, 1999a: 1-2). 
 
This downplaying of the military aspect of the future ESDP reflects internal struggles and a 
discursive and political commitment achieved between the representatives of the (then) twelve 
EU Member States. The document proceeded with limiting the military aspect by stating that 
“the development of an EU military crisis management capacity is to be seen as an activity 
within the framework of the CFSP” (ibid.: 2), without the same sense of urgency as displayed 
in previous moments, or on the Saint-Malo declaration. The report frequently uses the 
expression ‘EU’ as subject (in expressions such as ‘the EU needs’, ‘the EU has’, ‘EU-led 
operations’, etc.), reflecting a much greater internalisation of its ‘actorness’ identity, especially 
in comparison with previous discourses. 
 In July 1999, a British-Italian summit took place in London. This summit produced a 
Joint Declaration Launching European Defence Capabilities Initiative where Tony Blair and 
Massimo D’Alema, then HSGs of both countries, emphasised “the pressing need for improved 
European military capabilities” (Blair and D’Alema, 1999: 46), reiterating the prevailing 
‘urgency’ and ‘responsibility’ narrative in the EU’s discourse as a means of justifying the 
establishment of the ESDP (Niţoiu, 2013; Miskimmon, O’Loughlin, and Roselle, 2013; 
Schumacher, 2015; Birchfield, Krige, and Young, 2017). Blair and D’Alema mention the 
preparation for the launch of a joint proposal ‘to set criteria for improved and strengthened 
European defence capabilities and effective performance’ to be debated at a later stage in the 
context of the WEU and that ‘this approach’ is meant to be developed ‘with our Partners and 
Allies’ (Blair and D’Alema, 1999: 46, 47). While the expression allies refers to the members 
of NATO (also referred to in the text as ‘the Alliance’), the targets of the epithet partners (with 
a capital P) are less evident, but the discursive context at the European level about this matter 
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indicates that it refers to major international organisations, such as the UN, the OSCE, and the 
Council of Europe. 
 In December of 1999, a Finnish European Council meeting took place in Helsinki. The 
Presidency Conclusions that were produced in the aftermath of this meeting have a section 
dedicated to the ‘Common European Policy on Security and Defence’ where two Presidency 
progress reports are adopted, mainly concerning capability and institutional developments. 
While up until this stage all discourses in our corpus focused the responsibility on the EU, here 
there is a reference to the “primary responsibility of the UNSC for the maintenance of 
international peace and security” (European Council, 1999b). However, in the annex that relates 
to ESDP, the ‘responsibility’ focus returns to the EU alongside the Member States: 
 
To assume their responsibilities across the full range of conflict prevention and crisis 
management tasks defined in the EU Treaty, the Petersberg tasks, the Member States have 
decided to develop more effective military capabilities and establish new political and 
military structures for these tasks (ibid.). 
 
As such, this document appears to deviate slightly from the prevailing narrative of a focus on 
EU responsibility; yet, if we look at the Member States in this context as essentially being the 
EU, then we can argue that there is discursive continuity, rather than discontinuity. The text 
itself assumes a discursive continuity, in following the previous sentence with ‘also in order to 
assume these responsibilities, the Union will…’. This use of the Member States almost as a 
metonym for the EU occurs occasionally, especially in European Council and Council 
documents, and brings attention to the intergovernmental nature of this policy. 
 The 2000 European Council meeting in Santa Maria da Feira produced a document with 
the Portuguese Presidency Conclusions, with an annex concerning the Presidency Report on 
Strengthening the Common European Security and Defence Policy. This annex concerns 
mostly technical aspects of EU capabilities and institutional arrangements for the functioning 
of the policy, and little normative justification for the development and launch of the policy. 
However, Appendix 3 of the Presidency Report on a Study on Concrete Targets on Civilian 
Aspects of Crisis Management does contain elements that indicate the EU’s normative 
justification and positioning as a crisis management actor. In this text, the European Council 
affirms that the goals for which the EU ‘should seek to enhance its capability in civilian aspects 
of crisis management’ include 
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(…) improving its potential for saving human lives in crisis situations, for maintaining 
basic public order, preventing further escalation, facilitating the return to a peaceful, stable 
and self-sustainable situation, for managing adverse effects on EU countries and for 
addressing relevant problems of coordination (European Council, 2000a: 18). 
 
Underlying the discourse of ‘maintaining basic public order’ is an assumption that there is an 
understanding of what constitutes ‘basic public order’. This idea is quite evocative of 
Foucault’s work concerning the practice of enforcement, on behalf of those in power, of what 
they deem to be normal or expected. Here, the European Council is assuming that the EU’s 
civilian crisis management capabilities will be able to ‘maintain basic public order’ in ESDP 
host countries, according to what the EU considers to be adequate. The goal of achieving a 
‘peaceful, stable and self-sustainable situation’, in turn, encourages self-regulation in the 
aftermath of a potential EU intervention, according to EU standards of normalcy and adequacy, 
characterised by the adjectives ‘peaceful’ and ‘stable’. The superior hierarchic positioning of 
the EU is also visible in the expression ‘managing adverse effects on EU countries’, as it 
reminds us of the ultimate justification for the development of this policy and of the EU’s 
actorness in this area, which is to help others out of crisis situations - whereby it is the EU that 
dictates what is a ‘crisis’ and what terms and means of action it is willing to engage to tackle 
that crisis - in order to ultimately ensure the EU’s own security. 
 Additional normative justification for engaging in civilian crisis management is 
provided when the European HSGs indicate that the improvement of the EU’s civilian 
capabilities ‘would provide “added value”’ and be able to ‘meet the requests of the other lead 
organisations’ (again, the EU assumes that it is itself one such ‘lead’ organisation), as well as 
‘increase the Union’s visibility’ (ibid.). Similarly to other discourses, there is repeated mention 
of expressions such as the ‘Union and the Member States’, accentuating the intergovernmental 
nature of this policy and the EU’s autonomy complexity, highlighting the dual role of the 
Member States therein (Jupille and Caporaso, 1998). One such example is the section 
concerning ‘strengthening civilian administration’, whereby “Member States could consider 
improving the selection, training and deployment of civil administration experts for duties in 
the re-establishment of collapsed administrative systems” (European Council, 2000a: 19). The 
proposition is that administrative systems that are considered to have ‘collapsed’ (i.e. to have 
disintegrated or fallen apart, no longer functioning) can be ‘re-established’ following the 
contribution of EU Member States’ administrations that are, by opposition, portrayed as solid 
and wholesome, so much so that they are in a position to offer their support in bringing the 
  93 
collapsed systems back to ‘normal’ based on their own conceptions of what ‘normal’ means. In 
other words, like the EU itself, EU Member States’ administrations are portrayed as models to 
be emulated. 
Following the Cologne, Helsinki, Lisbon, and Feira European Council meetings, the EP, 
having gained more powers and responsibilities since the Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties, 
produced, in 2000, a resolution on the establishment of a common European security and 
defence policy. It is interesting that it is this actor, and not so much the actors that have been 
more closely involved in the development of this policy, that attempts to clarify the EU’s broad 
definition of security: 
 
(…) with the end of the Cold War, the distinction between security and defence has tended 
to become blurred, and a security and defence policy implies the use of civilian as well as 
military means of diverting and managing crises threatening the interests and values of a 
State or group of States such as the European Union (EP, 2000: 175). 
 
Here, an explanation is offered for why the C/ESDP, although having been primarily concerned 
with crisis management outside the EU’s territorial sphere, is nonetheless considered a ‘security 
and defence’ policy that seeks to safeguard European interests and safety. As seen in other 
discourses, the EP resolution mentions separately both the EU and the Member States, and 
highlights the latter’s importance in the former’s functioning and performance, while 
simultaneously maintaining the idea of the EU’s individual actorness:  
  
(…) pointing out that the efforts of the Union and its Member States to establish a credible 
common European security and defence policy are intended to strengthen the CFSP, 
enabling the Union to deploy the full gamut of financial, diplomatic, civilian and military 
instruments at its disposal to achieve its aims and to exercise a more effective influence on 
the outcome of international crises (ibid.). 
 
Here we notice the growing tendency to ensure effectiveness in crisis management through the 
‘comprehensive’ use of all the EU’s foreign policy tools and policies available. Similarly to 
other discourses, the EP resolution refers to the EU’s “declared intention of using the CFSP and 
the CESDP to take its place as a major player in international politics” (ibid.) as being important 
for the revitalisation and responsibility sharing with NATO, as well as for the preservation of 
international security. As other actors in the EU system, the EP also presents the EU as having 
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a predetermined, expected, natural ‘major’ role in the international scene, as well as a 
‘responsibility’ (shared with NATO) to ensure peace, reinforcing these two (thus far) central 
narratives in the EU’s normative justification as a crisis management actor. The EP resolution 
calls for parliamentary scrutiny and democratic accountability of the ESDP (ibid.: 176, 182, 
183), which was conceived as a strictly intergovernmental policy. 
 The link between the goals of exporting the EU’s norms, values, standards, and 
principles has always been more or less expressly linked with the development of an EU crisis 
management policy and with security (Larsen, 2004). The EP reiterates and reinforces this idea 
by emphasising  
 
(…) that this diversification and strengthening of the EU’s intervention capability in crisis 
areas must go hand in hand with action to restore and consolidate the rule of law, 
democracy, civil society, an independent judicial system, local administration and the 
economy in those areas, to allow a return to normal life at the earliest opportunity and to 
ensure democratic security in the area concerned (ibid.: 177). 
 
While this is not a new idea in the EU’s discourses, it still carries an asymmetry between those 
dictating exactly what standards should be applied and especially what constitutes a return to 
‘normal life’. This asymmetry is present again in the EP’s discourse when it is stated that it 
“considers that the first stage in establishing a conflict-prevention policy is to develop the EU’s 
intelligence-gathering and analysis capacities so as to detect the earliest signs of any crisis” 
(ibid.). This indicates not only a potential active search for actorness opportunities, but also, 
and most importantly, that it is up to the EU to determine what is a ‘crisis’, which can potentially 
lead to an overstretch of the concept according to its own interests. 
On May 9, 2000, European Commission President Romano Prodi produced a brief 
statement concerning the 50th anniversary of the Schuman Declaration. Prodi begins by 
evoking Europe’s historical linkage to the making of peace within its borders, as “major wars 
on our continent have been avoided and the European Union now enjoys an unprecedented 
standard of economic prosperity” (Prodi, 2000). The Commission President adds that “recent 
events in the Balkans are a frightful reminder of how fragile peace is, and of how urgent is the 
need to extend peace, freedom and prosperity to the whole continent and beyond” (ibid.), 
emphasising a growing rhetoric of EU ‘responsibility’ to spread its success as a peace ‘model’ 
to territories outside its borders. While short and mostly concerned with improving the EU’s 
democratic practices, this statement is nonetheless relevant for our study in that it reiterates 
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certain discursive patterns and narratives present in the EU’s discourses throughout the 
analysed timeframe. 
In the context of the 2000 European Council in Nice, the institutional framework of the 
ESDP was set up and reinforced “to enable the EU fully to assume its responsibilities” 
(European Council, 2000b: 24). Annex VI of the French European Council Presidency 
Conclusions, entitled ‘Report on the European Security and Defence Policy,’ reinforces the 
prevailing discourse that the creation of this policy is meant to “give the EU the means of 
playing its role fully on the international stage and of assuming its responsibilities in the face 
of crises” (ibid.: 23), adding that the value-added of the development of a policy at the European 
level comes from the EU’s ‘particular characteristic’, namely “its capacity to mobilise a vast 
range of both civilian and military means and instruments, thus giving it an overall crisis-
management and conflict-prevention capability” (ibid.). This highlights the EU’s focus on the 
opportunity and capability dimensions as it developed its actorness in the area of crisis 
management (Bretherton and Vogler, 2006). This description of the EU’s specific 
characteristics and ambitions regarding crisis management, in addition to the praise of NATO’s 
usefulness, reinforces a prevailing narrative of the EU’s crisis management actorness as 
bringing value-added to the international system. In this context, NATO is referred to as 
remaining a part of the EU’s defence structure, as “the development of the ESDP will contribute 
to the vitality of a renewed Transatlantic link” (European Council, 2000b: 24). This justification 
for NATO’s persistence is frequently repeated in the early years of the ESDP, and a distinction 
is often made between a domestic territorial defence (ensured by NATO) and the ESDP, which 
remained for almost two decades exclusively charged with crisis management outside of the 
EU’s territorial sphere.  
The concept of the ESDP as such is explained in the document and justified as 
“increas[ing] the range of instruments for responding to crises available to the international 
community,” while the EU is again placed at the same level as “leading organisations such as 
the UN or the OSCE” (ibid.: 24, 34). The narrative concerning an abstract EU ‘responsibility’ 
as a justification for the launch of the ESDP is recurrent (Niţoiu, 2013; Miskimmon, 
O’Loughlin, and Roselle, 2013; Schumacher, 2015; Birchfield, Krige, and Young, 2017), not 
only in reference to crisis management in general, but specifically in reference to conflict 
prevention (European Council, 2000b: 27). 
 During the Nice European Council, the Secretary General / HR and the Commission 
presented a report with practical recommendations for improving the coherence and 
effectiveness of EU action in the field of conflict prevention, where the latter is presented as a 
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‘fixed priority of EU external action’. The document argues in favour of the EU becoming 
‘more pro-active and less reactive’ as well as looking for, and dealing with, potential embryonic 
crisis before they occur through what came to be known as the EU’s ‘comprehensive approach’ 
(Drent, 2011; Gebhard and Norheim-Martinsen, 2011; Smith, 2012; Major and Mölling, 2013), 
including the integration of development, trade, economic, humanitarian, military, and civilian 
tools (HR and Commission, 2000: 2, 4, 10). This document is the first, in the universe of our 
discursive corpus, that identifies a ‘necessity’ to establish an explicit link between development 
and crisis management as such, although the EU’s normative inclination to export its norms 
and principles in foreign policy, including in crisis management, already suggests such 
proclivity. Another aspect proposed in the report concerns the idea of “build[ing] and 
sustain[ing] effective partnerships with those who share our values and priorities at global, 
regional, national and local level” (ibid.). This type of discourse is at the very base of Manner’s 
normative power concept, whereby the effectiveness of the normative power is contingent upon 
the shared belief in the same values and priorities on behalf of the EU’s partners, who are, in 
some cases, simultaneously targets of some of its policies (Diez and Manners, 2007).  
The concept of partnership / partner, as we will observe throughout this study, evolves 
in the EU’s discourse from a vague concept that is mostly attributed to major international 
organisations (oftentimes accompanied by the epithet ‘strategic’), to a more encompassing 
notion that includes (and even becomes focused on) the countries that host the EU’s security 
and defence missions and operations. In this sense, this discourse of ‘effective partnerships (…) 
at the national and local level’ appears to be ahead of its time and can be interpreted to represent 
a slight break from the prevailing narrative that treats the host countries as abstract (because 
the ESDP had not yet been implemented at this point) and inferior (referred to as ‘collapsed’ or 
‘failed’ States, for example), and the partners placed at the same level as the EU and nominally 
identified (the UN, the OSCE, NATO, the Council of Europe, etc.). We can also interpret the 
‘effective partnerships with those who share our values and priorities’ as referring to the latter, 
rather than the former, which would mark this more as a continuity than a disruption in the 
EU’s discourse (even though the EU’s discourse eventually evolves in a different direction). 
What leads us to consider that this might be a discursive disruption or (temporary) discontinuity 
is that, later on in the text, there is also a distinct and specific mention of the EU’s ‘international 
partners’ (HR and Commission, 2000: 4), an epithet commonly attributed to international 
organisations. 
The EU’s self-focus is present in the document, as in other instances, and the EU’s own 
‘strikingly successful example’ is used as a justification for the development of a crisis 
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management policy that includes conflict prevention, which “constitutes one of [the EU’s] most 
important external policy challenges” (ibid.: 3). Another justification provided, in addition to 
the ‘human cost in suffering’ is that conflict ‘undermines economic development’ and the EU’s 
interests “by creating instability, by reducing trade and putting investments at risk, by imposing 
a heavy financial burden in reconstruction and ultimately by threatening the security of its 
citizens” (ibid.). Another instance of the EU’s self-focus in justifying the policy is when the HR 
and the Commission state that the EU is ‘well placed to engage in conflict prevention’ due to 
its capabilities and expertise in areas in which “the Union has very considerable influence” 
(ibid.: 4), such as trade, cooperation, development, humanitarian assistance, diplomacy, 
including crisis management missions and operations. 
Shortly after the 2000 Nice European Council, the Political and Security Committee 
(PSC), composed of ambassadors of the Member States, was formally established to support 
the Council of the EU in its External Relations formation (Council, 2001a). In addition, an EU 
Military Committee (EUMC), consisting of the Chiefs of Defence of the Member States, was 
created to support the PSC (Council, 2001b). In the same context, the EU Military Staff 
(EUMS), a permanent military structure that answers to the EUMC, was set up with the purpose 
of providing military expertise to the ESDP decision-making structure (Council, 2005a). 
Similarly, a Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM), composed of 
EU Member States’ representatives, was created to advice, inform, and elaborate 
recommendations to the PSC regarding the civilian aspects of crisis management (Council, 
2000). 
On January 19, 2001, European Commission President Romano Prodi made a speech at 
the International Bertelsmann Forum ‘Europe without borders’ entitled “After Reform: a future 
strategy for Europe as a whole.” Among other issues, the speech addresses the topic ‘Europe 
on the world stage.’ Not just on the designation used in this topic, but throughout the speech, 
Prodi uses the term ‘Europe’ as a surrogate for the EU, in what is a common discursive practice 
that is not meant to represent a geographic entity but rather an abstract idea based on common 
values and history that the EU has come to represent (Kuus, 2011), despite its mutability. Prodi 
begins by stating that “global challenges call for global action, and that has to mean a strong 
partnership between strong global players such as Europe and the US” (Prodi, 2001). Like other 
Commission Presidents before him (Santer, 1995), Prodi places the EU in an equal position to 
the EU as an international actor, implying that that is desirable and achievable. While urging 
for closer relations between the EU and the US in security matters, Prodi claims that “an 
autonomous European capability will not weaken NATO or our security ties to the US. On the 
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contrary, it should make the EU a more valuable and responsible partner” (Prodi, 2001). This 
assertion falls in line with a discursive pattern that ascribes a uniqueness to the EU as a crisis 
management actor which both complements and reinforces NATO and simultaneously justifies 
a security role for the EU.  
The Commission President also advocates in favour of a comprehensive approach to 
external conflicts and crises, arguing that “if the EU is to become a truly effective global player, 
we need to go beyond the current fragmentation of our external action,” adding that “we need 
to integrate all our foreign policy instruments into a single external policy framework, with 
special rules and procedure tailored to the needs of security and defence” (ibid.). Even though 
this was conceived as (and remains to this day) a predominantly intergovernmental policy, 
Prodi argues that the EU’s external representation in matters of security and defence should lie 
with the European Commission. 
In 2001, due to a massive enlargement to the East and the effective introduction of the 
single currency, a new treaty revision was undertaken. Implemented in 2003, the Nice Treaty 
maintained the exact phrasing as the Amsterdam Treaty in the previously mentioned preamble 
paragraph related to the CFSP, and in the EU’s second objective of ‘asserting its identity on the 
international scene’ (Article 2). The Nice Treaty is the first treaty where the ESDP is actually 
contemplated as such. Nonetheless, the identification of the tasks to be carried out therein 
maintain the exact same wording of the WEU’s Petersberg Declaration, namely “humanitarian 
and rescue tasks, peacekeeping, tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, 
including peacemaking” (Article 17.2). These remain vague and ambiguous and, much like 
before, no definitions or explanations are provided regarding what they involve. So, this treaty 
revision was not very much focused on improving or changing EU actorness, but rather on other 
key internal policies and developments, especially targeting the preparation for the common 
currency and the massive enlargement that followed. 
In May 2001, the Council released Common Position 2001/374/CFSP concerning conflict 
prevention, management and resolution in Africa. The document begins by stating that “the 
primary responsibility for prevention, management and resolution of conflicts on the African 
continent lies with Africans themselves” (Council, 2001d: 3), while simultaneously assuming 
its normative positioning (and value judgement) regarding the issue, by stating that “there is a 
link between conflict prevention and democracy, human rights, the rule of law and good 
governance, where development cooperation has a strategic role to play in strengthening 
capacities to manage conflicts in peaceful ways” (ibid.). The Council explains the EU’s 
proposed role with regard to this issue by stating that the goal of the common position “is to 
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contribute to the prevention, management and resolution of violent conflicts in Africa by 
strengthening African capacity and means of action in this field” (ibid.). While these objectives 
and initial statements appear very oriented towards ensuring capacity-building and African 
ownership of crisis management therein, the document ends up focusing more on the EU itself 
and on how it can guarantee to have a (pro)active role in this area: 
 
The EU shall develop a proactive, comprehensive and integrated approach (…). As a part 
of this, and to enhance capacity for early action, a yearly survey shall be drawn up by the 
Presidency assisted by the High Representative and the Commission and designed to 
identify and monitor potential violent conflicts and presenting the policy options necessary 
to prevent their outbreak or recurrence (ibid.). 
 
The idea of EU engagement in preventive or early action and a commitment to be active in 
different stages of crises (i.e. conflict prevention, crisis management, peace-building), as a 
result of ‘the need to respond to existing crises’ appears to dilute the apparent strength of the 
EU’s initial statement that attributed the primary responsibility for dealing with conflicts in 
Africa to Africans. The discourse appears to indicate a focus on African ownership explicitly, 
but implicitly the focus remains very much in tune with the EU responsibility narrative. In this 
sense, while the EU’s commitment to capacity-building and focus on African ownership appear 
to be central to its proposed role as a crisis management actor in Africa, there is also a promise 
of EU operational engagement on the ground as a crisis preventer and manager on its own: 
 
The EU will support, over the long term, the enhancement of African peacekeeping 
capabilities (…). Notwithstanding such capacity enhancement, the EU and its Member 
States will continue, on a case-by-case basis, to consider deploying their own operational 
means for conflict prevention and crisis management in Africa (ibid.: 4). 
 
In June 2001, the EU Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts, also known as the 
‘Göteborg Programme’, was drafted by COREPER (Council, 2001c) and adopted by the 
Council soon after. In this document, not unlike previous instances, the EU portrays itself as “a 
successful example of conflict prevention, based on democratic values and respect for human 
rights, justice and solidarity, economic prosperity and sustainable development” (ibid.: 2). In 
this statement, the COREPER ambassadors reiterate the EU’s strong normative position vis-à-
vis the conflict prevention dimension of crisis management and emphasises the predominant 
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narrative that peace (the opposite of conflict) is built through “the externally led construction 
of liberal democratic institutions” (Légaré, 2010: 35). The accompaniment of – or rather the 
direct link between – conflict prevention with democratic-oriented normative standards and 
other European-like administration standards are frequent throughout the document. As in 
previous discourses, the COREPER establishes in the ‘Göteborg Programme’ a link between 
conflict prevention and the EU’s normative vision regarding how the world should work, 
implicitly branding opposite paradigms as lesser paradigms while referring to the EU as a 
‘community of peace and progress’ thus emphasising the idea of superiority. 
As in previous instances, ‘partner’ in conflict prevention is almost anyone – “the UN 
system, the OSCE, the Council of Europe, other regional and subregional organisations and the 
international financial institutions” – but the potential host countries (Council, 2001c: 7) where 
the EU may launch security and defence missions or operations. This reflects the EU’s focus 
on itself and European values and norms, and potentially in placing higher value in the 
validation from these specific international partners rather than from the potential host 
countries. This means that the ‘targets’ of the practical implementation of the policy (i.e. host 
countries) are not necessarily the ‘targets’ of the EU’s normative justification discourse (i.e. the 
intended audience that the EU seeks to persuade / convince about the validity of the policy and 
its actorness in this area). 
In the ‘Göteborg Programme’, the COREPER ambassadors identify key priorities for 
EU actorness: 
  
In line with the fundamental values of the EU, the highest political priority will be given to 
improving the effectiveness and coherence of its external action in the field of conflict 
prevention, thereby also enhancing the preventive capabilities of the international 
community at large (ibid.).  
 
The priorities themselves appear to be quite innocuous in terms of establishing or reproducing 
asymmetries between the EU and its interlocutors (particularly the host countries). However, 
the fact that coherence (largely an internal actorness criterion, according to Jupille and 
Caporaso, 1998) is one of the highest political priorities reiterates the inward-looking tendency 
– derived from the EU’s multi-level nature – for the EU to look more at itself than others when 
justifying normatively its crisis management policy. The fact that effectiveness is the other 
highest political priority further highlights this tendency: it suggests that the important thing is 
doing something (launching missions), not necessarily that the missions that are being launched 
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are accepted or desired by the host countries’ authorities or populations. The EU does point out 
occasionally that it ‘recognises the UNSC’s primary responsibility for the maintenance of 
international peace and security’ (European Council, 2001a: 11), as is the case of the 2001 
Presidency Conclusions of the Göteborg European Council that took place following the launch 
of the Göteborg Programme. 
 The 2000 EP Resolution, the Report by the HR and the Commission on conflict 
prevention, the Commission Communication on Conflict Prevention, the Göteborg Programme, 
and the Göteborg Presidency Conclusions are the first discourses in our corpus to expressly 
establish a direct link between conflict prevention and development cooperation (ibid.: 12), 
even though, as pointed out before, the idea of norms export and EU-led State building and 
democratisation efforts have been linked to the ESDP since the latter’s inception. This emerging 
narrative, which would later be dubbed the ‘security-development nexus’, represents the EU’s 
efforts to capitalise on what is arguably one of the most recognizable areas in EU foreign policy 
- development policy - even if it is not the most successful one (Banthia, 2007). While this 
narrative was not commonly expressly supported up until his point, it became increasingly 
salient following the 2013 comprehensive approach to external crisis and conflicts, as we will 
see further ahead in our study. 
On September 11, 2001, a series of terrorist attacks on the USA, attributed to Al-Qaeda 
and in particular to its leader Osama Bin Laden, changed the international scene regarding 
security (Hughes, 2002; Shearman and Sussex, 2004) and drove the advancement of the EU’s 
efforts in matters of security (EP, 2002: 2). This event triggered an extraordinary European 
Council meeting in Brussels a few days later, meant to “analyse the international situation 
following the terrorist attacks in the United States and to impart the necessary impetus to the 
actions of the EU” (European Council, 2001b: 1). While the Conclusions and Plan of Action of 
the European Council meeting were focused on security, they were particularly concerned with 
the area of Justice and Home Affairs and with the link between internal and external security, 
in particular with transnational terrorism. In the Conclusions, the HSGs reinforce a narrative of 
alterity and consequent asymmetry by classifying the attacks as “an assault on our open, 
democratic, tolerant and multicultural societies” and pledge their solidarity to, and cooperation 
with, the USA, stating that “the Member States of the Union are prepared to undertake such 
actions, each according to its means” (ibid.). In the Conclusions, the European Council indicates 
that the EU “will step up its action against terrorism through a coordinated and inter-
disciplinary approach embracing all Union policies,” in a similar understanding as the future 
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‘comprehensive approach’ (Drent, 2011; Gebhard and Norheim-Martinsen, 2011; Smith, 2012; 
Major and Mölling, 2013).  
The European Council states that the EU calls for ‘the broadest possible global coalition 
against terrorism, under United Nations aegis’, arguing that it should include the EU, the US, 
candidate countries, Russia, as well as ‘our Arab and Muslim partners and any other country 
ready to defend our common values’ and whose action should be carried out “through a 
coordinated and inter-disciplinary approach embracing all Union policies (…) reconciled with 
respect for the fundamental freedoms which form the basis of our civilisation” (European 
Council, 2001b: 1). In this document there is a reinforcement of the European responsibility 
narrative (albeit implicit), and of the narrative that places the focus on the EU dictating the 
terms and conditions as well as the standards and norms underlying what ‘should’ be done. The 
European Council proposes an EU policy to combat terrorism, including aspects of police and 
judicial cooperation and legal instruments, and argues that “the fight against terrorism requires 
of the Union that it play a greater part in the efforts of the international community to prevent 
and stabilise regional conflicts” and that “it is by developing the CFSP and by making the ESDP 
operational at the earliest opportunity that the Union will be most effective” (ibid.: 3). Again, 
the rhetoric of EU responsibility marks the discourse of the European Council, and the EU is 
presented as already playing a part that allegedly needs to become ‘greater’. The European 
Council states that the condition for combatting terrorism is “the integration of all countries 
into a fair world system of security, prosperity and improved development” (ibid.), reiterating 
the growing tendency to join the areas of security and development.  
In the extraordinary meeting’s Conclusions, the European HSGs state that they “reject 
any equation of terrorism with the Arab and Muslim world” (ibid.: 4). This assertion was 
formulated in a context of change in international security that was accompanied by an 
emergent international (including European) discourse characterised by Islamophobia (Doyle 
and Ahmad, 2013; Aizurua et al., 2017). This statement is meant to show European 
‘objectiveness’ in dealing with terrorism, emphasising that the EU is not engaging in practices 
of ‘equating terrorism with the Arab and Muslim world’. However, the mere sense of a need 
for affirmation of the EU’s position regarding this matter brings attention to the intrinsic 
difference and ‘otherness’, emphasised by the expression ‘world’. The EU’s repeated self-
identification with the term ‘tolerance’ reinforces an underlying hierarchical positioning 
(whereby those that ‘tolerate’ put themselves in a superior positioning of ‘allowing’ or 
‘indulging’ others). The September attacks fuelled an USA intervention in Afghanistan in early 
October and contributed towards the subsequent war in Iraq, as both countries were categorised 
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by then US President George W. Bush as being part of an “axis of evil”.27 This discourse 
reinforced an already prevailing narrative of alterity (us vs. them) that opposes European and 
North American identities to Arab and Middle Eastern identities (Semati, 2010; Wintle, 2016). 
In October 2001, the HSGs of the EU Member States together with the President of the 
Commission produced, in an informal meeting that took place in Ghent, a Declaration in the 
follow-up to the September 11 attacks and the fight against terrorism. This declaration 
emphasises a continued support for the USA and for the latter’s actions against terrorism, and 
it contains several policy recommendations that include the implementation of the action plan 
proposed in the extraordinary European Council meeting in Brussels in September 2001 as well 
as the indication of the development of a programme tackling risks, alerts, and intervention. 
The HSGs alongside the Commission President pledge the increase in the EU’s “efforts in other 
regions of the world to promote a fair international system based on security, prosperity, 
democracy and development. Law must be restored to areas of lawlessness” (European Council, 
2001c: 5). This statement implies not only the prevalence of EU responsibility narrative, but 
also characterises the EU itself as ‘a fair international system based on security, prosperity, 
democracy and development’ that needs to be emulated or reproduced ‘in other regions of the 
world’ (Niţoiu, 2013; Miskimmon, O’Loughlin, and Roselle, 2013; Schumacher, 2015; 
Birchfield, Krige, and Young, 2017). An indication that the ‘return to stability in the Balkans’ 
is one of the EU’s ‘clear priorities’ is also mentioned in the document and reflects the first steps 
in the practical implementation of the ESDP taking place in BiH two years later. The declaration 
finishes with a paragraph that again underlines an implicit understanding of ‘otherness’ and 
difference, that, in turn, is emphasised by expressions like ‘to avoid’, ‘any’, ‘equals’, and 
‘civilisations’:  
 
To avoid any equating of terrorism with the Arab and Muslim world, the European Council 
considers it essential to encourage a dialogue of equals between our civilisations, 
particularly in the framework of the Barcelona process but also by means of an active policy 
of cultural exchange (European Council, 2001c: 5). 
 
The very last sentence – “the Union invites those responsible in the Member States to give 
concrete priority to the dialogue between cultures both at international level and within their 
societies” (ibid.) – reveals a sense of the complexity of the EU’s autonomy as an actor (Jupille 
                                               
27 https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html 
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and Caporaso, 1998) when the EU Member States’ HSGs speak qua European Council (‘the 
Union invites’) directed at themselves qua ‘those responsible in the Member States’. 
 Also in October 2001, the EP voted on a motion for a resolution on the progress achieved 
in the implementation of the CFSP, where it ‘welcomed’ the Göteborg Programme and 
‘endorsed’ “the shift in the EU’s substantive aspirations after Nice, whereby future EU foreign 
policy is to be built on the twin pillars of ‘conflict prevention’ and (civil and military) ‘crisis 
management’” (EP, 2001: 6). In this document, the EP’s discourse begins by being much more 
restrained and less idealistic than that of intergovernmental institutions (the European Council 
and the Council) and the Commission in describing the EU’s role and providing normative 
justifications for the latter’s engagement in crisis management. In this sense, the EP (at least 
initially) withholds the EU ‘responsibility’ narrative in favour of a more realistic or modest 
explanation (political will): 
 
[The EP] recognises, now that the CFSP bodies and tools have finally been put in place in 
accordance with the Treaty of Amsterdam, that the EU is, for the first time, trying to give 
effectively expression to the political will to develop a distinctive foreign policy profile and 
the ability to act on its own initiative in crisis situations (ibid.: 7). 
 
Further ahead in the document, however, the EU’s ‘global responsibility for peace, security, 
and sustainable development’ appears, consolidating the dominant EU narrative. As in the 
previously examined EP document, there is a return to the discourse of calling for “a strong 
parliamentary dimension to the ESDP both by fostering a security and defence policy culture 
within the EP and by intensifying cooperation between the EP and the national parliaments” 
(ibid.), whist making practical institutional recommendations to this end. Even more expressly 
than the Councils and the Commission, the EP argues in favour of a closer link between internal 
and external security (the example of combating international terrorism is mentioned). As in 
previous instances, the need to qualify NATO as still being relevant and even ‘indispensable’ 
(after the Cold War) remains a leitmotif in EU discourse and continues to be used, to an extent, 
to establish a distinction between territorial defence and crisis management (ibid.: 8) and to 
emphasise the EU’s own usefulness as a crisis management actor in a logic of complementarity. 
The EP states its belief in that “the EU should strictly enforce the principle of conditionality 
when mediating in crisis situations” (ibid.), referring to both situations in Europe (the Western 
Balkans and Macedonia) as well as outside Europe (such as the Middle East). The use of this 
expression as such is quite unprecedented in EU discourse in the context of crisis management 
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and has remained somewhat separate from this area throughout the first decade of 
implementation of the E/CSDP, even if only discursively and not so much in practice due to 
the interaction of different EU instruments in countries where conditionality is indeed used (Del 
Biondo, 2015; Arnould and Vlassenroot, 2016; Ketevan, 2016). In the context of crisis 
management, it is more expectable to find this expression being used with regard to countries 
that are themselves on a road towards accession than otherwise. 
The EP’s more moderate discourse (in comparison with other prevailing EU discourses) 
regarding the EU’s role as a crisis management actor and its alleged ‘responsibilities’ is again 
visible when it states that “the EU has demonstrated its determination to intervene in the foreign 
policy field as a long-term strategic player on the world stage” (ibid.: 13). In addition, the EP 
argues that ‘the Macedonian case has shown that the EU can succeed as a crisis manager if’ it 
follows certain criteria, such as ensuring that key EU figures ‘act coherently and take a high 
profile’; or making sure that its message is clear in terms of linking EU support with ‘the 
demand to open a dialogue on political reforms’ (reinforcing the proposal of linking 
conditionality and crisis management); or if the EU implements long-term strategies for the 
affected region, among others (ibid.: 13). The link between development and crisis management 
is again present in the EP’s discourse when the latter identifies the Commission’s main 
achievement as “the modernisation of the management structures for the administration of all 
EU cooperation programmes, including development aid, and their combination under one roof 
(…) in order to dovetail short-and long-term conflict management measures more effectively” 
(ibid. 16). In this context, the EP classifies the EU’s attention to the Balkans and the Middle 
East ‘crisis regions’ as being of ‘exceptional importance’, while simultaneously proposing that 
the EU “should direct its external policy attention, using the instruments it currently has at its 
disposal, to (…) countries where a crisis may well occur” (ibid.: 17).  
In December 2001, a European Council meeting in Laeken made a decision to convene 
a Convention to debate the future of the EU, as a preparation for a subsequent 
Intergovernmental Conference, which was meant to produce a new EU treaty. This European 
Council meeting produced several documents within the Presidency Conclusions - including 
the Laeken Declaration on the future of the EU and a Declaration on the operational capability 
of the ESDP - that help us understand the EU’s envisaged role as a crisis management actor 
just before the practical implementation of the ESDP. The Belgian Presidency Conclusions 
document has a section dedicated to the EU’s action following the September 11, 2001 attacks 
in the USA where the EU’s efforts to ‘restoring stability in Afghanistan’ are briefly explained. 
These efforts include the ‘encouragement’ of an international security force that would 
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contribute ‘to the establishment and training of new Afghan security and armed forces’, to 
which the EU Member States could contribute in order to “provide a strong signal of their 
resolve to better assume their crisis-management responsibilities and hence help stabilise 
Afghanistan” (European Council, 2001d: 4). Even though we can recognise here the recurrent 
narrative of an ‘EU responsibility’ to engage in crisis management, this is not specifically 
directed at the EU, but rather at its Member States. This direction can be explained not only by 
the intergovernmental nature of the area in question and of the institution producing the 
discourse, but also by the very particular context of Afghanistan and the fact that no EU crisis 
management missions or operations had yet been launched. 
In annex to the Presidency Conclusions, the Laeken Declaration on the future of the EU 
includes a section entitled ‘Europe’s new role in a globalised world’ where the European 
Council states that the ‘opposing forces’ - representing the other - ‘have not gone away’, and 
identifies them as “religious fanaticism, ethnic nationalism, racism and terrorism” which are 
generated by “regional conflicts, poverty and underdevelopment” (ibid.: 20). It is interesting to 
notice that the ‘opposing forces’ are referred to thusly, and not as ‘threats’ or ‘risks’, for 
example. Instead, they are referred to as ‘opposing’, meaning ‘contrasting’, ‘different’, and 
solutions to mitigate this ‘opposition’ are inherently prescribed by identifying their drivers. In 
this sense, the European Council asks what Europe’s new role ‘in this changed world’ is and 
asks if Europe has a “leading role to play in a new world order, that of a power able both to 
play a stabilising role worldwide and to point the way ahead for many countries and peoples” 
(ibid.). Although this is formulated as a question rather than an affirmation, it still carries an 
asymmetry in the portrayal of the EU’s envisioned global ambitions. Not only is the EU 
portrayed as a leader but also a power that has a normative capacity - a normative power. In a 
seeming answer to the question concerning the EU’s ‘leading’ role, the European Council states 
that Europe is ‘the continent of humane values, (…) of liberty, solidarity and (…) diversity’ 
arguing that its ‘one boundary is democracy and human rights’, which means that “the Union 
is open only to countries which uphold basic values such as free elections, respect for minorities 
and respect for the rule of law” (ibid.). This explains the logic behind the E/CSDP as a policy 
that concerns the guarantee of the security of the EU through defence actions (civilian and 
military) that take place outside of the EU’s territory, pursued through transforming others 
according to the EU’s values and principles (in a ‘civilising’ logic). The narrative of ‘EU 
responsibility’ to play an important global role is very much present in this document (Niţoiu, 
2013; Miskimmon, O’Loughlin, and Roselle, 2013; Schumacher, 2015; Birchfield, Krige, and 
Young, 2017), as is the EU’s (morally) superior hierarchical positioning: 
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Now that the Cold War is over and we are living in a globalised, yet also highly fragmented 
world, Europe needs to shoulder its responsibilities in the governance of globalisation. The 
role it has to play is that of a power resolutely doing battle against all violence, all terror 
and all fanaticism, but which also does not turn a blind eye to the world’s heartrending 
injustices. In short, a power wanting to change the course of world affairs in such a way as 
to benefit not just the rich countries but also the poorest. A power seeking to set 
globalisation within a moral framework, in other words to anchor it in solidarity and 
sustainable development (European Council, 2001d: 20). 
 
In a section called ‘more democracy, transparency and efficiency in the EU’ further ahead in 
the document, the European Council states that the EU “derives its legitimacy from the 
democratic values it projects, the aims it pursues and the powers and instruments it possesses” 
(ibid.: 22). Statements like this have both fuelled, and been fuelled by, the normative power 
Europe narrative in academia, in particular Manners’ work (2009b), and by the categorical 
assumption of universality, ubiquity, and morality (and thus superiority) underlying these 
principles that the EU argues legitimate its external action, which we argue is at the base of the 
EU’s ‘civilising’ attitude and is reflective of the EU’s ‘postcolonial’ condition (Staeger, 2016).  
In the context of the early development of the ESDP, and to provide support to the 
emerging policy, an EU Situation Centre was created, in 2002. This structure was renamed EU 
Intelligence Analysis Centre (EU INTCEN) in 2012, in the context of the implementation of 
the Lisbon Treaty. The EU INTCEN’s primary task is, in cooperation with the EUMS 
Intelligence Directorate, to provide intelligence support to the E/CSDP’s institutional structure. 
In late February 2002, the Inaugural Meeting of the Convention on the future of the EU that 
had been convened by the Laeken European Council at the end of the previous year, a few 
months earlier, took place in Brussels. At this time, the preparation of the text of the draft 
Constitutional Treaty that was meant to replace the Nice treaty began. Two months later, in 
April 2002, the EP launched a resolution on the state of the ESDP and EU-NATO relations, 
due to the imminence of the launch of the latter policy and of the EU’s access to NATO’s 
planning capabilities. The EP starts out by classifying EU values as inherently ‘universal’, by 
stating that the CFSP (and the ESDP) “serves the global interest and universal values, as these 
have been expressed in the Charter of the United Nations” (EP, 2002a: 1). The resolution 
emphasises NATO’s usefulness, as we have seen in other instances of EU discourse, by 
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recognising it as ‘the military security organisation for collective defence’ (while identifying 
the ESDP as a crisis management policy).  
The EP identifies the emergence of terrorism, after the 2001 USA attacks, and the 
combat thereof as a ‘major objective in ESDP’ and argues in favour of a comprehensive 
approach to tackling this phenomenon. Such an approach entails, according to the EP, “a whole 
range of non-military measures such as intelligence-sharing and police and judicial cooperation 
(...) or the building of democratic institutions, infrastructure and civil society in failed or failing 
states” (ibid.: 2). In addition, the EP reinforces the idea of an underlying ‘civilising attitude’ in 
EU crisis management by “stressing that the EU’s greatest contribution to preventing 
international terrorism will be its capacity to be effective in the building or rebuilding of 
democratic institutions, social and economic infrastructure, good governance and civil society” 
(ibid.). As in other instances, the EP attempts to convince the Member States (as such and in 
the Council) and other EU institutions (particularly the Commission) – the targets of this 
resolution – to make the ESDP subject to parliamentary scrutiny and reporting to the EP, in the 
context of expenditure and budget-related decisions, as well as overall negotiations with 
NATO, while “recall[ing] that crisis prevention and civil crisis management are a first-pillar 
issue with clear responsibilities for the Commission and the European Parliament” (ibid.: 5). 
The impending deployment of the ESDP through missions in BiH and especially FYROM (with 
access to NATO planning and command capacities) are identified by the EP as being “of great 
symbolic and practical importance for the EU’s credibility in crisis management” (ibid.: 3). 
In June 2002, a European Council meeting took place in Seville. The Spanish 
Presidency Conclusions produced in this meeting mention the effective launch of the ESDP 
foreseen for January 2003, through the launch of EUPM BiH, and reinforce the EU’s 
willingness to launch another mission in FYROM. In this context, four priority areas are 
identified concerning the civilian dimension of crisis management, namely police, the rule of 
law, civil administration, and civil protection. The Presidency Conclusions include, in annex, a 
Declaration on the contribution of the CFSP, including the ESDP, to the fight against terrorism. 
Terrorism is identified as a priority for the EU and ‘a key plank of its external relations policy’, 
and the CFSP and the ESDP (in particular conflict prevention), are identified as important tools 
to tackle it. 
 
The EUPM [BiH] is one example of the EU’s commitment to stabilising post-conflict 
regions and helping to establish the rule of law. By promoting stability, including the 
strengthening of local law-enforcement capabilities, norms and standards, the EU helps to 
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deny terrorist organisations the opportunity to take root. (…) through the military and 
civilian capabilities developed by the EU for crisis management, the CFSP will become 
stronger and will contribute more effectively to the fight against terrorism for the benefit of 
the populations concerned (European Council, 2002: 33). 
 
Here, the justification for the launch of crisis management missions and operations is altruistic 
- ‘for the benefit of the populations concerned’ - even though the EU mostly identifies its own 
security as the end goal of this policy, here reflected by the emphasis on ensuring stabilisation. 
In September 2002, the EP divulged a resolution on the progress achieved in the 
implementation of the CFSP, where it recognises the EU’s ‘clear and unanimous response’ to 
the September 11, 2001 attacks on the USA in whose context the EU “has demonstrated that it 
is also prepared to assume global responsibilities in a multilateral framework” (EP, 2002: 1). 
Here we notice a reinforcement of the principal EU narrative of a ‘responsibility’ to engage in 
the area of security at the international level (Niţoiu, 2013; Miskimmon, O’Loughlin, and 
Roselle, 2013; Schumacher, 2015; Birchfield, Krige, and Young, 2017), even though the EP’s 
discourse remains more moderate than that of other institutions by leaving out possessive 
pronouns and adjectives that denote an assumption of a burden / obligation belonging to the EU 
(e.g. its responsibilities). The EP’s discourse (as in previous instances) reinforces the arguments 
in favour of a comprehensive framing of the EU’s security-related endeavours, linking the EU’s 
‘traditional instruments’ (identified as aid, trade, and diplomacy) with conflict prevention, 
which is identified as “the guiding principle of [EU] foreign policy actions and is thereby 
tackling not only the symptoms, but also the root causes of terrorism” (EP, 2002: 2). The EP’s 
assessment of the September 11, 2001 attacks is that they ‘have altered the basic European 
foreign and security policy context’, having generated ‘five major strategic tasks’ for the EU 
since the Cold War ended. These tasks include emphasising the strategic importance of the 
transatlantic alliance; an increased clarity in the definition of relations between NATO and the 
ESDP (so as to allow for a better functioning and justification of the latter); ensuring strategic 
relations with Russia (due to the massive EU enlargement to the East); maintaining multilateral 
cooperation in the context of the UN; and combatting social, economic, and political root causes 
of extremism (ibid.).  
The EP states that neither the USA alone nor specific international coalitions are able to 
deal with new threats, identified as “a mixture of terrorism, WMDs, religious fanaticism and 
states with crumbling systems of order” (ibid.) and uses this presumed ineffectiveness as a 
justification for the increase and improvement in the EU’s international role in “establish[ing] 
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itself permanently in the strategic quartet comprising the USA, EU, Russia and the UN, open 
to cooperation with all other partners” (ibid.). This justification for the EU’s actorness is 
reflected in the identified ‘new threats’ that are meant to be tackled. One of the identified threats 
- ‘states with crumbling systems of order’ - indicates a normative understanding of what 
‘order’ should consist of, implying that that order is based on European models, and the 
categorisation of the collapse of these systems as a ‘threat’ reveals that it is considered 
detrimental to the EU’s security, which itself justifies action. These normative understandings 
and justifications for EU crisis management actorness are reinforced in the EP’s discourse when 
it states that 
 
(…) only a foreign policy based on the consolidation of rights and freedoms and on the 
affirmation of the principles of democracy and the rule of law throughout the world, and in 
particular in all third countries with which the EU maintains special relations via 
cooperation and association agreements, will enable the Union to overcome threats to 
peace, stability and freedom (ibid.: 2-3). 
 
The EP does not advocate the EU’s complete independence as an international security actor, 
particularly in the Middle East context, arguing that “the EU only has a chance of influencing 
the peace process within the quartet with the USA, Russia and the UN, as well as with other 
countries concerned” (ibid.: 3). There is mention of the EU’s ‘interpretation’ of its crisis 
management role as being global and ‘not limited to the area immediately beyond its borders’, 
even though the EP claims that it is ‘worried by the lack of visibility’ of the EU’s role. Again, 
as in previous instances, the EP returns to the idea of playing a (bigger) role (recommendations, 
debate, scrutiny) in the CFSP and the ESDP and to making these policies ‘Community-based’. 
As such, it criticises the EU’s fragmentation as an international actor (with the Member States 
acting independently vis-à-vis major international events), reflected in the CFSP (and the 
ESDP) being “determined by the co-existence of two centres of gravity: the HR, as spokesman 
of the common will of the Member States, and the Commission whose role so far has been 
narrowly confined to mobilising common resources and instruments” (ibid.: 4). 
The EP identifies the USA as being a ‘strategic partner’ of the EU (despite an ‘apparent 
alienation’ between the two) in “maintaining and fostering common values and interests” (ibid.: 
6). Similarly, the success of the EU’s ‘strategic partnership’ with Russia is identified as being 
contingent upon the inclusion of ‘promotion of democracy and human rights in the former 
Soviet Union’ (ibid.: 7). These statements provide us with an idea of what the expression 
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‘strategic partners’ means for the EU (as this concept becomes increasingly frequent in the EU’s 
discourse), bringing attention to the normative power academic debate (Diez and Manners, 
2007).  The idea that a ‘strategic partner’ is interrelated with ‘common values’ also reinforces 
certain actorness criteria, such as Bretherton and Vogler’s ‘opportunity’ (2006) that links the 
EU’s normative power to its actorness context and the EU’s assumption of the universality of 
the values it projects to how the latter serve a purpose of legitimating the EU’s actorness 
ambitions. 
On October 9, 2002, European Commission President Romano Prodi addressed the EP 
with a speech entitled “A stronger foreign and security policy for Europe.” He begins the speech 
by asking “whether political union can exist without a common foreign policy. And whether a 
serious common foreign policy can exist without a common defence policy” (Prodi, 2002). The 
Commission President argues that “if we are to play our part in ensuring peace, security and 
prosperity in Europe and beyond, we need a strong foreign and security policy” (ibid.). Here, 
as in other discursive instances, there is an abstract assumption that the EU has a part to play 
(our part) in ensuring peace, and that that role is to take place in Europe (i.e. including the 
Balkans) and outside Europe. The use of the expression “Europe and beyond” is more common 
at this stage of policy development than ‘globally’ or similar expressions, mirroring a cautious 
attitude before the launch of the ESDP. Prodi recalls, as other Commission Presidents before 
him, the genesis the European integration project as a peace project: “the European integration 
idea rose from the realisation that we needed to find a new way of solving conflicts. A method 
that did not involve recourse to arms [i.e.] by sharing aspects of our sovereignty” (ibid). 
The armed conflict in the Western Balkans, according to Prodi, taught Europeans that 
“diplomacy cannot work without a common foreign policy. And that we had no serious 
common foreign policy to speak of - much less a common defence and deterrence capability”, 
and because of that, the experience of the EU on the ground was “humiliating and belittling” 
(ibid.). Prodi makes these statements while bringing attention to the EU’s ‘capacity to rebuild 
the region economically and politically,’ while simultaneously pointing out that “if we had been 
more effective during the war, it would have cost less - in human lives and in money. And in 
terms of our own prestige and self-confidence - which could help us to defuse future conflicts 
elsewhere” (ibid.).  
In an unprecedented discursive move, Prodi brings attention to the EU’s image on the 
international scene in a negative light, as a means to either encourage his audience (the EP and 
eventually other EU actors) to support the EU’s move towards an ESDP, or simply to illustrate 
the latter’s necessity. Regardless of the goal, the fact remains that he puts emphasis on the EU’s 
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perceived image as a crisis management actor, thus sustaining the importance of improving the 
latter. Prodi goes on by arguing that “we want to be successful at preventing the conflicts, not 
just good at picking up the pieces”, adding that “the need for a Common Security and Foreign 
Policy and a European Security and Defence Identity is more urgent than ever” (ibid.). Even 
though it is not entirely clear why he distinguishes between a CFSP as a ‘policy’ and an ESDP 
as an ‘identity’, the idea goes together with the rest of the speech in that it emphasises the need 
for an EU crisis management actorness identity that is visibly effective and useful and makes 
the EU proud rather than ashamed. 
Also in October 2002, the text of the preliminary draft Constitutional Treaty was 
proposed by the Conference on the future of the EU, leading to a period of debate, as well as 
changes and amendment proposals, that were meant to be concluded in 2003. Two months later, 
in December 2002, an EU-NATO Declaration was drafted, signalling the EU’s access to 
NATO’s planning capabilities, and thus a significant advancement in its crisis management 
actorness potential. Drafted in an especially active period for the development of a crisis 
management policy at the EU level, this short joint declaration – drafted by the representatives 
of the Member States of both organisations – establishes a strategic partnership between them 
founded on ‘shared values.’ The aforementioned questioning of NATO’s raison d’être during 
the 1990s and the use of this partnership with the EU as a crisis management actor in order for 
NATO to remain relevant is visible in the document, as it “reaffirm[s] that a stronger European 
role will help contribute to the vitality of the Alliance, specifically in the field of crisis 
management” (EU and NATO, 2002). The opposite is also relevant, as the EU uses the gap left 
by NATO in terms of crisis management to assume a role based on its specificities and value-
added. The reference to a ‘stable Euro-Atlantic security environment’ as a goal of the 
partnership suggests both organisations’ interests and core reasoning for engaging in crisis 
management. 
In this section we have explored the EU’s discourses related to the early development 
of the EU’s foreign policy that contain normative justification elements for the development of 
a crisis management dimension within EUFP. We were able to pinpoint some of the major 
narratives used to justify normatively the EU’s engagement in this area, such as the EU’s 
alleged ‘responsibility’ as well as the normative assumption of ‘universality’ and ‘desirability’ 
of EU norms, values, principles, and standards, from whence the EU claims that its actorness 
legitimacy derives from (Niţoiu, 2013; Miskimmon, O’Loughlin, and Roselle, 2013; 
Schumacher, 2015; Birchfield, Krige, and Young, 2017). These narratives that are both 
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constructed and repeatedly reproduced by the EU will be further analysed and debated in 
chapter 5. 
 
4.2 - The European Security Strategy and the launch of the ESDP 
 
The present section analyses and contextualises discourses produced or divulged by the EU in 
the context of the adoption, in 2003, of the European Security Strategy and the practical 
implementation of the ESDP with the launch of the first crisis management missions and 
operations until 2004. During this period, albeit relatively short, the international security 
environment became tenser with the war breaking out in Iraq following a USA-led intervention, 
and the EU’s purported responsibility to play a role as a security actor, including in the field of 
crisis management, became more acute and visible in its discourses. 
The EU’s first ESDP mission – EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUPM 
BiH) – was effectively launched in January 2003, following Council Joint Action 
2002/210/CFSP, and was closed in June 2012. Despite not being the first EU-led military 
operation, EUPM BiH was the first EU mission launched under the aegis of the newly created 
ESDP and one of the longest standing missions to date. It was, however, a takeover from the 
UN International Police Task Force, and ultimately represented a test for the newly created 
ESDP (Osland, 2004) achieving moderate success (Celador, 2009). The essential aspects of this 
police mission’s mandate throughout its nearly ten years of duration included the following 
tasks: 
 
To strengthen the operational capacity and joint capability of the law enforcement agencies 
engaged in the fight against organised crime and corruption; To assist and support in the 
planning and conduct of investigations in the fight against organised crime and corruption 
in a systematic approach; To assist and promote development of criminal investigative 
capacities of BiH; To enhance police-prosecution cooperation; To strengthen police-
penitentiary system cooperation; To contribute to ensuring a suitable level of accountability 
(EEAS, 2003). 
 
Each sentence describing a task begins with an expression that suggests the idea of 
‘improvement’ (strengthen, enhance, promote development), and the reference patterns 
(systematic approach, suitable level) appear always to be implicitly those of the EU, as if that 
were the obvious / expectable reference. On the other hand, the normative nature of this mission 
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stems from the imprecision of the idea of crisis, which is a vague and ambiguous concept whose 
definition the EU (likely purposefully) does not properly address in its E/CSDP related 
discourses. The EU is referred to in this context as playing a “key supporting role in the 
stabilisation of Bosnia and Herzegovina” (ibid.), an idea emphasised by HR Solana at a press 
conference (Solana, Kelleher, and De Hoop Scheffer, 2004).  
In February 2003, an Extraordinary European Council meeting took place in Brussels 
to discuss the situation in Iraq, in the context of general protests in Europe opposing a military 
intervention therein, while the US, the UK, and Spain submitted a draft resolution to the UNSC. 
This draft resolution was meant to validate a potential intervention by reinforcing the November 
2001 UNSC resolution 1441 that stated that there would be ‘serious consequences’ for Iraq if 
the demands of UN weapons inspectors were not complied with (UNSC, 2002: 5). This 
environment, which led to serious divisions within Europe (Jones, 2006; Fakiolas and Fakiolas, 
2006; Jones, 2004), inspired the (unusually short) Conclusions document to begin with an 
ominous statement: “the way the unfolding of the situation in Iraq will be handled will have an 
important impact on the world in the next decades” (European Council, 2003c: 1). Like in 
previous sporadic instances, the ‘responsibility’ focus is directed at the UNSC instead of the 
EU itself, in this case due to the imminence of a mandate that would allow for military action 
to take place (even though this mandate was never issued due to vehement opposition by France 
and Russia). In the Conclusions document, the European Council does not encourage military 
action, but there is, nonetheless, a latent threat to use force in case the demands of the UNCS 
are not met (European Council, 2003c: 1). 
The first EU-led military operation, which was also the first mission under the Berlin 
Plus agreement between NATO and the EU, was EUFOR Concordia (Petrov, 2010), a military 
operation in FYROM that the EU took over from NATO (originally called ‘Allied Harmony’) 
with the purpose of ensuring a safe environment for the implementation of the Ohrid peace 
agreement between FYROM and Albanian representatives. EUFOR Concordia, which lasted 
from March to December 2003, was not launched under the ESDP, but was replaced by the 
ESDP mission EUPOL Proxima. EUFOR Concordia was essentially a monitoring mission, 
despite being clad as a military operation. This mission was crucial in strengthening the EU’s 
relationship with NATO, and in showing the world that the EU had the capacity to become an 
effective crisis management actor just before the formal launch of the newly created ESDP 
(Mace, 2004).  
At the ceremony marking of the end of EUFOR Concordia, the EU HR stated that ‘the 
process towards stabilisation and normalisation’ had reached a point where foreign troops were 
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no longer needed. Again, the idea that the EU helps others achieve ‘stability’ and especially 
‘normalcy’ is imbued with a marked asymmetry between itself and the others that the EU is 
trying to help become ‘normal’, according to EU standards. In the ceremony, Solana went on 
to express his gratitude “to our partners, the United States, NATO, which has provided assets 
and capabilities to this operation, thereby implementing successfully the Berlin Plus 
agreements, and the OSCE” (Solana, 2003a: 2). The topic of the EU’s ‘partners’ comes up 
occasionally in the analysed discourses as unevenly tilted in favour of certain large countries 
and that mostly align with the EU’s worldview from a normative standpoint, to the detriment 
of E/CSDP host countries. In fact, in the early years of development and implementation of the 
ESDP, the latter are very seldom referred to as ‘partners’.  
In announcing the end of EUFOR Concordia and the beginning of EUPOL Proxima, 
Solana emphasised the importance of ‘stabilisation’, and the EU’s fundamental role in ensuring 
it: 
 
The end of Operation Concordia is in no way the end of the EU engagement in this country. 
But as the main threat to stability is no longer armed conflict but criminality, the emphasis 
of our support must be police and not military. At the same time as we lower the flag here, 
the flag will be hoisted at the Headquarters of the EU Police Mission Proxima (ibid.). 
 
The inclusion, at the end of the speech, of a description of hoisting an EU flag in a non-EU 
country is quite interesting from a semiotic viewpoint, as it evokes a number of meanings, such 
as the symbolic affirmation of power over a territory. 
With the launch of the EU’s first crisis management missions in the Balkans, a press 
conference with EU HR Javier Solana and NATO Secretary General Lord George Robertson – 
and deemed a moment of ‘particular significance’ by the former – was held in the context of 
the completion of the Berlin Plus agreement between both organisations. The agreement’s 
purpose was described by Lord Robertson as enabling “the handling of future crisis in Europe” 
(in particular in the Balkans region), while the EU’s role in the agreement was described as 
“providing another option in the European theatre for crisis management” (Solana and 
Robertson, 2003). Additional discussions between the two organisations, as described by Lord 
Robertson, appear to be framed in an optic of territorial defence: “we are working closely 
together (…) also on emergency planning, consequence management, if terrorists should attack 
– on terrorism as a whole” (ibid.). This could mean that either NATO did not envisage a global 
crisis management role for the EU, or perhaps it might have been early to think about the EU 
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in such terms, as the area of crisis management at the EU level was still taking its first steps at 
the time. This apparent divergence in the discursive constructions of the EU’s emerging crisis 
management actorness made by the EU and NATO representatives reveals that, even though 
most members coincide, the institutional dimension makes a difference, particularly in the EU, 
in terms of the formation and dissemination of collective discourses, and in the establishing of 
common narratives and identity. This is noticeable when Javier Solana expands NATO’s 
apparent narrow view of the EU’s role in crisis management – or rather the EU-NATO 
relationship in this area: “security, stability, not only in the region in which we are now, but 
beyond the region in which we are now” (ibid.). On the other hand, Solana appeared to make a 
distinction between ‘the people of Europe and the people of the Balkans’, which could simply 
imply a distinction between the EU and Europe, potentially diminishing the previous 
statement’s apparent territorial expansion in relation to the EU’s role as a crisis management 
actor.  
While our analytical focus falls on EU discourses, rather than how other actors like 
NATO took part in the discursive construction of the EU’s crisis management actorness, we 
deemed this press conference to be relevant not only due to the validity in understanding the 
views of the EU’s newly appointed HR concerning the early development of the ESDP, but 
also in understanding how these views diverge from those of NATO, despite most Member 
States coinciding. In the open discussion with the journalists during the press conference, Lord 
Robertson referred to this agreement as “one of the biggest projects that has ever been embarked 
upon by NATO and the European Union” (ibid.). In the same setting, Solana spoke of the EU’s 
takeover from NATO in FYROM and referred to the EU’s ‘responsibilities’ therein as a part of 
a ‘comprehensive approach’ that the EU had towards the country (including economic and 
policing activities / missions), which “we [the EU] would like to be part of the European Union” 
(ibid.). Here we notice strong normative ambitions for the EU’s engagement in FYROM in the 
context of crisis management; however, such ambitions also aim at an ultimate goal that only 
occasionally does EU crisis management entail, which is that a host country can become a 
potential accession candidate. In this latter case, the normative aspect is always at the very core, 
as the processes that seek to increase cohesion between the potential candidate and the rest of 
the EU are overtly assumed to go beyond mere crisis management, towards a greater 
approximation to EU standards. 
When a journalist asked in what way would the forthcoming meeting between EU 
Ministers of Defence and the NATO SG improve the CFSP ‘especially on defence,’ Solana 
replied that they would analyse ‘basically, fundamentally capabilities’ (ibid.). The EU HR 
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stressed that discussions and meetings would amount to very little without commitments 
regarding capabilities, in what appeared to be an effort to avoid falling into (or remaining in) a 
‘capabilities-expectations gap’, as described by Christopher Hill in the 1990s. The final 
question of the press conference, addressed at Solana, concerned the EU’s potential role in the 
event of war in Iraq. Solana cautiously replied that the EU had neither a seat nor formal 
representation at the UNSC, as only some individual EU Member States did. He also stated 
that, at the time, the decision to go to war had not been made by any party, stressing the 
importance of continuing efforts to avoid war and arguing that he would not make statements 
about an uncertain future scenario. 
Nine days after the EU-NATO press conference, on March 20, 2003, a USA-led 
coalition invaded Iraq. This offensive took place despite the UNSC not having issued a second 
resolution and UN inspectors not having found, at that point, substantial evidence of the 
presence of WMDs in Iraq, raising questions about legality and legitimacy (Fisher and Biggar, 
2011; Corn and Gyllensporre, 2010). The Iraq conflict led to internal normative divergences 
within the EU (Puetter and Wiener, 2007), with some Member States backing up the US-led 
coalition, particularly the UK28 and Spain, and others being resolutely against intervention, 
such as Germany and France. 
In the subsequent month, on April 16, 2003 the Athens Declaration was produced under 
the aegis of the Greek European Council Presidency in an informal meeting where the Member 
State representatives met symbolically under the Acropolis to signal the accession treaty of ten 
new EU Member States. Even though this is not a document specifically dedicated to crisis 
management, but rather to considerations about the EU and the meaning of a renewed and larger 
EU, it does include elements concerning the EU’s envisioned ambitions in matters of external 
action, portraying ambitions that were heavily influenced by the tense international 
environment at the time. In this regard, the European Council states that ‘we believe the Union 
has an essential role to play in the world’, pledging to “promote relentlessly the dialogue among 
civilizations and contribute uncompromisingly to strengthening the institutions of global 
governance and expanding the reach of international law” (European Council, 2003d: 2). The 
‘alterity’ narrative (us vs. them) that occasionally marks the EU’s discourse appears again in 
                                               
28 In September 2002 the British government published a document (available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/nol/shared/spl/hi/middle_east/02/uk_dossier_on_iraq/pdf/iraqdossier.pdf) 
describing the potential threat stemming from the alleged Iraqi weapons of mass destruction, which 
prompted the UK’s direct involvement in the war that began in the subsequent year. 
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the use of the expression ‘civilizations’. These assertions reaffirm the centrality of the EU in its 
own discourse, characterised as being in a position that enables and ‘obliges’ it to strengthen 
global governance institutions. This centrality is reinforced when the European Council 
maintains the EU ‘responsibility’ narrative as a normative justification to engage in crisis 
management (Niţoiu, 2013; Miskimmon, O’Loughlin, and Roselle, 2013; Schumacher, 2015; 
Birchfield, Krige, and Young, 2017), emphasising the latter with the use of a possessive 
pronoun (our):  
 
We are committed to facing up to our global responsibilities. We will support conflict 
prevention, promote justice, help secure peace and defend global stability. We are 
determined to work at all levels to tackle global terrorism and stem the weapons of mass 
destruction. To these ends, the Union will continue to enhance its civilian and military 
capabilities to enhance stability beyond its borders and further its humanitarian goals 
(European Council, 2003d: 2). 
 
The Member States’ representatives’ pledge (on behalf of the EU), to support the UN “and its 
efforts to ensure international legitimacy and global responsibility” (ibid.) reinforce their 
collective belief in the universality of the UN Charter and in the legitimacy that the UN (and 
the UNSC in particular) lend to the EU’s own external action (itself deemed ‘necessary’) and 
that of other actors in the international system. Even if arguably so, this assertion can be 
interpreted as a criticism to the lack of a UNSC mandate in the context of the US-led coalition’s 
intervention in Iraq.  
The escalation of the situation in Iraq prompted the Greek European Council Presidency 
to produce a brief Statement on Iraq on the same day as the Athens Declaration. This statement 
mentions the presence of the UN Secretary-General and the ‘opportunity to discuss the next 
steps on Iraq’. The responsibility to take action to ‘ensure a secure environment’ is not 
attributed to the EU as in previous instances, but rather to the ‘coalition’ of which the EU is 
part, emphasising the EU’s focus on multilateralism. Throughout the document, the emphasis 
is placed mostly on the UN, which “must play a central role, including in the process leading 
towards self-government for the Iraqi people, utilizing its unique capacity and experience in the 
post-conflict nation building” (European Council, 2003e: 1), whereas the EU “reaffirms its 
commitment to play a significant role in the political and economic reconstruction of the 
country” (ibid.). The UN is encouraged to ‘further strengthening’ its involvement in post-
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conflict Iraq, while the EU “reaffirms its commitment to bring the Israeli / Palestinian Peace 
Process to a successful conclusion” (ibid.). 
On March 20 and 21, 2003, the European Council met in Brussels. The Italian 
Presidency Conclusions that came out of this meeting focus mostly on the Lisbon Strategy, 
meant to turn the EU into “the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in 
the world” (European Council, 2003f: 1), but they do include a section on the situation in Iraq 
following the beginning of the conflict, as well as on the Middle East and other regions, and on 
the EU’s intended role in those contexts. Concerning Iraq, the document indicates that the EU 
is “faced with a new situation” (ibid.: 31) and lists the EU’s challenges in this context as the 
guarantee of Iraq’s territorial integrity, sovereignty, stability, and disarmament; the centrality 
of the UN’s role therein (including the need for a UNSC post-conflict assistance mandate); the 
humanitarian situation; as well as the need for EU-led institution building. In addition, the 
Presidency Conclusions indicate as challenges regional stability, terrorism prevention, the 
Middle East Peace Process, as well as the “deepen[ing of] our dialogue and cooperation in all 
fields with the Arab and the Islamic worlds” (ibid.: 33). This last point is indicative of a 
dichotomist world view on behalf of the EU particularly amplified by the use of the expression 
‘worlds.’ In the Presidency Conclusions, the ‘primary responsibility’ for ensuring peace and 
stability at the international level is attributed to the UNSC. Even though this does not dismiss 
the maintenance of the prevailing ‘EU responsibility’ narrative as a crisis management or 
security actor, the discursive variance of placing the responsibility focus appears in discourses 
that concern Iraq, as well as other active conflicts. This can be explained by the EU’s 
predominant institutional and policy focus on other moments of the crisis cycle, particularly 
crisis/conflict prevention, and post-conflict crisis management – both of which are carried out 
predominantly through institution-building based on European standards and models – rather 
than on active conflict. 
In June 2003, the EU launched a military operation in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo (DRC) – Operation Artemis – which lasted until September of the same year (Petrov, 
2010). The launch of this military operation, in the same year that the divisions in the context 
of the Iraq war, was “an attempt by the European powers to prove that they could still cooperate 
and that the CFSP / ESPD was still alive” and “for the EU to prove that it could act 
autonomously from NATO” (Olsen, 2009: 1). According to the operation’s mandate in Council 
Decision 2003/432/CFSP, its purpose was to ‘provide a temporary stabilisation force in 
implementation of the mandate provided in the UNSC Resolution 1484’, in the aftermath of a 
civil war and subsequent humanitarian crisis (Council, 2003). So, in a way, this short-term 
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operation was not so different from the idea behind EUFOR Concordia – i.e. a monitoring 
mission –, even though it was developed without recourse to NATO assets and capabilities, and 
it started out as a French operation (Schmidt, 2011: 568-9; Petrov, 2010).  
HR Solana, in a press conference about the end of operation Artemis, stated that 
“l’Union Européenne entend rester au premier plan des efforts pour la stabilité, la paix et la 
reconstruction en République démocratique du Congo en mettant en œuvre l’ensemble de ses 
moyens d’action” (Solana, 2003b). The recurrence of the idea of the EU as a ‘force for stability 
/ stabilisation’ indicates precaution on behalf of the EU in its early steps as a crisis management 
actor, as this idea entails making something unlikely to change (and thus unlikely to disturb). 
The efforts to make its other regions ‘stable’, i.e. unlikely to change, are related to the EU’s 
main goal of ensuring its own security, which is prioritised in relation to the promotion of its 
values, principles, and norms. 
The European Council meeting that took place in Thessaloniki on 19 and 20 June 2003 
was marked by the presentation of the draft Constitutional Treaty. This treaty was signed in the 
subsequent year but ended up not being ratified by all Member State governments after failing 
to obtain support in the French and Dutch referenda that were carried out in 2005 (Hobolt, 
2006). Regardless of this treaty’s failure, its drafting reflected an environment amenable to 
improving the EU’s functioning, particularly in matters of foreign and security policy. The 
Greek Presidency Conclusions that came out of the Thessaloniki European Council meeting 
reflect this environment with a section dedicated to External Relations, CFSP, and ESDP, which 
mentions the forthcoming European Security Strategy (ESS). The ESS’s drafting had been 
entrusted to the EU’s HR Javier Solana in cooperation with Member States’ governments and 
EU institutions, and with the help of diplomatic, military, as well as academic experts (Biscop, 
2004). In this section, the European Council reinforces the dominant EU ‘responsibility’ 
narrative (Niţoiu, 2013; Miskimmon, O’Loughlin, and Roselle, 2013; Schumacher, 2015; 
Birchfield, Krige, and Young, 2017), arguing that “our Union is committed to facing up to our 
responsibilities, guaranteeing a secure Europe and a better world” (European Council, 2003g: 
17), maintaining a strong focus on multilateralism. The Greek Presidency European Council 
Conclusions reinforce the EU’s aspirations to “contribute relentlessly to strengthening and 
reshaping the institutions of global governance, regional cooperation and expanding the reach 
of international law” (ibid.) by means of conflict prevention, justice promotion, sustainable 
development, as well as ensuring peace and stability ‘in our region and globally’. These 
assertions reflect the EU’s ambitious normative goals, in particular the idea of ‘reshaping’ 
global governance institutions.  
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The ESS was drafted as a response to the international environment at the time, marked 
by a legitimacy crisis of international security and governance organisations (Barbé, Herranz-
Surrallés, and Natorski, 2015). The ESS was approved by the European Council in December 
2003, signalling the beginning of a new stage for EU security and defence. This strategy was 
proposed in the same year as the launch of the first ever ESDP missions and had the purpose of 
providing a conceptual framework for the development and legitimation of the CFSP and of the 
ESDP, and to identify Europe’s main security challenges and respective political implications 
in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 attacks on the USA and the 2003 Iraq war (Biscop, 
2004). This was the key strategic document in place at the EU level during most of our period 
of analysis, up until the launch of the EU Global Strategy, in 2016. 
The title of the European Security Strategy, ‘A Secure Europe in a Better World’, 
indicates a focus on EU territorial security (‘a secure Europe’), and on the achievement thereof 
through an improvement of the outside world (‘in a better world’). Another aspect of the title 
that stands out is the reference to ‘Europe’ rather than the EU. According to Kuus (2011: 1146), 
“policy professionals have a substantial and hitherto underappreciated role in the producing 
(rather than simply describing) a canonical geographical and geopolitical category like 
Europe”. What we see here is a representation of the EU as if it embodied (all of) Europe (the 
latter itself an extensively contested concept). In other words, ‘Europe’ is used as a concept 
marked by a deliberate ‘constructive ambiguity’ which symbolises an abstract political and 
cultural value-based idea that is materialised by the EU’s policies and actions, rather than a 
merely geographic concept, as “defining the borders of Europe distracts from policy because it 
hinders the creation of an even space where standards could be applied neutrally. It limits the 
reach of Europe’s soft power” (ibid.: 1148).  
The ESS was the first time that an entity like the EU (an intergovernmental and 
supranational regional integration organisation, mainly focused on political and economic 
issues) drafted such a document, representing another instance of the efforts of purposeful 
construction of an EU identity through discourse that portrays itself as an international actor 
with a ‘responsibility’ to act in the field of security and that determines its own broad and 
encompassing conception of security (Niţoiu, 2013; Miskimmon, O’Loughlin, and Roselle, 
2013; Schumacher, 2015; Birchfield, Krige, and Young, 2017). A sentence in the second 
paragraph, which encases what would become a key standard in the EU’s engagement in crisis 
management in subsequent years, reads: “(…) the progressive spread of the rule of law and 
democracy has seen authoritarian regimes change into secure, stable and dynamic democracies” 
(European Council, 2003a: 1). This sentence denotes the assumption of the premise that peace 
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building can, or should, be achieved through “the externally led construction of liberal 
democratic institutions” (Légaré, 2010: 35). This assumption, in turn, creates a distinction 
between ‘secure’, ‘stable’ and ‘dynamic’ democracies (which represent the European 
paradigm), and authoritarian regimes, which, by opposition, are implied to be ‘insecure’, 
‘unstable’, and ‘stagnant’. Thus, the text suggests that not having liberal democratic state 
institutions – with free elections, separation of powers, rule of law, and European-like human 
and civil rights and liberties – is a sign of lack of dynamism and progress. This, in turn, places 
one paradigm that is marked by positive attributes at a superior level in relation to the other 
paradigm that is portrayed as an opposite, and thus is implicitly marked with negative attributes. 
This idea is reiterated when the document states that “flows of trade and investment, the 
development of technology and the spread of democracy have brought freedom and prosperity 
to many people.” The use of the noun ‘spread’ and of the verb ‘to bring’ (have brought) suggest 
that these ‘improvements’ come from an external source, and that it was these actions that 
generated ‘freedom and prosperity’, thus echoing the idea behind the EU’s aforementioned 
peace building paradigm and implies that these ‘many people’ were the opposite of ‘free and 
prosperous’ (i.e. ‘confined’ and ‘deprived’) before these actions. In a paragraph a few pages 
later, the document goes back to a similar topic – ‘state failure’, marked as a ‘key threat’ – and 
uses clearer language in establishing a distinction between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ governance: 
 
State Failure: Bad governance – corruption, abuse of power, weak institutions and lack of 
accountability – and civil conflict corrode States from within. In some cases, this has 
brought about the collapse of State institutions. (…) Collapse of the State can be associated 
with obvious threats, such as organised crime or terrorism. State failure is an alarming 
phenomenon that undermines global governance, and adds to regional instability 
(European Council, 2003a: 4). 
 
Peace building through state / institution building has become one of the EU’s main crisis 
management paradigms (Bouris and Reigeluth, 2012; Bouris, 2012; Turner, 2012). This 
paragraph encapsulates the EU’s normative justification for engaging in such practices from 
the onset, i.e. right at the beginning of the launch of the ESDP. This is one of the aspects that 
reflect this document’s importance in the establishment of the EU’s public discourses as a crisis 
management actor, and overall as an actor with normative security ambitions. Here, the EU 
defines what it means by state failure and, later in the document, why this is important for the 
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EU, implicitly justifying its engagement in state / institution building practices in the context 
of crisis management.  
The first expression in the paragraph – state failure – already contains normative 
assumptions. It implies that there are criteria that need to be fulfilled in order to ensure that the 
state does not fail. The use of the noun ‘failure’ entails that the subject to which it refers (in this 
case a state) is unable to or has stopped performing ‘normally’ or ‘successfully’. But what 
constitutes ‘normal’ or ‘successful’? The fact that this document stems from the EU’s 
institutions and is part of the latter’s public discourses indicates that the ‘normal’ or ‘successful’ 
is the European norm (which, in itself, is quite varied). In this definition, the paragraph presents 
two criteria for what is considered by the EU to be ‘state failure’: ‘bad governance’ and ‘civil 
conflict’. Bad is the opposite of good, and the document indicates what constitute ‘bad’ (albeit 
vague) aspects of governance: corruption, abuse of power, weak institutions, and lack of 
accountability. According to Derridaean logic of deconstruction, these are such also because 
they are not their opposite – decency/honesty, respect for power, strong institutions, and 
accountability – these are not just technical considerations whereby a specific case is being 
compared to a list of universally established criteria. Even if such list existed, there would be 
nothing ‘natural’ about it: it would still be shaped by historical or institutional contingencies. 
On the other hand, this definition creates meaning through difference, by determining what a 
successful state is (for the EU) based on a definition of what it is not. There are elements of 
value judgement in this document’s definition of state failure, not least because of the use of 
the qualifier ‘bad’. This is accompanied by a normative assertion, a few pages later, that states 
that “in failed states, military instruments may be needed to restore order” (European Council, 
2003a: 7). This brings us back to our earlier statement about this text containing a justification 
for the EU’s engagement in state building practices in the context of crisis management: the 
document appears to place similar importance to ‘the weakening of the state system’ as it does 
to ‘terrorism committed to maximum violence, the availability of weapons of mass destruction, 
organised crime, and the privatisation of force’, ultimately classifying all of these as “a very 
radical threat” (ibid.: 5). 
The ESS goes on to state that “the European Union is inevitably a global player” (ibid.: 
1), due to its sheer size, population, and GNP. Yet, when the document describes certain 
features of this actorness, the focus remains exclusively internal / domestic: “the increasing 
convergence of European interests and the strengthening of mutual solidarity of the EU makes 
us a more credible and effective actor” (ibid.), similarly to previous documents. Credibility and 
effectiveness are, thus, portrayed as having an internal source, and no external elements or 
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interactions are mentioned in the achievement or confirmation of such attributes. The EU’s 
focus on itself – on its ability, internal functioning, domestic credibility, effectiveness, etc. – to 
the detriment of external perceptions or endorsement, has accompanied thus far, throughout 
time, its normative justification discourses as a crisis management actor. 
Going back to the idea present in the title, the document states that “Europe should be 
ready to share in the responsibility for global security and in building a better world” (ibid.). 
Here, as in other instances, we notice the recurrence of the use of the expression ‘Europe’ as an 
deliberately ‘ambiguously constructed’ symbolic representation of the EU (Kuus, 2011). The 
use of the comparative adjective ‘better’ in this passage (and in the title) implies improvement, 
i.e. something that is more ‘good’ than something else or than it was before. This indicates that 
whatever is ‘better’ is so in comparison with something that is its relative opposite – ‘worse’, 
or less ‘good’ – which suggests a superior hierarchical positioning of the object ‘world’ after 
the EU has engaged in ‘building’ endeavours. This, in turn, suggests that what makes the object 
‘world’ to be ‘better’ is, thus, the EU – its action, its paradigms, its values and norms. However, 
the reference to the verb ‘share’, on the other hand, removes the exclusive focus from the EU, 
and portrays it as one of many contributors to the ‘betterment’ of the world, recalling the EU’s 
strong focus on the idea of multilateralism. The idea that ‘Europe should be ready’ indicates a 
strong prescriptive assumption about the EU’s role and obligations to ‘share in the 
responsibility for global security’. The deliberate choice (paradigm) of vocabulary – 
responsibility, mission – suggests an urgency or inevitability regarding its role.  
After presenting some statistical data about poverty and disease in the world, and in Sub-
Saharan Africa in particular, the document states that “security is a precondition of 
development” (European Council, 2003a: 2). This sentence may appear innocent, but it implies 
certain normative assumptions about the world, as it suggests that development is seen as a 
universal objective, ultimately shaping the way the EU constructs its role in crisis management 
– which became more explicit in the 2013 comprehensive approach to external conflict and 
crises (Drent, 2011; Gebhard and Norheim-Martinsen, 2011; Smith, 2012; Major and Mölling, 
2013). 
The ESS specifically mentions the threat of terrorism for Europe and points out the 
complexity of the phenomenon. Even though the use of the word ‘terrorism’ may appear 
initially to refer to a phenomenon that is foreign to the EU, the document admits that “this 
phenomenon is also a part of our own society” (European Council, 2003a: 3), thus implying 
that tackling it is also a matter of territorial defence (although not necessarily in a traditional 
sense). The EU’s justifications for developing a crisis management policy, in discourses that 
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preceded the ESS, had been more focused on its potential role and value-added than on its 
territorial security interests. In this document, on the other hand, there are indications of a 
different rhetoric, linked to the EU’s self-interests: 
 
Problems such as those in Kashmir, the Great Lakes Region and the Korean Peninsula 
impact on European interests directly and indirectly, as do conflicts nearer to home, above 
all in the Middle East. Violent or frozen conflicts, which also persist on our borders, 
threaten regional stability (ibid.: 4). 
 
In this paragraph, a direct reference is made to potential host countries / regions for the EU’s 
crisis management efforts. The fact that the reference is vague, and that the latter are not referred 
to as potential host countries, but rather as sources of ‘problems’ that impact the EU’s interests, 
reflects the EU’s self-centredness and implicit assumption of superiority. In addition, the use 
of the expression ‘Middle East’ is also quite Eurocentric, as it reflects a historical colonial 
geopolitical positioning of Europe (especially the UK) as the reference point to establish the 
positioning and designation of this contested region to the detriment of less politically charged 
and more geographically-oriented designations used therein (such as West Asia, for example) 
(Bilgin, 2004). 
In the section dedicated to the EU’s strategic objectives, the document starts by justifying 
why these are even listed: “to defend its security and to promote its values” (European Council, 
2003a: 6). The EU thus appears to justify having a security strategy and a crisis management 
policy by equating both ideas. 
 
Our traditional concept of self-defence (...) was based on the threat of invasion. With the 
new threats, the first line of defence will often be abroad. The new threats are dynamic. 
The risks of proliferation grow over time; left alone, terrorist networks will become ever 
more dangerous. State failure and organised crime spread if they are neglected (...). This 
implies that we should be ready to act before a crisis occurs. Conflict prevention and threat 
prevention cannot start too early (ibid.: 7). 
 
In this document, there is an association between a more traditional territorial type of defence 
and a preventive, normative-oriented type of defence (whereby security is understood as a state, 
and defence is the action – civilian or military – carried out to achieve that state). With this 
statement, the EU is implying that the crisis management actions that it intends to carry out are 
  126 
not only driven by security-related self-interest but are also imbued with a normative view of 
how the world should be, and how the EU intends to contribute to the realisation of that vision. 
This positioning risks a relativizing of the ‘emergency’ dimension of certain crises – not to the 
point of using conditionality, as proposed by the EP, but also not as immediate as, for example, 
humanitarian assistance – as it might result in a search for ways of imposing a ‘European’ 
(Kuus, 2011) vision of the world by actively seeking for supposed future or embryonic crises, 
identified by the EU according to its own convenience. 
 Even though the following sentence relates largely to what would become the ENP soon 
after the launch of this document, it also encases key normative ideas that reflect the EU’s 
justifications for engaging in crisis management and in overall external action: “our task is to 
promote a ring of well governed countries to the East of the European Union and on the borders 
of the Mediterranean with whom we can enjoy close and cooperative relations” (European 
Council, 2003a: 8). By stating that the EU’s task is to ‘promote a ring of well governed 
countries’ the document is implying that these countries are the opposite – poorly / badly 
governed countries – prior to the EU’s engagement therein. On the other hand, by adding ‘with 
whom we can enjoy close and cooperative relations’, the document reiterates the 
aforementioned idea of the EU’s portrayal as a superior polity, as ‘good’ governance is 
presented as a precondition for this kind of relations to take place. The statement that this is the 
EU’s ‘task’ confirms the EU’s normative ambitions and perceived dominance. 
Simultaneously to the launch of the ESS, the partnership between the EU and NATO 
continued towards its consolidation in a document on EU-NATO Consultation, Planning and 
Operations, drafted by the European Council in December 2003. In the midst of more practical 
and technical considerations concerning the ‘Berlin Plus’ agreement between NATO and the 
EU, one interesting assertion regarding the EU’s ambitions as a crisis management actor 
emerges in the succinct document. At one point, the European Council recommends the 
establishment, within the EUMS, of a civil / military cell in order to enhance the latter’s capacity 
to conduct early warning, situation assessment, and strategic planning, whose purpose (among 
others) is to “link work across the EU on anticipating crises, including opportunities for conflict 
prevention and post-conflict stabilisation” (European Council, 2003b: 2). The use of the noun 
‘opportunities’ evokes ideas of ‘convenience’, ‘excuses’, or ‘favourable circumstances’ for the 
EU to be a crisis management actor (Bretherton and Vogler, 2006). Here, there is again a 
suggestion of a paradigmatic choice in favour of the EU’s actorness in situations that may not 
be of emergency. This reflects discourses that constitute the EU’s way of viewing its potential 
role, where its actorness ambitions are emphasised. 
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The European Council met in Brussels, in December 2003, and produced a Presidency 
Conclusions document that focuses largely on the Intergovernmental Conference preparing the 
draft Constitutional Treaty, as well as the implementation of the Lisbon Strategy, but also 
informing of the European Council’s adoption of the ESS, as well as the EU strategy against 
the proliferation of WMDs. The ESS is described as reaffirming the EU’s common 
determination to face ‘our responsibility for guaranteeing a secure Europe in a better world’ 
and the European Council Italian Presidency urges the preparation of proposals for the 
strategy’s practical implementation, starting with a focus on UN-centred multilateralism, 
combatting terrorism, a strategy for the Middle East, as well a ‘comprehensive policy’ for BiH 
(where the European Council confirms the EU’s ‘readiness’ for a Berlin Plus ESDP military 
operation) (European Council, 2003h). 
Also in December 2003, the aforementioned EUPOL Proxima – EU Police Mission in 
FYROM – was launched, after “the map of the Macedonian police field drawn by the European 
experts marked out the local police as a force deviating from European standards of normality” 
(Merlingen and Ostrauskaitė, 2006: 87). The mission had two one-year mandates, the first from 
December 2003 until December 2004, and the second from then until December 2005, and was 
followed by an EU Police Advisory Team (EUPAT) until June 2006. As previously mentioned, 
EUPOL Proxima followed EUFOR Concordia in the context of the implementation of the Ohrid 
framework agreement in FYROM. While the previous operation (albeit military) was more of 
a monitoring mission, Proxima was a police mission (not unlike EUPM BiH) with the purpose 
of ‘monitoring, mentoring, and advising’ the police in FYROM. At the opening ceremony of 
EUPOL Proxima, the EU High Representative Javier Solana, as in other instances, begins by 
elevating the host country to an equality status with the EU, to subsequently ‘remind’ them that 
the actors’ positioning is asymmetrical, and that the EU is in a superior hierarchical position by 
stating that “Proxima will be a unique mission carried out in strong partnership with the 
Government. We want to support you in the further development of an efficient and professional 
police service, living up to European standards” (Solana, 2003a: 3).  
The mandate for the extension of Proxima (Council Joint Action 2004/789/CFSP), 
whose purpose was “to further support the development of an efficient and professional police 
service based on European standards of policing,” (Council of the EU, 2004d: 3) even though 
it is meant to be a mere police mission, reflects the EU’s ‘civilising’ ambition towards the 
country: 
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(…) the Union's contribution is based upon a broad approach with activities to address the 
whole range of rule of law aspects, including institution building programmes and police 
activities which should be mutually supportive and reinforcing (ibid.: 2). 
 
Further ahead in the text, the EU goes back to the recurrent idea of stabilisation, and describes 
itself as a definite contributor to that stability, both in the country as in the region: 
 
It can, however, not be excluded that the security situation may deteriorate with potentially 
serious repercussions on international security. A continued commitment of EU political 
effort and resources will thus help to further embed stability in the country as well as in the 
region (ibid.). 
 
As before, when EUPOL Proxima II concluded its mandate, the High Representative made a 
statement, in which he began by referring to the host country in an apparently balanced and 
symmetrical way with regard to the EU, but shortly after reminded the listeners of the 
underlying hierarchy: “in partnership and through competent work of people on both sides, for 
two years, PROXIMA has been instrumental in supporting the further development of a police 
service based on European standards” (Solana, 2005). While describing Proxima as a 
‘necessary task’, Solana went on to state that the EU’s relationship with FYROM would from 
then on move ‘from post-crisis stabilisation to pre-accession integration’, which meant that the 
ESDP as such was no longer needed.  
The EUPAT that followed would only be welcomed by local authorities ‘under certain 
conditions’ including not defining it as a stabilization-oriented ‘mission’, nor as a follow-up to 
Proxima, but would have to be instead presented as a ‘reform-oriented effort’ (Ioannides, 2006: 
14). This shows the local authorities’ concern with discourse (and the image that the latter 
projects) rather than necessarily the mandate of the mission itself. As such, this mission would 
be part of the EU’s ‘support to the broader Rule of Law area in this country’: “we began by 
taking over a military operation, continued with an ESDP police mission, the ending of which 
we mark today, and will follow up with EUPAT and the European Commission projects” 
(Solana, 2005). This is an interesting case for observing, in practice, the genesis of what would 
become the EU’s staple guideline in EU external action after the Lisbon Treaty – the EU’s 
comprehensive approach concept (Drent, 2011; Gebhard and Norheim-Martinsen, 2011; Smith, 
2012; Major and Mölling, 2013) – which explains why crisis management is never just that and 
is always imbued with some sort of normative purpose or ambition. It also highlights the 
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conceptual imprecision underlying some key concepts – starting with the concept of crisis. On 
the other hand, the fact that FYROM acquired the status of accession candidate following the 
end of EUPOL Proxima’s mandate in December 2005 means that the overall ambitions for this 
country were not the same as for other ESDP host countries, as approximation to EU standards 
is a precondition for accession. 
 In January 2004, three years after the launch of the 2001 Council Common Position 
2001/374/CFSP concerning conflict prevention, management and resolution in Africa, this 
document was repealed and replaced by Council Common Position 2004/85/CFSP. Even 
though in 2004 the EU had only launched one ESDP operation in Africa, at that time the policy 
was already being implemented and its limits were being tested with each launch. The second 
version of the EU’s Common Position about conflict prevention, management and resolution 
in Africa, more extensive than the previous, is similar in that its initial statement remains the 
premise that “the primary responsibility for prevention, management and resolution of conflicts 
on the African continent lies with Africans themselves” (Council, 2004g: 25). The document 
maintains the discourse of a “link between conflict prevention and democracy, human rights, 
the rule of law and good governance” (ibid.) and the potential role of development cooperation 
in crisis management. Yet, the second document differs from the first in that it states earlier the 
EU’s idea of becoming directly involved in crisis management in Africa ‘with its own 
capabilities’, “notwithstanding its commitment to African ownership” (ibid.). Its initial view of 
working in close connection with African actors appears less visible in the second document, 
where the EU discernibly commits to long-term closer involvement as a crisis management 
actor on its own, suggesting that the previous version of this document might have been too 
idealistic to be implemented, or perhaps simply that the EU would have, in Africa, an amenable 
environment – a context of opportunity – that could enable its crisis management actorness: 
“the EU shall develop long-term conflict prevention and peace-building initiatives, recognising 
that progress in these areas is a necessary precondition also for African states to build and 
sustain capacity to deal effectively with terrorism” (Council, 2004g: 26). 
While the first document’s idea of crisis prevention through early action was portrayed 
as an additional focus of the EU’s proposed role as a crisis management actor (‘the EU shall 
also focus on…’), in the second version of the document this becomes a more central focus: 
“while recognising the need to respond to existing crises, the EU's policy shall focus on 
preventing the outbreak and spreading of violent conflicts through early action, and on 
preventing the recurrence of violent conflict” (ibid.). The EU proposes to do this through crisis 
prevention, crisis management, and peace building, adding, in the second document, the task 
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of ‘reconstruction’ by means of “supporting the economic, political and social re-building of 
post-conflict states and societies to prevent the re-escalation of violence and to promote 
sustainable peace” (ibid.). Here, we see that the 2004 document reflects the evolution of crisis 
management closer towards the area of development and the application of European state type 
administration models and standards. This discourse can be seen as early evidence of the EU’s 
future institutional adoption, nearly 10 years later, of the concept of a ‘comprehensive 
approach’ to external conflicts and crises (Drent, 2011; Gebhard and Norheim-Martinsen, 2011; 
Smith, 2012; Major and Mölling, 2013). The increased discursive focus on EU direct 
engagement as a crisis management actor (not just as a crisis management ‘mentor’ that 
provides tools for local ownership) reflects the EU’s attitude of the first years of practical 
implementation of the ESDP, and the identification and exploitation of an amenable dynamic 
environment that enabled such actorness – or what Bretherton and Vogler (2006) would identify 
as ‘opportunity’. It also reflects an adjustment of the EU’s ambitions as the ESDP’s 
implementation was being tested. 
 In February 2004, the EU’s HR Javier Solana addressed a Conference on European 
security in Helsinki regarding the steps to follow after the ESS. While referring to the 
development of the CFSP, Solana stated that “the Union has emerged as a distinct actor also in 
this area, working side by side with its Member States. I am a physicist. I know that a molecule 
is more than a collection of atoms. The European Union is more than the sum of its parts” 
(Solana, 2004: 18). His assertion reflects the EU’s intergovernmental character but also its 
individual actorness, even with additional Member states, and it also reflects the analytical 
complexities in discerning the EU’s autonomy and authority as an actor in certain matters 
(Jupille and Caporaso, 1998). Solana refers to the EU’s ‘responsibilities’ as one of its main 
challenges and mentions a change that EUFP underwent from ‘reactive’ to ‘proactive’, acting 
to ‘prevent new conflicts from erupting’ due to the EU’s ‘new’ crisis management capabilities. 
According to Solana, the ESS, which “signals a new – strategic – approach to our external 
action” (Solana, 2004: 19), originated from a European acknowledgement “that we are stronger 
when we have a common perception of the threats we face and how to deal with them. Threats 
are never more dangerous than when we are divided” (ibid.). This statement refers to the 
normative disagreements following the Iraq war that divided EU Member States and to the 
effort that the ESS represented in ensuring a greater degree of unity in matters of security in 
face of perceived common threats, reflecting the academic debate’s focus on the importance of 
cohesion as a key domestic actorness criterion (Sjöstedt, 1977a; Jupille and Caporaso, 1998). 
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 Solana refers to the EU’s ‘responsibilities for building regional security’ primarily 
regarding the Balkans, in particular BiH and Kosovo, but also in the Arab world. Solana also 
identifies as a ‘European’ (Kuus, 2011) responsibility the achievement of a ‘closer economic 
cooperation with our neighbours to the East’ accompanied by efforts to develop democracy and 
good governance and to end frozen conflicts. In addition, the HR speaks of a ‘global 
responsibility’ for the EU to act in matters of terrorism and criminal activities, and of a link 
between internal and external European security. In this context, we can identify two major 
normative justifications provided for the development of EU crisis management actorness: the 
EU’s alleged regional and global responsibility, as well as the guarantee of the EU’s own 
security. Solana brings attention to prevention – the “need [for the EU] to be able to act at the 
first signs of trouble” (Solana, 2004: 20) – as a central tool for the EU’s security and crisis 
management actorness, mentioning different examples such as the Balkans or Iran. The HR 
references the importance of the EU’s civilian and military capability development, mentioning 
the importance of the forthcoming Headline Goal 2010, and the link between the latter and 
humanitarian, trade, and development tools. Solana also advocates in favour of multilateralism, 
a key principle in the EU’s worldview, bringing attention to the need for security ‘partnerships’ 
with the USA (due to the complementarity between both actors’ approaches to security), Russia 
(whose importance increases with each EU enlargement), as well as the UN (placed at the centre 
of the EU’s multilateral worldview). The practical implementation of the ESS is identified as 
more important that the ESS itself, as “it is not the words but the deeds that count in 
international politics” (ibid.: 22) – we argue, in this project, that it is both, reflecting the 
importance of a balance between capabilities and expectations (vehiculated through discourse) 
as discussed the corresponding scholarly debate (Hill, 1993). 
 Following the terrorist attacks in Madrid on 11 March 2004, attributed to Al-Qaida, a 
European Council meeting that took place in Brussels a few weeks later adopted a Declaration 
on Combating Terrorism drafted by the Council. The fight against terrorism falls into a policy 
‘grey area’ somewhere between the area of justice and home affairs and security and defence, 
yet it is undoubtedly connected to the EU’s security and crisis management actorness (Martins 
and Ferreira-Pereira, 2012; Zwolski and Kaunert, 2013), and thus the EU’s discourses 
concerning this issue are important for our project. The Declaration brings attention to the 
centrality of the fight against terrorism in the ESS and urges the implementation of the ESS to 
be carried out, calling for “the development of an EU long-term strategy to address all the 
factors which contribute to terrorism” (Council, 2004i: 3), mentioning the ESDP’s rapid 
development as a relevant contribution for this matter. Most goals and procedures listed in the 
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document concern actions related to justice and home affairs and are thus very focused on the 
EU’s borders and internal security. However, one of the proposals made in Annex I concerning 
the EU’s Strategic Objectives to Combat Terrorism (Revised Plan of Action) includes an idea 
already present in previous EU discourses, which is the promotion of “cross-cultural and inter-
religious understanding between Europe and the Islamic World” (ibid.: 17). This assertion 
represents Europe and ‘the Islamic world’ as opposing entities (and thus in need of such 
‘understandings’), enhanced by the use of the expression ‘world’. 
In May 2004, a document named ‘Headline Goal 2010’ (HG2010) was drafted and 
approved by the General Affairs and External Relations Council and endorsed, in the 
subsequent month, by the European Council. The HG2010 aimed at establishing a new headline 
goal after the adoption of the ESS in the previous year, as the previous headline goal, which 
had been established in the 1999 Helsinki European Council summit, was achieved. The 1999 
Helsinki headline goal was simply a practical military capability target that entailed the ability 
to deploy a certain number of multinational rapid reaction forces by 2003, with little to no 
normative statements about the EU’s nature or role. However, the HG2010 is quite a distinct 
document from its previous 1999 ‘version’. While the HG2010 also focuses on the development 
of military capabilities – namely battle groups – as it was drafted in the midst of continued 
institutional reinforcement of the EU’s security and defence area with the creation of the 
European Defence Agency (EDA), whose purpose is to develop EU defence capabilities in 
aspects of research and technological development and promotion of intra-European arms 
(Council, 2004a). Our interest in these headline goals, however, is not related to the actual 
development of military capabilities, but rather on how the EU depicts itself and justifies its 
potential role as a crisis management actor. This is why we focus on the HG2010 document, a 
much more extensive document that discusses not only practical aspects related to capability 
goals, but also justifies these goals in light of the EU’s actorness ambitions in the area of crisis 
management. 
The HG2010 begins by reaffirming, as previous documents had, that “the European 
Union is a global actor, ready to share in the responsibility for global security” and goes on to 
admit that, in the ESS, “[the EU] affirmed the role it wants to play in the world” (Council, 
2004b: 1). Not unlike the ESS, the HG2010 highlights how the EU can “make a major 
contribution to security and stability in a ring of well governed countries around Europe and in 
the world (…)” adding that it “has the civilian and military framework needed to face the 
multifaceted nature of these new threats” (ibid.). In this assertion, the document reaffirms the 
idea of a necessity to establish a ring of ‘well governed’ countries – an expression that entails 
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value judgement, in that this is the opposite of poorly / badly governed countries, which are 
likely so because they do not follow European governing norms and standards. This value 
judgement, as in previous instances, emphasises the suggestion that the EU / Europe is placed 
in a hierarchically superior and dominating level, as it is suggested that the EU is equipped to 
face these ‘threats’ by means of its ‘civilian and military framework’. The recurring idea of the 
EU as a ‘force’ or a ‘guarantor’ of stability and security appears again in this document. 
The document mentions the Member States almost as frequently as it does the EU as 
the main actors. While this does not necessarily mean a decrease in the EU’s projection of unity, 
it does appear to reiterate the intergovernmental nature of this policy (especially of the latter’s 
military dimension), where the Council and the European Council are the main institutional 
actors. It also highlights the source of the military capabilities that the EU has at its disposal 
(i.e. the Member States). 
Even though the HG2010 does not specify how, it points out that the EU “must be able 
to act before a crisis occurs” (ibid.). As in previous instances, such as the ESS, this is related to 
the export of the EU’s norms, values and standards, especially in matters of governance. It also 
reflects an active search for ‘opportunities’ for actorness in this area, which is made possible 
by the EU’s omission of a clear definition of key concepts such as ‘crisis’ or ‘threat’. Again, 
like in previous policy documents, the use of the expression ‘partners’ is used not in reference 
to potential host countries, but to international organisations such as NATO or the UN (there is 
also mention of the OSCE and the Council of Europe). Perhaps due to the more technical or 
practical nature of this document, the prevalence and focus on effectiveness as a means of 
justifying the validity of the EU’s actorness claims in crisis management is greater than in 
previous discourses. This ‘utilitarian’ view on normative justification based on a logic of 
consequences reflects the ‘output’ legitimacy debate concerning EUFP, whereby “policy-
makers seek legitimisation by achieving an output that could be seen as an efficient solution to 
given interests and preferences” (Sjursen and Smith, 2004: 127). 
Other aspects of the EU’s actorness in this area identified in the document include the 
need for further convergence and coherence (ibid.: 8), as well as reiterating the importance of 
the Member States’ position (either in the Council or the European Council, or as Member 
States tout court) within the development of this policy. This focus reflects the scholarly debate 
concerning EU actorness conceptualisations, namely the importance of domestic criteria such 
as cohesion and the analytical difficulties of the EU’s autonomy and authority in this policy 
field (Jupille and Caporaso, 1998). 
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In the summer of 2004 the EU launched another ESDP mission – EUJUST Themis –, a 
Rule of Law mission in Georgia. The mission, which was the first of its kind launched under 
this policy and lasted one year. The mission’s tasks were to 
 
(…) assist in the development of a horizontal governmental strategy guiding the reform 
process for all relevant stakeholders within the criminal justice sector, including the 
establishment of a mechanism for coordination and priority setting for the criminal justice 
reform (Council, 2004e: 22). 
 
The political changes that occurred in Georgia (an ENP partner country with territorial disputes 
with Russia) in the aftermath of the Rose Revolution in late 2003, led to a government amenable 
to a greater integration with Europe and the West, which contributed towards the Russian 
military intervention therein five years later in an effort to ensure that Georgia would remain 
under its sphere of influence (Kirova, 2012; Shafee, 2010). EUJUST Themis was a very small-
scale mission (with little over 10 EU experts deployed), and, according to its mandate (Council 
Joint Action 2004/523/CFSP) it was meant to “(...) help Georgia in its further progress and is 
committed in particular to continue to assist the new government in its efforts to bring local 
standards with regard to rule of law closer to international and EU standards” (Council, 2004e: 
21).  
Even though a number of EU instruments were already in place or being planned for 
Georgia in the area of rule of law, the EU deemed this country’s situation appropriate for the 
launch of a crisis management mission, as both a testing ground and an opportunity for 
geographical expansion of the ESDP, in addition to elevating the political profile of an EU 
involvement without directly antagonising Russia. The EU’s HR for CFSP stated that the 
mission “shows the importance of a healthy Rule of Law system. It is key to ensuring stability 
and also growth” (Solana, 2004: 1). The EU’s justification for launching a crisis management 
mission appears to be linked again with its ‘civilising mission’ and with the conceptual 
imprecision of ‘crisis’, as well as with the idea of searching for potential future crises, in a logic 
closer to crisis prevention by means of export of EU norms and standards: 
 
The security situation in Georgia is stable but may deteriorate with potentially serious 
repercussions on regional and international security and the strengthening of democracy 
and the rule of law. A commitment of EU political effort and resources will help to embed 
stability in the region (Council, 2004e: 21). 
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However, even within the EUFP machinery this mission was considered ‘overstretching’ the 
idea of civilian ESDP (Kurowska, 2008: 100). The mission provided an opportunity for the EU 
to be a crisis management actor without an actual crisis even taking place, again following the 
principle that the EU is a ‘guarantor’ of stability. Yet, the EUJUST Themis mission was not a 
complete success as an ESDP mission, and the lack of interest on behalf of local authorities 
reflects this (Bouris and Dobrescu, 2017). 
At the end of 2004, the much anticipated EUFOR Althea – an EU military operation in 
BiH – was launched. ESDP’s longest running military operation (still ongoing at the time of 
this study) stems from UNSC resolutions 1575 (2004), 1639 (2005), 1722 (2006), 1785 (2007), 
1845 (2008), and 2183 (2014), and is essentially a takeover from NATO’s SFOR (Stabilisation 
Force) operation in BiH. Council Joint Action 2004/570/CFSP states that Althea “(…) should 
provide deterrence, continued compliance with the responsibility to fulfil the role specified in 
(…) the GFAP [General Framework Agreement for Peace] in BiH and contribute to the safe 
and secure environment,” while emphasising its inclusion in “the EU’s comprehensive 
approach towards BiH, and support BiH’s progress towards EU integration” (Council, 2004: 
10). Here, we see evidence of the ESDP as being a less isolated policy than commonly depicted 
(due to its strictly intergovernmental character) and evidence of an idea of a comprehensive 
approach to external crises being implemented nearly a decade before its formal 
conceptualisation (Drent, 2011; Gebhard and Norheim-Martinsen, 2011; Smith, 2012; Major 
and Mölling, 2013). 
Throughout time, a subtle syntagmatic shift is observed in the EU’s depiction of EUFOR 
Althea’s core mission: while the aforementioned Council Joint Action 2004/570/CFSP places 
the EU’s contribution to a safe and secure environment in BiH after the fulfilment of tasks 
related to the implementation of the GFAP, as do the early factsheets about the operation (EU 
Council Secretariat, 2004), subsequent factsheets released by the Council Secretariat about the 
mission present these ideas in reverse order. In versions 16, 17, and 20 of ESDP factsheets for 
EUFOR Althea, the text reads that  
 
The main objectives of Operation [EUFOR] ALTHEA are: First and foremost, to maintain 
a safe and secure environment in BiH and to ensure continued compliance with the 
Dayton/Paris agreement (…); Also, to support the international community’s High 
Representative/EU Special Representative for BiH, Valentin Inzko, and the local 
authorities (EU Council Secretariat, 2009a; 2009b; 2010). 
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In the subsequent version 27, the text changes in line with the evolution of the operation’s 
mandate: “the main objectives of Operation EUFOR ALTHEA are: to support BiH efforts to 
maintain the safe and secure environment in BiH; and to provide capacity-building and training 
support to the BiH Ministry of Defence and Armed Forces” (EU Council Secretariat, 2012). 
The expression ‘first and foremost’ is dropped, suggesting a greater balance, priority-wise, to 
both objectives, even though the more ambiguous / vague, yet more politically charged 
‘maintenance of a safe and secure environment’ is still at the top. Another subtle change is in 
the actor doing the maintenance of the safe and secure environment. While the mandate reads 
that the goal of the EU is one of ‘contributing’ towards that, the 2009/10 factsheets state that 
the EU is the one doing the ‘maintaining’. The 2012 factsheet, on the other hand, speaks of the 
EU’s role as a ‘supporting’ one. The January 2015 version of the factsheet evolves further, 
placing specific tasks ahead of more general / vague goals, and including the idea of a 
comprehensive approach therein, suggesting a shift in the EU’s priorities towards the country, 
more directed at the latter’s accession to the EU: 
 
The main objectives of Operation ALTHEA are: To provide capacity-building and training 
to the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina; To support BiH efforts to maintain the 
safe and secure environment in BiH; To provide support to the overall EU comprehensive 
strategy for BiH (EU Council Secretariat, 2015). 
 
These discursive shifts reflect the operation’s mutability and adaptability, which stem from its 
sheer dimension and the evolution of the surrounding security environment (Knauer, 2011). 
Overall, it has largely been considered a successful example (ibid.). 
On October 29, 2004, the Constitutional Treaty was signed in Rome. This highly 
politicised and somewhat controversial treaty was meant to represent a new stage in the 
development of the EU, as it would have imbued it with an augmented political-constitutional 
dimension, rendering the EU one step closer to a federation. Yet, two referenda in France and 
the Netherlands during 2005 impeded the treaty’s ratification and with them, the project of a 
Constitutional Treaty as such fell (Dinan, 2008). In matters of EU identity and representation 
(discursive and otherwise), the treaty would have made a difference, for example with the 
symbolic and legal ‘constitution’ dimension and with the replacement of the HR with a Minister 
for Foreign Affairs. The Lisbon Reform Treaty, signed in 2007 and ratified in 2009, ended up 
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salvaging much of the Constitutional Treaty’s proposed changes and innovations (minus the 
contentious symbolic elements) (Kreidman, 2009: 70). 
On November 30, 2004, European Commission President José Manuel Barroso 
addressed the 7th European Community Studies Association World Conference with a speech 
entitled “The European Union and the Emerging World Order: Perceptions and Strategies.” 
Barroso begins by stating that “crises in different parts of the world, including right at our 
doorstep, remind us of the importance of creating a robust European foreign policy” (Barroso, 
2004). While identifying multiple security challenges that the world faces (including failed 
states, terrorism, or radicalisation) he points out that “the distinction between what is ‘internal’ 
and what is ‘external’ is becoming less relevant by the day,” which means that “Europe cannot 
be passive or – even worse – complacent. We must not rest on the laurels of our great 
accomplishments over the last fifty years. Europe cannot be an island of peace in a sea of 
instability. We have to take our responsibility in an interdependent world” (ibid.). In addition 
to using the expression Europe as a symbolic metonym for the EU (Kuus, 2011), Barroso argues 
that the EU is a project of ‘great accomplishments’ that has an inherent ‘responsibility’ to ensure 
peace at a global scale. In fact, during his brief speech, Barroso claims three times that the EU 
‘is (undoubtedly) a global player,’ and three times that it has a ‘responsibility’ to do so. 
The uniqueness – the ‘specific nature’ – of the EU’s actorness is emphasised, and its 
value-added is highlighted when Barroso bring attention to the “wide range of foreign policy 
instruments which are particularly suited to respond to the challenges” (Barroso, 2004). The 
Commission President addresses the EU as ‘the champion of multilateralism,’ claiming, in line 
with remarks made by two of his predecessors, that “if the EU wants to be an active, equal 
partner of the U.S., we need to further strengthen our European foreign policy” (ibid.). When 
specifically addressing crisis management, Barroso is somewhat vague, arguing that “[the EU’s 
emphasis on human security] will also necessitate greater EU activities in the field of civilian 
crisis management, for which we will draw on our various instruments and render them even 
more operational” (ibid.). He adds that “we are in the process of strengthening our European 
Security and Defence Policy. Security-related challenges remain relevant in the new world 
order. Therefore, our foreign policy needs the backing of military instruments. Crisis 
management tasks stand at the core of this policy,” reiterating that “Europe is already well-
equipped to face its new tasks. There are not many international actors who possess this breadth 
and depth of instruments” (ibid.). As in other instances, the Commission President reinforces 
the EU’s uniqueness and value-added as a crisis management actor, which would become a 
recurrent discursive pattern embedded in a normative justification narrative surrounding the 
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EU’s security role in complementarity to NATO. Unlike his predecessors, however, Barroso 
puts a lot more emphasis on the civilian dimension of EU actorness tout court and as a crisis 
management, as he finishes the speech by arguing that “it is my goal to strengthen the European 
Union as a civilian power. We want to project peace, democracy and market economic 
principles abroad” (ibid.).  
In this section we have explored the EU’s discourses related to the early development 
of the ESDP that contain normative justification elements. The launch of the ESS and of the 
first ESDP missions changed the EU’s crisis management actorness not only discursively, but 
also in practice. The narrative of the EU as a security actor with its own interests and a strategic 
dimension, albeit rooted in the principle of multilateralism, characterise the EU’s discourse 
during this period and reflect a greater autonomy (Sjöstedt, 1977a; Jupille and Caporaso, 1998) 
and presence (Allen and Smith, 1990; Bretherton and Vogler, 2006) in matters of crisis 
management. The following section illustrates the discursive evolution of the EU’s ambitions 
and normative justifications as a crisis management actor in a period of reflection over the 
future of the EU, on the road towards the Lisbon Treaty. 
 
4.3 - Crisis management goals and actions on the path to the Lisbon Treaty 
 
The present section analyses and contextualises discourses produced or divulged during the 
first years of practical implementation of the ESDP and of the ESS, from 2005 until the end of 
2008, that contain normative justification elements for the EU’s crisis management actorness 
just before the entering into force of the Lisbon Treaty in the subsequent year. During this 
period, a series of missions and operations were launched all over the world, and the EU was 
able to test and adjust both the discourse and functioning of its crisis management undertakings. 
This section explores the period following the failure of the Constitutional Treaty in 2005, 
which led to a rethinking of the EU’s ambitions as an actor (including in the area of security 
and crisis management) and to their reformulation with a strong focus on external action as is 
demonstrated by the Lisbon Treaty’s corresponding stipulations (Barroso, 2007; Brandão, 
2010; Özoğuz-Bolgi, 2013; Ilik and Adamczyk, 2017). 
On January 24, 2005, Javier Solana gave a speech at the Konrad Adenauer Foundation 
entitled ‘Shaping an effective EU Foreign Policy’. The speech begins by stating that there is a 
“need [for] a stronger and more capable Europe” as “EU foreign policy remains a work in 
progress” (Solana, 2005: 17). Imbued with high expectations for the Constitutional Treaty, 
Solana projected that 2005 was likely to be “a crucial year for the political development of the
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EU, for our ability to speak with one voice, for the improvement of our crisis management 
capabilities, and most of all for our effectiveness in promoting security and stability in our 
neighbourhood and beyond” (ibid.). While describing the EU’s global role and ambition, 
Solana cites and corroborates then German President Horst Köhler in stating that “the EU has 
a responsibility to work for the ‘global common good’” (ibid.), reinforcing the prevailing EUFP 
and security actorness narrative. Solana identifies a new security environment as a challenge 
for the EU. This environment is characterised by a change “from a state-based security 
paradigm to one where, increasingly, non-state actors present the greatest threats to our security 
and where solutions mostly transcend the power of the state” (ibid.), and where human security 
becomes paramount.  
Solana describes EUFP as being “in essence about managing change, about 
safeguarding our people, about promoting our values and interests” and adds that “Europe can 
and must play a bigger role” (ibid.: 18). There are several relevant aspects about these 
statements, from the core normative justifications of foreign policy (and consequently crisis 
management), namely the EU’s security, its interests, and the promotion of European values, 
to the assumption that the EU already plays a big role and that it needs to increase its efforts: 
“indeed we are a global actor (…) with the comprehensive array of instruments – economic, 
legal, diplomatic, military – at our disposal” (ibid.). The EU’s foreign policy is deemed 
‘promising’ “because the EU is an amazing economic and political success story” and that 
“from the outside it looks like a loose ‘European model’ exists, both as a way of organising our 
societies and in approaching international affairs” (ibid.). Through these affirmations, Solana 
implies that the EU’s success has turned it into an example that must be reproduced throughout 
the world in different foreign policy endeavours, even though he acknowledges that “there can 
be no simple export of a whatever we think the European model is, but the EU is seen as a 
source of inspiration”, as “imitation and adaptation are easier than invention” (ibid.). The HR 
lists the EU’s efforts made in the context of the implementation of the ESS, namely in the fields 
of non-proliferation of WMDs and the fight against terrorism, while bringing attention to the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict as a threat for the EU, the region, and the world. Solana argues that 
“there was a time when the EU’s foreign policy was criticised for being all talk and no action” 
(ibid.: 20) but states that the practical implementation, as well as the capability and institutional 
development of the ESDP changed this paradigm. 
In April 2005 the EP released a resolution on the European Security Strategy. In the 
document, the EP proposes a more ‘comprehensive understanding’ of the concept of security 
to involve political democratic issues as well as social, economic and environmental issues, 
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since all of these contribute to conflict proliferation as well as “the failure of states and the 
emergence of criminal and terrorist networks” (EP, 2005: 3). In reference to the ESS, the EP 
agrees with the necessity of combining “the various assistance programmes and instruments, 
including those of development policy (…) in conjunction with diplomatic, civilian and military 
capabilities and expertise” (ibid.), i.e. the adoption of a ‘comprehensive’ approach towards 
crisis situations (Drent, 2011; Gebhard and Norheim-Martinsen, 2011; Smith, 2012; Major and 
Mölling, 2013). The practical implementation of the ESS would, according to the EP, “enable 
the Union to detect crises sufficiently far in advance to act in a pro-active manner” (EP, 2005: 
3). This reflects the prevailing idea that the EU assumes that it is its prerogative to dictate what 
falls into the category of ‘crisis’, as well as to determine the means it is willing to deploy and 
the terms under which EU-led crisis management is to take place. When referring to the newly 
created ENP and the ESS, the EP “stresses that democracy and the rule of law are the most 
important preconditions for the peaceful coexistence of peoples” (ibid.:4). 
Also in April 2005, the EU launched EUPOL Kinshasa, “the first civilian mission of 
crisis management in Africa” (EEAS, 2006: 1). This mission was followed by EUPOL RD 
Congo – another police mission in the DRC. The first mission ran from April 2005 to June 
2007, and the subsequent one from June 2007 until the end of 2014. We put these missions 
together in our chronological analysis of the evolution of the EU’s discourses because these 
missions are not necessarily separate, but rather an adaptation and continuation of the same 
basic objectives that evolved following the DRC’s requests and the EU’s commitment in this 
context. At the time, the EU was already involved in crisis management in the DRC and had 
“already taken concrete steps to contribute to the re-establishment of security within the DRC” 
(Council, 2004h: 30), namely through the 2003 Operation Artemis. According to Council Joint 
Action 2004/847/CFSP of 9 December 2004 on the EU Police Mission in Kinshasa regarding 
the Integrated Police Unit (IPU), the initial goal of the mission was, at the behest of DRC 
authorities, to follow up the Commission’s efforts (through the European Development Fund) 
in setting up the IPU – according to EU standards – in order to “contribute to ensuring the 
protection of the state institutions and reinforce the internal security apparatus” in DRC (ibid.). 
The document identifies the EU’s ambitions for the country, where several civilian missions 
and military operations were launched under the ESDP: 
 
The current security situation in the DRC may deteriorate with potentially serious 
repercussions on the process of strengthening of democracy, the rule of law and international 
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and regional security. A continued commitment of EU political effort and resources will help 
to embed stability in the region (ibid.). 
 
This assertion reaffirms the EU’s commitment to stabilisation as well as its self-identification 
as guarantor for stability – an increasingly common concept used in the context of the E/CSDP, 
particularly with regard to the Southern Mediterranean region (Roccu and Voltolini, 2018). As 
mentioned previously, the use of this concept is not innocuous, as stabilising something requires 
making it unlikely to change and, perhaps more importantly, unlikely to disturb. But more than 
that, stability is achieved “when the formal roles and structures set by authority match those 
constructed by informal social interaction” (Margolis, 2010: 332). To do so, action is required 
on behalf of the stabiliser (i.e. the EU), who provides benchmarks and standards, thus projecting 
a ‘civilising’ identity (Mitzen, 2006). 
On the other hand, the increasing use of this expression, especially after the signing of 
the Lisbon Treaty is accompanied with a retraction in the EU’s normative attitude in crisis 
management, which carries a change in attitude altogether (this change will be discussed further 
ahead in this project). Nonetheless, at this point it is important to indicate that the idea of the 
EU as a ‘stabiliser / force for stabilisation’ has been present in its crisis management discourses 
since the beginning of the ESDP.  
 The EUPOL Kinshasa mission statement in the Council document declares that the goal 
of the mission is to “monitor, mentor, and advise the setting up (...) of the IPU” (ibid.: 31). 
These vague and ambiguous expressions appear with frequency in EU documents relating to 
mission goals and mission statements. Oftentimes these expressions’ vagueness and ambiguity 
serve a practical purpose of leaving room for interpretation and implementation, without 
compromising the EU. Notwithstanding, all these expressions – ‘monitor’, ‘mentor’, and 
‘advise’ – presuppose a superior hierarchical positioning of the EU with regard to its 
interlocutor, as they entail that not only is the EU going to counsel local actors, but also guide 
them according to its own standards and subsequently supervise the application of those 
guidelines. In an October 2006 press document concerning the mission, there is a statement 
justifying the latter’s extension for an additional year where the EU refers to the DRC’s 
situation in a particular way that reflects the EU’s take on its liberal democratic reference 
framework as natural and expected: 
 
On 22 November 2005, taking into account the continuation of the Transition in the DRC 
until 30 June 2006, and following a request by President Kabila dated 6 October 2006, the 
  142 
Council of the European Union decided to extend the EUPOL-Kinshasa Mission for an 
additional year, until 31 December 2006 (EEAS, 2006: 1). 
 
In what appears to be a merely informative paragraph, the word ‘transition’ (with a capital ‘T’) 
is used without references to democracy (or any other kind of transition) and we can only infer 
what it is being used in reference to either by knowing the country’s specific situation at the 
time29 or the fact that the EU (an actor that deliberately projects its own liberal democratic 
values and assumes the latter’s universality) is the collective author of the document. Otherwise, 
nothing in this document explains what ‘transition’ is being referred to, with the exception of a 
sentence that reads that “maintenance of order in Kinshasa has been recognised by the UN as a 
key element for the success of the electoral process” (ibid.: 4). The rest of the document relates 
to more practical considerations concerning the implementation of the mission. 
In July 2005, two months after the launch of EUSEC RD Congo, the EU launched its 
first integrated rule of law mission – EUJUSTLEX Iraq – an especially contentious mission 
that was launched only two years following the 2003 Iraq war and lasted until 2013. This 
mission was idealised by the EU, following the deployment of a ‘Joint Fact-Finding Mission’, 
and only then was it followed by a formal request on behalf of local authorities (Council of the 
EU, 2005d: 37). The mission was meant to strengthen the rule of law “with a full array of 
necessary expertise and assistance ranging from police to justice, penitentiary, human rights 
and gender” (EEAS, 2014a: 1) by providing “training for high and mid-level officials in senior 
management and criminal investigation” (Council, 2005d: 38). This was a contentious mission 
for several reasons, namely the disagreements between EU Member States regarding the EU’s 
role in Iraq in the aftermath of the war in general, and the fact that training could not take place 
in the country, not to mention the difficulties derived from local administrative fragmentation 
and corruption, as well as difficulties in evaluating the mission’s progress (Christova, 2013). 
                                               
29 ‘Transition’, in the context of the DRC refers to the Global and Inclusive Agreement on Transition 
in the DR Congo: Inter-Congolese Dialogue - Political negotiations on the peace process and on 
transition in the DRC, signed in 17 December 2002. Title II of the Agreement lists the transition 
objectives: 1. the reunification and reconstruction of the country, the re-establishment of peace and 
the restoration of territorial integrity and State authority in the whole of the national territory; 2. 
national reconciliation; 3. the creation of a restructured, integrated national army; 4. the 
organisation of free and transparent elections at all levels allowing a constitutional and democratic 
government to be put in place; 5. the setting up of structures that will lead to a new political order. 
Available at https://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/global-and-inclusive-agreement-
transition-dr-congo-inter-congolese 
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According to Council Joint Action 2005/190/CFSP of 7 March 2005, the motivations provided 
for the launch of the mission were linked to the CFSP’s objectives as listed in the Nice Treaty 
(namely the safeguard of EU values, interests, and security, as well as international security and 
cooperation, and the development of democracy, the rule of law, and human rights): 
 
EUJUST LEX will implement its mandate in the context of a situation posing a threat to 
law and order, the security and safety of individuals, and to the stability of Iraq and which 
could harm the objectives of the Common Foreign and Security Policy as set out in Article 
11 of the Treaty (Council, 2005d: 37). 
 
Unlike the recurring tendency verified in previous documents, and perhaps due to the high 
political profile of this mission (given that some EU countries had been directly involved in 
conflict therein), the Council Joint Action refers to the host country (or rather the latter’s 
authorities) as a ‘partner’: 
 
The success of the mission will depend on an effective strategic and technical partnership 
with the Iraqis throughout the operation (…). The EU will use its dialogue with Iraq and 
its neighbours to encourage continuous regional engagement and support for improved 
security and for the political and reconstruction process in Iraq (…) (ibid.). 
 
After 9 years, the mission had become ‘the largest and most performing international rule of 
law partner to Iraq’ amounting to over 7.000 mid and high-level Iraqi officials trained, leading 
the path for subsequent development-oriented EU programmes in the areas of democracy, good 
governance, rule of law and human rights (EEAS, 2014a). 
Between 15 September 2005 and 15 December 2006, following Council Joint Action 
2005/643/CFSP of 9 September 2005, the EU was swiftly engaged in a Monitoring Mission in 
Aceh, Indonesia, under the aegis of the ESDP, as part of a successful international effort to 
implement the Memorandum of Understanding between the Indonesian government and the 
Free Aceh Movement (Schulze, 2007). A few months after the launch of the Aceh Monitoring 
Mission, an informal meeting at Hampton Court gave way for the EU HSG to agree to the 
further strengthening of the EU’s crisis management institutional structure. Two years later, in 
2007, the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC) was established, following the 
approval, by the Council, of the Guidelines for Command and Control Structure for EU Civilian 
Operations in Crisis Management. 
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In November 2005, the EU launched two ESDP missions in the Palestinian territories – 
EUPOL COPPS (the EU Police Mission for the Palestinian Territories) and EUBAM Rafah 
(the EU Border Assistance Mission at the Rafah Border Crossing Point). According to Council 
Joint Action 2005/797/CFSP of 14 November 2005, EUPOL COPPS was meant to:  
 
(…) contribute to the establishment of sustainable and effective policing arrangements 
under Palestinian ownership in accordance with best international standards, in 
cooperation with the Community’s institution building programmes as well as other 
international efforts in the wider context of Security Sector including Criminal Justice 
Reform (Council, 2005e: 66). 
 
This Council Joint Action is somewhat different from other similar documents, as it does not 
refer to EU standards, but to ‘international’ standards. The reason behind this change has to do 
with the EU being part of a ‘Quartet’ that is meant to assist and facilitate the implementation of 
a Roadmap for the establishment of a Palestinian State. The EUPOL COPPS police and rule of 
law mission was, similarly to other ESDP missions, idealised by the EU (reaffirmed during 
several instances in 2004 and 2005), followed by the formal establishment of an EU 
Coordinating Office for Palestinian Police Support by an ‘Exchange of Letters’ between the 
Palestinian Prime Minister the EU Special Representative to the Middle-East Peace Process. 
Unlike previous documents, in addition to not using EU standards as a reference, this Council 
Joint Action uses inverted commas when referring to ‘security’, ‘institution-building’, and 
‘safety and security’, possibly suggesting the volatile nature of this context, or eventually a 
more careful normative commitment in comparison with other missions: 
 
The follow-on to the EU Coordinating Office for Palestinian Police Support is an 
expression of the EU continued readiness to support the Palestinian Authority (…), in 
particular with regard to ‘security’ and ‘institution-building’ (…). Furthermore, the support 
of the EU to the Palestinian Civil Police aims at increasing the ‘safety and security’ of the 
Palestinian population (…) (ibid.: 65). 
 
EUPOL COPPS is considered a success, despite the many operational obstacles it faced in light 
of a volatile political and security environment (Bouris, 2012: 261). Council Joint Action 
2005/889/CFSP of 12 December 2005 established the EU Border Assistance Mission for the 
Rafah Crossing Point (EUBAM Rafah), which was meant to  
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(…) provide a Third-Party presence at the Rafah Crossing Point in order to contribute, in 
cooperation with the Community’s institution-building efforts, to the opening of the Rafah 
Crossing Point and to build up confidence between the Government of Israel and the 
Palestinian Authority (Council, 2005f: 29). 
 
Unlike the EUPOL COPPS, the Council Joint Action establishing EUBAM Rafah does not use 
inverted commas when referring to the concepts of security, threat, or safety. In this document, 
we also notice a greater emphasis on the EU’s actorness in expressions such as “the EU has 
identified as a priority the building up of a Palestinian customs administration in EC-Palestinian 
cooperation”, or “the Community has provided assistance to the Palestinian border 
management” (ibid.: 28). This actorness focus is likely related to the fact that the EU was invited 
by the Israeli and Palestinian authorities as a third-party monitor at the Rafah crossing point 
between Gaza and Egypt, and “was also satisfied as for the first time it was given not the typical 
role of being a payer but the one on being an on-the-ground player” (Bouris, 2012: 262; 
Mueller, 2013). However, the mission functioned irregularly and was suspended in June 2007, 
following Hamas’ take over the Gaza Strip and the Palestinian Authority’s Presidential Guard’s 
subsequent departure from the crossing point, as well as “security concerns and the EU’s policy 
of not engaging with Hamas which it has designated a terrorist organisation” (Bulut, 2009: 
303). 
Following the 2005 referenda in France and the Netherlands that rejected a Constitutional 
Treaty for the EU, a period of reflection about the EU’s future ensued (Hooghe and Marks, 
2006). In early June 2006, the European Commission proposed a Communication to the 
European Council entitled ‘Europe in the World: Some Practical Proposals for Greater 
Coherence, Effectiveness and Visibility’ with the purpose of making “pragmatic proposals to 
enable the Union to define a strong sense of collective purpose in our external action and to 
ensure that this is backed by the necessary policy instruments” (Commission, 2006: 2). The 
Commission starts by pointing out that “Europe faces strong economic competition and new 
threats to its security” and that “Terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, 
regional conflicts, failed states and organised crime remain as pressing as ever” and also that 
“Europe has the potential to rise to these challenges and to share in the new opportunities 
created by emerging markets and globalisation” (ibid.). In addition to the ample use of the 
expression ‘Europe’ as a metonym for ‘the EU’ (Kuus, 2011), here we notice an apparent 
retraction from the EU ‘responsibility’ narrative in favour of a more modest characterisation of 
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the EU’s role in face of the identified challenges. Yet, the Commission brings attention to the 
ultimate goals of EU external action (including crisis management), i.e. to “protect and promote 
our interests and our values” (ibid.). 
By identifying the purpose of the document as ensuring that the Member States and the 
EU institutions work together to address certain key issues, the Commission acknowledges the 
EU’s discursive nature, as it is the representatives of these entities that discursively constitute, 
and act on behalf of, the EU and without whom the EU simply would not exist. As such, the 
communication document includes a series of proposals for improvement of coordination 
between both the Member States and the EU institutions, focusing in particular on the 
Commission’s role. In stating that “European citizens expect the Union to use its substantial 
international influence to protect and promote their interests and there is an expectation among 
our international partners for Europe to assume its global responsibilities” (ibid.: 3), the 
Commission returns to the normative ‘attitude’ that places the EU in a superior hierarchical 
positioning, anchored in the prevailing ‘responsibility’ narrative that has marked EU discourses 
in matters of foreign and security policy (Niţoiu, 2013; Miskimmon, O’Loughlin, and Roselle, 
2013; Schumacher, 2015; Birchfield, Krige, and Young, 2017). Crisis management related 
activities are identified as one of the EU’s main external action instruments and characterised 
as ‘very visible elements’ thereof. 
On June 12, 2006, the Council produced a Presidency Report on ESDP, calling attention 
to the continued expansion of the EU’s crisis management civilian and military operational 
activity, reaching three continents. The increase in the EU’s CFSP budget is explained by “the 
growing need in the field of civilian crisis management combined with the increase in the EU’s 
ambition level” (Council, 2006: 2). Both the abstract ‘need’ for EU engagement in crisis 
management and the EU’s ambitions are presented as normative justifications for the 
development of its actorness. The report continues, in a very descriptive and technical tone, 
with an account of the status of the ongoing and planned ESDP missions as well as the 
development of EU civilian and military capabilities, without delving much into normative 
considerations. Although this report does not offer much on normative justification for EU 
engagement in crisis management, it is useful in that it provides an understanding of the 
environment of determination and ambition through a detailed description of the state of affairs 
in matters of policy development and implementation, thus helping to contextualise other 
discourses that are more relevant for our study. 
On June 15 and 16, 2006 a European Council meeting took place in Brussels, and the 
Austrian Presidency Conclusions that came out of this meeting reveal the environment of 
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reflection about the EU’s future. Despite the uncertainty of future treaty changes, “improving 
the Union’s responsiveness to emergencies, crises and disasters inside and outside the Union 
remains a political imperative” (European Council, 2006: 5), including through the 
development of EU capabilities. One of the subheadings in the document concerning the 
promotion of ‘the European way of life in a globalised world’ reflects the persistence of the 
EU’s normative ‘civilising’ attitude in the aftermath of the failure of the Constitutional Treaty. 
The means of promotion include sustainable development “based on democracy, gender 
equality, solidarity, the rule of law and respect for fundamental rights” (ibid.: 7), fighting 
climate change, re-launching the Lisbon Strategy, developing an EU energy policy, as well as 
the active promotion of “the dialogue between cultures and civilizations” (ibid.: 11). The 
subsequent subheading in the document concerns ‘improving the efficiency, coherence and 
visibility of the Union’s external policies’, reflecting one of the future Lisbon Treaty’s staple 
slogans. This section revisits the Commission’s communication and proposes measures for its 
implementation. Despite the uncertainty concerning the EU’s future and treaty change, the EU’s 
normative ‘attitude’ appears resolute, as the European Council calls for the adoption in the 
subsequent year a political declaration by EU HSGs “setting out Europe’s values and ambitions 
and confirming their shared commitment to deliver them” (ibid.: 17), in the context of the 50th 
anniversary if the Rome Treaties. Following this logic, the then recently created ENP is 
described as “a means to strengthen cooperation with [the EU’s] neighbours and expand 
prosperity, stability and security beyond the borders of the European Union” (ibid.: 22). 
In July 2006, the EU launched yet another ESDP operation in DRC, following UNSC 
resolution 1671 and Council Joint Action 2006/319/CFSP of 27 April 2006 on the EU military 
operation in support of the UN Mission in the DRC (MONUC) during the election process, in 
the context of the EU’s professed commitment to supporting the ‘transition’ process in the DRC 
– described by Moshonas as a “triple transition towards peace, liberalisation and 
democratisation” (2013: 132). The operation was quite limited in time, in comparison with other 
ESDP missions and operations, lasting only four months (from 30 July 2006 to 30 November 
2006). 
 In November 2006 the EP put forward a resolution on the implementation of the ESS in 
the context of the ESDP. In this resolution, the EP assumes that the fight against terrorism 
requires “a whole range of non-military measures (…) and that the building of democratic 
institutions, infrastructure and civil society in failed or failing states is required” adding that 
“one of the greatest contributions of the EU to preventing international terrorism is its capacity 
to be effective in the building or rebuilding of democratic institutions, social and economic 
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infrastructure, good governance and civil society” (EP, 2006: 335). In addition to these 
considerations about the EU’s role in the fight against international terrorism, the EP identifies 
the normative justifications for the development of the CFSP as the protection of EU citizens 
from the threats identified in the ESS, the defence of the ‘justified interests of the EU’, as well 
as the promotion of the UN Charter objectives, by means of the EU “acting as a global 
responsible actor for worldwide peace and democracy” (ibid.). The EP adds that the EU, 
through the ESDP, ‘must fulfil’ its ‘legitimate tasks’ with the respect for human rights and 
fundamental freedoms as a ‘primary consideration’. As in all previous EP discourses 
concerning EUFP and crisis management, the EP urges the increase in parliamentary scrutiny 
for the CFSP and ESDP and brings attention to the importance of NATO for ensuring European 
territorial defence. Concerning the development and implementation of the ESDP, the EP 
“demands that the EU – in order to develop its credibility as a global actor – concentrate its 
capabilities on its geographical neighbourhood, particularly the Balkans” even though it also 
“envisages at the same time the development of further capabilities to enable the EU to make 
an active contribution to conflict resolution in other parts of the world as well” (ibid.: 336). 
On January 29, 2007, EU HR Javier Solana addressed an ESDP Conference at the EU 
Institute for Security Studies with a speech entitled ‘From Cologne to Berlin and Beyond – 
Operations, Institutions and Capabilities’. Solana began the speech by pointing out the global 
reach and scope of the ESDP missions and operations launched by the EU and their ‘significant 
impact’, and by arguing that through this policy “the EU is providing the ‘key enablers’ for 
peace and stability” (Solana, 2007: 21). According to the HR, the demand for EU action in 
matters of crisis management is increasing – which is seen as constituting a responsibility – and 
the sources of such demands are identified as being the EU Member States, the ‘countries in 
crisis’, and the UN. The reason why the EU is in demand, as Solana explains, has to do with its 
‘trademark’ in crisis management missions and operations, characterised by “a joined-up agile, 
tailor-made and rapid response, each drawing on a mixture of civilian, military, economic, 
political and institution-building tools” (ibid.: 22). Solana’s optimist view of the ESDP is 
visible throughout his speech: 
 
(…) where we have acted we have succeeded. We have helped governments take forward 
their peace processes and we have helped to make those processes more sustainable by 
strengthening their institutions. Most of all, although much remains to be done, of course, 
in all of these places, we have improved the lives of people and given them hope (ibid.). 
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According to the HR, the ESDP has rendered the EU’s external action more credible, while 
strengthening the EU’s dialogue with third countries. In addition, Solana argues that the ESDP 
“makes multilateralism effective, and it helps shape the thinking of others” (ibid.: 23). The 
development of capabilities, on the other hand, is justified by the need for the EU to “be able 
to act in response to a range of likely threats to our interests and values” (ibid.: 24), as identified 
in the ESS. 
In March 2007, the European Council Presidency represented by German Chancellor 
Angela Merkel, together with the Presidents of the EP and of the Commission, Hans-Gert 
Pottering and José Manuel Barroso respectively, signed the Berlin Declaration commemorating 
the 50th anniversary of the Rome Treaties. Albeit short, the declaration comes at a time of 
uncertainty concerning the future of the EU in both its domestic and external dimensions. In 
this sense, the authors pointed out that the EU was facing ‘major challenges’ that go beyond its 
borders, and that “the European Union is our response to these challenges” through a “European 
model that combines economic success and social responsibility” (Merkel, Pottering, and 
Barroso, 2007: 69). As such, the authors argue that they (qua the EU) “can thus shape the 
increasing interdependence of the global economy and ever-growing competition on 
international markets according to our values” adding that the EU “(we) will fight terrorism, 
organised crime and illegal immigration together. We stand up for liberties and civil rights also 
in the struggle against those who oppose them” (ibid.: 69-70). 
In matters of crisis management, the authors stated that  
 
We are committed to the peaceful resolution of conflicts in the world and to ensuring that 
people do not become victims of war, terrorism and violence. The European Union wants 
to promote freedom and development in the world. We want to drive back poverty, hunger 
and disease. We want to continue to take a leading role in that fight (ibid.: 70). 
 
The declaration finishes on a hopeful note for a new treaty revision and with the authors stating 
that the EU “will continue to promote democracy, stability and prosperity beyond its borders” 
(ibid.). 
In June 2007 the EU launched EUPOL Afghanistan – the EU Police Mission in war torn 
Afghanistan – following Council Joint Action 2007/369/CFSP. The purpose of the mission, 
which ended on 31 December 2016, after running for 9 years, was described in the following 
paragraph: 
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EUPOL AFGHANISTAN shall significantly contribute to the establishment under Afghan 
ownership of sustainable and effective civilian policing arrangements, which will ensure 
appropriate interaction with the wider criminal justice system, in keeping with the policy 
advice and institution building work of the Community, Member States and other 
international actors. Further the Mission will support the reform process towards a trusted 
and efficient police service, which works in accordance with international standards, 
within the framework of the rule of law and respects human rights (Council, 2007b: 34). 
 
There are several relevant features about this paragraph concerning the EU’s portrayal and 
justification of its crisis management actorness. The first one is that the verb ‘shall’ is paired 
up with the adverb ‘significantly’, which indicates a reinforced sense of certainty, reflecting the 
EU’s confidence in its abilities to carry out a successful mission, in contrast with the caution 
verified in documents concerning the previous launch of a police mission within the ESDP 
(EUPOL COPPS). However, unlike the prevailing tendency in previous documents, one of the 
mission’s objectives is to ensure local ownership. This apparent indication of some kind of local 
autonomy or control is mitigated soon after with a reminder that the local actors are 
hierarchically placed under the ‘policy advice and institution building work’ of the Community, 
its Member States, as well as ‘other international actors’. Yet, the EU maintains the reference 
to ‘international standards’ as opposed to the prevailing tendency of referring to ‘EU standards.’ 
The Council Joint Action states that the mission “shall carry out its tasks through, amongst 
other means, monitoring, mentoring, advising and training” (ibid.: 35). These vague and 
ambiguous concepts – in particular monitoring, mentoring, and advising – are a recurrent 
feature of the Council Joint Actions and other policy relevant documents setting up ESDP 
missions, yet they are never clearly defined, possibly to allow room for interpretation. Similarly 
to other EU missions, EUPOL Afghanistan was idealised by the EU, after sending several 
exploratory missions to assess what the EU’s role could be in rebuilding Afghanistan, and only 
after an EU proposal was there a formal invitation on behalf of the Afghan government. This 
logic reflects not only opposing strategic views within the Transatlantic community – namely 
a EU’s long-term civilian-oriented strategy vs. a US / NATO short-term militarized approach 
(Larivé, 2012), but also the EU’s active search for opportunities (Bretherton and Vogler, 2006) 
to contribute towards international (and European) security as a crisis management actor. 
Also in June 2007, the EU launched EUPOL RD Congo. This mission was, as mentioned 
previously, an evolution of EUPOL Kinshasa. The mission was launched following Council 
Joint Action 2007/405/CFSP on the EU police mission undertaken in the framework of reform 
  151 
of the security sector (SSR) and its interface with the system of justice in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo (EUPOL RD Congo). Even though this remains a police mission, the 
very title of the Council Joint Action that triggered its launch already points out important 
aspects concerning the evolution of the EU’s ambitions in DRC and “the fragile internal 
security situation after the national elections” (ibid.): “EUPOL RD Congo shall be a mission 
without executive powers. It shall accomplish its tasks through, inter alia, mentoring, 
monitoring and advisory duties” (Council, 2007a: 48). Yet, the mission statement remains 
vague, as in the case of previous cases, with emphasis on the recurrent ambiguous concepts of 
mentoring, monitoring, and advising. 
 
As it is aware of the benefits to be gained from adopting a comprehensive approach 
combining the different initiatives underway, the EU indicated in the conclusions adopted 
by the Council on 15 September 2006 that it was prepared to assume a coordinating role 
in international efforts in the security sector, in close cooperation with the United Nations, 
to support the Congolese authorities in this field (ibid.: 46). 
 
Despite all ESDP missions launched in the DRC having been launched after formal requests on 
behalf of local authorities, the fact is that Congolese ownership was low and more often than 
not implementation of recommendations and of other important aspects of the missions was 
systematically postponed by local authorities, motivated by the fact that these reforms stem 
from donors rather that local authorities (Moshonas, 2013). Nonetheless, in this context,30 one 
month after the launch of EUPOL Kinshasa, the EU launched another mission in DRC: the EU 
mission to provide advice and assistance to security sector reform in the Democratic Republic 
of Congo (EUSEC RD Congo), which lasted until 2016. The EU’s motivations to launch the 
mission have to do with perceived potential risks for internal and external security, but also the 
EU’s (recurrent) identification as a guarantor for stability: 
 
The current security situation in the DRC may deteriorate, with potentially serious 
repercussions for the process of strengthening democracy, the rule of law and international 
                                               
30 In addition to operation Artemis, police missions EUPOL Kinshasa and EUPOL RD Congo, and 
security sector reform mission EUSEC RD Congo, the EU also launched EUFOR RD Congo, a 
military operation in support of the United Nations Organisation Mission in the DRC (MONUC) 
during the election process in 2006, following Council Joint Action 2006/319/CFSP of 27 April 
2006. 
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and regional security. A continued commitment of EU political effort and resources will 
help to embed stability in the region (Council, 2005c: 20). 
 
The mission, in a 2012 EEAS factsheet, is described as having been launched “(…) to support 
the Congolese authorities in rebuilding an army that will guarantee security throughout the 
country;” yet, the EU assumes its normative ambitions by stating that –  through a small-scale 
mission as EUSEC DR Congo – it is also meant to “create the conditions for making economic 
and social development possible again” (EEAS, 2012: 1).31 In the same documents, there 
appears to be a hierarchy concerning the portrayal of the EU’s interlocutors: “working closely 
with the other contributing members of the international community, EUSEC RD Congo 
provides practical support for security sector reform in the DRC by giving advice and assistance 
directly to the Congolese authorities” (ibid.). While the document does not identify which 
actors are the EU’s ‘partners,’ there is a sense of parity vis-à-vis the ‘other members of the 
international community’ (alongside the EU), and an apparent lower positioning of the 
Congolese authorities, who are portrayed as requiring assistance to be able to carry out their 
SSR. 
In November 2007, a new headline goal document – the ‘Civilian Headline Goal 2010’ 
(CHG2010) – was drafted, approved by the ministerial Civilian Capabilities Improvement 
Conference, and noted by the General Affairs and External Relations Council. This document 
came to replace the Civilian Headline Goal 2008, which had been launched in the aftermath of 
the European Security Strategy, the launch of the first ESDP missions, and the launch of the 
HG2010 document. The CHG2010 is more politically charged than the military headline goal, 
which makes it more interesting for the purpose of our study.  
The CHG2010 document begins by stating that civilian crisis management is an 
‘important tool’ for the ESDP which contributes to the EU’s “support for international peace 
and security” (PSC, 2007: 1). This indicates not only the EU’s commitment to supporting peace 
efforts outside of its territorial sphere, but also its intention to continue using civilian means to 
do so (among other instruments). The document goes on to claim that “there has been a growing 
demand for Security Sector Reform” (ibid.), despite not identifying who should carry out such 
tasks or who demands that they should be carried out. Similarly to the HG2010, aspects related 
to the EU’s actorness identified in the document include effectiveness and coherence (ibid.: 2), 
                                               
31 In a similar factsheet from 2015, the latter statement remains, despite the mission being comprised 
of only 10 people. 
  153 
highlighting the importance of the Member States for the development and implementation of 
this policy. Even though throughout the document the main actor appears to be the EU as such 
(‘the EU is’, ‘the EU can’, ‘the EU strengthens’, ‘the EU should’, etc.), there is frequent mention 
of the EU Ministers or Member States. Although the main decision-making institution in this 
area is the Council, which is made up of representatives of the Member States’ governments, 
the latter appear to be depicted as separate entities from the EU. This reflects the complexities 
described by Jupille and Caporaso (1998) in the EU’s autonomy and authority as a global actor. 
The Member States are represented as sources of capabilities and one of the principal ‘targets’ 
of the EU’s official normative justification discourses in expressions such as: “this will inform 
the report to Ministers on civilian ESDP preparedness” (PSC, 2007: 7), while their 
representatives in the Council and in the European Council are simultaneously involved in the 
composition and dissemination of EU crisis management actorness discourses. The EU’s 
relationship with other actors in this context also appears in the document: 
 
The CHG 2010 should identify and exploit possible synergies with other actors in civilian 
crisis management, which include International Organisations, Regional Organisations and 
other major actors, e.g. non-EU States and civil society through Non-governmental 
Organisations and Civil Society Organisations, in line with agreed principles and in full 
respect of the EU’s autonomous decision-making. (ibid.: 5). 
 
In this paragraph (like in the rest of the document, as in previous documents), the CHG2010 
does not mention the potential host countries directly nor does it mention the latter’s requests. 
As is the case with previous documents, the text gives the utmost importance to the EU itself, 
followed by its ‘international partners’, namely IOs, regional organisations, ‘and other major 
actors’. Again, like in our analysis of previous documents, what appears to be the second most 
important target for the EU’s normative justification discourses for having a crisis management 
policy (after the Member States) are its ‘international partners’. Although this expression is 
quite vague and ambiguous, from what we have observed in the EU’s discourses is that it is 
more likely to refer to actors (like NATO, the UN, the USA, etc.) other than the potential host 
countries. 
 Also in November 2007, David Miliband, then British Foreign Secretary, addressed 
students at the College of Europe in Bruges, with a speech entitled ‘Europe 2030: Model Power 
Not Superpower’. The important and interesting characteristic of this speech for our project, 
despite not focusing extensively on crisis management but rather at EUFP as a whole, concerns 
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its contribution to the EU actorness debate (Ferreira-Pereira, 2010) from the perspective of a 
Member State representative, and also the latter’s understanding of the future of EUFP. In the 
speech, Miliband lists his understanding of the EU’s threats at the time, identifying one of them 
as “rogue states and failing states risk sparking conflicts, the damage of which will spill over 
into Europe” (Miliband, 2007). While ‘failing’ states is a familiar designation in EU discourses, 
‘rogue’ states not as much. Miliband describes these states as “[states] that defy and endanger 
the international community by breaking the common rules we have all agreed to abide by” 
(ibid.). As such, this expression is no less hierarchical nor disparaging than the former, as it 
entails a deviation or disobedience from the norm, as well as inferiority, particularly in the case 
of a statement about a purported threat to the EU, which, in turn, is characterised by Miliband 
as a ‘continent of values’ or a ‘triumph of shared values.’ In addition, Miliband argues that this 
and other threats “provide a new raison d’être for the European Union” (ibid.), while proposing 
that the EU be ‘a pioneer and a leader’ and, if not a superpower, then at least a ‘model power 
of regional cooperation’ that is “able to deploy soft and hard power to promote democracy and 
tackle conflict beyond its borders” (ibid.). Miliband speaks of a “great shared project for Europe 
and America, to embed our values and commitments in international rules and institutions” 
(ibid.), which is relevant to understanding the normative nature of EUFP and especially of the 
legitimation thereof (Diez and Manners, 2007). In a sentence, Miliband summarises his view 
of the EU’s normative potential and ambitions: “a club that countries want to join, it can 
persuade countries to play by the rules, and set global standards. In the way it dispenses its 
responsibilities around the world, it can be a role model that others follow” (Miliband, 2007). 
The EU’s challenges for 2030 are described as being predominantly outside of the EU’s 
geographical scope: 
 
A Europe at war not within its borders but struggling to cope with forces beyond its borders. 
Global capital, people and goods with whom it has not made peace. Religious extremism 
and division on its doorstep. Energy insecurity and climate change which threatens our 
security as well as our prosperity. Conflict and instability in regions where we have 
economic as well as moral interests (ibid.). 
 
The last sentence is especially revealing of the existence of a European view of an ethical and 
moral dimension to its crisis management role that accompanies its economic interests 
(Aggestam, 2008). The idea that “while Europe can be a magnet for the world’s best talent, it 
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cannot be a tent for the world’s poorest people” (Miliband, 2007) also fuels its crisis 
management and accompanying value and norm promotion ambitions. 
In matters of conflict prevention, Miliband argues that “a model power should champion 
international law and human rights not just internally, but externally too” (ibid.), classifying the 
EU as an ‘extraordinary success’ in domestically achieving these goals. Comparing the EU to 
NATO, Miliband argues that “its members have shared values which can generate the political 
and military commitment for decisive action”, and comparing it with the UN, he adds that “its 
member states have the full spectrum of economic, development, legislative, political and 
military tools” (ibid.). The ‘security-development nexus’ comes up in Miliband’s speech, when 
he states that “security without development will soon alienate local populations. Development 
without security is impossible. They are two sides of the same coin,” adding that “we [the EU] 
must use our power and influence, not just to resolve conflict, but prevent it. We must show we 
are prepared to take a lead and fulfil our responsibilities” (ibid.). Miliband finishes his speech 
by emphasising the ‘EU model’ idea: “it is telling that those who are near us, want to join us. 
And that those who are far away, want to imitate us. The EU can claim major successes” 
(ibid.).32 
On December 4, 2017, European Commission President José Manuel Barroso addressed 
the 4th Joint Parliamentary meeting on the Future of Europe with a speech entitled “The 
European Union after the Lisbon Treaty,” where he emphasised the Treaty’s importance for the 
EU’s actorness on a global scale ‘in diplomatic, security, defence, trade and development 
issues.’ After speaking about the improvement of the EU’s democratic credentials, Barroso 
moves on to a section concerning ‘the Interest of an Enlarged European Union in a ‘Global 
World’,’ where he reminds his audience of the ‘great results’ achieved by European 
construction, whereby “Europeans built legitimate ways to resolve their political, cultural and 
ideological differences in a peaceful way and to promote common values and economic and 
social prosperity,” adding that “to preserve and to improve what we achieved during the last 
fifty years, we need to influence and to shape the world around us” (Barroso, 2007). Unlike 
                                               
32 Looking forward in time to the Brexit process, it is interesting to consider Miliband’s words and the 
discursive changes that occurred domestically in the UK in this context; however, as our thesis does 
not focus on the Brexit, but rather on the EU’s crisis management actorness (regardless of the 
former’s importance for the EU tout court), we will refrain from making further considerations on 
this matter. 
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previous discourses, there is no mention (in this section of the speech) of an abstract 
‘responsibility, but rather of a specific goal to preserve the European way of life.  
The means to achieve this goal, according to the Commission President, include 
“working in close cooperation with our main partners, namely the countries that share the 
common values of freedom and democracy, we are in a position to decisively shape 
globalization” (ibid.). Here, we notice an instance of a prevailing discursive recurrence, 
whereby the EU’s ‘main partners’ are described as ‘the countries that share the common values 
of freedom and democracy.’ This reflects the scholarly debate surrounding the NPE concept, 
which advocates that the ability of the EU to achieve normative power is related to the shared 
belief in the validity and universality of the values and norms that it propagates (e.g. Pace, 2007; 
Diez and Manners, 2007; Manners, 2009b). 
Barroso enumerates the challenges that the EU and its Member States are meant to 
tackle, arguing that “the task for the coming decades is how to use the power and the capacities 
we built during the last half century to promote our values and interests at the global level,” 
which the Commission President claims “helps the world to be a better place” (Barroso, 2007). 
In addition to other issues, Barroso claims that the Lisbon Treaty “will allow the emergence of 
a true common European defence,” adding that it “will reinforce the Union’s cohesion, 
coherence and effectiveness in external affairs. As such, it will improve the Union’s capacity 
to pursue one of its central tasks: to shape globalization” (ibid.). 
On December 13, 2007, a Reform EU Treaty was signed in Lisbon, signalling a renewed 
confidence in the European project and with a strong focus on improving the EU’s external 
action, including many of the innovations that had been proposed in the failed Constitutional 
Treaty. In the subsequent subchapter we will explore the discursive contents of the new EU 
treaty in more detail, in the context of its entering into force in 2009.  
During 2008, the EU launched three civilian missions and two military operations, 
including some of the ESDP’s most durable and renowned ones. In March 2008, the EU 
launched EUFOR Tchad/RCA – the EU military operation in the Republic of Chad and in the 
Central African Republic – following Council Joint Action 2007/677/CFSP of 15 October 
2007. The mission, which lasted only for the period of one year, was meant to be a ‘military 
bridging operation’ in Chad and the Central African Republic following UNSC resolution 1778 
(2007), which also established a UN Mission in the same region (MINURCAT), as a response 
to the crisis in Darfur “and the urgent need to address the destabilising impact of the crisis on 
the humanitarian and security situation in neighbouring countries” (Council, 2007c: 21). Both 
the UN mission and the EU operation were meant to improve the security of refugees and 
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internally displaced persons, and to allow for the delivery of humanitarian assistance and 
creation of ‘favourable conditions for reconstruction and development efforts in these regions’ 
(ibid.). The French-led EUFOR Tchad/RCA was largely born out of the latter Member State’s 
“political priority of demonstrating that the EU is an independent international conflict 
manager, at least in Africa” (Olsen, 2009: 256). A 2009 document explaining the main aspects 
of the operation explicitly mentions it being part of a ‘comprehensive EU approach’ “designed 
to enhance the EU's engagement in tackling the crisis in Darfur” where “all the EU's instruments 
– diplomatic, political and financial – are being mobilised in support of this effort”, including 
the Commissions financing of MINURCAT through the Instrument for Stability (EEAS, 2009: 
2).  
Three months after the launch of EUFOR Tchad/ RCA, the EU launched, in June 2008, 
the EU mission in support of Security Sector Reform in Guinea-Bissau – EU SSR Guinea-
Bissau – by means of Council Joint Action 2008/112/CFSP of 12 February 2008.33 The mission, 
which was extended several times until it ended in September 2010, was launched in the context 
of the 2007 Joint Africa-EU Strategy, whose strategic priority is the “promotion of peace, 
security and stability in Africa and Europe” (Council, 2008b: 2). The EU was already present 
in the country in the context of development programmes. The Council Joint Action points out 
that “security sector reform (SSR) in Guinea-Bissau is essential for the stability and sustainable 
development of that country” (ibid.), highlighting two key concepts linked with the evolution 
of the EU’s worldview regarding crisis management. Like other missions before it, EUSSR 
Guinea-Bissau was idealised by the EU following two missions to gather information during 
2007 in cooperation with local authorities, followed, in the subsequent year, by a formal 
invitation on behalf of the government of Guinea-Bissau. According to the mission statement, 
EUSSR Guinea-Bissau was meant to “provide local authorities with advice and assistance on 
SSR (…) to contribute to creating the conditions for implementation of the National SSR 
Strategy (…)” (ibid.: 3). The mission’s objectives are listed as follows: 
 
(…) assisting in the development of detailed implementation plans for downsizing/ 
restructuring the Armed Forces and security forces (…); assistance to the development and 
                                               
33 Council Joint Action 2008/112/CFSP was subsequently amended by Council Joint Actions 
2009/405/CFSP of 18 May 2009, 2009/841/CFSP of 17 November 2009, and Council Decision 
2010/298/CFSP of 25 May 2010. All the amendments have to do with financial re-arrangements 
and extensions of the duration of the mission, rather than mission objectives, which means that we 
will not consider these documents in our discourse analysis. 
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articulation of capacity-building needs (…); assessment of the potential and risk for 
continued ESDP engagement in the medium term in support of SSR implementation (ibid.: 
3, 4). 
 
Even though the EUSSR Guinea-Bissau might have been initially envisaged by the EU, in a 
2012 document concerning the mission, the EU states that “it was conducted in partnership 
with the Republic of Guinea Bissau, which maintains ownership of the security sector reform 
(SSR) process” (EEAS, 2010: 1). Nonetheless, a gaping discrepancy between perceptions and 
preferences of local actors and external SSR actors such as the EU remains (Kohl, 2015). The 
underwhelming perceptions of those on the ground, in addition to EUSSR Guinea-Bissau 
having been primarily conceived by the EU rather than a result of a request on behalf of local 
authorities reflects an apparent discrepancy between the EU’s portrayal of a successful 
ownership-oriented mission, and a lack of effectiveness on the ground. The termination of the 
mission was triggered by an uprising in April 2010, despite the EU’s expressed concerns with 
the situation on the ground. However, the EU reiterated that “the reform must not be abandoned, 
as it is a crucial element for ensuring peace, democracy and the socio-economic development 
of Guinea-Bissau, to which the European Union remains firmly committed” (EEAS, 2010: 3).  
In September 2008, following the deployment of an exploratory mission to Georgia to 
assess the situation of conflict between the latter and Russia, and to prepare a possible ESDP 
mission – after which the EU received a formal invitation on behalf of the Georgian government 
– the EU launched the EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia (EUMM Georgia). According to 
Council Joint Action 2008/736/CFSP of 15 September 2008, the mission, which was still 
ongoing at the time of this research project, was meant to 
 
(…) provide civilian monitoring of Parties’ actions, including full compliance with the six-
point Agreement and subsequent implementing measures (…), working in close 
coordination with partners, particularly the UN and the OSCE, and consistent with other 
EU activity, in order to contribute to stabilisation, normalisation and confidence building 
whilst also contributing to informing European policy in support of a durable political 
solution for Georgia (Council, 2008c: 27). 
 
The paragraph reflects a tendency observed in other instances of the EU’s discourses of an 
attribution of the epithet of ‘partner’ to International Organisations (in this case the UN and the 
OSCE) instead of the host country. The attribution of the ‘partner’ label in this case, however, 
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has to do with the fact that both the UN and the OSCE are the two key actors that were tasked 
to mediate in the context of the Geneva International Discussions framework. The goal of 
‘stabilisation’ remains a leitmotiv in the EU’s justification for its crisis management actorness 
– particularly in its neighbourhood (Roccu and Voltolini, 2018); however, this paragraph adds 
‘normalisation’ and ‘confidence building’ as additional elements, reflecting an effort of return 
to pre-war status. Unlike other previous instances, this Council Joint Action actually describes 
what is entailed in each of these ‘mission tasks’ yet fails to define the concepts with precision. 
The stabilisation task entails the monitoring, analysis and reporting “on the situation pertaining 
to the stabilisation process (…)”; the normalisation task entails monitoring, analysing, and 
reporting “on the situation pertaining to the normalisation process of civil governance, focusing 
on rule of law, effective law enforcement structures and adequate public order”; and the 
confidence building task entails a contribution “to the reduction of tensions through liaison, 
facilitation of contacts between parties and other confidence building measures (…)” (ibid.). 
What we notice is that there is no clear definition of each of these concepts (likely deliberately), 
only descriptions of the respective tasks that include the latter, in a redundant and tautological 
manner, reflecting the EU’s tendency to avoid conceptual clarity. EUMM Georgia can be 
considered, in addition to other EU efforts, to have helped (re)affirm the EU’s security actorness 
in the region (Freire and Simão, 2013). 
In December 2008, three months after the deployment of EUMM Georgia, the EU 
launched an EU rule of law mission in Kosovo (EULEX KOSOVO), a high-profile mission in 
the midst of extensive international presence therein, following Kosovo’s declaration of 
independence in February of the same year. Despite not agreeing on the final status for Kosovo, 
which is not bereft of problems, EU Member States were in agreement regarding the need to 
deploy a mission of this nature. The unprecedented and ambitious mission was launched at the 
behest of the UN (through resolution 1244) for the EU and other international actors to “develop 
a comprehensive approach to the economic development and stabilisation of the region affected 
by the Kosovo crisis,” including “the promotion of democracy, economic prosperity, stability 
and regional cooperation” (Council, 2008d: 92). According to Council Joint Action 
2008/124/CFSP, the mission, which was still ongoing at the time of this study, was meant to 
 
(…) assist the Kosovo institutions, judicial authorities and law enforcement agencies in 
their progress towards sustainability and accountability and in further developing and 
strengthening an independent multi-ethnic justice system and multi-ethnic police and 
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customs service, ensuring that these institutions are free from political interference and 
adhering to internationally recognised standards and European best practices (ibid.: 93). 
 
The means through which the EU proposed to achieve these goals reflect a conceptual 
vagueness and ambiguity that had not, until that point, been addressed, as the mission was 
meant to “(…) fulfil its mandate through monitoring, mentoring and advising, while retaining 
certain executive responsibilities” (ibid.). The executive nature of the mission, even when the 
EU works in collaboration with local actors, establishes a clear hierarchy between the EU and 
Kosovo, placing the latter in a subordinate position. A study carried out by Labinot Greiçevci 
in 2011 attempted to analyse the EU’s actorness in the context of EULEX Kosovo, by using 
Jupille and Caporaso’s 1998 conceptualisation. The author concluded that while the EU has a 
high level of authority and autonomy to act, there are problems with the recognition criterion 
(namely on behalf of local authorities). Greiçevci also points out problems with all types of 
cohesion with the exception of procedural cohesion, particularly due to the existence of 
horizontal conflicts between the Member States. The author concludes that the identified 
problems undermine the EU’s effectiveness (Greiçevci, 2011). 
Also in December 2008, the EU launched one of its most high-profile CSDP operations: 
an EU military operation to contribute to the deterrence, prevention and repression of acts of 
piracy and armed robbery off the Somali coast, also referred to as EU NAVFOR Somalia, 
operation Atalanta. The EU’s first ever naval operation under the CSDP, which was still 
ongoing at the time of the present study, was deployed following UNSC resolutions 1814 and 
1816 recommending international action in cooperation with the Transitional Federal 
Government of Somalia, and especially resolution 1838 (2008) recommending EU action in 
particular. Despite European engagement therein prior to the launch of operation Atalanta, the 
EU’s engagement as a whole was not bereft of economic interests, as, according to Council 
Joint Action 2008/851/CFSP of 10 November 2008, Atalanta was meant to protect World Food 
Programme vessels delivering food aid to displaced persons in Somalia, and “vulnerable vessels 
cruising off the Somali coast,” as well as deter, prevent, and repress “acts of piracy and armed 
robbery off the Somali coast,” by means, if necessary, of the use of force (Council, 2008e: 34).  
One of the problems of this operation is that it is an example of the long-standing 
critique in EUFP and ESDP of a ‘capabilities-expectations gap’ (Hill, 1993), as “military and 
civilian capacity-building lags behind as operational requirements become more demanding” 
(Faleg and Blockmans, 2012: 1). Another problem is that it does not solve Somalia’s core 
problems, as HR Javier Solana put it in an opinion article in the British newspaper The 
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Guardian: “we are seeking to build on the success of Atalanta and act on land as well as at sea 
to eradicate piracy and help Somalia develop into a stable, functioning state that can offer a 
future for its people” (Solana, 2009a). Solana’s projected aspirations for Somalia following a 
possible future EU involvement therein contrast with his description of the country as 
“fractured, violent, ungovernable and open to external interference, (…) with growing regional 
instability, continuing piracy and an increasing risk of terrorism” (ibid.). In suggesting the 
importance of developing a Somali army and police force, Solana points out the EU’s “added 
value, with its expertise in security sector reform, training and mentoring” (ibid.), placing the 
EU at a higher hierarchical level, and implicitly branding the latter as an exemplary crisis 
management actor. 
On December 11, 2008 the EU released a report on the implementation of the European 
Security Strategy, at a time when more than 15 ESDP missions had already been launched. The 
title of this report – ‘Providing Security in a Changing World’ – shows a change from the title 
of the ESS’s title – ‘A Secure Europe in a Better World’ – in the sense that the overall text of 
the report presents the EU as a much less inward-looking actor as far as security goes and 
portrays it as more proactive and outward-looking. It also appears to be less judgemental in 
presenting the world – it is now seen as ‘changing’, rather than in need of ‘betterment’. 
Nonetheless, the report starts out by arguing that “five years on from the adoption of the 
European Security Strategy, the European Union carries greater responsibilities than at any 
time in its history,” adding that it “remains an anchor of stability,” and that “enlargement has 
spread democracy and prosperity across our continent” (EU, 2008: 1). This, along with the verb 
‘providing’ in the title, reveals a continuity of the ESS’s rhetoric of superiority and dominance 
of EU liberal democratic standards, and consequent self-perceived duty to spread them: 
“Europe will rise to these new challenges, as we have done in the past” (ibid.).  
The mention of the EU’s value-added as a justification for its engagement in crisis 
management is frequent: “drawing on a unique range of instruments, the EU already contributes 
to a more secure world” (ibid.), as is the portrayal of the kind of actor the EU aims to become: 
“there is no room for complacency. To ensure our security and meet the expectations of our 
citizens, we must be ready to shape events. That means becoming more strategic in our thinking, 
and more effective and visible around the world” (ibid.). The document states a number of 
leadership and actorness-related objectives, such as that “at a global level, Europe must lead a 
renewal of the multilateral order” (ibid.: 2), that include a need for improvement in some areas: 
“for our full potential to be realised we need to be still more capable, more coherent and more 
active” (ibid.). Nonetheless, the document still repeatedly portrays the EU as not only making 
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a positive difference, but as being acknowledged as such: “we are recognised as an important 
contributor to a better world” (ibid.).  
The EU’s actorness in the area of crisis management has been straightforwardly and 
admittedly normative from the onset, as the ESS is described in the report as having 
“established principles and set clear objectives for advancing the EU’s security interests based 
on our core values” (ibid.: 3). The report argues that the ‘vision’ that the EU set out with the 
ESS was “of how the EU would be a force for a fairer, safer and more united world” (ibid.: 
12), reinforcing the EU’s normative justification actorness discourses’ focus on the EU itself, 
on its potential role, on its value-added, and ultimately its dominance over other paradigms, 
which reflects the ‘convincing’ goal of these documents, as the latter state much more 
frequently what the EU can do in different areas and circumstances than what needs to be, or 
has been done in particular. This has to do, on one hand, with the unpredictability underlying 
the emergency and crisis nature of security and crisis management missions (which, 
nonetheless, sometimes result from the EU’s active seeking for opportunities), but on the other 
hand, it is very much about convincing domestic and external actors to endorse the EU’s 
ambitions and actions.  
In this section we have explored the EU’s discourses during a period of practical 
implementation of the ESDP and the challenges and opportunities that rose during the debate 
that followed the constitutional treaty failure. The prospect of a new treaty that would have a 
strong focus on effectiveness in matters of external action gave way to a proliferation of 
discursive acts with the purpose of convincing the Member States and their constituents (in 
particular in Ireland, due to the latter’s rejection of the Lisbon Treaty in a first referendum in 
June 2008, which would come to a successful turn on a second referendum in October 2009), 
as well as other actors, to validate the Reform Treaty. The narrative of the EU as a responsible 
security actor, derived from its portrayal as a ‘model’ of peace is quite prevalent during this 
period, as is the call for greater effectiveness and efficiency in the EU’s engagement in crisis 
management and other foreign policy areas. A strong focus on ESDP missions in Africa reflects 
a growing link between security and other areas where the EU already had a strong presence 
(such as development) and an increasing use of a comprehensive approach (Drent, 2011; 
Gebhard and Norheim-Martinsen, 2011; Smith, 2012; Major and Mölling, 2013). In the 
subsequent section we explore the normative justification discourses that followed the signing 
of the Lisbon Treaty and marked the beginning of a new stage for EUFP, including crisis 
management. 
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4.4 - The Lisbon Treaty: an effort toward coherence, effectiveness, and visibility 
 
The present section analyses and contextualises discourses that include elements of normative 
justification for the development of the EU’s crisis management actorness that were produced 
or divulged during the first years of practical implementation of the Lisbon Treaty starting in 
2009. These include the setting up of the EEAS and the attribution of legal personality to the 
EU, up until the launch of the 2013 comprehensive approach to external conflicts and crisis. 
During this period the EU refocused its external action in an effort to achieve greater coherence, 
effectiveness, and visibility. 
On February 19, 2009, the EP produced a resolution on the European Security Strategy 
and the ESDP. The document begins with the EP describing its expectations for the CFSP, 
while simultaneously justifying the latter. The EP begins by urging the EU to develop ‘its’ 
strategic autonomy by means of a ‘strong and effective’ CFSP “in order to promote peace and 
international security, to defend its interests in the world, to protect the security of its own 
citizens, to contribute to effective multilateralism, to advance respect for human rights and 
democratic values worldwide, and to safeguard world peace” (EP, 2009: 2). NATO is 
mentioned, and its importance emphasised, and a clearer distinction between the latter and the 
ESDP are prescribed by the EP, as “many of the new threats are not simply military and cannot 
be tackled by military means alone” (ibid.). Concerning the EU’s security role, the EP argues 
that “there is neither an automatic obligation nor the means available for the EU to deploy 
ESDP missions, be they civilian or military, in all crisis situations” (ibid.). This awareness of 
the EU’s own limits is uncommon in the EU’s discourses as a crisis management actor, but it 
reflects the reality of the EU’s deliberate choices of engaging in contexts where the risk is more 
controlled and conflicts less active (or where NATO or the UN have already a presence), and 
for avoiding contexts that are likely to be politically controversial (like Iraq, Libya, or Syria, 
for example). The environment for the preparation of the EP resolution is described rather 
negatively, particularly concerning a lack of developments in terms of a new or revised ESS 
“despite extensive preparation but in consequence of a loss of momentum caused by the 
impasse over the Lisbon Treaty” (ibid.: 5). 
The EP argues in favour of an increase in EU-level strategic thinking in matters of 
security, claiming that Member States have too great a focus on national security interests to 
the detriment of common interests. According to the EP, this approach is ‘counterproductive’ 
in achieving the goal of making the EU “a more important player on the international scene, 
providing for more effective European security arrangements” (ibid.: 2). As such, the EP argues 
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that there is a need to identify the EU’s common security interests, adding to the work already 
put in place by the ESS. The EP lists, in addition to the ESS, the protection of EU citizens and 
EU domestic interests as fundamental, as well as the protection of the EU’s external borders 
and critical infrastructure, the improvement of EU cyber security, energy security, and climate 
change. Regarding the EU’s ambitions as a security actor, the EP posits that the “should not try 
to become a superpower like the United States but that it should guarantee its security, work 
for stability in its neighbourhood, and contribute to a multilateral global system of security 
within the framework of the UN”, with a particular focus on “crisis and conflict prevention, as 
well as post-conflict management and resolution” (ibid.: 4). In fact, the EP argues that the EU 
prioritises crisis prevention in the ESDP, pointing out that “security and the rule of law are 
indispensable preconditions for development and long-term stability” (ibid.).  
While acknowledging the validity of the upcoming Atalanta operation, the EP stresses 
that “the reasons for the problem of piracy in that region are deeper rooted, including as they 
do poverty in a failed state, and demands more profound European actions to tackle those 
problems” (ibid.: 3), reinforcing the growing tendency of linking security and development. 
The EP resolution criticises the EU’s discourses surrounding the ESS, namely the use of “vague 
wording (…), which fails to describe a real strategy”, as well as the lack of a White Paper, 
making it “unlikely that a fruitful, wide-ranging public debate will be initiated” (ibid.: 5). As in 
all other EP discourses concerning the EU’s security actorness, this resolution includes several 
pleas in favour of an increase in parliamentary scrutiny for this policy area, both at the European 
and national levels.  
On April 22, 2009, Javier Solana gave a speech at the University College Dublin entitled 
‘Together we are Stronger’ concerning “why we embarked on the journey of European 
integration (…) from building peace in Europe to promoting peace around the world” (Solana, 
2009b: 73). The speech is both a plea and a justification for the implementation of the Lisbon 
Treaty, particularly directed at an Irish audience. This focus has to do with an earlier rejection 
of the Treaty in June of the previous year by the Irish constituency, which was scheduled to 
vote again in another referendum in October 2009. Asking the audience why the EU needs a 
foreign policy, Solana answers that “Europe is not, and cannot be, an island of peace and 
prosperity in a turbulent world. We share common values and interests. We want to promote 
those values and protect those interests” (ibid.). The threats that Europe faces are identified as 
“the abuse of human rights, flows of migrants escaping conflict and failed states, disputes over 
natural resources, or international terrorism” (ibid.: 74), which originate outside the EU’s 
territorial sphere. As such, Solana argues that EUFP “is needed because no country in Europe 
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can cope with them on its own. By acting together we can achieve much better results” (ibid.). 
The idea that collective action is necessary is repeated in the text, but the EU is always portrayed 
as a primus inter pares – e.g. “a major actor in the world”, “at the heart of this [global] 
collective effort” “the EU is leading international efforts to fight poverty in Africa and keep the 
peace in the Balkans” (ibid.). 
Asking the audience what the EUFP’s purpose is, Solana answers that “the aim of EU 
foreign policy is to replace the law of force with the force of law. This comes naturally to us. 
The EU, after all, has always been a peace project founded on democratic values and respect 
for laws. The EU wants a world order based on the rule of law” (ibid.). As in previous instances, 
we notice that a recurrent normative justification provided by EU actors for engaging in crisis 
management is the reproduction of the EU’s model (however loose this model is) because it 
worked for the EU. While describing the EU as ‘unique’, Solana compares it to NATO and 
identifies a specificity in the EU’s security and crisis management role, characterised by the 
EU’s multifaceted capabilities and expertise, that justifies its existence: 
 
[The EU] is not a military alliance, like NATO. NATO is for most EU member states the 
cornerstone of their territorial defence. This is not the EU’s objective. Rather, EU security 
and defence policy is a crisis management policy, which forms only one part of a much 
broader EU foreign and security policy. Plus, the implementation of the EU’s security and 
defence policy uses the full range of resources available to us: from diplomats and 
development workers to judges and police, and – but only when necessary – soldiers (ibid.: 
75). 
  
NATO is acknowledged as remaining valid and irreplaceable, while the EU assumes security-
related aspects that NATO does not, dealing with matters with a markedly different and more 
comprehensive (or what Solana refers to as ‘holistic’) approach than NATO that comprises the 
EU’s efforts of linking security and development. The speech is meant to convince the Irish 
audience of the validity of the Lisbon Treaty for the EU to be able to play a ‘constructive global 
role’, while emphasising the intergovernmental component of EUFP, which is described as 
‘marrying’ “the collective resources of EU governments with their common values and 
interests” (ibid.: 77). 
On June 15, 2009, the Czech Council Presidency approved a report on the ESDP. The 
Council report lists all ongoing ESDP missions and operations at the time, and their main goals 
or achievements. In a section meant to be merely descriptive, the missions and other EU 
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activities are fundamentally portrayed in a positive light, and marked with labels like ‘timely’, 
‘effective’, ‘successful’, ‘making progress’, ‘innovative’, ‘comprehensive’, ‘breakthrough’, 
‘exemplary’, ‘making a tangible contribution’, ‘active’, ‘coordinated’, ‘coherent’, or ‘strategic’ 
(Council of the EU, 2009c: 2-15). The report consists mostly of a series of technical 
considerations on institutional and capability development, yet there some normative 
considerations are made that are of interest to our study, such as the idea that, within the broad 
area of crisis management, the area of conflict prevention is considered a priority, a ‘key EU 
objective’. The relationship between the EU and other organisations is featured in the report, 
with particular attention given to NATO, as in previous discursive instances. EU-NATO 
relations are identified as a ‘strategic partnership’ that needs to be strengthened “in a spirit of 
mutual reinforcement and respect for their decision-making autonomy” (ibid.: 34). Unlike most 
previous instances, though, this report focuses on the areas of convergence of both interests and 
capabilities of both organisations, instead of what makes them different and complementary. 
One of the mandates for the upcoming Council Presidency identified in the report is “to 
explore synergies between ESDP and Justice and Home Affairs, including by highlighting the 
mutual operational benefit in the fight against organised crime, developing information sharing 
between ESDP missions and EUROPOL” (ibid.: 39). The idea of approximating the areas of 
crisis management and JHA was not particularly common in the EU’s discourse up until this 
time, but became increasingly so in subsequent years, and materialised with the launch of 
EUNAVFOR MED Sophia, a military CSDP naval operation in the Mediterranean, in 2015. 
Another mandate proposed for the subsequent Presidency is the continuation of the promotion 
of “an EU comprehensive approach to conflict prevention and crisis management in ESDP (…) 
and to ensure the effective implementation of human rights aspects” (ibid.: 41), which reflects 
the growing practice of framing the ESDP in a wider range of foreign policy instruments even 
before the institutionalisation of the concept of ‘comprehensive approach’ to external conflicts 
and crises four years later, in 2013.  
 Three days later, the European Council Presidency Conclusions of 18 and 19 June 2009 
continued with attempting to convince the Irish of the necessity of the Lisbon Treaty, including 
the security and defence-related aspects thereof. Annex I of the Conclusions document is 
dedicated to a decision of the HSGs of the EU Member ‘on the concerns of the Irish people on 
the treaty of Lisbon’ and section C thereof specifically addresses security and defence. This 
section starts by enumerating the principles that the EU’s action on the global stage, including 
democracy, the rule of law, and human rights. The CSDP’s purpose is vaguely described as 
“providing the Union with an operational capacity to undertake missions outside the Union for 
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peace-keeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security” (European 
Council, 2009: 18). In several instances, the policy’s intergovernmental nature is evoked, in an 
effort to ease Irish concerns over its military neutrality. In this sense, the eventuality of a 
potential ‘common defence’ is pushed to an uncertain future, and the underlying principle if 
unanimity that would be necessary to put it in place is repeatedly recalled. In addition, in an 
effort to mitigate the potential problems arising from the military dimension of the CSDP for 
the Irish government and constituents, the document states that Lisbon treaty “does not provide 
for the creation of a European army or for conscription to any military formation” (ibid.: 19), 
even though the battlegroups had already been operational for two years. The section ends by 
emphasising that ultimately it is up to the Member States to decide whether or not to participate 
in military operations. The Irish reply to these concerns is present further ahead in the 
document, where it “reiterates its commitment to the ideal of peace and friendly cooperation 
amongst nations and to the principle of the peaceful resolution of international disputes”, in 
addition to reaffirming “its strong commitment to conflict prevention, resolution and 
peacekeeping” (ibid.: 22). 
The Lisbon Treaty, which entered into force on December 1, 2009 following a positive 
result in the October Irish referendum, represented an unprecedented effort to improve the EU’s 
actorness in many different aspects. In this context, the post of High Representative for CFSP 
was renamed and reorganised as the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and 
Security Policy (HR) (TEU article 18(1)). Catherine Ashton was appointed the first post-Lisbon 
HR and charged with conducting the CSFP and the CSDP by carrying out proposals for the 
development of the latter policies, as mandated by the Council (European Council decision 
2009/950/EU). In addition, Ashton was also charged with the Vice-Presidency of the 
Commission, as well as with chairing the Foreign Affairs Council, and the direction of the 
EDA. In the same year, DGE VIII (political-military affairs) and DGE IX (civilian crisis 
management) of the Council Secretariat were merged into a new single civilian-military 
strategic planning structure, the Crisis Management and Planning Directorate (CMPD). The 
CMPD’s role is to provide expertise, support the development of concepts and capabilities, and 
conduct the political-strategic planning of CSDP civilian missions and military operations. 34 
Herman Van Rompuy was nominated the first permanent President of the European Council. 
                                               
34 https://eeas.europa.eu/topics/common-security-and-defence-policy-csdp/5433/crisis-management-
and-planning-directorate-cmpd_en 
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Among the most relevant changes introduced with the Lisbon Treaty are some that affect 
the projected and perceived image of the EU in the international system. One example is the 
attribution to the EU, as a whole, of de jure legal personality (TEU article 47). This means that 
the EU, in its entirety, rather than just being a specific pillar or institution, acquires the capacity 
for legal relations (Smith, 1928: 283). However, it also means that the EU as a whole is legally 
responsible for the activities and policies that it develops and implements. Such activities 
include what takes place within the framework of the CSDP, namely civilian missions and 
military operations, as this ceases to be a completely isolated policy, despite the maintenance 
of a singular character largely dominated by intergovernmental cooperation. This means that 
ad hoc coalitions of willing and able Member States involved in the launch of civilian missions 
and military operations ultimately do so bearing the EU flag and do so in the name of the EU35 
(Biscop and Coelmont, 2011: 7). It also means that SOMAs / SOFAs, as well as other related 
agreements, are signed between the countries hosting EU CSDP missions and operations and 
the EU as a whole, rather than an ad hoc group of Member States. Following the Lisbon Treaty, 
the overall functioning of this policy field resembles a ‘supranational inter-governmentalist’ 
logic (Howorth, 2012). 
As for the actual text of the Lisbon Treaty, with the exception of the number of the 
article, the treaty’s preamble paragraph that refers to foreign and security policy and to the 
‘progressive framing of a common defence policy’ in order to ‘reinforce the European identity 
and its independence in order to promote peace, security and progress in Europe and in the 
world’ remains the same as in the previous treaty (Nice Treaty). However, unlike the previous 
treaties, the Lisbon Treaty refrained from presenting an article openly stating the EU’s 
objectives as it had done so far – the Nice, Amsterdam, and Maastricht Treaties had marked as 
EU’s second objective the ‘asserting [of] its identity on the international scene’. The Lisbon 
Treaty not only removed this list as such, but it reformulated, repositioned, and specified the 
contents of these ‘objectives’ (no longer directly referred to as such). Article 3 (former article 
2) is presented in six points. The fifth point reads the following: 
 
In its relations with the wider world, the Union shall uphold and promote its values and 
interests and contribute to the protection of its citizens. It shall contribute to peace, 
security, the sustainable development of the Earth, solidarity and mutual respect among 
                                               
35 TEU article 44 allows for a group of willing and Member States to launch a mission under the EU 
flag (the decision-making, however, has to be collective and subject to unanimity). 
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peoples, free and fair trade, eradication of poverty and the protection of human rights (…) 
as well as to the strict observance and the development of international law, including 
respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter (TEU article 3.1).  
 
Despite this Treaty’s visible effort to improve the EU’s actorness, including in security and 
crisis management, apart from the aforementioned preamble paragraph, the direct mention of 
the projection of an EU or European ‘identity’ was removed from the text. This does not mean, 
however, that the normative character of external action and of the CSDP in particular is no 
longer present. It simply appears to indicate a more cautious approach to explicit symbolic / 
ideological language, so as to accommodate Member States’ concerns. In fact, the normative 
character of EU external action is present throughout the text. The first point of the first chapter 
of Title V, which includes the general provisions on the EU’s external action and specific 
provisions on the CFSP and CSDP, reads: 
 
The Union’s action on the international scene shall be guided by the principles which have 
inspired its own creation, development and enlargement, and which it seeks to advance in 
the wider world: democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of equality and 
solidarity, and respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter and international 
law (TEU article 21.1). 
 
In other words, not only is everything that the EU does externally – including crisis 
management – meant to be guided by its principles, but also the advancement thereof constitutes 
itself a key goal for the EU’s external action, reiterating the normative nature of the EU’s 
actorness that has been present since the inception of the CFSP. Interestingly, though, the 
motivations for the development of a CSDP stated in the treaty appear to be increasingly 
inward-looking. Moreover, the Lisbon treaty looks more at the Member States than previously, 
somewhat reversing an apparent trend of increased focus on the EU as an actor in its own right 
in the earlier years of the CSDP: 
 
Within the framework of the principles and objectives of its external action, the Union shall 
conduct, define and implement a common foreign and security policy, based on the 
development of mutual political solidarity among Member States, the identification of 
questions of general interest and the achievement of an ever-increasing degree of 
convergence of Member States’ actions (TEU article 24.2). 
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According to article 42.2, first paragraph, the EU under the Lisbon Treaty still does not have a 
common defence policy as such, much like in previous treaties, as this policy is still referred to 
as being ‘progressively framed’. Article 41.1 reads that the EU may carry out “missions outside 
the Union for peace-keeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security”, 
which include, according to article 43.1, “joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and 
rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks, 
tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making and post-conflict 
stabilisation” (TEU article 43.1). Even though there is more diversity in the listing of the EU’s 
possibilities for CSDP missions and operations in comparison with previous treaties and 
documents, these remain undefined and (likely) purposefully vague and ambiguous, so as to 
allow room for interpretation as to what each one may entail. In fact, according to article 43.2, 
“the Council shall adopt decisions relating to the tasks referred to in paragraph 1, defining their 
objectives and scope and the general conditions for their implementation.” 
On February 6, 2010, the newly-appointed High Representative of the EU for foreign 
affairs and security policy, Catherine Ashton, gave a speech at the Munich security conference 
with a goal of identifying how the EU sees the main security challenges as well as its approach 
is in terms of policy response. Ashton refers to the environment as “an important moment in 
Europe’s history” due to the entering into force of the Lisbon treaty, and to an ensuing 
“opportunity to deliver a step change in European foreign policy” (Ashton, 2010: 25). The High 
Representative identifies the global threats and challenges as being fragile states, terrorism, 
organised crime, the proliferation of WMDs, cyber security, energy, climate change, struggles 
for natural resources, illegal migration, as well as human trafficking. To tackle these threats and 
challenges, Ashton argues that the EU needs to mobilise all its ‘levers of influence’, including 
political and economic tools, as well as crisis management, and mentions the relevance of the 
growing ‘development-security nexus’ and of the link between internal and external security. 
The establishment of the EEAS is also mentioned as particularly relevant for the 
implementation of this ‘comprehensive’ approach (Drent, 2011; Gebhard and Norheim-
Martinsen, 2011; Smith, 2012; Major and Mölling, 2013). 
The idea of an EU ‘responsibility’ and ambition to engage in security actorness is 
present in Ashton’s speech: “we know that we in the EU have primary responsibility for our 
neighbourhood. This is important in itself but our wider international credibility also depends 
on the work we do with our neighbours” (Ashton, 2010: 26). Here we notice a particular 
geographic focus that is not as present in other crisis management-related discourses that we 
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have analysed in this study. The link between the EU’s action in its neighbourhood and its 
international credibility reflects a greater focus on image and perceived identity than on 
effectiveness. On the other hand, the issue of effectiveness is mentioned often in the document, 
even when the HR admits that this focus was previously lacking: “the days when EU foreign 
policy could be dismissed as all talk and no action are long over” (ibid.). EU crisis management 
missions and operations are labelled “innovative, tailor-made solutions, mixing civil with 
military components”, bringing attention to the idea of the EU’s value-added in the field of 
security, which corresponds to what is ‘required’ by the world’s ‘complex security challenges’ 
(ibid.). As in previous discursive instances, the EU’s global role is equated to that of a leader, 
in statements such as “the European response [to rising powers] should be more generous – in 
making space at the top tables of global politics” (ibid.: 28).  
In July 2010, a new diplomatic administrative service – the European External Action 
Service (EEAS) – was set up in order to assist the HR/VP in coordinating the external action of 
the EU and to develop and execute the CSDP (Council Decision 2010/427/EU). This 
administrative structure, comparable to a Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Defence of the EU, 
was divided into eight thematic and geographic Managing Directorates (MDs). One of these 
MDs is the Crisis Response and Operational Coordination Directorate. This Directorate is in 
charge of the mobilisation of the Crisis Response System, which includes a Crisis Platform, a 
Situation Room, and a Crisis Management Board. Also within the EEAS is located a Security 
Policy and Prevention Directorate, which promotes a comprehensive approach in dealing with 
security threats and potential conflicts, in coordination with the pertinent services within the 
EU system (Rehrl, 2014: 40). The work developed by the main CSDP bodies within the EEAS 
– the EUMS, the CPCC, and the CMPD – is intimately connected with the work developed by 
the PSC and the Foreign Affairs Council (which, as mentioned, is headed by the HR/VP) and 
by other bodies that function directly under the PSC, namely the EUMC and CIVCOM.  
 On September 16, 2010, a European Council meeting took place in Brussels, focusing 
on the EU’s role as a global actor. The Conclusions document begins by pointing out that the 
meeting’s discussion focused on ‘how to give new momentum’ to EUFP by ‘taking advantage’ 
of the ‘opportunities’ offered by the Lisbon treaty, while agreeing “on the need for Europe to 
promote its interests and values more assertively and in a spirit of reciprocity and mutual 
benefit” (European Council, 2010: 1). The first section of the document, concerning the EU’s 
relations with its ‘strategic’ partners, focuses greatly on the idea of multilateralism, which has 
been very present in EUFP discourse particularly since the ESS. The first heading of the section 
is ‘a changing world: a challenge for the EU’. In this section, the European Council states that 
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the EU “must be an effective global actor, ready to share in the responsibility for global security 
and to take the lead in the definition of joint responses to common challenges” (ibid.). While 
in previous discursive instances the idea of effectiveness was scarcely present, we begin 
noticing that, in the aftermath of the Lisbon Treaty, this idea becomes increasingly more 
important. While mentioning its ‘firmly-rooted’ belief in the idea of multilateralism and in the 
UN’s role in the world, the European Council also mentions its belief in ‘universal values’, 
which marks the EU’s ‘civilising’ attitude altogether. An enumeration of the EU’s foreign 
policy achievements ensues, including the ‘major stabilizing role in its neighbourhood’. The 
idea that the Lisbon treaty will allow the EU ‘and its Member States’ to “act more strategically 
so as to bring Europe’s true weight to bear internationally” (ibid.: 2) is reiterated. The EU’s 
‘strategic partnerships with key players in the world’ are seen as providing ‘a useful instrument 
for pursuing European objectives and interests’. These players are identified as the UN, China, 
Korea, the G8 and the G20, NATO, the EU’s eastern and southern neighbours, Africa, Ukraine, 
Russia, as well as Latin America and the Caribbean. Transatlantic relations, described as being 
“based on common values and constitutes a core element of the international system” (ibid.: 4), 
are identified as being in need of ‘fresh impetus’ that would allow for the creation of “a true 
partnership based on our respective strengths and specificities” (ibid.). 
While “looking at concrete measures to more generally improve the functioning of the 
European Union's external policy,” the genesis of the conceptual bases for the 
institutionalisation of the notion of ‘comprehensive approach’ are present in the European 
Council Conclusions, as it “calls for a more integrated approach, ensuring that all relevant EU 
and national instruments and policies are fully and coherently mobilised, consistent with the 
provisions of the Treaties, in support of the EU’s strategic interests” (ibid.: 8). The idea of EU 
autonomy as an actor is reinforced in statements such as that “what is done at the level of the 
European Union complements and reinforces what is done at the level of the Member States 
and vice versa” (ibid.). 
The self-immolation of Tunisian street vendor Mohamed Bouazizi in December 2010 
largely fuelled and contributed to the visibility of the ‘Arab Spring’ pro-democracy uprising 
movements in the MENA region. These movements led to the fall of the Tunisian and Egyptian 
leaders and affected several other countries in the region, such as Libya and Syria, among 
others. In the context of these developments in the EU’s neighbourhood and of the early stages 
of implementation of the Lisbon Treaty changes to EUFP, the EP produced a resolution 
concerning the development of the CSDP on May 11, 2011. The document begins with the EP 
stating that 
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[The EP] recognises that, in a turbulent global context (…) the EU is being called upon to 
enhance its strategic autonomy to uphold its values, pursue its interests and protect its 
citizens by developing a shared vision of the main challenges and threats and by aligning 
its capabilities and resources to adequately respond to them, thereby contributing to the 
preservation of international peace and global security, including by pursuing effective 
multilateralism (EP, 2011: 2). 
 
In this brief description of the EU’s crisis management policy goals and dynamics the EP points 
out what it identifies as the justifications for the EU’s engagement in this area, i.e. being ‘called 
upon’ to promote values, pursue its interests, and protect its citizens, that will ultimate result in 
the ‘preservation of international peace and global security’. The CSDP revision under the 
Lisbon Treaty in particular is characterised as 
 
(…) provid[ing] a firm political statement of the Union’s intention to act as a force for 
stability in the world and provide a clear legal framework for reinforcing its capacities to 
pursue its foreign and security policy through a comprehensive approach drawing upon all 
the instruments available to the EU and its Member States, to prevent and manage crises 
and conflicts, and to build lasting peace (ibid.). 
 
Similarly to other instances, and unlike the discourses expressed and reproduced by more 
intergovernmental institutions or representatives, the EP’s discourse maintains a certain 
distance from strong normative assertions concerning the EU’s role. This more moderate and 
careful attitude is noticeable in this paragraph in the expression ‘providing a statement of the 
EU’s intention to act as’ instead of arguing that the EU simply ‘is’ a ‘force for stability’. In line 
with a prevailing EU-wide narrative, the EP maintains the discourse of a rootedness of the 
CSDP within the EU’s “legally binding institutional framework of EU principles” (ibid.), 
including democracy, the rule of law, human rights and fundamental freedoms, equality and 
solidarity, bringing attention to the latter’s inscription within the objectives of EUFP. Instead 
of viewing coalitions of the willing and able Member States as a viable alternative to the 
collective CSDP, the EP ‘expresses deep concern about the risk’ that these coalitions bring, 
arguing that “no European State has the capacity to be a significant security and defence actor 
in the 21st century world” (ibid.: 3), as opposed to the EU, acting collectively. This discourse 
is contextualised by the EP’s ‘regret’ of “the unwillingness of the EU Member States to define 
a common position on the Libya crisis” (ibid.) – despite welcoming operation EUFOR Libya – 
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adding nonetheless that that “the elaboration of a strategy for the Sahel region and the Horn of 
Africa is yet another concrete opportunity to demonstrate the ability of the EU to act both on 
security and development challenges” (ibid.). 
The EP urges the European Council, eight years following the launch of the ESS, to 
“carry out its task of identifying the strategic interests and political objectives of the EU by 
drawing up a European foreign policy strategy geared to international developments” (ibid.) 
and urges both the Council and the HR/VP “to build on the concept of human security to make 
it central to the European Foreign Policy Strategy” (ibid.). Following considerations about the 
CSDP’s capabilities and institutional structure (including pleads in favour of increased 
parliamentary scrutiny in this field, in line with previous discourses), the EP goes on to express 
a need to strengthen the link between internal and external security, particularly in matters 
related to the fight against terrorism, proposing an “expansion of the CSDP to include wider 
Petersberg-type missions” (ibid.: 12).  
Bringing attention to the E/CSDP’s repertoire of 24 civilian missions and military 
operations in three different continents, the EP argues that CSDP missions are “increasingly 
being required to assume a ‘multifunctional’ character” (ibid.: 14). This idea reflects the EU’s 
comprehensive approach to external conflicts and crises, which would come to be formalised 
in 2013 but was already present in practice in EU external action (Drent, 2011; Gebhard and 
Norheim-Martinsen, 2011; Smith, 2012; Major and Mölling, 2013). In this sense, the EP 
predicts a central role for rule of law in upcoming civilian missions and calls for “greater 
coordination between development cooperation projects and CSDP missions as a part of CFSP” 
(EP, 2011: 16). While considering E/CSDP missions as “the acid test of the CSDP mandate and 
an important touchstone of the EU's credibility as an international player” (ibid.: 14), the EP 
criticises a lack of ‘linkage to a clear political strategy’, which it argues is detrimental to the 
missions’ effectiveness and efficiency. 
The EP supports the international ‘trend towards multipolarity’ and the promotion of 
multilateralism, emphasising the consistency between the establishment of ‘strategic 
partnerships’ with “respect for the universal rule of law, the specific nature of the EU and the 
growing interdependence which characterises globalisation” (ibid.: 17). In line with this idea 
and with occasional previous crisis management-related EU discourses here analysed, the EP 
places the ‘primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security in the 
world’ with the UNSC (where the EP envisions the EU as such having its own permanent seat). 
NATO is identified, as in previous discourses, as constituting ‘the foundation of collective 
defence for its Member States’, and attention is brought to “the need for constructive 
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cooperation between the EU and NATO, particularly where the two organisations are active in 
the same theatres of operations” (ibid.: 18), emphasising the specificity and complementarity 
of each organisation in matters of international security. 
Following the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty and the establishment of the EEAS, 
the Council of the EU in its Foreign Affairs formation met in Luxembourg in June 2011 and 
produced a document stating its conclusions on the topic of conflict prevention. In this 
document, the Council reiterates the idea that “preserving peace, preventing conflicts from 
erupting into violence and strengthening international security” remains “a primary objective 
of the EU’s external action,” and goes on to express the EU’s leadership ambitions “in 
conjunction with its global, regional, national and local partners” (Council, 2011: 1). The 
reasons why preventing conflicts is so important are enumerated in the document: “violent 
conflicts cost lives, cause human rights abuses, displace people, disrupt livelihoods, set back 
economic development, exacerbate state fragility, weaken governance and undermine national 
and regional security” (ibid.).  
Much like in previous documents, there is value judgement regarding different 
arrangements of governance and state administration, as well as a link between lack of 
economic development and conflict. Even though we may almost objectively argue that violent 
conflict, forced displacement, and human rights abuses are negative, the portrayal of the 
remaining situations – lack of economic development, state fragility, and weak governance – 
as being negative results from an assessment based on specific normative ideas or benchmarks 
of what constitutes (economic) development, a (strong) state, and (good) governance. As we 
have seen in previous documents, the EU’s discourses are imbued with normative 
considerations that result in implicit asymmetric portrayals of its own paradigms vis-à-vis other 
non-European paradigms. The EU’s implicit assumption that European moral dominance is 
normal or natural means that it is taking a normative position that is shrouded by an apparent 
(yet false) objectiveness, since its discourses (as are all discourses) are artificial and 
constructed. 
These Council conclusions revisit the 2001 ‘Göteborg Programme’ – i.e. the EU 
Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts – adopted by the same institution a decade 
earlier and reinforce its validity as a ‘policy basis’ for EU action in conflict prevention. Even 
though the Council conclusions mimic the Göteborg Programme (Council, 2001c: 7) and other 
documents in repeating the attribution of the ‘partner’ epithet to many international institutions 
and organisations instead of the host countries – the UN, World Bank, OSCE, NATO, the AU, 
other regional organisations and countries (Council, 2011: 1-2) – the document also indirectly 
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appears to refer to potential host countries: “the EU will continue to support local, regional, 
international partners, relevant non-governmental organisations and institutions for conflict 
prevention and resolution and the strengthening of peace efforts, as appropriate” (ibid.: 2). The 
importance of the idea of cohesiveness has been strongly reinforced with the development of 
the concept of ‘comprehensive approach,’ also introduced in the context of the Lisbon Treaty’s 
changes to the field of EU external action (Drent, 2011; Gebhard and Norheim-Martinsen, 
2011; Smith, 2012; Major and Mölling, 2013), and explicitly mentioned in the Council 
conclusions on conflict prevention (ibid.).  
The first EEAS annual report was produced in reference to the year 2011 and includes 
practical and structural aspects of the functioning of this administrative body, in addition to 
containing prescriptions for the role the EEAS can play in the development of the EU’s external 
action and normative assumptions about the role the EU can, or should, play with the support 
of this new structure. This document embodies Ashton’s ambitions for the EEAS and, more 
importantly, for the EU’s actorness in various domains, including crisis management. Its 
importance lies in having been drafted by the person and the service that have been charged 
with carrying out the EU’s external action, including the CSDP, in the beginning of a new stage 
for EU diplomacy. The report is divided into four parts: ‘policy achievements’, ‘management 
and internal control systems’, ‘building blocks towards the declaration of assurance’, and the 
‘declaration of assurance’. As our research concerns the discourses surrounding the external 
legitimacy of the development and establishment of a specific policy, we will be focusing our 
analysis on the first part of the document – policy achievements – and in particular on chapters 
IV (global issues) and V (CSDP). In this document, the normative character of EU external 
action is quite discernible: 
 
At the start of her mandate, the High Representative set three priorities for EU external 
relations over 2011-2012. First, the establishment of a functioning EEAS; second, fostering 
deeper relations with Europe's neighbours, with the aim of promoting democracy, stability 
and prosperity; and third, the building of strong strategic partnerships with existing and 
emerging global players. The events of 2011 have confirmed that these were the right 
priorities, defining the EU’s role as a global and regional political actor. The EU’s 
fundamental values of democracy, the respect for human rights and the consolidation of the 
Rule of Law, underpin their implementation (EEAS, 2011: 6). 
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At this point, there is no doubt that one of the fundamental goals of the EU’s external action is 
to propagate EU paradigms, standards, norms, and values. However, the EU’s discourse 
maintains the tacit idea that this propagation is natural, expected, or normal, revealing an 
underlying assumption that these paradigms are absolute and universal, and thus dominating. 
While praising the EU’s many qualities and potential is not new in the documents analysed, an 
interesting aspect in this particular text is the use of praise even in contexts where the EU did 
not perform much of a role: 
 
The High Representative, assisted by the EEAS, took a leading role in international 
coordination efforts as well, striving for convergence of views within the international 
community even on those issues (such as the Libyan crisis) which had proven to be more 
divisive (ibid.). 
 
In line with previous documents, in this document there appears to be a slight difference in 
reference to ‘partners’, albeit not substantial. It refers to the EU’s ‘main strategic partners’ as 
the US, China, India, Brazil, and Russia, but it also refers to being ‘committed to strengthening 
its partnership with Africa’ (ibid.: 6-7). Yet, while the first kind (individual countries) are 
referred to as ‘main strategic partners’, Africa (a vast and diverse continent with more than 50 
countries and a number of regional organisations) is referred to as in only in a collective 
‘partnership’. This distinction is not explicit, but it is present. Even though these ‘partners’ are 
not mentioned at this point in reference to the CSDP, this distinction reflects a common theme 
of dividing the partners that are portrayed as mattering more (economically strong business 
partners or – and especially – those that share the EU’s worldview, values, and principles, 
referred to by epithets such as ‘strategic’ and others) and lesser partners that are portrayed as 
being in need of change / improvement – which is done through CSDP or other instruments 
that involve norms export. 
 In chapter IV – global issues – the document is divided in several subheadings. One of 
these subheadings concerns the promotion of democracy, human rights and the rule of law, 
followed by another one on conflict prevention. In the former, the document speaks in general 
terms regarding external action, as these topics are crosscutting for the EU’s relations with the 
rest of the world, including crisis management. The mention of the 2011 document ‘Human 
rights and democracy at the heart of EU external action: towards a more effective approach’ a 
Joint Communication by the HR and the Commission to the EP and the Council, reiterates this, 
as this document includes sections on both conflict prevention and crisis management.  
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 As in previous documents, the report maintains the focus on the EU, and the EU’s 
concerns and interests, rather than on shared concerns and interests: “the EU held over 40 
bilateral human rights dialogues with third countries, providing many opportunities to address 
effectively the EU’s specific human rights concerns” (ibid.: 31). This is not inherently wrong 
or unusual – it is an EU document after all – but it is consistent with the pattern of the EU’s 
self-centeredness and an implicit perceived superiority of European norms and concerns that 
has been observed so far. In the very brief subheading dedicated to conflict prevention, the 
document simply reiterates the importance of the aforementioned 2001 ‘Göteborg Programme 
for the Prevention of Violent Conflict’ as a ‘valid policy basis’, and mentions the creation of a 
new Conflict Prevention, Peace-building and Mediation Division under the aegis of the EEAS. 
The subsequent chapter, dedicated to the CSDP, starts with a very practical and not very 
normatively charged heading (at least directly) regarding capabilities. It mentions mostly 
aspects related to the improvement of civilian and military capability development and 
effectiveness, as well as the possibility of pooling and sharing military capabilities among 
Member States (ibid.: 33). As for the subsequent heading dedicated to cooperation with 
partners, there are some differences in comparison to previous documents, and that also 
contrasts with the aforementioned distinction between types of ‘partners’ identified at the 
beginning of the document. Instead of referring to them as international or strategic partners, 
this section refers to international organisations (like NATO, the UN, the AU) simply as such 
(ibid.). On the other hand, the subsequent section titled ‘partner countries’ enumerates twelve 
countries that were participating in on-going CSDP missions and operations at the time, which 
is not exactly the norm in the identified documents that form the CSDP’s policy basis, but there 
is no direct reference to the CSDP host countries themselves (ibid.: 34). This emphasises the 
idea identified earlier that countries in need of assistance are seen quite differently as those in 
a position to partner up with the EU in assisting the former. 
On July 23, 2012, the 3183rd Foreign Affairs Council meeting took place in Brussels. 
In the Council Conclusions on CSDP, the EU Ministers starts by welcoming the imminent 
launch of CSDP missions EUCAP Nestor in the Horn of Africa, EUCAP SAHEL Niger, and 
EUAVSEC South Sudan. The Council praises CSDP missions and operations’ ‘concrete impact 
on the ground’, adding that this policy “is a very tangible expression of the EU's commitment 
to contribute to promote and preserve peace and stability, strengthening the EU's overall ability 
to respond to security challenges” (Council, 2012: 1). The Council identifies the CSDP’s 
rootedness in the EU’s ‘comprehensive approach’ (Drent, 2011; Gebhard and Norheim-
Martinsen, 2011; Smith, 2012; Major and Mölling, 2013), which “makes full use of the role of 
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the HR (…) and that mobilises the different tools at the EU's disposal in close interaction with 
the Member States to achieve the EU’s objectives, in close cooperation with other international 
actors” (Council, 2012: 2). The reference to the EU and the Member States separately 
emphasises this policy’s intergovernmental nature, but the express identification of ‘the EU’s 
objectives’ lends the latter a sense of identity and autonomy as an actor, even in the context of 
an intergovernmental policy.  
The Council announces the HR’s conceptualisation of the EU’s comprehensive 
approach in the subsequent year, while underlining the CSDP’s importance ‘as an essential 
element’ in this context. The Council mentions a growing approximation between the CSDP 
and the area of Freedom, Security and Justice (essentially JHA), in the spirit of the EU’s 
comprehensive approach to external crises and conflicts, leading the CSDP to become 
increasingly less isolated and thus more integrated in the EU’s increasingly holistic approach 
to external action (Drent, 2011; Gebhard and Norheim-Martinsen, 2011; Smith, 2012; Major 
and Mölling, 2013). We notice a broadening and more recurrent use of the concept of ‘partners’ 
used in reference to crisis management, as the Council refers to ‘partner countries in view of 
their participation in and support to CSDP missions and operations’, particularly in the Southern 
and Eastern neighbourhood, in order to “contribute to enhancing regional security and stability” 
(Council, 2012: 3).  
On October 12, 2012, the Nobel Peace prize was awarded to the EU, prompting Herman 
Van Rompuy and José Manuel Barroso, the Presidents of the European Council and of the 
Commission, respectively, to make a brief joint statement. Van Rompuy and Barroso used the 
opportunity to claim that the prize is an acknowledgement of ‘the deep political motives behind 
our Union’, namely “the unique effort by ever more European states to overcome war and 
divisions and to jointly shape a continent of peace and prosperity” (Van Rompuy and Barroso, 
2012). This prize is taken to be an opportunity to provide public validation of the EU’s narrative 
that it is both a ‘model’ and a ‘provider’ of peace for the rest of the world. The EU is described 
as having achieved peace and unity based on its values of ‘human dignity, freedom, democracy, 
equality, the rule of law, and respect for human rights’, which are the same values that it 
promotes “in order to make the world a better place for all” (ibid.). The presidents imply that 
the prize is a validation of the EU’s value promotion in the area of peace and security based on 
the idea that it is a model to be emulated, adding that they are ‘proud’ of the EU and that the 
prize is proof that it “remains an inspiration for leaders and citizens all over the world” (ibid.). 
On November 22, 2012, the EP issued a resolution on the implementation of the CSDP 
based on the Annual Report from the Council to the EP on the CFSP. The EP’s resolution 
  180 
describes the geopolitical environment at the time where ‘significant changes’ took place with 
consequences for EU policy making, including for the CFSP and the CSDP. The EP refers 
specifically to the “upheavals in the Middle East and North Africa (including revolutions, 
conflicts and/or regime change in Libya, Tunisia, Egypt and Syria), the emergence on the 
international scene of new players with regional or even global ambitions and the reorientation 
of US defence policy priorities towards the Asia-Pacific area” (EP, 2012: 2). As a response to 
this tense geopolitical environment, the EP proposes that “the CSDP needs to consolidate its 
contribution to peace and stability in the world through its missions and operations that form 
part of the EU’s comprehensive approach” (ibid.).  
In referring to a ‘strategic framework’ for the CSDP, the EP emphasises that the EU 
“should be a global political player on the international scene in order to promote international 
peace and security, to protect its interests in the world and to ensure the security of its citizens”, 
adding that “the EU should be able to assume its responsibilities when confronted with 
international threats, crises and conflicts, especially in its neighbourhood” (ibid.: 3). In this 
section the EP expresses the motivations that justify the existence and further development of 
the CSDP, namely the promotion of peace outside of its territorial sphere, and the protection of 
its interests and of the security of its citizens. On the other hand, the EP reinforces the idea that 
this is all connected to an existing ‘responsibility’, particularly in the EU’s neighbourhood, thus 
reinforcing the prevailing narrative that characterises the EU’s perception of its own role as a 
security actor (Niţoiu, 2013; Miskimmon, O’Loughlin, and Roselle, 2013; Schumacher, 2015; 
Birchfield, Krige, and Young, 2017). The EP argues that this can be achieved through a ‘more 
ambitious vision for the CSDP’ as well as an EU ‘strategic autonomy’ that is, nonetheless, 
anchored in the idea of its complementarity to NATO and its commitment to multilateralism, 
adding that, as such, it is time for a revised EU security strategy. 
The EP places the CSDP ‘at the heart of a comprehensive approach’ in mentioning the 
upcoming conceptualisation by the HR, and states that it provides the EU with political 
credibility and visibility. In this context, the EP provides a normative justification for the 
CSDP’s development in describing the EU’s strength as a crisis management actor in 
comparison with other organisations (such as NATO) as lying “in its unique potential to 
mobilise the full range of political, economic, development and humanitarian instruments to 
support its civilian and military crisis management, missions and operations (…) giv[ing] it a 
unique and widely appreciated flexibility and efficiency” (EP, 2012: 4-5). The relationship 
between the EU and NATO, described as one of cooperation and synergy, is argued to be 
mutually beneficial, even though the EP brings attention to the risk of duplication as the EU 
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delves deeper into developing military capabilities. On the other hand, the EP “expresses 
disappointment at the development of civilian crisis management structures within NATO, 
given that this represents an unnecessary duplication of capabilities already present and well-
developed in the EU” (ibid.: 17-18). This disappointment is expressed by the EP because the 
EU’s value-added and uniqueness as a predominantly civilian comprehensive security actor is 
one of its most visible and important legitimating narratives in this context. 
As the EP describes some of the Lisbon Treaty’s yet unfulfilled innovations, it mentions 
the idea of the Council being able to “entrust a mission to a group of states in order to preserve 
the Union’s values and serve its interests” (ibid.: 5). The phrasing of this commitment reverses 
the traditional order of hierarchy, as the EU was created to serve the Member States’ interests. 
As such, the EP ascribes to the EU a high degree of actorness and independence, with its own 
values and interests that can be projected and protected by the individual Member States 
working collectively under a new provision in the treaty. The EP’s expectations and ambitions 
for the CSDP are shown to be high, as while acknowledging that this policy has made a 
contribution to crisis management, peacekeeping, as well as ‘the strengthening of international 
security’, the EP argues that “the CSDP now needs to be able to intervene in all types of crisis, 
including in the context of high-intensity conflicts in its own neighbourhood, and to be 
ambitious enough to have a real impact on the ground” (ibid.: 6). As an example, the EP states 
that it is ‘regrettable’ that the EU did not make use of CSDP tools in the context of the ‘Arab 
Spring countries’, particularly in North Africa and the Sahel region. On the other hand, the EP 
praises the EU’s action in matters of crisis management in contexts such as the Western Balkans 
or the Horn of Africa. 
During the course of 2011 and 2012, the CSDP was not visibly prominent in the 
European Council’s discursive endeavours, as the focus was mainly put on domestic policies 
and the financial crisis. In addition, the EU’s response to the Arab uprisings in its southern 
neighbourhood was mainly constructed in the context of the development of the ENP. 
Nonetheless, in the context of the European Council Conclusions of 13 and 14 December 2012, 
the EU’s crisis management policy was emphasised in preparation for ‘further development’ to 
be made in the subsequent year. Still, the main focus of the document is on the EU’s recovery 
from the financial crisis, and considerations about the CSDP appear under the heading ‘other 
items.’ In addressing the EU’s security and defence policy, the European Council’s discourse 
does not differ from previous instances, as it maintains that “in today's changing world the 
European Union is called upon to assume increased responsibilities in the maintenance of 
international peace and security in order to guarantee the security of its citizens and the 
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promotion of its interests” (European Council, 2012: 8). In this assertion, the EU acquires 
‘increased’ responsibilities (in addition to the ones it allegedly already has) to maintain world 
peace, thus reaffirming the EU ‘responsibility’ narrative that has been marking the EU’s 
discourse since its inception (Niţoiu, 2013; Miskimmon, O’Loughlin, and Roselle, 2013; 
Schumacher, 2015; Birchfield, Krige, and Young, 2017). Normative justifications are provided 
in the European Council’s discourse that seek to explain the EU’s actorness ambitions, namely 
guaranteeing the security of EU citizens and the promotion of its interests. Interestingly, unlike 
other instances, there is no mention of promotion of European values or norms, which can be 
interpreted as the beginning of a retraction in the EU’s normative ambitions. 
The CSDP is described as “a tangible EU contribution to international crisis 
management” and the EU is identified as “play[ing] an important role in its neighbourhood and 
globally” in this context (European Council, 2012: 9). The European Council inscribes the 
CSDP within the EU’s comprehensive approach in ‘crisis regions’ – including the Western 
Balkans, the Horn of Africa, the Middle East, Sahel, Afghanistan, as well as the South 
Caucasus, – and argues that missions and operations ‘should be carried out in close cooperation’ 
with ‘other relevant international actors’, including the UN, NATO, the OSCE, and the AU, as 
well as ‘partner countries’. The European Council invites the HR to make proposals, in the 
subsequent year, for improvement of the CSDP, including in aspects that might improve this 
policy’s effectiveness, visibility, and impact by means of ‘further developing the 
comprehensive approach to conflict prevention, crisis management and stabilisation’, as well 
as aspects that might improve the CSDP’s defence capabilities and industry. 
On July 29, 2013, HR Catherine Ashton published a Review of the EEAS’s first years, 
drafted by herself and her team at the EEAS, providing a basis for the understanding of the 
newly created EEAS’s purpose and its part in determining the EU’s role in the world, including 
in the area of crisis management. The Review begins with a foreword by HR Ashton where she 
recalls the tremendous difficulties present during the setting-up of the EEAS. While doing so, 
Ashton argues that “the world did not wait for a service to exist”, as “challenges in our own 
neighbourhood and beyond demanded a European response” (Ashton, 2013b: 1). This assertion 
reiterates the recurring idea in the EU’s discourses as a crisis management actor of an EU 
‘responsibility’ to engage in external ‘challenges’ and crises (Niţoiu, 2013; Miskimmon, 
O’Loughlin, and Roselle, 2013; Schumacher, 2015; Birchfield, Krige, and Young, 2017). A 
few paragraphs later, the HR/VP sums up both the main constraint and the main purpose of the 
EEAS in its initial years: 
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We have sought to make the best use of scarce financial resources – and also to meet 
expectations that the EU should support progress towards democracy and prosperity in 
countries as varied as Libya and Somalia, Iraq and Afghanistan, Mali and Myanmar/ Burma 
(Ashton, 2013b: 1). 
 
In this paragraph, Ashton assumes that the EU is expected to engage in the promotion of 
democracy, although she does not mention the source of the expectation. Nonetheless, this says 
a lot about how EU external action is seen by the person appointed to be in charge of it during 
a crucial period of reaffirmation of its very purpose and aim. In fact, this paragraph is 
immediately followed by the affirmation that “We are guided by our conviction that Europe has 
a special role to play in today’s world” (ibid.). This sentence is, in many ways, a reproduction 
of some core ideas that we have identified in previous discourses, not least because of the use 
of the adjective ‘special’, denoting distinction, uniqueness, exceptionality, in line with one of 
the main narratives used to legitimate EUFP and crisis management in particular. 
 After mentioning how ‘people around the world’ are ‘willing to place trust’ in the EU, 
Ashton assumes that “conflicts thousands of miles from our borders can damage our interests, 
while the spread of peace, prosperity and democracy around the world is good for Europe” 
(ibid.). Thus, the HR justifies the development of the EU’s external relations for realist purposes 
(based on interests and self-preservation) by means of constructivist instruments (spread of 
peace, prosperity and democracy): “the EEAS has developed into a modern and operational 
foreign policy service, equipped to promote EU interests and values in our relations with the 
rest of the world” (ibid.: 2). It is the very frequency of this normative justification for EUFP 
and crisis management in particular that makes it relevant for our study. While the idea that the 
EU has a foreign policy to cater to its interests is not very different from what states may do, 
the idea that it has a foreign policy primarily to spread its values – and especially that this has 
become almost taken for granted – is where it stands out. This idea, in turn, is rooted in the 
narrative that the EU is a ‘model’ of peace and progress to be reproduced through its foreign 
policy. 
The document then moves on to the EEAS’ structures, in a mostly descriptive manner. 
At some point, the Review has a section dedicated to Crisis Management Structures, where it 
begins by stating that “the EU is highly regarded for our civilian and military missions” (ibid.: 
5). The praise comes from unidentified external sources, which makes the phrasing appear as 
if the assertion is assumed to be not only true but taken for granted. The section goes on to 
describe the existing technical and capability features of the missions and the functioning of the 
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structures. The part concerning EEAS structures is followed by a description of the functioning 
of the EEAS in the context of the development and implementation of EU external action, and 
in the context of its relationship with EU institutions. The subsequent part deals with the role 
of the HR and of the EU delegations worldwide. These sections of the Review are quite 
descriptive and not very normatively charged (either implicitly or explicitly), relating mostly to 
practical and administrative aspects. The document finishes with practical recommendations 
for practical internal improvements, such as further speed, efficiency, and coordination in the 
decision and implementation of EU external action or avoiding unnecessary structural / 
institutional duplications.  
On October 15, 2013, HR Catherine Ashton produced a final report on the CSDP in 
preparation for the European Council on Security and Defence to be held later that year. The 
report begins with a quote by the HR at the EDA annual conference, held in Brussels in March 
of the same year, where the development of the area of security and defence at the EU level is 
normatively justified with ‘three cases’: “the first is political, and it concerns fulfilling Europe’s 
ambitions on the world stage. The second is operational: ensuring that Europe has the right 
military capabilities to be able to act. And the third is economic: here it’s about jobs, innovation 
and growth” (Ashton, 2013c: 1). These internally-oriented normative justifications for the 
development of the CSDP add to the prevailing discourses concerning the preservation and 
promotion of EU values and interests, as well as the security of the EU and other citizens.  
The first point addressed in the report concerns the ‘strategic context’, characterised by 
Ashton as being “marked by increased regional and global volatility, emerging security 
challenges, the US rebalancing towards the Asia-Pacific and the impact of the financial crisis” 
(ibid.). The HR insists on the idea of a growing interconnection between internal and external 
security and the weakening of the power of individual states (implying that the EU is a viable 
alternative). In addition, Ashton brings up the ‘Arab uprisings’, which are described as “full of 
promise [but] have also led to increased instability and conflict” (ibid.) as well as other issues 
in the EU’s neighbourhood that affect the EU. ‘Long-standing’ security threats are enumerated 
– including WMDs, terrorism, ‘failed states’, regional conflicts, as well as organised crime – in 
addition to ‘new’ threats, including cyber-attacks, climate change, and resource-related 
competition. To tackle these issues, the HR argues that ‘the transatlantic relationship remains 
essential’, but “Europe must assume greater responsibility for its own security and that of its 
neighbourhood” (ibid.), meaning that it needs more autonomy and resources in matters of 
security and defence not only for crisis management outside of its territorial sphere, but also 
for ensuring EU-level defence.  
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In order to stimulate a security and defence debate at the highest political level, Ashton 
enumerates the EU’s priorities in this area as: a focus on the CSDP ‘as a security provider’ 
primarily in its neighbourhood, ‘including through direct intervention’; the protection of the 
EU’s interests and projection of its values by “helping to prevent and resolve crises and 
including through projecting power” (ibid.: 2); building and reinforcing regional and bilateral 
partnerships to both cooperate and build capacities in matters of crisis management; increase 
the EU’s reaction speed and operational independence in different dimensions (land, air, 
maritime, space, and cyber); and  the practical implementation of the comprehensive approach 
(Drent, 2011; Gebhard and Norheim-Martinsen, 2011; Smith, 2012; Major and Mölling, 2013), 
allowing for the use of a plethora of EUFP tools – described as “the EU's main strength at the 
international level” (Ashton, 2013c: 4) – ‘in a strategically coherent and effective manner’. 
Following the enumeration of the EU’s security priorities, the HR recalls the E/CSDP’s 
achievements throughout the previous 15 years, concluding that “the EU is becoming an 
effective security provider, and is increasingly being recognized as such” (ibid.: 3), even though 
many challenges remain. A key challenge that remains is, according to Ashton, that there is no 
agreement on a ‘long-term vision’ regarding the CSDP’s future, despite this policy becoming 
increasingly embedded in the idea of the comprehensive approach, as well as focusing 
increasingly more on capacity-building and on establishing and reinforcing partnerships: “for 
the EU to live up to its role as security provider means that European citizens and the 
international community need to be able to trust and rely on the EU to deliver when the situation 
demands. We must move from discussion to delivery” (ibid.: 4). 
Ashton prescribes greater coherence and alignment between EUFP tools, particularly 
CSDP’s short-term oriented instruments and long-term development instruments (despite both 
policies having different objectives and decision-making procedures), by means of regional or 
thematic strategies, in order to “increase their impact, effectiveness and visibility” (ibid.: 5). 
Another prescription is a closer cooperation with the EU’s partners, identified firstly as the UN, 
NATO, and the AU, where the EU’s cooperation with NATO in particular is described as 
“strong, coherent and mutually reinforcing”, and as “remain[ing] as important as ever” (ibid.). 
Other partners that are mentioned include ‘non-EU NATO allies and candidate countries’, 
including countries such as BiH and Georgia, meant to provide assets, expertise, and 
knowledge. In addition, a newly created Panel on CSDP of the Eastern Partnership “opens new 
opportunities for dialogue and cooperation between the EU and EaP countries” in a ‘tailor-
made approach’ that ‘adapts this cooperation to the EU’s and partners’ respective expectations 
and interests’ (ibid.). In addition to closer cooperation with partners, the HR also prescribes an 
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increased support to capacity-building ‘of local and regional partners’, including Niger, Mali, 
or Somalia, to encourage partners to “increasingly take the responsibility for preventing crises 
and managing them on their own” (ibid.). 
On 21 November 2013, the EP produced a resolution on CSDP where it enumerates 
what it identifies as ‘significant and ongoing changes in the geopolitical environment’ that 
affect not only the EU (and ultimately drive the CSDP) but affect ‘both sides of the Atlantic’.  
In this context, the EP urges a reassessment and strengthening of the EU’s ‘role in the world’, 
which is deemed ‘one of the major challenges of the 21st century’. As such, the EP argues that 
“the time has come for the Member States of the Union to show the political will needed for 
making the EU a relevant global actor and security provider with real strategic autonomy” (EP, 
2013: 3). This statement (especially coming from a supranational institution) reinforces the 
intergovernmental nature of the CFSP (and of the CSDP) and the EU’s relative and conditional 
autonomy and effectiveness, which are only possible with political will and competence 
delegation from the Member States. In encouraging the meeting of the European Council at the 
end of 2013 to debate the future of the CSDP, the EP provides five key justifications for the 
existence and further development of this policy, namely arguing that 
 
(…) the EU needs to be able to provide security for its citizens, to promote and defend its 
fundamental values, to assume its share of responsibility for world peace and to play an 
effective role in preventing and managing regional crises in its wider neighbourhood, 
contributing to their resolution and protecting itself against the negative effects of these 
crises (ibid.). 
 
In order for the EU to be able to improve its role and its ability to achieve these goals, the EP 
proposes that certain mechanisms present in the Lisbon Treaty be put into practice, such as the 
establishment of permanent structured cooperation between groups of willing and able Member 
States, among others. The EP emphasises that, 
 
according to the Treaties, the EU’s aim is to promote peace, its values and the well-being 
of its peoples (Article 3 TEU) and that its action on the international scene seeks to 
consolidate and support democracy, the rule of law and human rights, and to prevent 
conflicts and strengthen international security (ibid.: 4). 
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As such, the EP defends that the CSDP ‘serves these aims’ and needs to be further developed 
and better integrated in the context of the EU’s ‘comprehensive approach’ (Drent, 2011; 
Gebhard and Norheim-Martinsen, 2011; Smith, 2012; Major and Mölling, 2013). In addition, 
the EP stresses the need to upgrade also the ESS to take into account growing challenges by 
focusing more on protecting EU citizens, as well as defending EU infrastructures and the 
European neighbourhood. Ultimately, the EP stresses “the need to ensure that the EU is in a 
position to contribute, by means of crisis management operations, to conflict prevention, 
stabilisation and resolution” (EP, 2013: 5), adding that certain treaty changes (namely the 
mutual defence and solidarity clauses) have contributed towards the reinforcement of a ‘sense 
of common destiny’ and a ‘spirit of commitment, mutual understanding and genuine solidarity’ 
that will allow the EU to “be able to fulfil its global role, thus enhancing the security of Europe 
and that of its citizens” (ibid.). Throughout the document, the EU’s neighbourhood is identified 
as a key area for EU security, where the EU is thought to need to be able to ‘act autonomously’ 
(ibid.: 8). 
 Following two sections dedicated to improvement proposals for capabilities and 
industry, respectively, the EP finishes the resolution by urging a public debate about EU level 
security and defence from a normative standpoint, as it “stresses the need to (…) explain the 
causal nexus between security and defence on the one hand, and freedom, democracy, rule of 
law and prosperity on the other” (ibid.: 11). This sentence entails an assumption (present 
throughout the EU’s discourses) that this link is driven by an underlying causality, i.e. that core 
EU values such as democracy and the rule of law produce suitable conditions for peace and 
security, even though the EP admits that such causal nexus needs to be explained and justified. 
Moreover, the EP argues that internal and external security are indivisibly linked, and that “a 
peaceful, secure and stable environment is a precondition for preserving the political, economic 
and social model in Europe” (ibid.), thus justifying the existence of a policy like the CSDP, 
which is labelled “a basic pillar of the European integration process” (ibid.). 
The ‘comprehensive approach’ concept was formally launched on December 11, 2013, 
when HR/VP Catherine Ashton presented a Joint Communication to the EP and the Council 
entitled ‘The EU’s comprehensive approach to external conflict and crises’. This concept 
proposes a mobilisation and interconnectedness of all tools and instruments available to the EU, 
mainly with the purpose of maximising coherence and effectiveness in tackling external 
conflicts and crises, and of validating the idea of the EU as a relevant international actor (Drent, 
2011; Gebhard and Norheim-Martinsen, 2011; Smith, 2012; Major and Mölling, 2013). The 
document starts out by explaining that the EU engages in different stages of crisis management 
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“in order to help countries getting back on track towards sustainable long-term development” 
(Ashton, 2013a: 2). This statement reveals the EU’s assumption that ‘development’ is 
something that is universally desired and that it is a positive thing, as implicitly opposed to 
‘stagnation’. Even though the document does not specify what kind of development, or what 
‘development’ even means, previous documents have linked the EU’s crisis management policy 
to an effort to encouraging or improving the economic development of the recipient countries 
or regions. The following paragraph summarises the EU’s ambitions and vision of its own 
actorness: 
 
The EU has a vital interest to prevent, prepare for, respond to, address and help recovery 
from conflicts, crises and other security threats outside its borders – this is a permanent 
task and responsibility, already recognised in both the European Security Strategy and the 
EU Internal Security Strategy. This is the case not only because the EU is widely considered 
as an example of peace and stability in its neighbourhood and in other parts of the world, 
but also because it is in the EU's global interest (ibid.: 3). 
 
The definition of ‘comprehensiveness’ encompasses itself aspects related to ‘EU instruments 
and resources’ and ‘the shared responsibility of EU-level actors and Member States’ (Drent, 
2011; Gebhard and Norheim-Martinsen, 2011; Smith, 2012; Major and Mölling, 2013). These 
aspects indicate the importance of getting domestic EU actors on board with the EU’s crisis 
management discourses, which denote that the document is mostly targeted at the Member 
States. Expressions such as ‘unique’ and ‘expertise’ mark the EU’s description of its diplomatic 
assets, which the document argues can be brought together to allow the EU to “better define 
and defend its fundamental interests and values, promote its key political objectives and prevent 
crises or help to restore stability” (ibid.). The positioning of these elements in the sentence is 
not random, as it appears to reflect the EU’s priorities and deep-rooted normative positioning 
regarding its ambitions and stance as a crisis management actor. These priorities are also 
reflected in how the EU describes the purpose of engaging in crisis management, as it is meant 
to “help to improve the lives of those threatened by conflict and prevent or mitigate the negative 
effects [for the EU, its citizens and its internal security] of insecurity and conflict elsewhere” 
(ibid.). 
 The link between security and development – which is present in previous documents – 
is considered in this context to be paramount – it ‘is therefore a key underlying principle in the 
application of an EU comprehensive approach’ (ibid.: 4), again reiterating the EU’s normative 
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attitude towards crisis management as well as the link established by the EU between lack of 
development/ progress and conflict. The former concepts are assumed to be universally desired 
and, as such, become a preferred process for the EU to achieve sustainable peace by means of 
exporting its normative standards (such as democratic practices, rule of law, and human rights 
protection). The following paragraph summarises the idea that the EU has of its own role in the 
area of crisis management, revealing its inward-looking strategy and focus on itself, its 
understanding of a situation, its potential role, quality, and value-added: 
 
A coherent political strategy for conflict prevention, preparedness and response starts with 
all relevant players sharing a common understanding of the situation or the challenge. A 
shared analysis should set out the EU’s understanding about the causes of a potential 
conflict or crisis, identify the key people and groups involved, review the dynamics of the 
situation and assess the potential risks of action, or non-action. It must also identify the EU 
interests and objectives and our potential role to contribute to peace, security, 
development, human rights and the rule of law, taking into account existing EU resources 
and action in the country or region in question (ibid.: 5). 
 
In this document, the concepts of ‘fragile states’ and ‘poorly governed areas’ appear again, as 
in previous documents. Even though these are not specifically defined, they help sustain the 
link between an EU normative vision of strong states or well-governed areas and lack of 
conflicts or crises (ibid.: 9). The inward-looking language remains present in expressions such 
as ‘the EU’s understanding’, or ‘EU interests and objectives’ and ‘potential role’. As in previous 
cases, the identification of other actors is directed at the EU’s ‘international partners’ – “the 
UN in most crisis situations, NATO in Kosovo and Afghanistan, the International Monetary 
Fund and the World Bank on macro-financial issues, et cetera” (ibid.: 11-12) – rather than the 
potential host countries / regions, suggesting that the EU seeks the former’s recognition and 
validation above the latter’s. 
The December 2013 Council Conclusions drafted in response to the EEAS Review are 
a very brief and technical document. The most normatively charged statement that the 
document contains is the repetition of the sentence that the EEAS is a “modern and operational 
foreign policy service, equipped to promote EU values and interests as well as to ensure 
coordination and consistency in the EU’s relations with the rest of the world” (Council, 2013: 
1) as stated in the EEAS Review. This reiterates the idea that the promotion of EU values and 
interests is one of the main tasks of the EEAS, but also one of the main purposes of EU external 
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action. Concerning crisis management, the document does not go beyond recognising a need 
for revising and streamlining the policy’s planning and decision-making procedures, as well as 
its effectiveness and efficiency, as it refrains from making any statement related to the policy’s 
normative goals. 
On 19 and 20 December 2013, and “for the first time since the entry into force of the 
Lisbon Treaty, the European Council held a thematic debate on defence” (European Council, 
2013: 1). The European Council was held in the aftermath of a meeting with NATO Secretary-
General Anders Fogh Rasmussen, who “presented his assessment of current and future security 
challenges and welcomed the ongoing efforts and commitments by the EU and its Member 
States as being compatible with, and beneficial to NATO” (ibid.). Later in the document, the 
European Council returns to the idea that the CSDP “will continue to develop in full 
complementarity with NATO in the agreed framework of the strategic partnership between the 
EU and NATO and in compliance with the decision-making autonomy and procedures of each” 
(ibid.: 2). The highlighting of NATO’s importance and symbiotic relationship with the CSDP 
is a recurrent narrative in the EU’s discourses which serves, among other purposes, to 
emphasise the EU’s complementarity role as a global crisis management actor, and thus the 
usefulness of both organisations. The mentioning of the EU and its Member States here and 
throughout the Conclusions document highlights the intergovernmental nature not only of the 
policy in case, but also of the institution producing the discourse.  
The European Council begins its Conclusions document by stating that ‘defence 
matters’, and that “an effective CSDP helps to enhance the security of European citizens and 
contributes to peace and stability in our neighbourhood and in the broader world” (ibid.: 1). 
The European Council brings attention to the rapid evolution of ‘Europe’s strategic and 
geopolitical environment’ and identifies some capability and industry-related constraints that 
hinder the EU’s action in this field. In this sense, the HSGs argue that “the EU and its Member 
States must exercise greater responsibilities in response to those challenges if they want to 
contribute to maintaining peace and security through CSDP together with key partners such as 
the UN and NATO” (ibid.: 2). The means through which the European Council proposes that 
the EU and its Member States exercise ‘greater responsibilities’ is by “deepen[ing] defence 
cooperation by improving the capacity to conduct missions and operations and (…) improve 
the development and availability of the required civilian and military capabilities” (ibid.).  
The three axes that guide the European Council on defence are identified as increasing 
the CSDP’s effectiveness, visibility, and impact; capability development; as well strengthening 
the European defence industry. In reference to the first axis, the European Council describes 
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CSDP missions as a “tangible expression of the Union's commitment to international peace and 
security” (ibid.: 3), arguing that “the EU and its Member States can bring to the international 
stage the unique ability to combine, in a consistent manner, policies and tools ranging from 
diplomacy, security and defence to finance, trade, development and justice” (ibid.). Here, 
another justification is provided for the EU’s crisis management actorness, as the EU’s 
uniqueness and preparedness are emphasised as making it a particularly adequate actor in this 
field, in line with the previously mentioned complementarity to NATO’s more traditional 
military approach. In addition, a tendency towards a greater focus on ownership is present, as 
the European Council accentuates the importance of “supporting partner countries and regional 
organisations, through providing training, advice, equipment and resources where appropriate, 
so that they can increasingly prevent or manage crises by themselves” (ibid.). Although the 
focus on ownership and the elevation of CSDP host countries and potential host countries to 
‘partners’ became increasingly present in the EU’s discourse, this stance is still largely imbued 
with an asymmetric positioning of the EU’s ‘partner countries’ vis-à-vis the EU itself, whereby 
the latter positions itself in a higher hierarchical positioning of dictating the standards to be 
adopted by the former, as well as the terms of the cooperation between the two. 
As in previous discourses, there is a reinforcement of the idea of a growing link between 
external and internal security in the EU’s discourses and policy-making, triggered by a 
changing security environment with more and diverse challenges that affect the EU, including 
cyber and maritime security, illegal migration, organised crime, terrorism, as well as energy 
security.  
On March 4, 2014, European Commission President José Manuel Barroso addressed a 
high-level conference on the European security and defence sector with a speech entitled 
“Strengthening Europe security and defence sector.” Barroso starts by pointing out that the 
‘European security and defence sector’ is “vitally important to the European Union, to its lasting 
stability and prosperity as well as to its role and projection on the world stage,” adding that 
Eurobarometer surveys show that a ‘strong and credible’ “features high among our citizens’ 
legitimate aspirations” (Barroso, 2014).  
After explaining the characteristics of the security and defence industry, Barroso 
explains why it is strategically important for the EU to develop the latter: “it is a key element 
of our capacity to ensure that every European has access to security, economic prosperity, 
political freedom and social well-being. It is therefore at the core of Europe’s ‘raison d’être’,” 
adding that “it is also at the core of Europe’s role and ambition on the international stage, in an 
increasingly interdependent and interconnected world” (ibid.). It is interesting and unusual that 
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the first strategic reason pointed out for the development of a security and defence sector at the 
EU level is domestically-oriented, and while it appears to reflect an idea of territorial defence, 
it is most likely to refer to the EU’s crisis management endeavours outside of its territorial 
sphere as indirect guarantors of EU security, in addition to matters of actorness ambition. This 
interpretation is confirmed when Barroso continues by stating that “recent events from 
Afghanistan to Africa and even more recently Ukraine have shown that for the sake of its own 
stability and security, Europe has to pay attention to old ‘frozen conflicts’ and other potential 
new flashpoints” (ibid.). In addition to explaining the strategic motivation behind the EU’s 
efforts, the Commission President argues that “there is also beyond Europe a growing demand 
for Europeans to dispatch their military forces on mission abroad,” and that “expectations for 
more action from Europe worldwide have been rising since the 1990s” (ibid.), even though he 
does not explain whence such demands stem. Barroso adds, in line with statements made by 
previous Commission Presidents, that “the need for further efforts in security and defence is 
increasingly seen as a matter of political credibility of the European Union” (ibid.), reflecting 
the importance of this area for the EU’s actorness identity. 
On 17 March 2014, the Council, in its Foreign Affairs formation, discussed the 
implementation of the EU Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel. In the 
Conclusions adopted by the Council, the concept of ‘partner’ appears frequently in reference to 
local actors, which the EU seeks to “support (…) in addressing the region's key security and 
development challenges” (Council, 2014b: 1). The Council reiterates its perceived validity of 
the goals of the strategy in matters of security, peace-building, conflict prevention, countering 
radicalisation, as well as development, highlighting that “the link between security and 
development will remain at the heart of EU policies and operations in the region” (ibid.), in the 
spirit of the EU’s comprehensive approach (Drent, 2011; Gebhard and Norheim-Martinsen, 
2011; Smith, 2012; Major and Mölling, 2013). Even though the so-called ‘security-
development nexus’ was already present in the EU’s discourse before, the launch and 
institutionalisation of the EU’s comprehensive approach to external conflicts and crises in the 
previous year emphasised this link and made it gradually more discernible in the EU’s 
discourses.  
As in previous instances, the Council repeats the idea that “the primary responsibility 
and ownership for peace, security and development is with the governments of the Sahel 
region” (Council, 2014b: 3). Yet, it also states that the EU “will continue to promote democracy, 
human rights, decentralisation policies, good governance (…) and it will encourage the fight 
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against corruption as well as counter-radicalisation projects as a means of conflict prevention” 
(ibid.: 2).  
In May 2014, the Council produced a document with conclusions on the EU’s 
comprehensive approach to external conflicts and crises, proposed in the previous year by the 
HR/VP. In the Conclusions, the Council argues that the comprehensive approach “contributes 
greatly to the Union’s ability to play a positive and transformative role in its external relations 
and as a global actor” (Council, 2014a: 1). This assertion stems greatly from a continuance of 
an inward-looking focus and identity construction as an actor: 
 
The EU’s policies and priorities should follow from common strategic objectives and a 
clear common vision of what the EU collectively wants to achieve in its external relations 
or in a particular conflict or crisis situation. The Council notes that the regional strategies 
developed for the Horn of Africa, the Sahel and most recently the Gulf of Guinea have been 
valuable in framing the EU’s engagements across many policy areas (ibid.: 2). 
 
The EU’s normative justification discourses shift between frequently acting according to ‘what 
the EU collectively wants to achieve’ and acting according to an abstract ‘need / responsibility’ 
for it to act. This shift is reflected in both the EU legitimacy and actorness scholarly debates, 
albeit separately: the first type of normative justification is identified by authors that defend the 
EUFP’s intergovernmental nature to justify its legitimacy (e.g. Moravcsic, 2002, 2008), and the 
second type of justification is reflected in constructivist or post-structuralist authors’ claims of 
centrality of strategic narratives in justifying actorness claims (e.g. Niţoiu, 2013; Miskimmon, 
O’Loughlin, and Roselle, 2013; Schumacher, 2015; Birchfield, Krige, and Young, 2017). 
Another aspect that was brought up was “the need for the EU to better, earlier and more 
systematically link up its political engagement, its CSDP missions and operations, its 
development cooperation and assistance” (Council, 2014a: 2). This reiterates an aspect that has 
appeared systematically in the EU’s discourses in the area of crisis management, which is the 
linkage between the idea of the EU helping countries and regions in crisis and the simultaneous 
export of its norms and values in this context; as well as a growing tendency to link crisis 
management and development cooperation. This also recaps the EU’s inherent ambition in the 
world, which is the prevalence of its ‘superior’ normative standards over other paradigms of 
‘weak / bad’ governance and underdevelopment. Following this argument, the document states 
that “a comprehensive approach should also enable rapid EU action as required” (ibid.). The 
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use of the adverb ‘also’ suggests a bigger concern with the former (political engagement and 
development) than with the latter (ensuring rapid assistance). 
In August 2014, Federica Mogherini assumed the role of HR/VP. Her approach to the 
area of security and defence has been slightly different from that of Catherine Ashton. This is 
because Mogherini inherited years of hard work done by Ashton in setting up the EEAS and 
streamlining a number of procedures related to the area of crisis management (such as the 
decision-making procedure, for example), and because of the rapidly changing security 
environment around Europe. Mogherini’s performance as HR in the area of security and 
defence appears to be more active in matters of public diplomacy (Blockmans and Montesano, 
2015), yet she inherited a difficult security environment, as mentioned, which has shaped and 
conditioned her action. 
In the mandates of most civilian CSDP missions, three concepts appear repeatedly: 
monitoring, mentoring, and advising (MMA). The lack of conceptual clarity had not been 
properly addressed until – perhaps for practical reasons, such as allowing for room for 
interpretation – when a document was prepared in November 2014 to establish clear definitions 
under the guise of ‘operational guidelines’ for these concepts. The extensive EEAS document 
entitled Civilian Operations Commander Operational Guidelines for monitoring, mentoring and 
advising in civilian CSDP missions (EEAS, 2014b), is addressed at the PSC and the Council. 
The document is divided into different sections, including one concerning definitions of each 
of the three concepts, another section concerning basic principles for monitoring, mentoring, 
and advising – which include  European values; local ownership; capacity building; 
sustainability; flexibility; patience; awareness of the political, legal, and administrative 
environment; cultural awareness; respect; interaction; trust and confidence; structured transfer 
of knowledge; as well as cooperation with other actors –, as well as sections regarding 
responsibilities within mission leadership, as well as training, and implementation.  
 In the introduction, the triad of concepts is collectively identified as aiming “at capacity 
building and transfer of knowledge in order to enable the host country to develop sustainable 
rule of law organisations and processes” (ibid.: 6), and the purpose of the document is 
explained. The document then defines and explains the three concepts ‘for the purposes of 
MMA’: 
 
(…) ‘monitoring’ refers to observing performance, efficiency and work methods and the 
performance of the local counterparts, with a view to drawing conclusions about how to 
improve their performance through mentoring and advising. It also involves developing a 
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political and contextual understanding of the institution in which the local counterparts 
work (ibid.: 8). 
 
The mentor is an experienced person who fosters and supports the personal skills and 
professional performance of another person (mentee). Mentoring takes place in a long-term 
one-to-one relationship, which must be based on trust and respect (ibid.: 9). 
 
The advisor is an experienced person who gives advice to an organisation in order to 
develop the performance of the entire organisation with a view to enable the organisation 
or parts thereof to fulfil its tasks (…) (ibid.: 10). 
 
In addition to these definitions, the document further explains the uses and contexts of the latter 
as part of civilian CSDP missions. All of these definitions imply an asymmetrical hierarchical 
positioning, with the actor performing these tasks being placed in a superior dominant position 
and the actor receiving them being positioned in a subordinate position. Although all MMA 
principles described in the document are important for civilian crisis management, we will 
focus particularly on the first two: European values and local ownership. After describing the 
EU’s values as stated in the Lisbon Treaty, the document explains the extent to which they 
matter in civilian crisis management missions: 
 
The European Union intervenes with a civilian CSDP strengthening mission only when the 
host country has made its own decision to move towards reform and/ or state and capacity 
building. Inviting the EU to assist in these efforts implies acceptance of the 
abovementioned values and the will of the local authorities to enforce them (ibid.). 
 
This explanation entails an idea that has been latent in the EU’s discourses since the inception 
of its foreign policy: the EU constructs itself as a crisis management actor built on the protection 
of liberal norms, institutions, and values, promoting the latter’s alleged universality and global 
desirability on its own terms, as the one that determines what should be considered normal, 
appropriate, and universal. As for local ownership, it is described as ‘the ultimate goal of 
MMA’, as “the transition of knowledge, skills and capacity with respect for the full ownership 
of the host-country’s authorities” (ibid.: 11). Yet, the document also points out challenges to 
ownership that can be solved with capacity building efforts, since  
 
  196 
(…) the host country initially might not have the capacity to take ownership because of 
shortfalls in organisation, experience, legal framework, etc. (…) However, a reform 
imposed on a country from the outside – even with the agreement of the political elite – is 
bound to fail in the long run (ibid.). 
 
This might explain why crisis management missions are mostly launched following a formal 
request on behalf of local authorities, despite oftentimes the EU being the driver behind their 
launch. 
In this section we have explored the EU’s discourses in the context of the signing and 
implementation of the Lisbon Treaty. This period reflects a greater focus on EU actorness and 
visibility, particularly due to the treaty changes, but simultaneously there is a greater discursive 
emphasis on the intergovernmental specificity of the E/CSDP, following the rejection of the 
constitutional treaty in 2005. We noticed an increasing approximation between the external and 
internal dimensions of EU security, and between different areas of Foreign Policy (such as 
security and development), in line with the implementation of the EU’s comprehensive 
approach to external conflicts and crises (Drent, 2011; Gebhard and Norheim-Martinsen, 2011; 
Smith, 2012; Major and Mölling, 2013). The following section analyses EU discourses that 
contain normative justification elements for the further development of its crisis management 
policy that reflect the emergent threats and challenges facing the EU since the entering into 
force of the Lisbon Treaty.  
 
4.5 - Resilience and retraction in the EU’s normative ambitions 
 
In the present section, we analyse and contextualise discourses that include elements of 
normative justification for the development of the EU’s crisis management actorness that were 
produced or divulged during the period of 2015 and 2016 that led to the adoption of a new EU 
strategic document, the EU Global Strategy. Around this period, events such as the civil war in 
Syria and the emergence of new complex and unconventional terrorist networks (such as ISIS) 
led to political instability in the European southern neighbourhood and within the EU itself, 
which was simultaneously affected by the refugee crisis that emerged in the Mediterranean 
region. To the East, the Ukrainian revolution – often dubbed ‘Euromaidan’ revolution / 
revolution of dignity – that took place in 2013 and 2014 in favour of increased European 
approximation or integration, was followed by the Russian annexation of Crimea and the 
emergence and intensification of territorial disputes between pro-Russian separatist forces and 
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pro-Ukrainian / pro-European forces (Shveda and Park, 2016). Domestically, the EU was also 
dealing with the practical implementation of the Lisbon Treaty and the establishment of the 
EEAS, as well as with the first steps in an unprecedented Member State’s withdrawal from the 
European project, in the midst of a growing wave of populism and Euroscepticism. These 
various growing domestic and external challenges and threats that the EU had to deal with 
during this period strengthened the link between external and internal dimensions of EU 
security and reinforced the gradual reduction in the EU’s normative ambitions in many areas 
of EUFP, including crisis management. This was accompanied by an increasing portrayal of 
the EU’s interlocutors as ‘partners’ and a focus on the latter’s ownership, autonomy, and 
capacity-building.  
 On March 4, 2015, HR Mogherini produced a Joint Consultation Paper entitled 
‘Towards a new European Neighbourhood Policy’, meant to “frame the discussion for a 
thorough re-examination of the ENP” (Mogherini, 2015b: 3). Even though the ENP and the 
CSDP are distinct policies, they are neither isolated policies nor are they free from mutual 
influence. Not only is the ENP one of the EU’s most important foreign policy frameworks, but 
the implementation of the comprehensive approach to external conflicts and crises has rendered 
EU external action policies closer and more interconnected so as to tackle goals more 
effectively and efficiently (Oproiu, 2015). The purpose of analysing this document is to 
illustrate the similarities between the discursive and policy changes that we observe in the 
CSDP and those that have occurred in the context of the ENP, emphasising both policies’ 
interconnection in the framework of the construction and normative justification of the EU’s 
overall crisis management actorness.  
The Joint Consultation Paper begins by labelling the EU’s relationship with its 
neighbourhood as ‘special’, citing article 8(1) of the TEU. The lack of stability in the EU’s 
neighbourhood is identified by Mogherini as ‘increasing the challenges faced by the EU and its 
partners’, including “aggravating economic and social pressures, irregular migration and 
refugee flows, security threats and leading to diverging aspirations” (Mogherini, 2015b: 2). As 
the HR briefly describes the evolution of the ENP, including its attempts to adapt to changes 
such as those generated by the Arab uprisings since 2011, she admits that the policy “has not 
always been able to offer adequate responses to these recent developments, nor to the changing 
aspirations of our partners. Therefore, the EU’s own interests have not been fully served either” 
(ibid.). Mogherini argues that “the reform agenda has stalled, in part due to competing interests, 
in part because not all partners seem equally interested in a special partnership with the EU 
under the model of pluralism and integration” (ibid.). This rhetoric accompanies the 
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aforementioned tendency towards the increasing use of the epithet ‘partner’ with regard to 
countries with which the EU has mostly had a marked asymmetric relationship (either by 
imposing conditionality or by dictating the terms of all manners of assistance, not to mention 
the EU Member States’ colonial past). In this sense, the ENP reform is, according to the HR, 
triggered by a “need to review the assumptions on which the policy is based” (ibid.: 3), in 
addition to its functioning and the appropriateness of EU tools for each context, in order to 
“ensure the ENP can (…) support more effectively the development of an area of shared 
stability, security and prosperity with our partners” (ibid.). 
What was the prevailing paradigm in most areas of EUFP – the EU putting itself and its 
interests first – is rethought, as Mogherini considers essential to not only consult the EU’s 
partners ‘on their interests and ambitions for this partnership’, but to reconsider the EU’s own 
interests and ambitions as well, in light of the latter. In addition, “it should also be considered 
how the EU should best respond to crises and conflict situations (…) taking into account the 
sources of influence and pressure on our partners that determine their political positions, 
including towards the EU” (ibid.). The CSDP is identified as a key policy for ensuring stability 
in the EU’s neighbourhood – a key idea in the revised ENP – as the lack thereof “not only 
disrupts progress towards democracy but also threatens the rule of law, violates human rights 
and has serious impacts on the EU, such as irregular migratory flows and security threats” (ibid.: 
6). As such, one of the ideas raised in the HR’s Joint Consultation Paper is a greater integration 
between the ENP and the CSDP.  
This document, meant to “frame a policy debate on the future direction of the ENP” 
(ibid.: 10), is clear in indicating the overall direction and intentions for the ENP (even if it is 
not necessarily clear in much else). This direction points, as mentioned, towards stability and a 
clear retraction in the EU’s normative ambitions, as a result of a dilemma that the EU was 
facing. For years it pressed for too many or too deep reforms, appearing condescending and 
patronising, and approximating a colonial attitude. Yet, a relaxation of these normative 
ambitions in favour of stability and resilience, on the other hand is also not bereft of risks, as 
the focus on ownership and the treatment of autocrats as ‘partners’ may result in the latter’s 
validation and in the maintenance of potentially oppressive environments, which, in turn, can 
generate the problems that the EU is precisely trying to avoid (Schumacher, 2016). 
 The discourse of other EU institutions at the time also focuses predominantly on the 
EU’s neighbourhood. This is the case with the EP’s resolution on the HR’s Annual Report on 
CFSP, published on March 12, 2015, which begins with the identification of a ‘changed 
political and security environment’ characterised by “the dramatically aggravated security 
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environment around the EU, especially in its immediate neighbourhood, where the international 
law-based order and stability and security of Europe are challenged to a degree unprecedented 
since the beginning of European integration” (EP, 2015a: 1). In addition, the EP points out that 
the EU’s internal crisis environment hinders the use of “its full potential to shape the 
international political and security environment” (ibid.), and “lack of policy coordination and 
coherence between EU policies, and financial limitations, pose additional restraints on 
Europe’s influence in the world and its capacity to be a regional and global security provider 
contributing to conflict prevention and crisis management” (ibid.: 2).  
The main goals of the CFSP (including many specific CSDP goals) are identified by the 
EP in the resolution, allowing us to pinpoint the EP’s view regarding the normative 
justifications for this policy. The first identified goal is the protection of EU values and interests, 
the strengthening the political and legal order in Europe “thereby restoring and safeguarding 
peace and stability” (ibid.). The second goal entails the territorial defence of the EU Member 
States and the protection of EU citizens “by strengthening its ability to defend itself against the 
threats facing it, including terrorism and arms, drug and human trafficking” (ibid.). The third 
goal of the CFSP, according to the EP, is “supporting security, democratisation, the rule of law 
and economic and social development in the EU’s neighbourhood” (ibid.). The fourth goal 
entails the EU’s assumption of a ‘leadership’ position in conflict resolution by means 
peacekeeping and peace enforcement in the framework of the CSDP. The listing of the EP’s 
perception of the CFSP’s goals is presented almost in reverse of the policy’s goals at the time 
of its inception in the 1990s, where the EU’s leadership and normative ambitions of 
democratisation and strengthening of the rule of law were at the forefront of the EU’s foreign 
policy drives, whereas territorial defence was either put last, or indirectly associated with the 
EU’s proactive action, or primarily left up to NATO. 
The idea of multilateralism is also raised by the EP in identifying another CFSP goal, 
where the EU is meant to, alongside its ‘partners’, strengthen the “the rules-based, pluralistic 
global political, economic and financial order, including respect for the rule of law and human 
rights” (ibid.). The last CFSP goal identified by the EP is the EU’s own improvement “in order 
to strengthen its resilience and allow it to unleash its full potential as a global player” (ibid.). 
All of these goals reflect the discursive and practice atmosphere in CFSP and CSDP during the 
period that preceded the launch of the EU Global Strategy, particularly the last one. The idea 
of ‘resilience’ – i.e. the EU’s ability to adapt, endure, and especially to recover in face of 
adversity (Aradau, 2014; Juncos, 2016; Bendiek, 2017: 14; Colombo et al., 2017) – became 
increasingly important, and was accompanied by a progressive contraction of the EU’s foreign 
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policy normative ambitions in face of its own vulnerability and of the volatility and 
unpredictability of its surrounding security environment. Moreover, the goal of strengthening 
the EU’s ability to defend itself and ensure stability reflects a growing acknowledgement of the 
link between external and internal aspects of EU security, as well as a ‘pragmatist’ turn in EUFP 
(Juncos, 2016). The idea of the EU’s credibility as an actor is also raised by the EP, in line with 
the goals established by the Lisbon Treaty in matters of external action. The EP describes the 
EU’s credibility as an actor as stemming from achieving an ‘ambitious and effective’ EUFP 
“based on a shared vision of key European interests, values and objectives in external relations 
and on a common perception of the threats affecting the EU as a whole” (EP, 2015a: 2) and 
encourages a ‘strategic reflection’ to ensue. The need for increased effectiveness and visibility 
is raised, as the EP proposes a greater emphasis on the comprehensive use of the EU’s tools, as 
well as a move from a reactive to a ‘proactive, coherent, and strategic’ CFSP, “based on 
common values and deployed in the shared European interest” (ibid.: 3).  
The normative nature of EUFP, including the CFSP and the CSDP, is evoked by the EP, 
as it mentions that “the EU has the obligation under Article 21 of the Treaty on EU to ensure 
that its external action is designed and implemented in order to consolidate and support 
democracy, the rule of law, human rights and the principles of international law” (ibid.). Even 
though, as in previous instances in EU discourses, the EP praises “the vital importance of 
collective defence guaranteed by NATO for its members” (ibid.: 4), it still “urges the Member 
States, as a matter of urgency, to step up their ability to contribute to territorial defence” (ibid.) 
under the aegis of the CSDP. This greater focus on the EU’s ability to defend itself follows the 
USA’s Foreign Policy pivot to Asia and the worsening of crises within and outside of Europe, 
including terrorist attacks in EU Member States and a growing flow of refugees and irregular 
migration, making it “increasingly difficult to separate internal from external security” (ibid.: 
6).  
The EU’s relations with its neighbourhood are also the target of comments and 
recommendations by the EP, as it urges a new, less patronising approach to be undertaken 
“based on merits, differentiation and the ‘more for more’ principle”, adding that “supporting 
those countries that want to draw closer to the EU must be a top priority for EU foreign policy 
and that an important response for containing Russia’s ambitions in its neighbourhood is to 
invest in the independence, sovereignty, economic development and further democratisation of 
these countries” (ibid.: 8). These comments are made in the context of Russia’s ‘aggressive’ 
border policy and the conflict between Russia and Ukraine that followed the former’s 
annexation of Crimea. As for the southern neighbourhood, the EP urges the EU to ‘substantially 
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revise’ its policy therein with a greater focus on “support for the building of functioning and 
inclusive states capable of delivering security for their citizens, promoting democracy, 
confronting religious extremism, respecting human rights, protecting religious and ethnic 
minorities and enhancing the rule of law, as a key precondition for investment and economic 
development” (ibid.: 10). 
The importance of the transatlantic alliance is reiterated when the EP brings attention to 
the idea that “the US is the EU’s key strategic partner” (ibid.: 12), encouraging “closer 
coordination (…) on EU foreign policy in support of international law and pursuing common 
approaches to challenges in the EU neighbourhood and at global level” (ibid.). Moreover, the 
EP reinforces its perception of the EU as a ‘major power’, as it “underlines the need for an EU 
strategy, in coordination with the US, on how to share with Russia, China, India and other 
major powers the responsibility for the peace and stability of the global political and economic 
order” (ibid.) and “stresses (…) that the EU should become a full member of the UN (ibid.: 13).  
On March 20, 2015, the Council, in its conclusions, commented the Review of the ENP. 
As in other discourses produced by the EU especially since 2013, there is a reinforcement of 
the importance of effectiveness in the EU’s regional and global actorness (Groen and Niemann, 
2013; Niemann and Bretherton, 2013; Bretherton and Vogler, 2013; Da Conceição-Heldt and 
Meunier, 2014; Hoffmann and Niemann, 2017). In the press document that summarises the 
conclusions, the ENP’s goals are described as “develop[ing] a democratic, stable and 
prosperous neighbourhood, based on a commitment to fundamental values, including the rule 
of law, protection of human rights and gender equality” (Council, 2015b: 1). Here, the emphasis 
is placed on the assumption that certain values are ‘fundamental’, and thus widely accepted 
(arguably one of the ENP’s problems, and an overall difficulty for the effectiveness of EUFP 
in general, including crisis management). The Council reiterates the HR’s proposal of 
establishing “closer coordination between ENP and wider CFSP/CSDP activities in a 
comprehensive manner” (ibid.), in line with the comprehensive approach to external conflicts 
and crises institutionalised a few years earlier (Drent, 2011; Gebhard and Norheim-Martinsen, 
2011; Smith, 2012; Major and Mölling, 2013). 
In the Council conclusions there is an underlying concern with discourse and narratives 
as a means of normatively justifying the EU’s engagement in its neighbouring region: 
 
The Council stresses the importance of a clear narrative and the need for strategic 
communication efforts on the EU's engagement in the region, including its values and 
objectives. Further efforts should be taken to strengthen EU visibility as a whole and 
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communicate European foreign policy and the wide range of sector cooperation activities 
towards the countries of the region (Council, 2015b: 1-2). 
 
This concern enhances the importance attributed by the EU to the discursive dimension of 
EUFP as a means to ensure the effectiveness thereof. 
 In line with the changing security environment at the time, and with the EU’s ambitions 
to improve its external policies and domestic policies with external scope, the Commission 
produced, on April 28, 2015, a Communication, directed at the EP, the Council, the EESC, and 
the CoR entitled ‘the European Agenda on Security’. This document reflects the EU’s growing 
concern with identifying the ‘new and complex threats’ and challenges in matters of security, 
and to update its security strategy in light of the growing link between internal and external 
dimensions of security. The EU’s concern with the modernisation of the ENP and the CSDP 
reflect this environment, as the Commission argues that “many of today's security concerns 
originate from instability in the EU's immediate neighbourhood and changing forms of 
radicalisation, violence and terrorism” (Commission, 2015b: 2). The Agenda on Security is 
meant to, according to the Commission, “set out how the Union can bring added value to 
support the Member States in ensuring security” (ibid.). This idea of justifying the EU’s security 
actorness by focusing on its value-added is a recurring narrative in EU discourses, alongside 
the ‘responsibility’ narrative (Niţoiu, 2013; Miskimmon, O’Loughlin, and Roselle, 2013; 
Schumacher, 2015; Birchfield, Krige, and Young, 2017), which is shared with the Member 
States in this document.  
Throughout the document, the Commission identifies terrorism, organised crime, and 
cybersecurity as the EU’s main threats, and bolsters the need to strengthen the EU’s 
multilateral, cross-border, and cross-policy approach to security, in line with its comprehensive 
approach, while focusing increasingly more on the idea of prevention. As such, according to 
the Commission, the EU must carry out “a global perspective with security as one of our main 
external priorities” where it “must be able to react to unexpected events, seize new opportunities 
and anticipate and adapt to future trends and security risks” (Commission, 2015b: 20). Even 
though the Commission does not state it explicitly, these ideas frame the key concept of 
‘resilience’ that marks EUFP discourse particularly since 2015. 
On 18 May 2015, the Foreign Affairs Council adopted a document with conclusions on 
the CSDP. The document begins with the recurrent affirmation that the ‘dramatic changes’ that 
the ‘global and European security environment’ has gone through “call for a stronger Europe, 
with a stronger and more effective Common Security and Defence Policy” (Council, 2015: 2). 
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This affirmation is in line with the recurrent idea that the EU has some kind of inherent 
responsibility to develop this policy area, which consists of the deployment of normatively 
charged civilian missions and military operations outside of its territorial sphere. 
Notwithstanding, the document justifies this by arguing that  
 
The conflicts, threats and instability in the EU’s (…) neighbourhood (…), together with 
long standing and newly emerging security challenges, are significantly impacting 
European security as well as international peace and security and challenging our 
fundamental values and principles (ibid.). 
 
 While a part of the justification is seemingly related to ensuring security and territorial integrity 
in Europe and beyond, another part has to do with the alleged ‘challenging’ of EU ‘values and 
principles’. This last relates to a challenging of fundamental EU values and principles 
domestically (e.g. through terrorist attacks, organised crime, etc.), and abroad. Despite the fact 
that the E/CSDP has been a predominantly outward-oriented policy that seeks to prevent and 
manage what the EU identifies as crises outside of its territorial sphere, here we notice a 
reinforcement of the growing link between external and domestic EU security concerns. The 
basic idea is that the potential spread of these ‘conflicts, threats and instability’ can be 
detrimental to the European way of life at home, meaning that deploying CSDP missions / 
operations thereto could halt such spread; and that EU fundamental values and principles are 
universal and thus must be protected, as the idea of an EU ‘responsibility’ remains central: 
 
By addressing these conflicts, sources of instability and other security challenges, the EU 
and its Member States are assuming increased responsibilities to act as a security provider, 
at the international level and in particular in the neighbourhood, thereby also enhancing 
their own security and their global strategic role by responding to these challenges together 
(Council, 2015: 2). 
 
As identified in previous documents, especially since the launch of the 2013 comprehensive 
approach to external conflict and crises (Ashton, 2013a), the encouragement of a stronger link 
between internal and external security is present in these Council conclusions. In addition to an 
increasing shift towards more ownership and empowerment vis-à-vis CSDP host countries, the 
growing link between internal and external security could imply more than just a focus on 
increasing efficiency in the use of the EU’s scarce resources or an attempt to improve 
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effectiveness in dealing with increasingly hybrid threats, but rather a potential decrease in 
EUFP’s normative ambitions. This decrease in the EU’s normative ambitions for external 
action is visible in the 2015 review of the European Neighbourhood Policy (Delcour, 2015). 
The EU’s 2016 Global Strategy reinforces this tendency, as we will see further ahead in this 
analysis. 
 For the first time, we notice a mention to EU citizens in the context of EU-level policy-
making in the area of security and defence, when the Council highlights “the importance of 
effective communication to raise public awareness and foster a better understanding of security 
and defence matters” (Council, 2015: 4). Nonetheless, this effort to reach wider audiences, both 
domestic and external, has been visible especially since Federica Mogherini took office in 2014. 
This approximation to EU citizens can also be interpreted as a sign of the EU’s gradual inward 
shift and subsequent decrease in normative ambitions in foreign policy, including in security 
and defence. The following sentence appears to corroborate this interpretation of an inward-
shifting tendency, whereby the area of EU-level security and defence appears to be headed 
towards acquiring more territorial defence features (as opposed to being exclusively dedicated 
to crisis management outside the EU’s territory): 
 
While respecting the primacy of Member States competence in defence, the EU can act as 
an enabler for security and defence co-operation, in line with the Treaties. Therefore, 
defence issues should also be considered in coherence with other relevant EU policies and 
sectors, and vice versa, thereby fully exploiting the EU’s added value (ibid.). 
 
Nonetheless, this potential shift is likely to be neither instantaneous, nor diminish the EU’s 
crisis management actorness claims, as the document praises the achievements of the CSDP’s 
‘significant contribution to international peace and stability’ (ibid.: 5). The Council announces 
the approval of the first CSDP operation – EUNAVFOR MED, Operation Sophia – developed 
as a result of a collaboration effort between the area of crisis management / CSDP and the area 
of Freedom, Security, and Justice, reflecting the essence of the EU’s comprehensive approach 
closer to home (ibid.: 6). In this sense, this operation can be considered a first instance of a 
closer cooperation in EU security and defence (between domestic and external policies), and 
perhaps also a sign of the apparent tendency towards an inward-shift and possible change in the 
EU’s approach to the CSDP as more than just external crisis management. 
 The discourse on the concept of ‘partner’ in the area of crisis management is broadened 
in geographic terms, as the Council refers not only to the UN, NATO, and the OSCE, but also 
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to the African Union, the League of Arab States, and ASEAN, “as well as strategic partners 
and other partner countries, within our neighbourhood and more globally” (ibid.). This reflects 
the growing tendency towards more ownership and empowerment for host countries, less EU 
imposition – noticeable in expressions such as ‘willing neighbourhood countries’ (ibid.: 7) – 
and a resulting detachment and apparent decrease in the EU’s normative ambitions in favour of 
its own territorial integrity, security, and stability. Yet, what we have identified as a tendency 
towards a decrease in the EU’s normative ambitions does not, by any means, mean a complete 
reversal in the EU’s foreign policy ambitions. The tendency towards more ownership and 
empowerment for host countries is complimentary to this apparent progressive decrease in the 
EU’s normative ambitions, but it does not entirely exclude the latter. In fact, the Council 
conclusions argue in favour of the development of ‘an EU-wide strategic framework for 
Security Sector Reform’ (ibid.), a policy concept meant to join several EUFP tools including 
CSDP and Freedom, Security, and Justice, that is quite normatively charged, as it essentially 
entails EU-led security sector institution-building that reproduces European security standards 
and norms in third countries.  
This normatively-charged yet ownership-oriented approach is also present in other 
EUFP documents, such as the European Commission’s joint communication to the European 
Parliament and the Council entitled ‘Capacity building in support of security and development 
– Enabling partners to prevent and manage crises’ (Commission, 2015a), on which the Council 
conclusions draw. In practice, this idea has been developed under the aegis of the EU’s claim 
in favour of a ‘security-development nexus’, already occasionally present in previously 
analysed documents (e.g. Council, 2001c: 2; European Council, 2003a: 2; Council, 2011), but 
which gained substantial importance since the 2013 ‘comprehensive approach’ (e.g. Ashton, 
2013a: 2, 4; Council, 2014a: 2; Mogherini, 2015a: 4). 
After praising the CSDP’s contribution to ‘stability’ a few pages earlier, the Council 
calls for a “need to enhance the CSDP’s effectiveness and responsiveness in today’s 
increasingly unpredictable and rapidly changing security environment” (Council, 2015: 9), 
welcoming a number of technical and procedural improvements, as well as the ‘mainstreaming 
and strengthening’ of human rights and gender issues within the CSDP. This appears to 
contradict the possible interpretation that praising stability entails a decrease in the EU’s 
engagement tout court. Yet, following a number of technical considerations concerning the 
efficiency and procurement of capabilities and equipment, the ministers briefly go back to the 
idea of an increase in inward-looking territorial defence at the EU-level (as opposed to the 
almost exclusive focus on external crisis management and prevention that had characterised the 
  206 
CSDP since its inception), as the Council “encourages Member States, through their national 
decision-making processes, to further utilise and implement the Policy Framework for 
Systematic and Long-Term Defence Co-operation (…) in view of reinforcing systematic 
defence co-operation in Europe” (ibid.: 14). 
On 21 May 2015, the EP produced a resolution on the implementation of the CSDP. 
The EP begins by identifying the reasons for the existence and further development of the 
policy, which it identifies ‘as direct threats to the Union’s security’, namely the ‘unstable and 
volatile security environment of the EU and its neighbourhood’ (specifically due to conflicts 
and crises in Ukraine, Syria, Iraq, and Libya), as well as terrorism in Africa. To these threats, 
the EP adds the US’s disengagement from Europe and the financial crisis, both of which “serve 
to highlight just how necessary it is for the Union and its Member States to shoulder more 
responsibility for their own security and defence” (EP, 2015b: 3). This discourse is aligned with 
the EU’s overall change in discourse in security matters that has been progressively visible 
since 2013 towards a closer link between internal and external aspects of EU security.  
When mentioning the ‘unprecedented instability’ marking the EU’s neighbourhood, the 
EP shows concern “that the Union may not jointly be able to be a key player in addressing each 
of these threats and that it may all too often be reduced to (…) ad hoc alliances in which it has 
only a peripheral or reserve role to play” (ibid.). In addition, the EP argues that the EU “hardly 
possesses the requisite resources, operationally, industrially or in terms of capabilities, to 
contribute in a decisive way to the prevention and management of international crises and to 
assert its own strategic autonomy and strategic interests” (ibid.: 4). These ideas that the EU 
might not be an actor in matters of security and crisis management, or that its role therein might 
become peripheral is quite distinct from the prevailing discourses and narratives that place the 
EU at the highest possible level (model, ideal) with responsibility to improve the world and 
solve others’ crises. It shows a difference between the EP’s discourse and other EU institutions’ 
and actors’ discourses, but it also represents an instance of a growing tendency that affects the 
overall EUFP discourse towards a diminishing of its normative ambitions and a questioning of 
some of the ideas that were, thus far, taken for granted. As such, the EP proposes, with a sense 
of urgency, that the EU improve the use and coordination of the security and crisis management 
tools at its disposal under the aegis of the CSDP. According to the EP, the EU should also 
strengthen the link between CSDP tools and other tools, such as humanitarian and development 
assistance, highlighting the comprehensive character of EUFP.  
The EU’s ‘strength and relevance’ lie, according to the EP, in its specificity and 
expertise, materialised by “its ability to mobilise resources and bring into play simultaneously 
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a wide range of diplomatic, security, defence, economic, trade, development and humanitarian 
instruments, and in full compliance with the provisions of the UN Charter” (ibid.). As such, the 
EP claims that the ‘isolation’ of CSDP missions in the EU’s overall international security and 
crisis management efforts is detrimental, as the missions and operations “have been aimed at 
enhancing the Union’s crisis response profile rather than taking strategic measures on the basis 
of in-depth analysis and planning” (ibid.: 5). EUBAM Libya and EUBAM Rafah are referred 
to as examples of the CSDP’s ineffectiveness, as they both operate in an “institutional and 
security context in which it has never been able to address the basic aims identified therein” 
(ibid.). Another example provided is Mali, where “a structural policy for putting such [CSDP] 
missions on a long-term footing with efficient mandates and objectives that are adequate in 
terms of dealing with the situations with which they are confronted” is argued to be lacking 
(ibid.: 6). As such, the EP urges not only the efficient and coordinated use of CSDP and other 
CFSP tools, but also a strategic reflection on the EU’s main threats and challenges as well as 
its ambitions in matters of security and crisis management. 
HR Mogherini drafted a report ahead of the June 2015 European Council on security 
and defence. While the HR’s Report focuses predominantly on the CSDP, in practice, the June 
2015 European Council on security and defence ended up covering a number of subjects 
(including migration, security and defence, as well as jobs, growth, and competitiveness), 
making the concepts of ‘security’ and ‘defence’ quite encompassing in this case. In her report, 
Mogherini enumerates some of the major changes in the ‘global environment’, such as conflicts 
in the neighbourhood, Russia’s annexation of Crimea, the Mediterranean refugee crisis, and the 
rise of ISIS. Other issues, such as ‘cyber threats, the impact of the financial crisis and the 
continued fragmentation in the European defence market’ are identified as “trends [that] point 
to a growing responsibility for the Union and its Member States, as well as increased 
interdependence within the Union to effectively provide security for its citizens, now and in the 
long term” (Mogherini, 2015a: 1). In this paragraph, we notice the repetition of the idea of EU 
‘responsibility’ to engage in the area of security and defence, a recurrent narrative in the EU’s 
discourses. Yet, unlike what is commonly defended by the EU – i.e. the idea that it has a 
‘responsibility’ to engage in crisis management or conflict prevention outside of its territorial 
sphere – which is one of the main issues that we have been highlighting and critiquing in this 
research project, this paragraph seems to indicate a different approach to security and defence 
at the European level. In addition to mentioning the Member States and the idea of 
‘interdependence’, by pointing out the ‘responsibility’ to ‘provide security for its citizens’, this 
paragraph appears to reinforce the tendency of a shift towards a more internal or territorial type
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of defence (traditionally linked to states). Both these ideas are reiterated throughout the 
document: 
 
Indeed it appears logical that the current trends in the security environment will lead to a 
more extensive use of security and defence related instruments. In other words, the 
demands towards the EU to act as a provider of security will continue to increase (ibid.). 
 
The idea of maintaining the way the EU acts in the area of security and defence – through 
external crisis management and conflict prevention missions under the CSDP – is thus 
questioned in face of what the HR identifies as the setting of EU’s ambitions, while “taking 
account of interests and values, the overall security environment, the consequent need to project 
force and the available resources” (ibid.). Here, again, the idea of ‘necessity’ reinforces the 
claim of EU responsibility to engage in security and defence efforts, either through crisis 
management or a more territorial defence, as the document states that “the Union wants to act 
as a security provider” (ibid.). One of the main arguments of the document is thus to push 
forward a European defence industry, so as to allow for the proposed shift towards a more 
territorial approach to defence. 
 What does this shift entail? The document attempts to clarify (albeit vaguely) what 
Mogherini means by an increase in the EU’s engagement in security and defence beyond crisis 
management: 
 
Of course defence is and will remain Member States’ driven. However (…), the European 
level does have role to play, in line with the Treaties. For instance, the EU can act as a 
facilitator and enabler for defence cooperation to support Member States’ capability 
development (…). This requires maximizing the added value of the EU by combining its 
various instruments, ensuring effectiveness and avoiding duplication (ibid.: 2). 
 
The notion of added value has been, thus far, used as a normative justification narrative to 
support the EU’s crisis management actorness in comparison and in coordination with NATO. 
Here, we see this narrative being used in a similar manner in the context of the EU’s relationship 
with its Member States. The HR goes on to explain how “[CSDP] missions and operations are 
increasingly becoming more embedded in a wider EU approach” (ibid.: 3), giving the example 
of the UN-backed EUFOR RCA (which ran from April 2014 to March 2015). This was a 
predominantly military operation that gained civilian traits, namely through the use of European 
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Commission programmes directed at the restructuring of the local judicial system and gendarme 
training, according to European standards. This example is useful to demonstrate how crisis 
management military operations – and not just the civilian missions – are well embedded in the 
EU’s ‘civilising’ attitude, whereby local actors are ‘improved’, and ‘helped’ in getting closer 
to ‘normal’ standards. The idea of linking the two components of crisis management in the 
EU’s ‘civilising mission’ contributes to the EU’s self-perception (and self-portrayal) as a 
‘benign normative actor’ (Del Sarto, 2016: 222). For the EU, this combination of development-
related civilian instruments with civilian / military CSDP missions and operations is seen as a 
priority and a necessary change in light of what Mogherini presents as expected: “demands 
towards the EU to act as a provider of security will continue to increase in response to the 
deteriorating situation facing Europe's borders” (Mogherini, 2015a: 4) – despite never 
clarifying exactly whence these demands come. 
 The ‘civilising’ ambition of CSDP becomes more visible in a section of the document 
entitled ‘capacity building to support security and development’. In fact, the very title is already 
quite revealing, as it reaffirms the EU’s perception of a required link between its idea of 
development and that of security, as seen in a number of discourses so far (e.g. Council, 2001c: 
2; European Council, 2003a: 2; Council, 2011: 1; Ashton, 2013a: 2, 4; Council, 2014a: 2). 
Ultimately, this assertion reiterates what we have identified as the EU’s main approach to crisis 
management and conflict prevention in general, i.e. the premise that solving these issues, 
according to the EU, ought to be achieved through EU-led institution building. This approach, 
in turn, implies that European paradigms are appropriate to replicate in other circumstances, so 
much so that they are often labelled ‘ideal models.’ According to the HR, this approach “flows 
from the growing recognition of the linkages between security and development (the ‘security 
and development’ nexus)” (Mogherini, 2015a: 4; Keukeleire and Raube, 2013; Anderson and 
Williams, 2011; Winn and Lewis, 2017) 
Unlike the prevailing tendency that has been observed mostly up until 2013 (with 
occasional exceptions), Mogherini seemingly refers to the countries that host crisis 
management missions and operations as ‘partners’, by stating that the EU’s empowerment 
thereof has been ‘gaining ground’, as “the long-term objective is to enable partner countries 
and regional organizations to take responsibility for their own security, so they can increasingly 
prevent and manage crises by themselves” (Mogherini, 2015a: 4). Both calling CSDP host 
countries ‘partner’ and the idea of empowerment / ownership are not common in the documents 
we have analysed up until the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty – in fact, the prevailing 
paradigm has been EU-led institution-building, based on EU norms and standards, and using 
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the term ‘partner’ to refer to specific large countries or organisations also engaged in crisis 
management outside their respective territorial spheres, whose values and normative goals 
matched those of the EU (such as NATO, the US, the UN, or OSCE). This does not mean that 
the prevailing paradigm shifted substantially (the shift was progressive), but it does imply a less 
hierarchical portrayal of the EU’s interlocutors: in such positioning, the EU is admitting that 
the countries in crisis are capable (albeit with the EU’s help, and following EU standards and 
norms) to get themselves out of whatever crisis they are in. And the epithet ‘partners’ also helps 
to slightly mitigate the asymmetries, at least discursively. Nonetheless, there is no mention in 
the document of whether the EU’s motivations have to do with an effort to manage technical 
and financial resources more efficiently, or if indeed the EU believes in these countries’ ability 
to succeed more autonomously than previously suggested. 
 The HR mentions ‘partners’ in a second instance, this time reverting to previous 
practices of apparently hierarchization of its interlocutors: “the EU has further developed 
cooperation with its international partners, in particular the UN, NATO, the OSCE, the African 
Union (AU) and ASEAN, as well with non-EU NATO Allies and third countries” (ibid.: 6). 
According to Mogherini, “EU-UN relations remain the cornerstone of the EU support to 
effective multilateralism and translate into close operational cooperation inter alia in Mali, 
Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, Somalia and Afghanistan” (ibid.). 
This paragraph exemplifies the EU’s prevalent logic of the ‘developed’ organisations / 
countries planning, defining priorities, authorising the launch of negotiations, and ultimately 
deciding what to do with the ‘less fortunate’ countries and regions (notice how ‘close 
cooperation’ is ‘in’ rather than ‘with’ said countries). 
The report repeatedly establishes a link between internal and external security (ibid.: 5, 
6, 10, 11), emphasising a tendency that was already briefly observed in the ESS more than 10 
years before, and that has been hinted at in successive discourses with growing emphasis. Still, 
this does not mean that there is any proposal made for changing the CSDP into a more territorial 
kind of defence, rather than outward-oriented crisis management. In fact, at some point, the 
document discusses the Member States’ reluctance in deploying Battlegroups, despite the 
latter’s alleged “continued interest on the matter” (ibid.: 7). The use of such vague expressions 
as ‘continued interest’ is quite common in EU documents. Oftentimes vague expressions and 
concepts are used to allow room for policy development or for mandate interpretation without 
necessarily compromising the Member States’ individual positions or the latter’s potential 
option to reduce the EU’s engagement in that area. In this case, we could interpret the use of 
the expression ‘continued interest’ as a way for the EU (or in this case the HR) to justify this 
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option’s viability, even though there has perhaps never been substantial political will on behalf 
of the Member States to allow for it to be carried out in practice. 
The document considers the ‘delaying factors’ to ‘force generation’ to be “the duration 
of the force generation process and the lack of a shared understanding of the implications of the 
fast track procedures” after which it adds that “force generation also raises the broader 
questions of political will and credibility” (ibid.: 9). While the concept of ‘force generation’ 
refers to the identification and activation of military assets and capabilities, including people 
and equipment, according to the requirements of a given mission / operation (Council, 2008a: 
6), there is nothing innocent about omitting considerations about the implications of the use of 
force at all. Even though there is no evidence that this sentence reflects in any way some kind 
of hierarchy of the EU’s priorities for this issue, it is still interesting to notice the near absence 
of moral considerations, especially when most referred to aspects concern practical / technical 
aspects of force generation (its duration, the implications of the fast track procedures, even 
political will), followed by a reference to credibility. It is not clear if this ‘credibility’ refers to 
the procedure or to the EU itself, but the use of this expression – about which there is nothing 
technical nor measurable – enters the realm of moral considerations or perceptions, as it refers 
to some kind of attributed validity or trustworthiness. If credibility is mentioned, why are other 
kinds of moral considerations not mentioned? This is conceivably a deliberate paradigmatic 
choice. On the other hand, the reference to credibility hints at the recurring pattern of a concern 
for the EU’s centrality in its own discourse, particularly regarding how it is seen as an actor, 
despite its performance. 
Following a series of chapters on technical considerations about financing, capabilities, 
and the pooling of resources, the report finishes with a chapter entitled ‘way forward’. The 
chapter begins by stating that “when considered against the ongoing changes in the global and 
regional environment, the demand for CSDP is likely to grow and to evolve” (ibid.: 17). As seen 
in several discourses so far, the reference to an unidentified abstract ‘demand’ for the EU to 
engage in crisis management is quite recurrent. Mogherini then goes on to enumerate the 
conditions for a mission to be successful: 
 
These missions and operations are successful where Member States provide the required 
resources. Their effect is further enhanced when a full range of instruments can be 
combined towards achieving the same political objective. In short, they need to be based 
on a strong political will, to have clear objectives and mandates, and to be part of a 
comprehensive approach (ibid.: 18). 
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The enumerated conditions are essentially internal / domestic, i.e. they stem from the EU’s 
wants and needs, as there is no reference to the needs of local actors. This absence is highlighted 
by the EU’s consistent portrayal of other countries and organisations as the EU’s main 
‘partners’, namely the UN, NATO, the AU, and the OSCE (ibid.). This is not surprising, 
considering that this fits into the recurrent pattern of inward-looking normative justification 
observed in most discourses so far. This focus presents the CSDP as a very one-sided policy, at 
least insofar as its normative justification is concerned, as the latter appears to serve to enhance 
the EU’s potential and value-added much more than to solve concrete problems. On the other 
hand, the identification of what constitutes a problem, or a crisis is also not bereft of normative 
considerations and is made according to the EU’s interests and objectives, as CSDP missions 
and operations purposefully entail the incorporation and dissemination of EU norms and 
standards and are oftentimes the result of an active search for opportunities on behalf of the EU, 
instead of being the direct result of requests on behalf of countries in crisis. 
This is in line with the stated belief that there are “clear linkages between security and 
development” (ibid.), which leads the EU to invest in capacity building, whereby “the long-
term objective is to enable partner countries and regional organizations to take responsibility 
for their own security, so they can increasingly prevent and manage crises by themselves” 
(ibid.). Even though this may arguably be considered less patronising / condescending than 
executive mandates, the (very normative) EU’s primary answer / solution for the ‘demand’ for 
its engagement in CSDP missions and operations remains EU-led institution building in third 
countries where the EU identifies the presence of either a full-fledged crisis (crisis 
management) or an embryonic one (crisis prevention). 
The HR’s report finishes by admitting that “defence is Member States driven, but the 
EU can act as a facilitator and enabler for defence cooperation” (ibid.: 19). This emphasises the 
idea that the EU’s normative justification discourses for developing and engaging in crisis 
management are likely to be primarily directed at its own Member States, which could help 
understand why the official discourses that stem from the EU’s institutional apparatus that we 
have been analysing in this research project, are predominantly inward-looking and focused on 
‘selling’ the EU’s potential, value-added, and attributes in the area of crisis management, to the 
detriment of the specific needs of local actors. 
On June 16, 2015, European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker and NATO 
Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg issued a brief statement concerning the ‘strategic 
partnership’ between both institutions. Much like in previous discursive instances here 
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analysed, there is an underlying notion that the EU and NATO are “unique and essential 
partners who share common values and strategic interests” (Juncker and Stoltenberg, 2015), 
reinforcing the discourse that the transatlantic relationship goes beyond the military dimension 
and includes a strong commitment to the dominance of certain values and norms, rooted in the 
interests of the members of both organisations. They add that “we support continuing close 
cooperation and complementarity between the two organisations. A stronger European Defence 
will contribute to a stronger NATO” (ibid). This statement emphasises the narrative of the EU’s 
value-added as a security actor, in that it does not mean to be a competitor of NATO, but rather 
a complementary actor to the latter, bringing to the fore distinct tools and unique approaches 
that surpass the traditional military tools that NATO is known for. 
On 25 and 26 June 2015, a European Council summit took place. This summit produced 
a document stating its conclusions, drawing on the HR’s report and the Foreign Affairs Council 
conclusions. This European Council, primarily dedicated to security and defence, ended up 
covering a number of subjects, as mentioned previously, including migration, security and 
defence, as well as jobs, growth, and competitiveness. This apparent broadening of the area of 
security and defence seems to conflate simultaneously with the ideals advanced by the EU’s 
‘comprehensive approach’ to external crises and conflicts (Drent, 2011; Gebhard and Norheim-
Martinsen, 2011; Smith, 2012; Major and Mölling, 2013), and to the tendency towards 
establishing a closer link between external and internal security. The European Council 
conclusions are concentrated in a brief document sectioned in the various mentioned areas.  
While this thesis’ focus is on the EU’s normative justification discourses as a crisis 
management actor, the changes operated in the EU’s depiction of the area of security and 
defence at the EU level cannot be ignored, which means that the normative considerations 
reproduced in such more encompassing discourses are also important for our study. In this 
sense, while discussing issues related to migration, and specifically (although not expressly) 
related to the EU’s response to the refugee crisis in the Mediterranean region, the document 
mentions the launch of the CSDP operation EUNAVFOR MED (European Council, 2015: 2). 
This operation, as mentioned, represents the implementation of a new, more integrated 
approach to EU crisis management, congregating internal and external security aspects and 
policy tools. The HSGs go on to briefly discuss migration-related issues, such as relocation 
within the EU, readmission to countries of origin, or cooperation with the latter. In this last 
section, the HSGs repeated treatment of African countries as ‘partners’ is substantially different 
to how these countries have been depicted in CSDP-related discourses up until 2013, reflecting 
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the EU’s increased focus on ownership, empowerment, as well as on stabilisation, and 
consequent progressive decrease in the EU’s overall normative ambitions (ibid.: 5).  
On a section dedicated to security and defence, the European Council begins by 
acknowledging that “Europe's security environment has changed dramatically” (ibid.), calling 
for several actions. The first is the implementation of the previously analysed European 
Commission’s ‘European Agenda on Security’ (Commission, 2015b), drafted as a result of the 
aforementioned changing security environment within Europe and around its borders but 
primarily internally oriented. Perhaps due to the origin of the document (the Commission) its 
focus falls more on internal security and justice and home affairs matters, such as terrorism, 
organised crime, and cybercrime. On the other hand, it is the result of the overall tendency of 
approximation between domestic and external security concerns and efforts. Even though the 
references to crisis management or conflict prevention that appear in the Agenda are sparse and 
usually linked to internal security procedures, the Agenda visibly highlights the aforementioned 
shift in the EU’s actorness in matters related to security towards internal / territorial security. 
The second security and defence related action that the European Council conclusions 
document calls for is the continuation of the HR’s ‘process of strategic reflection’ in preparation 
of the EU Global Strategy, to be launched in the subsequent year, which will be analysed further 
ahead in this study.  
The third action that the European Council calls for is “a more effective, visible and 
result oriented CSDP” (European Council, 2015: 6) as well as capability and industry 
development. Among other considerations, the issue of the mitigation of the hierarchization of 
the EU’s CSDP ‘partners’, yet without a complete removal thereof, reappears when the HSGs 
argue in favour of “intensifying partnerships, namely with the UN, NATO, OSCE and AU” 
followed by “empowering and enabling partners to prevent and manage crises, including 
through concrete projects of capacity building” (ibid). The EU’s treatment of both types of 
‘partners’ appears to be more levelled than before 2015, not least because of the ‘empowering 
and enabling’ intentions, even though the latter type is still the target of the EU’s ‘civilising 
attitude’ through EU-led capacity building based on EU standards and norms. The final sections 
of the document concern jobs, growth, and competitiveness, as well as a very brief statement 
about the UK’s first steps towards a referendum concerning the country’s departure from the 
EU. 
In a complex and challenging context for the EU, a new extensive EU security strategy 
was launched in June 2016 in an effort to identify key threats and goals, and to formulate 
possible EU responses for these challenges. The 60-page document is entitled ‘Shared Vision, 
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Common Action: A Stronger Europe – a Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and 
Security Policy’. The rhetoric in this document differs from that which precedes the Lisbon 
Treaty implementation, especially before 2013: more than identifying what kind of actor the 
EU can be, it inquires as to how the EU can still be an actor in the midst of so much doubt, 
crises, Euroscepticism, and increasing challenges to its security. While the arguments used to 
answer this discursive shift remain as self-centred as previously, with a focus on the EU’s 
quality, the EU’s domestic achievements that make it an ideal model, and the EU’s value-added 
through a unique combination of civilian and military elements in a comprehensive approach 
to security, the overall discourse does show some degree of change.  
The title of the document already reflects some of these changes in the EU’s gradually 
decreasing normative ambitions with regard to its external action. The first part of the title – 
‘Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe’ – in addition to referring to two 
adjectives that refer to the Member States rather than the EU as an actor, the last expression in 
particular seems to fall in line with the identified growing concern for domestic territorial 
security, and consequent convergence between internal and external security. The second part 
of the title, however – a Global Strategy for the EU’s Foreign and Security Policy’ – appears 
less inward-looking, especially considering the expression ‘global strategy’. Nonetheless, the 
explanation provided by Mogherini for the use of the adjective ‘global’ reflects, conversely, a 
geographic retraction, as the document “deals with peace-building and the resilience of States 
and societies, in and around Europe” (EU, 2016: 4). Moreover, if the syntagmatic positioning 
of each half of the title reflects any kind of inherent hierarchy, then our interpretation of an 
inward change in the EU’s overall discourse is corroborated. 
The EU Global Strategy (EUGS) is divided into four main sections: the first dedicated 
to the ‘promotion of EU citizens’ interests’, the second concerning the EU external action’s 
‘guiding principles’, the third (and most extensive) regarding external action priorities, and the 
final section entitled ‘from vision to action’ more dedicated to the EU’s available tools and 
networks to carry out its goals and priorities. The importance of this document is twofold: on 
one hand, it comes to replace an out-dated decade-old Security Strategy (which was, 
nonetheless, quite an important and unprecedented document itself when it was first launched), 
on the other hand, it establishes the EU’s actorness ambitions and prospects in the midst of 
major geopolitical changes both outside, as well as within the EU. As in previous discourses 
with a more encompassing scope, we will focus more on the aspects that pertain to security and 
defence, and in particular to the CSDP.  
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The actorness literature that we have discussed in chapter 1, in particular the section 
concerning EU actorness conceptualisations, suggests a shift in the EU’s actorness concerns 
(both in practice and in the academic debate), following the Lisbon Treaty and especially after 
2015, towards a greater focus in increased cohesiveness and effectiveness / performance, and 
later more concentrated around the concept of resilience. Our discourse analysis, covering a 
span of 24 years of discourses, confirms this pragmatist shift (EU, 2016; Juncos, 2016; Biscop, 
2016). In many ways, especially compared to the ESS, “the EUGS is more conscious of the 
limits imposed by our own capabilities and by others’ intractability, and therefore more modest” 
(Biscop, 2016: 1). In the EUGS there is a greater emphasis on ‘sharing responsibilities’ than in 
previous discourses, especially visible since the aforementioned Member State and domestic-
oriented ‘European Agenda on Security’ (Commission, 2015b). Simultaneously, another aspect 
that appears to be in focus in the Global Strategy is the idea of aiming for more ‘achievable’ 
outcomes, rather than ‘idealistic’ ones – accompanying the changes operated in the EU’s 
approach to its neighbourhood, for example, whereby much of its normative ambition has been 
reduced in favour of promoting greater stability (Delcour, 2015; Schumacher, 2016). The first 
paragraph in the Strategy’s foreword by Mogherini already encapsulates these ideas: 
 
The purpose, even existence, of our Union is being questioned. Yet, our citizens and the 
world need a strong European Union like never before. Our wider region has become more 
unstable and more insecure. The crises within and beyond our borders are affecting directly 
our citizens’ lives. In challenging times, a strong Union is one that thinks strategically, 
shares a vision and acts together (…) (EU, 2016: 3). 
 
The EUGS’s focus is still on the EU and its ‘responsibility’ to be a global actor, reinforcing a 
prevailing narrative (Niţoiu, 2013; Miskimmon, O’Loughlin, and Roselle, 2013; Schumacher, 
2015; Birchfield, Krige, and Young, 2017), but this responsibility is portrayed as much more 
‘shared’ than in previous instances (not only domestically, but also internationally). The EU 
maintains the abstract idea that the ‘wider world’ ‘expects’ a ‘stronger Europe’, but so do its 
citizens (EU, 2016: 7). On the other hand, the focus is not so much on how the EU can project 
and reproduce itself and its model (by means of exporting its values, norms, ideals, standards) 
in other countries and regions (even though this idea is still very much present), but more so on 
how the EU can better protect itself, its interests, and its territory. In fact, in the document, the 
EU’s first priority for external action is presented as its own security. In this sense, the EUGS 
advocates an increase in European autonomy in the area of security and defence, despite NATO, 
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while proposing a more territorial defence-type of modality to be developed at the EU level, 
within the CSDP (ibid.: 20). 
Despite sentences like “a fragile world calls for a more confident and responsible EU, 
it calls for an outward- and forward-looking European foreign and security policy” (ibid.: 5), 
the overall message conveyed by means of this document is mostly in line with the previously 
identified retraction from the EU’s normative civilising ambitions, giving primacy to dealing 
with more direct threats to its existence than to the search for new opportunities of actorness. 
In this sense, a lot of the focus of the EUGS’s discourse is on ensuring internal coherence and 
unity between the Member States and the EU institutions in order for the EU to regain 
credibility as an actor. As this was already the case in other previous discourses, such as the 
2015 ENP Review communication, this represents an instance of discursive continuity. 
The EUGS advocates a greater focus on the EU’s neighbourhood, as have other EU 
discourses done, especially since the inception of the ‘Arab Spring’ movements in the MENA 
region – with a more integrated, comprehensive, and multi-dimensional approach – to the 
detriment of farther regions / countries, reflecting a greater concentration of focus and energy 
on the EU’s territorial defence than previously. The EU’s second priority for external action is 
to “invest in the resilience of states and societies to the east stretching into Central Asia, and 
south down to Central Africa” (ibid.: 23). Albeit narrower than before, this description still 
appears to be quite a wide geographic range. Nonetheless, the document repeatedly uses 
expressions such as “the EU will therefore promote resilience in its surrounding regions” 
(ibid.). Resilience – a central concept in the EU Global Strategy, is defined in therein as “the 
ability of states and societies to reform, thus withstanding and recovering from internal and 
external crises” (ibid.). This concept is used not only in reference to the EU’s interlocutors, but 
also to itself, and to its own ability to persevere in light of a complex and volatile security and 
political environment (Aradau, 2014; Juncos, 2016; Bendiek, 2017; Colombo et al., 2017), and 
the increased pressure of the Brexit (Biscop, 2016). The use of this concept confirms the 
identified tendency towards greater empowerment and ownership of countries and regions in 
crisis in the EU’s neighbourhood, simultaneous to an overall intention to decrease 
conditionality-oriented approaches. 
The EUGS’s third priority for external action – which concerns more particularly the 
object of this study – regards an ‘integrated approach’ to conflicts and crises (which replaced 
the 2013 ‘comprehensive approach’ concept), while ‘concentrating’ its ‘efforts in surrounding 
regions to the east and south’ (EUGS, 2016: 28). The aforementioned geographic retraction is 
thus visible also in crisis management and peace building. The EU advocates a ‘multi-
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dimensional’, ‘multi-level’, and ‘multi-lateral’ approach to the prevention, management, 
resolution, and stabilisation of regions and countries affected by crises, expanding the idea 
proposed by the EU’s ‘comprehensive approach’ to external crisis and conflicts three years 
earlier (ibid.: 28, 29). The EUGS particularly advocates the idea of prevention, namely through 
“monitoring root causes such as human rights violations, inequality, resource stress, and climate 
change” (ibid.: 29). While the document advocates a ‘more systematic’ EU engagement in 
security and defence related aspects of these crises, references to ‘stabilisation’ appear to 
contrast, or at least mitigate the EU’s normative ambition more present in the CSDP’s first two 
decades. This decrease in the EU’s normative ambition in the area of crisis management is also 
suggested by the frequent use of more careful, ambiguous, and apparently less normatively 
charged expressions, such as ‘monitoring’ or ‘fostering inclusive governance through 
mediation and facilitation’ (ibid.: 31). 
In the final section of the EUGS the inward shift marking the area of security and 
defence appears again, in what seems to be a pledge of increased actorness and broadening of 
what had been thus far the area of security and defence at the EU level, with a much greater 
focus on domestic security and capacity-building, arguing that “soft power is not enough: we 
must enhance our credibility in security and defence. To respond to external crises, build our 
partners’ capacities and protect Europe (…)” (ibid.: 44). In order to do that, the EU states more 
directly that “Member States will need to move towards defence cooperation as the norm” 
(ibid.: 45).  
The idea of a ‘security-development nexus’ in EUFP appears in the EUGS’s overall 
integrated approach proposal for the improvement of the EU’s actorness and credibility: 
 
We must become more joined-up in our security and development policies. CSDP capacity 
building missions must be coordinated with security sector and rule of law work by the 
Commission. Capacity Building for Security and Development can play a key role in 
empowering and enabling our partners to prevent and respond to crises and will need to be 
supported financially by the EU. Our peace policy must also ensure a smoother transition 
from short-term crisis management to long-term peace building to avoid gaps along the 
conflict cycle. Long-term work on pre-emptive peace, resilience and human rights must be 
tied to crisis response through humanitarian aid, CSDP, sanctions and diplomacy (ibid.: 50, 
51). 
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This paragraph shows how the EU’s normative ambitions are portrayed differently than before 
2013 or 2015, even though there is no shortage of normative considerations and goals. There is 
still an underlying assumption that the EU’s goal is to improve / normalise (or ‘civilise’) others. 
The main change is rather a greater focus on domestic security, and the stability of the EU’s 
neighbourhood, in order to achieve domestic security. The EU’s ‘civilising’ efforts appear to 
be less linked to a belief in the idea that European norms, values, and standards are normal, 
natural, absolute, or universal or to the idea that they must be exported because of this, but 
rather on guaranteeing the EU’s own security through increased stabilisation, empowerment, 
and ownership – which requires a different kind of EU engagement. The CSDP’s discursive 
evolution presents it as a much less normative policy when observed as an isolated policy after 
2013, but when considered within the EU’s ‘comprehensive’ and ‘integrated’ approaches that 
advocate more openly a ‘security-development nexus’, the normative attitude remains present. 
 On the same day as the adoption of the EUGS, June 28, 2016, French Foreign Minister 
Jean-Marc Ayrault and German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier produced a joint 
statement entitled “A strong Europe in a world of uncertainties.” The statement begins with a 
mention of the Brexit and the consequences thereof for the EU, and a mention the widespread 
feeling of Euroscepticism that spread across Europe. The Ministers propose to “strictly focus 
our joints efforts on those challenges that can only be addressed by common European answers, 
while leaving others to national or regional decision making and variation. And we must deliver 
better on those issues we have chosen to focus on” (Ayrault and Steinmeier, 2016). The authors 
argue that “the European Union provides a unique and indispensable framework for the pursuit 
of freedom, prosperity and security in Europe, for shaping peaceful and mutually beneficial 
relationships amongst its people and for contributing to peace and stability in the world,” 
claiming that both countries see the EU “as more necessary than ever and as the only framework 
capable of providing appropriate collective answers to the changing international 
environment,” thus proposing “a more coherent and a more assertive Europe on the world 
stage” (ibid.).  
The Ministers enumerate one of ‘today’s main challenges’ as “ensur[ing] the security of 
our citizens confronted with growing external and internal threats” (ibid.), suggesting that they 
consider a collective type of defence to be developed at the EU level, or that this is a necessity. 
The logic of resilience and the EU’s pragmatist turn is also visible in the French and German 
Ministers’ statement when they claim that “we have to face increasingly interwoven internal 
and external challenges. We see the need to preserve (…) our common values both internally 
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and vis-à-vis the outside world” (ibid.). The inward-looking rhetoric is particularly visible in 
the use of the expression ‘preserve’ to the detriment of the more commonly used ‘promote.’  
While referring to the EU’s facing of a ‘deteriorating security environment and an 
unprecedented level of threat,’ the Ministers focus extensively on the topic of the link between 
external crises and the EU’s internal security, arguing that they are “more likely to have 
immediate consequences for European territory and the security of EU citizens,” and that, as a 
consequence, “Europe’s role as a credible force for peace is more important than ever” (ibid.). 
The solution presented by the Ministers is to “recommit to a shared vision of Europe as a 
security union, based on solidarity and mutual assistance between member states in support of 
common security and defence policy,” adding that “providing security for Europe as well as 
contributing to peace and stability globally is at the heart of the European project” (ibid.). 
The French and German Ministers stated that they “see the EU as a key power in its 
neighbourhood but also as an actor for peace and stability with global reach,” citing a number 
of examples and adding that “beyond the crises, we are convinced that Africa needs also a 
continuous commitment, being a continent of great challenges and opportunities” (ibid.). 
Despite the EU’s normative retraction at the time, visible in the EUSG and in the Minister’s 
own statement, there is still an inclination for the pursuit of actorness ‘opportunities’ 
(Bretherton and Vogler, 2006). The Ministers of France and Germany propose, as a solution to 
the volatile security environment within and surrounding Europe, the establishment of a 
“European Security Compact which encompasses all aspects of security and defence dealt with 
at the European level and thus delivers on the EU’s promise to strengthen security for its 
citizens” (Ayrault and Steinmeier, 2016).  
By fomenting increased dialogue and establishment of common security priorities 
within the European Council and the Council (with the help of CSDP organs in the Council), 
the Ministers argue that the EUGS is a step in the right direction, but claim that more must be 
done, and that their respective Member States will “promote the EU as an independent and 
global actor able to leverage its unique array of expertise and tools, civilian and military, in 
order to defend and promote the interests of its citizens” (ibid.). Many aspects of this last 
utterance are relevant for our analysis. Firstly, the idea of promoting the EU as an ‘independent’ 
and global actor is evocative of the scholarly debate on actorness, namely of Gunnar Sjöstedt’s 
1977a work and, to some degree, of Jupille and Caporaso’s conceptual difficulties in assessing 
the EU’s autonomy (1998). Secondly, the mention of the EU’s actorness being anchored by a 
‘unique array of expertise and tools’ is relevant in that it sustains the narrative of the EU as a 
security actor that brings value-added based on its ‘exceptionalism’ and ‘uniqueness’ (Biscop, 
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2004; Tonra, 2011). And third, there is a direct justification for the ultimate purpose of 
developing the EU’s security actorness that does not stem from an abstract ‘responsibility’, 
which is not that common in EU discourse, namely the defence and promotion of EU citizens’ 
interests. 
The EU’s apparent retraction visible in the EUGS is also present in the Ministers’ 
statement when they argue that “the EU will need to take action more often in order to manage 
crises that directly affect its own security” (Ayrault and Steinmeier, 2016). Even though they 
propose an increase in the EU’s engagement in crisis management actions, the Ministers argue 
that the focus thereof must be concerning crises ‘that directly affect its own security’ (by means 
of improved capabilities, budgets, and structures, including the operationalisation of PESCO) 
reflecting a shift of the EU’s crisis management actorness from effectiveness to functionality 
(Bickerton, 2011b). The Ministers add that the EU “must invest more in preventing conflict, in 
promoting human security and in stabilising its neighbourhood and regions affected by crisis 
all over the world” and ultimately advocate in favour of “a more integrated approach for EU 
internal security” (ibid.). The statement continues into other areas, such as migration and Justice 
and Home Affairs, and monetary union and growth. The placement of the EU’s actorness as 
the first and most widely debated issue in the statement indicates the latter’s importance. 
 In this section we have explored the EU’s normative justification discourses as an actor 
in the field of crisis management during 2015 until the launch of the EU Global Strategy in 
2016. This period was marked by an increase in the tension surrounding and within Europe in 
matters of security. Russia’s aggressive border policies and conflict in Ukraine, the massive 
waves of asylum seekers arriving daily in Europe, a worsening of the volatility of terrorist 
attacks within and around Europe, in addition to the Brexit process have reinforced the EU’s 
normative retraction, as well as its focus on stability and resilience. Discursively, this period is 
marked by an evolution of the EU’s comprehensive approach towards an integrated approach, 
where development and security appear more interconnected than before, and the CSDP’s 
evolution points to a geographic retraction and a greater focus on EU domestic security. This 
discursive shift towards increased pragmatism, alongside other findings, such as key concept, 
narratives, and discursive patterns, hierarchisations, omissions, and (dis)continuities will be 
further analysed and discussed in more detail in the subsequent chapter, in light of the most 
relevant and recent academic debates. 
  
  222 
 
 
   
  223 
CHAPTER 5 - NARRATIVES, HIERARCHIZATIONS, OMISSIONS, AND REPRESENTATIONS  
5.1 - The EU’s discursively constructed identity 
 
This project concerns the EU’s normative justification discourses as a crisis management actor, 
through which it establishes and exports an identity that is expected (by the EU) to be 
acknowledged and validated – and thus legitimated – by other actors in the international system, 
as well as domestic EU actors. Following the analysis of the evolution and context of the EU’s 
discourses in the area of crisis management, the goal of this chapter is to discuss the 
(in)consistencies and recurrences therein. These dynamics help to determine and reinforce 
certain narratives used by the EU to provide normative justifications for its crisis management 
actorness, which are established as a result of the “overlapping between various discourses 
which are more fluid and sometimes tend to collide” (Niţoiu, 2013: 240). In addition to 
identifying the EU’s main narratives as a crisis management actor, in this chapter we also 
analyse discursive hierarchizations and omissions, as well as representations of the EU and 
other actors involved in its crisis management endeavours. The importance of these narratives 
is that they represent “an explicit attempt to define and enact two processes central to both 
internal and external logics of foreign policy: identification and legitimation” (Martin, 2011: 
193; Carta and Wodak, 2015). 
One of the roles played by narratives in foreign policy “lies in the effects that its use has 
on the public acceptance of policies and policy action” (Schumacher, 2015: 384). As such, the 
narratives produced by the EU (through EU institutions’ and Member States’ discourses about 
the EU) in the context of crisis management, include aspects of normative justification in the 
sense that they are used by the EU to legitimate its ambitions and actorness in this policy area.  
 
Strategic narratives are a means for political actors to construct a shared meaning of the 
past, present, and future of international politics to shape the behavior of domestic and 
international actors. Strategic narratives are a tool for political actors to extend their 
influence, manage expectations, and change the discursive environment in which they 
operate. They are narratives about both states and the system itself, both about who we are 
and what kind of order we want. The point of strategic narratives is to influence the 
behavior of others (Miskimmon, O’Loughlin, and Roselle, 2013: 3). 
 
These narratives help construct the EU’s fluid and complex identity. Identity is a relevant 
concept for our project because it is “at the ontological and epistemological centre of 
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poststructuralist discourse analysis” and is “produced through and constitutive of foreign 
policy, and it is relationally and discursively constituted” (Hansen, 2006: 33). The EU’s identity 
conception and projection through self-focus and a curated image (despite the presence of 
discursive struggles) is one of the more manifest characteristics in the analysed discourses, and 
it has been expressly and deliberately present since the EU’s inception with the Maastricht 
Treaty. The five objectives for the EU, as established in the Treaty, already include the goal to 
‘assert its identity on the international scene’ through the implementation of a CFSP and the 
‘eventual framing’ of a common defence policy (EU, 1992: 5). This proves the EU’s purposeful 
intention to establish and promote an identity as an actor, including in the area of security and 
defence, rather than this being merely an unintended consequence of its actions. The 
Amsterdam Treaty reinforces the idea of EU ‘autonomy’ (Jupille and Caporaso, 1998: 217) by 
removing a Maastricht Treaty reference to the Member States (EU, 1992: 58) in the CFSP’s 
goal “to strengthen the security of the Union in all ways” (EU, 1997: 155). 
 
It is through the production and reproduction of these processes and practices that the 
notion of an identity is created, maintained and challenged. Identity becomes a reality as it 
is instantiated through the discourses of a variety of actors (…). It is disseminated through 
public and private communication within discursive spaces (Tonra, 2011: 1193).36 
 
The use of the pronoun ‘we’ as well as the conjugation of verbs in the third person singular (the 
EU is, the EU has, the EU needs…) became widespread practices following the Amsterdam 
Treaty, to the detriment of references to individuals that represent either the EU, or a specific 
EU institution or body. From a linguistic and semiotic perspective, these deliberate 
paradigmatic choices are neither arbitrary nor innocuous. These preferences, despite oftentimes 
being neglected or taken for granted in discourse analysis, illustrate an institutional 
personification of the EU, and an attribution of characteristics that are not necessarily ‘human’ 
(as we observe in literary texts), but at least those of an ‘individual’ or an ‘actor’ (Twardzisz, 
2013).  
As such, the authors of EU discourses often use prosopopeia37 to ascribe a collective 
identity to a complex institutional structure that not only does not have a (single) voice per se, 
                                               
36 Tonra, 2011: 1993, citing Laclau, E. and Mouffe, C. (1985) Hegemony and Socialist Strategy. 
Towards a Radical Democratic Politics, London: Verso. 
37 Prosopopeia is a speech device often used in classical Latin rhetoric to describe a character speaking 
on behalf of another, while assuming the absent character’s identity. 
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but is also never actually present and, as such, is always ‘represented’ discursively. In other 
words, the fact that something, like an actor, an entity, or an idea (e.g. the EU, the 
Mediterranean, the Middle East, the West, etc.), is constantly and continually ‘spoken on behalf 
of’ means that it is discursively constructed, and this construction is changeable, as it is 
contingent upon historical and social contexts (Cebeci and Schumacher, 2016). So, when we 
speak of the EU’s self-identification or self-portrayal, we mean the identification or portrayal 
of the EU on behalf of a group of individuals in the EU’s complex and multilayer system that 
discursively construct the EU’s fluid identity from within its institutional structure (Carta and 
Morin, 2014; Carta, 2015). Accordingly, when we personify the EU in our own analysis, we do 
so consciously and deliberately, following this logic of a discursively constructed identity. The 
realisation of the EU’s discursively constructed nature allows us to deconstruct it by identifying 
and analysing the ‘building blocks’ (i.e. the narratives) that it uses to shape and project its 
identity as a crisis management actor, and ultimately make this policy legitimate. 
Because the discourses and resulting narratives that we study here are produced by the 
EU about its own role, they are mainly presented in a positive or optimistic light. They mostly 
focus on the EU’s ambitions, its potential, and its value-added, to the detriment of representing 
a more accurate depiction of its policy accomplishments or of its shortcomings in matters of 
effectiveness. This ‘one-sidedness’ amplifies an existing discrepancy between narratives and 
practice and a continuous adjustment between the latter, where “a clear pattern of downgrading 
ambitions when policy outcomes do not match them can be observed in the EU’s external 
relations” (Niţoiu, 2013: 241), as shown in the EUGS. 
We have identified several direct justifications or explanations provided by the EU for 
the existence and development of its crisis management policy, including providing security 
for EU citizens, promoting its values, norms, and principles, preventing and managing crises in 
its neighbourhood, as well as protecting itself against the undesirable or adverse consequences 
from crises in its immediate and wider neighbourhood. While this project explores these 
immediate justifications, we seek to go further in understanding the EU’s discursive 
construction of its self-perceived crisis management actorness role. As such, our goal is to 
identify and analyse the several interweaving narratives that characterise and frame the EU’s 
crisis management normative justifications. The narrative / discourse taxonomy that we arrive 
at in our analysis is neither definite nor absolute, and in many cases involves more than one 
narrative at a time (in what we call narrative clusters) and it oftentimes involves more than just 
crisis management, especially as the tendency to adopt an increasingly comprehensive or 
integrated approach to handling crises becomes institutionalised. One particular feature that we 
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noticed as we discerned and analysed the results of our codification-oriented semiotic analysis 
from the previous chapter was that, similarly to the conclusions of authors like Ferreira-Pereira 
(2010) or Barbé, Herranz-Surrallés, and Natorski (2015), the EU’s main narratives have 
different origins and purposes, as they concern aspects of what the EU is, what it does, and why 
it acts in general and in specific policy areas, such as crisis management. 
In addition, there are other narrative-related elements which resulted from our analysis 
and that are important for the understanding of the EU’s normative justification as a crisis 
management actor. One such result does not constitute a narrative per se, but rather the absence 
thereof. This is the case with the issue of colonialism, which is a relevant discursive omission 
when we consider the historical past of many EU Member States and how the EU, despite 
maintaining a normative ‘civilising’ attitude in crisis management and other foreign policies, 
chooses to not address it. In this chapter we also address conceptual imprecisions in the EU’s 
discourses that contain elements of normative justification for its crisis management actorness, 
as well as the EU’s discursive treatment of different actors or groups of actors in this context 
(including the EU’s ‘partners’ and ‘strategic partners’, the countries that host E/CSDP missions 
and operations, in addition to EU Member States). 
In sum, in the subsequent sections we seek to delve deeper into our research questions 
that concern the presence of discursive hierarchies by identifying and analysing the dominant 
discourses and narratives, as well as the marginalised or concealed ones, and by pinpointing 
and analysing the elements that allow us to identify a ‘civilising’ attitude on behalf of the EU.  
 
5.2 - The EU as a peace promoting ‘model’ 
 
There is a group of narratives present in the analysed discourses – a narrative ‘cluster’ – that 
concerns what the EU is, where it presents itself as a “model of prosperity, stability and peace” 
(WEU Council of Ministers, 1995: 2) that has ‘responsibility’ and assumes a ‘leadership role’ 
as a crisis manager. A model is a paradigm or example meant for imitation or emulation. And 
the EU is constantly portrayed not just as a model (among other possible models), but as an 
archetype, i.e. an ideal version of the model, not just by the academic literature but especially 
by itself (Manners, 2002; Ferreira-Pereira, 2010; Cebeci, 2012, 2017; Barbé, Herranz-Surrallés, 
and Natorski, 2015; Chamlian, 2016). The project of European integration, motivated by the 
consequences of war in Europe, had as its primary goal the establishment of interdependence 
so as to render the re-emergence of conflict therein difficult, if not impossible. Integration has 
been considered, throughout the European project’s development, a ‘cornerstone’ of peace in 
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Europe, i.e. it was meant to create a regional ‘zone of peace’ (Mcdonagh, 2015). The project 
consisted, initially, of the integration of two key industries for the reconstruction of the war-
torn continent – coal and steel – but soon a more political and social dimension emerged, and 
European values, principles, and norms began gaining relevance, in particular in the context of 
the development of EUFP (Ferreira-Pereira, 2010). The peace-motivated European integration 
project acquired, thus, a philosophical, ethical, and idealistic dimension, amply based on 
liberalist ideas such as democracy, human rights, the rule of law, freedom, interdependence, 
market economy, and globalisation.  
The EU’s regional integration project generated peace for over half a century: a ‘model’ 
of democratic peace put to practice and publicly acknowledged and validated with the Nobel 
Peace Prize in 2012. In describing the EU as a ‘striking example’ of peace and progress, the 
discourses analysed in the previous chapter often recall this origin, assuming the link between 
democracy and peace / security as an ethos that characterises the EU’s very nature (Lucarelli, 
2002). In other words, in the EU’s analysed discourses in the area of crisis management, the 
‘EU as a model’ narrative coincides with the narrative of the EU as a ‘promoter of peace’ 
(Niţoiu, 2013: 243-6; Schumacher, 2015: 385-6; Birchfield, Krige, and Young, 2017). The 
EU’s historical experience as a democratic peace project became a narrative because it worked 
out for the EU, and therefore it is validated as a positive and legitimating experiment whose 
primary goal (peace) was indeed achieved, even if what generated that peace was economic 
interdependence rather than democracy as such (Mousseau, 2009). The ‘EU as a model’ 
narrative is “the most sedimented metaphor in EU policy discourse” (Barbé, Herranz-Surrallés, 
and Natorski, 2015: 19), and it entails the premise of assuming the EU’s ontology and teleology 
as a democratic peace project as one and the same (Ferreira-Pereira, 2010: Bicketon, 2011b).  
In the analysed discourses in the context of its crisis management normative 
justification, the EU claims to have responsibility not only to engage in crisis management and 
security actorness, but to assume a leadership role. Although the ‘EU as a model’ narrative 
exists on a more meta/comprehensive level of EUFP that transcends specific policies within 
EU external action (E/CSDP, ENP, aid, climate, human rights, etc.), it is reclaimed in each of 
these policies, including crisis management. What we have identified repeatedly in the semiotic 
analysis in chapter 4 as the EU ‘responsibility’ narrative is, in fact, part of, and rooted in, the 
‘EU as a model’ narrative, as it derives from the basic premise of a responsibility or a burden 
assumed by the EU for managing crises resulting from its appropriation of the idea that its 
success as a peace project makes it a model that needs to be reproduced, so as to spread the 
success to other parts of the world:  
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The aim of EU foreign policy is to replace the law of force with the force of law. This 
comes naturally to us. The EU, after all, has always been a peace project founded on 
democratic values and respect for laws. The EU wants a world order based on the rule of 
law (Solana, 2009b: 74). 
 
The ESDP was born in part out of European indecisiveness and lack of common tools to act in 
face of conflict on its doorstep, in former Yugoslavia. With the decision to move forward with 
the creation of a security and defence policy and the launch of its first crisis management 
missions, the atmosphere of inaction amplified an existing feeling of responsibility driven by 
both domestic and external expectations. This feeling is reflected in the EU’s discourse, as in 
most instances the EU maintains (explicitly or implicitly) this idea of ‘responsibility’, ‘duty’, 
‘commitment’, or ‘task’ to engage in crisis management outside its territory: “the EU has a vital 
interest to prevent, prepare for, respond to, address and help recovery from conflicts, crises and 
other security threats outside its borders – this is a permanent task and responsibility (Ashton, 
2013a: 3). In fact, in its discourse, the EU does not seem to be as much interested in its own 
performance as it appears to be in conveying a certain image of ideal / model / example or 
leader that is expected to act (Nicolaïdis and Howse, 2002). This ‘inevitable’ ‘responsibility’ is 
justified either by its claimed expertise and the appropriateness of its tools, or by its assumed 
mission of spreading its values, norms, and standards, not just in crisis management, but also 
in other policies like the ENP (Christou, 2010). The literature concerning types of roles and 
identities ascribed to the EU reflects this self-portrayal.  
Moreover, the EU’s engagement in crisis management has involved, up until a 
discursive shift around 2015, the EU dictating the terms on which crises should be managed 
according to its own understanding, its own interests, and its own objectives. The 2008 ESS 
implementation report argues that the ‘vision’ that the EU set out with the ESS was “of how 
the EU would be a force for a fairer, safer and more united world” (EU, 2008: 12). The EU 
also portrays itself as being “widely considered as an example of peace and stability in its 
neighbourhood and in other parts of the world” (Ashton, 2013a: 3), and as “highly regarded for 
our civilian and military missions” (Ashton, 2013b: 5). In other words, the EU depicts itself as 
the image of peace, and progress – a hubris-laden utopia (Nicolaïdis and Howse, 2002; Hyde-
Price, 2008), presented without moral flaw, and thus as having the moral authority to dictate 
what should be, and to impose (even if only by assuming their ‘natural’ or ‘expected’ character) 
its model onto others. This is especially visible in the incorporation of rule of law and state-
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building elements – shaped by European ‘superior’ standards and models – in crisis 
management missions and operations, particularly in statements such as making “a major 
contribution to security and stability in a ring of well governed countries around Europe and in 
the world” (Council of the EU, 2004b: 1).  
Around 2015, a progressive discursive shift towards resilience and pragmatism becomes 
more visible (EU, 2016; Biscop, 2016; Juncos, 2016) and an effort to re-shape the EU’s global 
identity ensues. The EUGS is perhaps the document that most evidently displays this discursive 
shift, as it “represents an attempt to both reckon with a deteriorated strategic environment while 
living up to the Union’s principles. It reflects an acceptance of both the Union’s declining 
leverage and influence and the non-linearity of changes occurring at the local, regional and 
international levels” (Stetter and Tocci, 2017: 7). According to Biscop, this discursive shift 
represents a return to the original sense of the concept of Realpolitik, i.e. “a rejection of liberal 
utopianism, but not of liberal ideals themselves” (Biscop, 2016: 1).  
Yet, the idea of ‘principled pragmatism’ underlying the EU’s focus on resilience can be 
somewhat contradictory and, as such, it can generate problems, since it entails the EU’s 
maintenance of its focus on the alleged universality of its values, while following a pragmatic 
flexible approach “which denies the moral imperatives of those universal categories” (Juncos, 
2016: 2), making it “bound to generate more criticisms of self-interest, selectivity and double 
standards and accentuate the weaknesses and limitations of the EU as an international actor, 
eroding its identity as a normative power” (ibid.). While this may be the case, the EU’s 
discursive shift does not constitute a complete discursive discontinuity, as such (but rather  only 
a partial discontinuity), from the prevailing ‘EU as a model’ narrative as it is produced by the 
EU, but rather affects the EU’s operationalisation thereof through its foreign and domestic 
policy tools, which, in turn, can affect perceptions if its actorness identity, since the latter is 
constructed by both discourse and practice. 
 
5.3 - The EU as a security actor that brings value-added 
 
In matters of crisis management, converging discourses that relate to what the EU is point not 
only to a narrative of the EU as a model and provider of peace, but also specifically to a narrative 
of the EU as a security actor that brings value-added. The EU assumes a role as a crisis 
management actor for many different reasons, one of them is that it seeks to bring something 
positive, different, and unique to the table, making use of the existing structures to find its place 
– its niche – and to project itself based on that uniqueness and resulting value-added. In other 
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words, the EU assumes a fundamental ‘exceptionalism’ (Tonra, 2011) or ‘unconventionality’ 
(Manners, 2001) in its foreign policy, including crisis management, largely derived from ‘the 
absence of a major military threat’, which prompted the EU to focus on “other factors that can 
constitute the underlying causes of terrorism or of armed conflict between or within third states, 
or that can intrinsically affect the values and interests of the EU” (Biscop, 2004: 11). The EU’s 
difference or specificity in face of other ‘powers’ in the international system in what concerns 
security can be identified as stemming from it having not only “different power capabilities” 
(Diez, 2005: 614),38 but also a “distinctive approach to security” (Biscop, 2004). 
 As observed throughout chapter 4, NATO keeps appearing in discourses related to EU 
crisis management and security, with its importance being constantly reinforced, and its 
necessity constantly validated. There are at least two main reasons why this is the case. The 
first reason is that being part of a transatlantic community – largely materialised by NATO – is 
not restricted to (military) security, but comprises a community of ‘ideals, interests and 
purposes’ (Diez, 2005: 621-32; Lucarelli, 2002) “committed to promoting shared values and 
defending common interests” (WEU Council of Ministers, 1995: 2), that “constitutes a core 
element of the international system” (European Council, 2010: 4). This is considered by the EU 
to be fundamental for the maintenance of ‘western/liberal’ normative dominance, particularly 
in face of the emergence of a ‘post-western world’ (Duggan, 2015; Freire, 2017; Stuenkel, 
2016).  
The second reason is that the subjacent inquiry over NATO’s necessity in the constant 
affirmation thereof is derived from a questioning of the consequences of the growing 
complexities of transnational and global security and of the multifaceted solutions needed to 
tackle them. The EU’s response is the identification of a gap that needs to be filled by an actor 
that has specific tools that transcend the traditional military tools used by NATO. A such, 
E/CSDP missions and operations are described as “innovative, tailor-made solutions, mixing 
civil with military components. This is precisely what the EU’s added value is – and what the 
complex security challenges of our world require” (Ashton, 2010: 26). The EU describes itself 
as filling that gap by relying on different instruments, such as expertise, extensive diplomatic 
experience, or considerable economic influence, thus capitalising on the idea of bringing value-
added to the global security environment. With this approach, NATO’s purpose becomes 
apparent and the EU’s complementary role becomes indispensable, “a true partnership based 
                                               
38 Diez (2005: 614) citing Kagan, Robert (2003) Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the 
New World Order, New York, Knopf. 
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on our respective strengths and specificities” (European Council, 2010: 4; Mayer, 2017). Even 
without mention to its complementarity to NATO or the UN, the EU insists on describing itself 
based on its value-added due to its expertise and specific capabilities, anchored in notions like 
civilian or normative power. 
The functionality underlying the recurrence of discourses and narratives that present the 
EU as playing ‘positive’ roles on the global scene is particularly evident in moments of crisis 
(Niţoiu, 2013: 241). The fall of the Berlin wall and the end of the Cold War, which led to a 
change in the global security environment, led the EC/EU to progressively frame a foreign 
policy and subsequently a security and defence policy based on its value-added. The 2003 
European Security Strategy followed a period of normative divergences between the Member 
States (Puetter and Wiener, 2007) and a reflection upon the EU’s role as a security actor in the 
context of the September 11, 2001 attacks, and the ensuing Iraq and Afghan conflicts. This 
context “influenced Member States’ willingness to consider an exercise in strategic thinking 
that was impossible when ESDP was created just a few years earlier” (Biscop, 2004: 9), and 
gave way to a reconceptualization of security at the EU level as a multidimensional concept 
(ibid.: 11). However vague it may be, the ESS itself has worked as a kind of positive ‘narrative’ 
(Coelmont, 2012; Biscop, 2015) that framed the EU’s ambitions and potential as a security 
actor based on its value-added for over a decade. The EUGS also represents an instance of this 
kind of ‘positive’ discursive reframing by outlining the EU’s potential role in a difficult and 
complex environment, as its “confidence in the value of its unique set of capabilities as a 
comprehensive security actor has apparently grown” (Mälksoo, 2016: 382). Even if the 
normative ambitions of the EU appear diminished in the EUGS, the EU is still discursively 
portrayed as defending its core values and providing a valuable, useful, and especially 
pragmatic contribution to the improvement of the regional or global security environment, 
particularly in complementarity to its own Member States by combining its particular 
comprehensive skills and tools.  
 
5.4 - The EU’s ‘civilising’ attitude and ‘normalisation’ narrative 
 
There is a narrative cluster that concerns what the EU does, i.e. how it acts in the area of crisis 
management, such as through the reproduction of the EU model representing European liberal 
democratic values, through EU-led institution building. Embedded in the EU’s ‘civilising’ 
attitude, we identify a narrative of ‘normalisation’, which derives from the recurrent discourses 
about crisis management practices and instruments making others ‘normal’ or ‘in order’, 
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according to EU standards (Turner, 2012). One of the main strategies that the EU uses for crisis 
management, particularly for crisis prevention, is the reproduction of the aforementioned 
flexible ‘EU model’ representing European liberal democratic values and standards, by means 
of institution building (EU-led or otherwise, most frequently on multilateral arrangements). In 
the context of its crisis management actorness discourses, there is a prevalence of the idea that 
peace can (and should) be made by replacing state institutions that are marked by negative 
attributes (failed, collapsed, corrupt, rogue) with liberal democratic institutions based on the 
EU model. The EU’s ‘civilising’ attitude in crisis management is framed by this narrative, 
stemming from its belief in having a status of model or ideal, i.e. a representation of ‘normalcy’ 
that others will inevitably want to emulate.  
In fact, the ESS – the EU’s first official strategic document, which laid the bases for the 
development of its crisis management policy – is described by the EU as having “established 
principles and set clear objectives for advancing the EU’s security interests based on our core 
values” (EU, 2008: 3). So, not only are the EU’s values, norms, and standards assumed to be 
‘normal’, they are assumed to be an inherent component of crisis management, and this policy 
is assumed to be a means of external projection of this model, under the aegis of the CFSP. In 
fact, the CFSP has been overall, since the beginning, meant to “develop and consolidate 
democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms” (e.g. 
EU, 1992: 94; 1997: 155) indicating the genesis of an underlying normative attitude towards 
external actors. This link between crisis management and the projection of the European model 
is especially present in the concept of crisis prevention (e.g. Council, 2001d: 3), and even in the 
case of small-scale CSDP missions like EUSEC DR Congo, which the EU expected to “create 
the conditions for making economic and social development possible again” (EEAS, 2012: 1).  
Crisis prevention largely entails an active search for actorness ‘opportunities’ that are 
mainly driven by EU interests oftentimes to the detriment of local interests (and local interest). 
The EU’s discourse – even when referring to specific missions or operations – puts the focus 
on itself, and in building its image and identity, instead of a focus on the potential host countries 
or regions, and even oftentimes disregarding the EU’s actual performance (Nicolaïdis and 
Howse, 2002), such as the case of EUSSR Guinea-Bissau, which was portrayed by the EU as a 
successful ownership-oriented mission, while showing a lack of effectiveness on the ground 
(Ansorg, 2017). Moreover, “the EU’s conflict management policy towards Africa has first and 
foremost been motivated by European concerns, which consist of both common interests and 
French national interests in particular” (Olsen, 2009: 257). In other words, the fact that many 
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crisis management missions and operations (perhaps even the majority) are more an initiative 
of the EU rather than of the host countries is not bereft of consequences (Ansorg, 2017).  
As such, the EU is no stranger to loss of interest and compliance on behalf of local 
authorities, as seen with the cases of EUPOL Kinshasa and EUPOL RD Congo, EUJUST 
Themis in Georgia, or EUSSR Guinea-Bissau, for example. These situations of disinterest are 
frequently motivated by the fact that CSDP missions and operations are often a result of the 
EU’s concerns and interests rather than the local actors’, especially in cases when only after an 
EU proposal there is a formal invitation on behalf of local authorities (e.g. EUPOL Afghanistan, 
EUSSR Guinea-Bissau, EUMM Georgia). Similarly, local lack of interest and cooperation can 
also be motivated by an active search, on behalf of the EU, of ‘opportunities’ to engage in crisis 
management, including the EU’s involvement even before certain situations turn into crises – 
i.e. the EU “be[ing] able to act before a crisis occurs” (Council of the EU, 2004b: 1). This 
positioning could potentially result in the relativizing of the ‘emergency’ dimension of certain 
crises and a broadening of the concept of crisis itself – potentially to the point of overstretching 
it, as in the case of EUJUST Themis in Georgia (which suffered, in addition, from the lack of 
Georgian authorities’ willingness to cooperate, see Bouris and Dobrescu, 2017) – as it might 
result in a search for ways of imposing a European world vision of what constitutes ‘normal’ 
by actively seeking for putative future or embryonic alleged ‘crises’, identified as such by the 
EU according to its own convenience.  
 
5.4.1 - The EU as a post-colonial actor 
 
The EU’s ‘civilising’ attitude and accompanying ‘normalisation’ narrative is also related to an 
important discursive omission. Our analysis revealed that the EU’s discursive ‘image’ – despite 
being the result of discursive struggles from within – is carefully curated to match an ideal that 
detaches itself from, and thus does not inherit, the violent and severely asymmetric colonial 
past of some of its individual Member States. In other words, European ‘exceptionalism’ is 
“based on a temporal ‘othering’ of its history” (Tonra, 2011: 1197; Larsen, 2004). The removal 
of the EU’s colonial past from its crisis management actorness normative justification reveals 
a paradigmatic choice that is not negligible as “the construction of the political in contemporary 
Western discourse marginalises the struggle of non-European peoples for economic justice and 
racial equality and discounts their historical experience of dispossession” (Darby, 2004: 3). 
Colonialism / imperialism was a normative justification for many EU Member States – before 
the EU even existed – to export their ‘superior’ way of life (Kleinfeld and Nicolaïdis, 2009: 
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140), while simultaneously exploiting and abusing both resources and populations, especially 
in African countries, for their own gains and interests (Onar and Nicolaïdis, 2013: 284). The 
resulting decolonisation processes – that oftentimes included war, but seldom any kind of 
restitutions, adding to a detachment to pre-colonial forms of traditional political organisation 
and authority (Darby, 2004: 10) – left entire regions bereft of functioning autonomous 
administrative structures, and resulted in territorial disputes and civil conflicts, political 
instability, as well as a history marked by foreign occupation and abuse that lacked any 
accountability.  
The EU’s detachment from its Member States’ colonial past marks a discursive 
construction of itself as a new and different post-Westphalian or post-modern actor (Zielonka, 
2013: 48-9), as “postcolonial literature is dominated by Europe Past, its imperialisms and 
colonialisms understood as events that have come to an end: there are global after-shocks but 
the phenomena that sourced them are ‘post’” (Hooper and Kramsch, 2007: 526). Whether the 
EU acknowledges it or otherwise, it remains a (post)colonial actor (Onar, Nicolaïdis, 2013; 
Turner, 2012); however, this narrative is entirely absent from the EU’s discourse as a crisis 
management actor, even though many of the crises it seeks to prevent or manage are likely to 
be rooted in problems derived from European colonial occupation, despite the decades that have 
passed since the end of European colonialism. The EU, in turn, depicts itself as the image of 
progress and peace and as a unique, sophisticated, and also ‘amnesiac’ (Onar and Nicolaïdis, 
2013: 293; Hooper and Kramsch, 2007: 527) actor that brings ‘good’ governance, ideals, norms, 
values to the rest of the world (Manners, 2002; Aggestam, 2008), while disregarding the 
colonial-type logic implied in its attitude (Staeger, 2016; Turner, 2012) and ignoring that 
“legacies of a more Eurocentric era may inflect, for better or for worse, upon actors’ perceptions 
and preferences to this day” (Onar and Nicolaïdis, 2013: 296). 
This discursive omission as part of the EU’s identity construction is relevant, but largely 
ignored, because “given continental Europe’s past (wars, empires, genocide, and so forth) and 
the EU’s new self-positioning as a morally superior ‘soft’ power, perhaps there is an 
understandable reticence to stir the imperial/colonial waters” (Hooper and Kramsch, 2007: 
532). Yet, by ignoring the past that contributed (to a greater or lesser extent) to many of the 
present crises (Heldring and Robinson: 2012), the EU as such is shedding itself from any actual 
responsibility and presents itself as a model or an ideal whose historical identity is shaped by 
peace and stability. Notwithstanding, the EU is not an entirely autonomous entity in the area of 
crisis management, and the main decision-makers are Member State representatives, who take 
advantage of this relatively new forum to begin anew with exporting (once again) ‘superior’ 
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norms, values, and standards with a clean slate (Darby, 2004). Even the concept of ‘ownership’, 
which the EU publicises abundantly in its discourse, yet struggles to achieve in practice, can be 
interpreted as a mechanism used to mitigate the normative appearance of its crisis management 
policy as “a case can be made that the EU became particularly attached to the principle of 
ownership as a way of avoiding appearing in a neo-imperial light” (Ejdus, 2017: 465).39  
As explored in previous sections, because the EU’s Member States overcame war and 
division, the EU’s discourse assumes that other regions / countries that suffer similar 
circumstances can benefit from the EU’s expertise, and thus exports its ideals, values, and 
norms in the context of crisis management: “(…) a Union that builds on the success of 70 years 
of peace; a Union with the strength to contribute to peace and security in our region and in the 
whole world” (EU, 2016: 5). Yet, and although we are not arguing that the EU is a colonialist 
actor, its actions and assumptions do resemble colonial logic in many ways (Pace and 
Schumacher, 2007: 148; Nicolaïdis et al., 2015; Staeger, 2016), not to mention that the omission 
of its member’s colonial past is not helpful in mitigating the asymmetries generated by the 
latter.  
 
5.4.2 - The ‘security-development nexus’ narrative 
 
Also within the narrative cluster that relates to what the EU does as a crisis management actor, 
we find a narrative concerning a ‘security-development nexus’ that is intertwined with the EU 
‘normalisation’ narrative, as described earlier. The ‘security-development nexus’ narrative is 
characterised by a “conflation of traditional security concerns with the overall development 
policy of the EU indicates an expansion of and an effort to legitimize the EU’s foreign and 
security policy” (Anderson and Williams, 2011: 1).  
The EU has discursively presented the fields of security and development as linked since 
the 2003 ESS and the 2005 European Consensus on Development, which “acknowledge that 
there cannot be sustainable development without peace and security, and that without 
development and poverty eradication there will be no sustainable peace” (Council, 2007d: 2). 
While the underlying link between security and development have always been present in the 
EU’s crisis management discourse (and that of other international institutions as well) 
(Bagoyoko and Gibert, 2009; Gänzle, 2009), not least because of the E/CSDP’s strong 
                                               
39 Ejdus, 2017: 465, citing Rayroux, A. and N. Wilén (2014), “Resisting ownership: the paralysis of 
EU peacebuilding in the Congo,” African security, 7(1), p. 26.  
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normative features, it has become more visible in recent years, especially with the launch of the 
EU’s comprehensive approach in 2013 (Drent, 2011; Gebhard and Norheim-Martinsen, 2011; 
Smith, 2012; Major and Mölling, 2013), which states that the EU engages in different stages of 
crisis management “in order to help countries getting back on track towards sustainable long-
term development” (Ashton, 2013a: 2). In fact, the link between security and development is 
considered to be “a key underlying principle in the application of an EU comprehensive 
approach” (ibid.: 4). The EUGS’s ‘integrated’ approach reiterates and strengthens this idea: 
 
We must become more joined-up in our security and development policies. CSDP capacity 
building missions must be coordinated with security sector and rule of law work by the 
Commission. Capacity Building for Security and Development can play a key role in 
empowering and enabling our partners to prevent and respond to crises (…). Our peace 
policy must also ensure a smoother transition from short-term crisis management to long-
term peace building to avoid gaps along the conflict cycle (EU, 2016: 50, 51). 
 
This means that while the EU’s normative ambition, present in its crisis management discourse, 
appears to subside with an increased focus on stability and local ‘ownership’, we might argue 
that it is, in fact, replaced by a stronger link between security and development (the latter being 
as normative or more than norms exports in crisis management). This process might be 
interpreted as the ‘developmentalisation’ of security policy, or the securitisation of 
development policy (Keukeleire and Raube, 2013; Anderson and Williams, 2011; Winn and 
Lewis, 2017). Even though the EU’s discursive changes towards more ownership and flexibility 
appear to point away from the predominant tendency of ‘depoliticization’ (Cebeci and 
Schumacher, 2016: 6) of EU engagement with third countries, its pragmatist pledge, in line 
with its neo-functional logic of conflict and crisis management (Visoka and Doyle, 2016), 
indicates otherwise. The EU’s increased focus on local ‘ownership’ is possibly connected to an 
uneasiness of being associated with its Member States’ colonial past, and to the understanding 
that the EU itself shares this kind of attitude towards ‘developing’ countries (this very 
nomenclature, borrowed from the EU’s discourse, is normatively charged and reproduces 
perceived asymmetries, yet is taken for granted, as are most normatively charged terms present 
in the EU’s discourse). 
The emergence of a ‘security-development nexus’ narrative is arguably justified by the 
EU’s efforts to be recognised as a security and crisis management actor, as much as it has been 
recognised as a development actor (Anderson and Williams, 2011: 19). The ‘security-
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development nexus’ is, as such, linked to the ‘internal-external security nexus’, where “the 
actorness and the security narrative of the nexuses are thus co-constitutive: appropriation of 
policies and instruments of a multifunctional actor for security purposes; securitization of issues 
to consolidate policies and actor projection” (Brandão, 2015: 15). 
 
5.4.3 - The EU as an ‘anchor of stability’ 
 
Somewhere between the narrative clusters concerning what the EU is and what the EU does is 
the narrative in which it assumes a stabilising role, oftentimes identifying itself as an “anchor 
of stability” (EU, 2008: 1) in regions and countries where it deploys crisis management 
missions and operations (especially in its immediate neighbourhood). This narrative, which can 
also be framed as a ‘security-stability nexus’ (Roccu and Voltolini, 2018), is anchored in the 
‘threat/risk’ narrative that has marked EUFP particularly since the launch of the ESS (Christou, 
2010; Schumacher, 2015). While the ESS marked a stronger shift in the EU’s discourse, the 
idea of promoting ‘structural’ stability was already present in the Commission’s 2001 
Communication on Conflict Prevention, which defined such stability as encompassing 
economic development, democracy, respect for human rights, ‘viable political structures’, and 
‘healthy’ social conditions. In the EU’s discourse – in particular in Council Joint Actions setting 
up missions and operations in contexts as distinct as FYROM, Georgia, or the DRC – we found 
the recurrent use of a sentence (almost ipsis verbis), where the EU claims that “a (continued) 
commitment of EU political effort and resources will (thus) help to further embed stability in 
the country (…) [and/or] in the region” (e.g. Council, 2004d: 2; 2004e: 21; 2004h: 30; 2005c: 
20). 
The use of expressions relating to the EU’s efforts to ensure ‘stability / stabilisation’ - 
however vague or ambiguous they may be - have been present in the EU’s discourse since the 
early days of the ESDP until the Lisbon Treaty and the launch of the EU’s comprehensive 
approach to external conflict and crises, acquiring more importance and visibility particularly 
since 2013/14 with an increased focus on resilience. The changes in the European 
Commission’s Instrument for Stability, which was replaced at that time, by the Instrument 
contributing to Stability and Peace, for example, reflect this increased focus in stability in the 
context of the ‘security-stability nexus’ and the ‘security-development nexus’.  
The basic logic behind this flexible security-stability nexus ‘master frame’, i.e. a 
narrative “through which actors interpret uncertain and problematic situations” (Roccu and 
Voltolini, 2018: 6) and the EU’s stabilisation efforts through crisis management (as well as 
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through other policy frameworks like the ENP) entails an understanding of security as an 
ontological goal, beyond the mere traditional territorial and structural protection from external 
threats, and stability as more of a process of mitigating uncertainty and ontological insecurity 
(ibid.: 9). So, the EU essentially attempts to ensure that a given situation that is deemed 
problematic remains stable (i.e. that it does not worsen), regardless of the country in case being 
autocratic or otherwise, with the ultimate objective of limiting potential problems for itself (thus 
ensuring its own ontological security). Yet, the fact remains that “neither stability nor security 
nor the nexus between them are self-evident, and indeed they are very much the result of 
contingent, and hence political, processes of construction, negotiation and also contestation” 
(ibid.: 2). The problem of the EU’s argument in favour of stability in countries or regions where 
there are power asymmetries that are detrimental to certain groups, and addressing oppressive 
authorities as ‘partners’ is that this is likely to ascribe some validation or endorsement to the 
latter, potentially causing said asymmetries to continue, which, in turn, may cause the opposite 
of stability and ultimately be detrimental to the EU itself (see Schumacher, 2016, regarding the 
EU’s stabilisation approach in the context of the ENP, particularly marked since 2015). 
After the Lisbon Treaty, with a tendency to look more inwardly and a greater focus on 
resilience, the references to stability become increasingly linked to dealing with the ‘threat of 
instability’. Throughout this period, this concept has become even more central in the changes 
operated in the EU’s initial normative ambitions as a crisis management actor, in addition to 
accompanying an increase in attention to a more territorial kind of defence, as well as an 
increasing approximation between internal and external security. Ultimately, it is clear in the 
EU’s discourses that the idea of ensuring ‘stability’ means more than traditional political 
understandings of this concept such as the mere absence of violence, or structural governance 
survival, and it does not necessarily preclude all manners of change (Dowding and Kimber, 
1983). Stability, in this context, is about supressing or mitigating changes or problems that 
affect the ontological survival of the EU’s way of life, deeply rooted in its ‘universal’ values, 
principles, and norms - which explains also the latter’s centrality in EUFP, including in its crisis 
management practices.  
In addition to the guarantee of ontological security, the use of the concept of stability 
and the attribution of a stabilising mission to the E/CSDP also entails something else. If we 
consider that stability is achieved “when the formal roles and structures set by authority match 
those constructed by informal social interaction” (Margolis, 2010: 332), then we must look to 
the source of the informally established roles and structures: in the case of E/CSDP missions 
and operations, the EU places itself in a position of surrogate to the latter, thus providing its 
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own benchmarks and standards as suitable, and consequently projecting a ‘civilising’ identity 
(Mitzen, 2006). 
 
5.5 - The primacy and universality of EU values, principles, and norms 
 
Finally, we have identified in our analysis a narrative cluster that concerns why the EU acts, 
and how what it does serves to justify its crisis management actorness, including the 
motivations for exporting the EU ‘model’ and the normative aspects associated with that: the 
EU’s assumption of the primacy and universality of its values, principles, and norms, which 
define its identity and ontology (e.g. Manners, 2000, 2002, 2006a, 2006b, 2006c, 2006d, 2006e, 
2008a, 2008b, 2008c, 2009a, 2009b, 2010, 2013a, 2013b; Larsen, 2004; Diez, 2005; Zielonka, 
2006; Diez and Manners, 2007; Pace, 2007; Tocci, 2007; Merlingen, 2007; Aggestam, 2008; 
Gerrits, 2009; Whitman, 2011; Manners and Whitman, 2013; Gordon and Pardo, 2014; Barbé, 
Herranz-Surrallés, and Natorski, 2015; Del Sarto, 2016; Colombo et al., 2017: 16; etc.).  
The reasons behind the EU’s actions and ambitions specifically in the area of crisis 
management are diverse, and include ensuring its own security above all, maintaining 
normative influence in world affairs, a sense of responsibility, and ensuring the safety and 
improve the lives of local populations in crisis affected areas. By assuming that “conflicts 
thousands of miles from our borders can damage our interests, while the spread of peace, 
prosperity and democracy around the world is good for Europe” (Ashton, 2013b: 1), the EU 
thus justifies a crisis management policy with realist purposes – i.e. based on interests and self-
preservation (Council of the EU, 2015: 2) – and driven by constructivist instruments (spread of 
peace, prosperity, and democracy). While this idea has always been important for the EU (from 
its own formation to the launch of the ESDP, up until the EUGS), it has progressively become 
more visible in the EU’s discourses as fundamental and essentially linked with the EU’s own 
(ontological) security. 
The EU assumes the primacy and universality of its values, principles, and norms, and 
assumes that primacy and universality as legitimating their projection (Larsen, 2004; Pace, 
2007: 1053; Manners, 2009b: 3; Zielonka, 2013: 46): the EU “derives its legitimacy from the 
democratic values it projects, the aims it pursues and the powers and instruments it possesses” 
(European Council, 2001d: 22). The EU’s export of its values, principles, and norms (through 
the E/CSDP and other EUFP frameworks) is motivated by its assumption that, because of its 
own success, they are appropriate to replicate elsewhere, oftentimes regardless of specific local 
dynamics. The assumption of universality of EU values, norms, and standards is one of most 
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visible and relevant normative justifications provided for the EU to engage in crisis 
management and for its actions in this context. It is a crucial component in the EU’s legitimation 
as a crisis management actor. In crisis management and conflict prevention, the EU’s norms, 
values, and standards are depicted as an essential element in guaranteeing success and in 
approximating the host country to EU standards, and thus to peace and progress. 
The EU’s crisis management policy is amply based on the premise that crises can 
primarily be solved in a stable and long-lasting manner if countries develop liberal democratic 
institutions based on European standards and models. This policy’s rapid progress changed the 
European security and defence field from a traditional reactive defence type of design, typical 
of states, to a proactive design that aims at preventive defence, i.e. it evolved from states’ more 
traditional peace keeping to EU / international peace building. This latter type of involvement 
between the EU and third countries in the context of conflict prevention and crisis management 
usually involves a normative component, as the EU often engages in practices that are based 
on the premise that peace building can be achieved through “the externally led construction of 
liberal democratic institutions” (Légaré, 2010: 35). The issue here is that – as we have seen 
throughout this study – the EU considers the latter to be universally accepted and desired. So, 
by relying on the assumption that these practices and values are universally accepted, the EU 
assumes that they are legitimate, and thus they justify the EU’s projection thereof. As such, the 
EU attempts, through crisis management and other EUFP tools, to ensure its own ontological 
security and to maintain a normative dominance in international relations and uses this alleged 
dominance as a legitimation tool. 
In its discourse, the EU simply does not depict crisis management without the promotion 
of European values and norms, as it reiterates consistently that countries in crisis need the EU’s 
help to achieve peace, progress, and development – the latter being considered by the EU to be 
universally desired as well. This is one of the main narratives that the EU sustains throughout 
its normative justification discourse as a crisis management actor, which it uses to legitimate 
its actions and ambitions in this policy area. The normative aspects of crisis management entail 
a value judgement over what it means to be in ‘crisis’, as well as the advancement of certain 
standards (in this case European standards) to the detriment of existing standards in place in the 
region affected the alleged crisis, regardless of whether the EU is successful in implementing 
them or otherwise (Raţiu and Ciulei, 2013). 
In addition to portraying its values, norms, and standards as ‘natural’, ‘normal’, 
‘universal’, or ‘superior’, the EU also assumes that they are inherent to crisis management. An 
example of this logic is a sentence in the EU Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts, 
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also known as the ‘Göteborg Programme’, where the EU portrays itself as “a successful 
example of conflict prevention, based on democratic values and respect for human rights, justice 
and solidarity, economic prosperity and sustainable development” (Council of the EU, 2001c: 
2). Although the EU’s normative ambitions have been present since its inception, the EU’s 
‘civilising’ attitude became increasingly more and more visible, with value judgement being 
more present in EU official documents in the period since the establishment of the EU’s foreign 
policy, up until the Lisbon Treaty. Yet, this value judgement is not something that is explicit: 
the EU does not state overtly that its standards and norms are better than others’, but rather its 
discourse assumes and portrays its action of expansion and propagation of European standards 
and norms as being normal, natural, universal, and thus unquestionable.  
On the other hand, most EU crisis management missions are not accompanied by 
executive mandates. This means that the norm is the signing of formal invitations and 
agreements between the EU and the host countries, which then form additional legal bases for 
the implementation of CSDP missions and operations. When doing so, host countries validate 
not only the EU’s presence and their help, but also the kind of help and especially the normative 
load that the latter is imbued with. Even in the absence of conditionality, in order to receive the 
EU’s help in this area, the host countries end up having to accept that it is contingent upon 
following EU standards, norms, and criteria. Although this does not necessarily render the EU’s 
normative standards ‘normal’ or ‘universal’ per se, it does provide some validation for the 
latter’s dissemination, which in turn legitimates the EU’s assumption of their ‘normalcy’ and 
‘universality’ reflected in its discourses. As such, if the depictions of actors, concepts, or ideas 
that translate into a power or position asymmetry are thusly publicly validated by the actors 
within the social order, then the claims of ‘normalcy’ of such asymmetries (systematically 
produced and reproduced by the dominant discourse) end up receiving some kind of validation. 
 
5.6 - Other discursive omissions and conceptual imprecisions 
 
An omission identified in the EU’s discourse as a crisis management actor concerns ethical 
considerations regarding the right, the consequences, and the legitimacy of the use of force. 
Even though the military dimension is small, and the use of force is residual, in the context of 
the E/CSDP, the EU’s change from having an identity rooted in the narratives of civilian / soft 
power to having a security and defence policy with a military component has been amply 
debated and critiqued, especially in academic literature (Duchêne, 1972 and 1973; Padova-
Schoppa, 2004; Nielsen, 2013; Bull, 1982; Stavridis, 2001). In the EU’s discourse, actors and 
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institutions discuss the idea of ‘force generation’, i.e. the identification and activation of 
military assets and capabilities, including people and equipment, according to the requirements 
of a given mission / operation (e.g. Council, 2008a: 6), but they make no real considerations 
about the ethics of the use of force. In 2009, the Council published the EU Concept for the Use 
of Force in EU-led military operations, which included, as other similar documents, a number 
of practical and legal considerations regarding the use of force. And while this document also 
included a section concerning the ‘Legitimacy of use of force’, this section is classified, and, 
as such, we were unable to analyse it.  
There is nothing innocent about omitting considerations about the implications of the use 
of force, while simultaneously pointing out issues of credibility: “force generation also raises 
the broader questions of political will and credibility” (Mogherini, 2015a: 9). HR/VP 
Mogherini’s Report ahead of the June 2015 European Council on security and defence debates 
many practical / technical aspects of force generation, followed by a mention of credibility. The 
use of this morally charged expression concerns perceptions about the EU and about validation 
or trustworthiness; yet the EU’s discourse does not go beyond that, which makes it likely to be 
a deliberate paradigmatic choice. 
Conceptual imprecisions are also quite frequent, as the EU’s discourses are marked by 
fragmentation and deliberate construction, discursive ‘path dependencies’, and especially 
discursive struggles stemming from its complex, composite, multi-layered structure. As such, 
“the EU’s foreign policy vocabulary is blurry with respect to the whole hierarchy of its 
concepts. Many terms are used, it is not always clear what kind of relationship is constituted by 
each term” (Blanco, 2016: 45). Throughout our analysis, we have identified several concepts 
that lack clarity, such as that of ‘strategic partner’ (Ferreira-Pereira and Vieira, 2016; Blanco, 
2016), whose semiotic evolution we discuss in the subsequent chapter. Similar lack of clarity 
affects other concepts in the area of crisis management, some of which have been addressed by 
the EU to a certain degree, such as the concepts of monitoring, mentoring, and advising (EEAS, 
2014b). Another elusive concept, until the launch of the 2013 comprehensive approach to 
external conflicts and crises was that of ‘comprehensive approach’ (Drent, 2011; Gebhard and 
Norheim-Martinsen, 2011; Smith, 2012; Major and Mölling, 2013): 
 
Generic terms like ‘human security’, ‘civil military coordination’ or ‘integrated missions’ 
are often used interchangeably with the EU’s ‘Comprehensive Approach’, while 
comprehensiveness as such is (…) taken as a given standard in any security-related venture 
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embarked on by the EU and its Member States (Gebhard and Norheim-Martinsen, 2011: 
224-5). 
 
In the EU’s crisis management discourse, many concepts lack clear definitions, not least the 
very concept of crisis management (Olsen, 2009: 246, 7; Kaldor, Martin, and Selchow, 2007).  
 
The term ‘crisis management’ exemplifies the imprecision of the EU’s CFSP and ESDP 
language and illustrates the ‘terminological jungle’ that surrounds collective security 
policy. Terms like ‘crisis response’, ‘civilian crisis response’ and ‘humanitarian response’, 
and ‘conflict’ and ‘crisis’, are often used as if they were interchangeable (Kaldor, Martin, 
and Selchow, 2007: 274-5). 
 
What is noticeable in the discursive corpus that we have analysed is that the conceptual 
umbrella under which the CSDP develops – crisis management – entails several different types 
of actions concerning the managing of crises. If we understand managing as ‘handling’ or 
‘dealing with’, then other more specific actions fit inside this broad definition, such as the list 
of tasks in article 43.1 of the Lisbon Treaty, including “joint disarmament operations, 
humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and 
peace-keeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making and 
post-conflict stabilisation” (TEU article 43.1). Still, these concepts, which appear repeatedly in 
EU discourses relating to mission goals and statements and in the overall discursive corpus 
under analysis, remain vague and unspecified, so much so that “there is no general agreement 
on how to define conflict management” (Olsen, 2009: 246). These expressions’ vagueness and 
conceptual ambiguity serve a practical purpose of leaving room for interpretation and 
implementation, without compromising the EU.  
While in most instances EU institutions and actors either use the umbrella concept ‘crisis 
management’ as a metonym for E/CSDP (as we have done in this project), or side by side 
conflict prevention and crisis management (e.g. HSG of Germany and France, 1998: 4; 
European Council, 1999b; EP, 2000; European Council, 2000b), in a discourse produced by the 
HR and the Commission (2000: 8, 9) crisis management is presented as one of several possible 
tools for conflict prevention. Apart from the lists of tasks associated with the E/CSDP that are 
listed in treaties, no clear definitions are offered for either concept. This diversity and ambiguity 
provides us with clues regarding the scope of the definitions attributed to these key concepts by 
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different EU institutions and actors, and regarding the uncertainty and resulting flexibility (for 
mandate definition, for example) that stems from a lack of clarity. 
The very designation of the policy under which these tasks and concepts are developed – 
the common security and defence policy – seems itself distantly related to the latter, as the link 
between externally-oriented crisis management and defence as territorial protection and the 
means through which an actor ensures the achievement of the state of security is not entirely 
clear. On the other hand, the EU does have quite a broad understanding of security and has been 
progressively linking it with other policy areas, such as development, which likely adds to the 
confusion regarding conceptual clarity, not to mention the fact that oftentimes security does not 
merely entail physical integrity, but a more encompassing notion of ontological security that 
includes the EU’s way of life rooted in its core values, norms and principles. The concept of 
‘crisis’ itself is never clearly defined and is ambiguously used as justification for EU action: 
 
(…) the discourse of crisis management assumes that all cases of EU intervention are those 
occasioned by humanitarian need, and therefore justified normatively (…). Yet the move 
to term any given situation a ‘crisis’, and thus trigger intervention is made in the first 
instance by the EU, rather than those targeted by it (Martin, 2011: 195).  
 
The concepts of ‘failed’ or ‘fragile’ state also appear repeatedly in the EU’s crisis management 
normative justification discourse (e.g. EP, 2002a; European Council, 2003a; EP, 2005; 
Commission, 2006; EP, 2006; Miliband, 2007; EP, 2009; Solana, 2009b; Ashton, 2010, 2013a, 
2013c; Council, 2011) with either conflicting or (most often) no clear definitions provided. 
Also, the EU’s discourses do not establish the parameters or red lines that limit and 
consequently define the criteria that the EU deems essential for a functioning state, even though 
the concept of ‘resilience’ amply referred to in the EUGS may provide us with some clues as 
to what those limits may be (Pospisil and Kuehn, 2016). 
In our analysis we found that for the European Parliament, for example, ‘failed / failing’ 
States are associated with terrorism and are lacking ‘democratic institutions, infrastructure and 
civil society’, which can (and should) be provided by the EU. For the European Council this 
concept is also associated with terrorism and organised crime, as well as with ‘bad governance’ 
(characterised by corruption, abuse of power, weak institutions, and lack of accountability) and 
to civil conflict. Much like the EP, the European Council is quite prescriptive and clear in 
indicating that it is up to the EU to ‘restore order’. The EU’s supranational institution (the 
European Commission) and individual actors (such as HR Solana and the UK Foreign Secretary 
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David Miliband) are much vaguer and less prescriptive, associating ‘failed’ or ‘fragile’ States 
with ‘challenges’ or one of many ‘threats’ that the EU faces. HR Ashton, like the Council (even 
though the latter with a slightly stronger emphasis) are also cautious and vague, even though 
both actors associate ‘fragile’ states with the EU’s conflict prevention endeavours. 
These divergent and (especially) scarce definitions are again partly explained by the 
discursive struggles and resulting fragmentation and conceptual incoherence that characterises 
the EU’s discourses, but on the other hand, they are also explained by the simple fact that no 
clearly defined meaning has been established within the EU structure for these complex and 
contentious concepts (oftentimes deliberately), even though they have been amply 
acknowledged as security priorities in different policy areas (Grimm, 2014).  
 
5.7 - The representation of different actors 
 
The constant production and reproduction of asymmetries between the EU and other actors – 
particularly potential host countries – whereby the EU is constantly implicitly represented as 
being dominant, is the focus of this section. Here, we will discuss the EU’s portrayal different 
groups of actors other than itself. In this section, we will also address the implications of the 
EU’s attribution of the epithets of ‘partner’ and ‘strategic partner’ to these interlocutors, a 
matter which has been amply neglected in the study of EUFP discourse (Blanco, 2016: 36), as 
well as the increasing use of an ‘ownership’ and ‘autonomy’ rhetoric regarding host countries 
and potential host countries. Essentially, we seek here to pinpoint the results of our analysis 
concerning how actors, including the EU, CSDP host countries, and other domestic and external 
actors, are represented in the EU’s discourses, as well as to identify the targets of those 
discourses. 
 
5.7.1 - The EU’s ‘strategic’ international partners 
 
In most documents since the beginning of the E/CSDP, and particularly up until the launch of 
the EU’s 2013 comprehensive approach to external conflict and crises, the use of the expression 
‘partners’ or ‘strategic partners’ has been used mostly in reference to non-EU European or 
North-American countries and international organisations, such as NATO, the UN, the US, the 
OSCE, or the Council of Europe (e.g. Council of the EU, 2001c, 2004b: 7; 2004c: 5; 2008c: 
27; Solana, 2003a: 2; EEAS, 2012: 1; Ashton, 2013a: 11-12). This could be interpreted as a 
suggestion of the EU’s perceived European ‘superiority’ vis-à-vis the potential host countries, 
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or at least in contributing “to the establishment of a hierarchy of partners of the EU” (Blanco, 
2016: 47).  
Throughout the early years of the E/CSDP’s development and implementation, when 
the EU does mention the potential host countries or regions, it does so either abstractly, or in 
normatively charged terms, like when it refers to ‘failed’, ‘fragile’, ‘rogue’, or ‘corrupt’ states. 
This downplaying or lack of attention to potential host states or regions has to do with the 
emergency nature of crisis management, but it also has to do with the EU’s focus on itself, 
derived from its intent on proving its uniqueness, quality, and leadership potential, and the 
value-added that these alleged qualities can bring to the international system. It also has to do 
with the inherent belief that European standards are universal and desired, so much so that they 
need to be exported in all areas of EUFP, as we have already discussed in the chapter about the 
EU’s perceived primacy of its values, norms, and principles. As such, in broader EUFP 
contexts, EU discourses often establish a distinction between more important partners, in the 
sense that they are portrayed as mattering more (economically strong predominantly European 
or North-American partners, often referred to as ‘strategic partners’) and lesser partners that are 
portrayed as being in need of change or improvement carried out through EUFP tools, such as 
the E/CSDP. 
 In fact, in the EU’s discourses in the context of its crisis management normative 
justification up until 2013, mostly European or North-American countries and international 
organisations are referred to as ‘strategic partners’, whereas E/CSDP host countries and 
potential host countries are, at best, occasionally referred to as ‘partners’. And while this may 
be the case, the fact remains that “official documents and statements from EU representatives 
do not provide an explanation of the basic nature of these [strategic partnership] relationships” 
(Blanco, 2016: 38). A discursive distinction between ‘strategic partners’ and ‘partners’ and 
other such designations in the context of the EU’s hierarchization of its interlocutors thus lacks 
conceptual clarity (Ferreira-Pereira and Vieira, 2016; Blanco, 2016: 38). Although the 
underlying asymmetric positioning of different types of partners according to the latter’s 
importance for the EU is discernible, the fact remains that the EU’s crisis management 
discourse does not address this issue from a conceptual point of view. Blanco points out that 
the normative attitude in EUFP is fundamental in understanding what ‘strategic partnership’ 
means in the EU context, in the sense that the actors deserving of this epithet on behalf of the 
EU are the ones that likely share the same goals and values as the EU, and actively support the 
latter through ‘multilateral cooperation’ (2016: 44-5). 
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The EU’s apparent hierarchization of its interlocutors / partners only appears to subside 
around the 2013 ‘comprehensive approach’, accompanied by a gradual apparent inward-
looking shift and the apparent decrease of the EU’s external normative ambitions. After the 
entering into force of the Lisbon Treaty, we can already notice some differences in the way the 
EU portrays its interlocutors, doing so with more inclusiveness, but still maintaining some 
degree of distinction between the two identified taxonomies (e.g. Council, 2011: 1-2; EEAS, 
2011: 6-7, 33-34; Council of the EU, 2015: 6). In this ‘intermediate’ stage towards a more equal 
treatment of all its E/CSDP interlocutors, we notice a geographic broadening of the EU’s 
‘partners’, which include not only the UN, NATO, and the OSCE, but also the African Union, 
the League of Arab States, and ASEAN, “as well as strategic partners and other partner 
countries, within our neighbourhood and more globally” (Council, 2015: 6). The distinction 
between ‘strategic’ and ‘other’ partners still indicates some distinction, in the midst of greater 
inclusiveness. Notwithstanding, there are still instances when the previous discursive hierarchy 
returns and a difference between ‘international partners’, ‘allies’, and ‘third countries’, 
reflecting the discursive struggles that are inherent to the discourse of a complex and multi-
layered actor such as the EU (e.g. Ashton, 2013a: 11-12; Mogherini, 2015a: 6, 18),  
In more recent discourses, however, the EU has tended more towards referring to its 
interlocutors with more ownership and partnership attributes (e.g. Commission, 2015a; 
European Council, 2015: 5-6; Mogherini, 2015a: 4; EU, 2016: 44, 50, 51), such as the instance 
where HR Mogherini states that “the long-term objective is to enable partner countries and 
regional organizations to take responsibility for their own security, so they can increasingly 
prevent and manage crises by themselves” (Mogherini, 2015a: 4). The EU’s discursive 
evolution is visible, but it is not a smooth evolution from one paradigm to the other. Sometimes 
in the very same discursive unit we can observe the EU’s actors / institutions portraying its 
interlocutors in different ways, signalling the aforementioned discursive struggles (discussed in 
more detail in chapter 3.1) that characterise the discourse of a complex multi-layered actor like 
the EU. 
 
5.7.2 - The E/CSDP host countries and potential host countries 
 
Overall, the E/CSDP host countries and potential host countries are constantly placed in an 
inferior hierarchical position vis-à-vis the EU and its ‘strategic’ and ‘international partners’ up 
until the Lisbon Treaty, by being either overlooked or omitted from the EU’s crisis management 
actorness discourse or portrayed negatively (either explicitly or implicitly). One example is the 
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EU’s treatment of countries in crisis as ‘failed’ and ‘corrupt’, or as having ‘weak institutions’, 
as discussed in chapter 5.6. In these instances, the EU is reaffirming its own identity as being 
the opposite – by establishing its own limits through difference (i.e. by establishing what it is 
not), while simultaneously repeating its ‘responsibility’ to help these ‘others’ to improve, to be 
remade based on its own image / model, thus pointing out a perceived asymmetry and placing 
itself at a superior hierarchical level in an effort to legitimate its engagement in crisis 
management.  
 
The construction of a superior ‘Europe’ to be emulated was the dominant political 
discourse of the Central European countries after the breakdown of communism in 1989, 
but this discourse simultaneously pointed to numerous facts proving the ‘Europeanness’ of 
the country in question, thus making these countries identical with yet temporarily 
separated from Europe (Hansen, 2006: 35). 
 
The example above serves to illustrate how, much like in an enlargement process, requests for 
assistance in civilian or military matters reflect logics of appropriation or emulation of certain 
norms, institutions, and standards set by the EU on behalf of other actors in the international 
system who request such support and assistance. By assuming their intent to emulate the EU 
(or be a part of the EU through enlargement, as in the above example), these actors acquiesce 
the ‘normalcy’ of the EU’s political and administrative standards, and they end up somewhat 
validating the EU’s claim as an actor with some degree of normative influence.  
 
(…) the less-than-radical construction of the Other within development discourse is carried 
out by a privileged Western subject, who is constructing not only the identity of the Other 
but also the concrete policies it should be undertaking to comply with this proscribed 
identity (Hansen, 2006: 36).40 
 
As such, the EU constructs itself as a crisis management actor built not on traditional territorial 
defence, but especially on the protection of liberal norms, institutions, and values, and on 
promoting the latter’s alleged universality and desirability for each country and region.  
                                               
40 Hansen, 2006: 35, citing Todorov, T. (1992) The Conquest of America: The Question of the Other, 
New York, Harper Perennial; and Doty, R.L. (1996) Imperial Encounters, Minneapolis, University 
of Minnesota Press. 
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The notion of ‘partner’ in the area of crisis management becomes more encompassing in 
the EU’s discourses as time progresses, including not only the EU’s traditional ‘international’ 
or ‘strategic’ partners, but also the E/CSDP’s host countries or potential host countries. The 
broadening of the scope of this nomenclature is related not only to the beginning of an apparent 
relative and slow decline in the EU’s normative ambitions in crisis management, where 
hierarchies between actors become progressively less marked in the EU’s discourses, but also 
to the increasing wide-ranging use (and subsequent normalisation) of this terminology in other 
policy contexts (such as the ENP). However, this is not always the case, and we can observe a 
change in the EU’s discourse throughout time regarding host countries, as discussed previously. 
This change was accompanied by a gradual change in its attitude towards its own role as a crisis 
management actor, where E/CSDP host countries and potential host countries begin gradually 
being treated as ‘partners’ (implicitly or explicitly) and an increased focus on ownership and 
autonomy is observed, particularly since the launch of the EU ‘comprehensive approach’ in 
2013. But before the changes occurred in practice, the EU’s discourse already hinted at this 
tendency. In 2001, before the launch of the ESDP, the Council released a Common Position 
concerning conflict prevention, management and resolution in Africa, whose main focus was 
the statement that “the primary responsibility for prevention, management and resolution of 
conflicts on the African continent lies with Africans themselves,” (Council of the EU, 2001d: 
3). Yet, the 2004 revised version of the document diminishes these autonomy ambitions and 
increases the EU’s commitment to engaging directly and individually in crisis management in 
Africa on a longer-term basis than what was projected in the first document (Council of the EU, 
2004g). Other similar situations of an apparent treatment of the E/CSDP host countries as 
partners, followed by a demarcation in the asymmetrical relationship between the latter and the 
EU are recurrent, as EU representatives like HR Solana, appear to place the host country (in 
this case FYROM) on an equal footing with the EU, to subsequently ‘remind’ them of the EU’s 
superior hierarchical position and ‘superior’ standards: “Proxima will be a unique mission 
carried out in strong partnership with the Government. We want to support you in the further 
development of an efficient and professional police service, living up to European standards” 
(Solana, 2003a: 3).  
There have been, however, instances when the EU has discursively treated host countries 
as partners for political reasons, even in the presence of a strong normative attitude as in the 
case of rule of law missions. An example is the integrated rule of law mission in Iraq, in the 
context of which the EU directly speaks of the mission’s success being dependent on ‘an 
effective strategic and technical partnership with the Iraqis’ and stating that “the EU will use 
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its dialogue with Iraq and its neighbours to encourage continuous regional engagement and 
support for improved security and for the political and reconstruction process in Iraq” (Council, 
2005d: 62). Especially since the 2009 entering into force of the Lisbon Treaty and the 2013 
‘comprehensive approach’, acknowledging E/CSDP host countries, and even referring to the 
latter as ‘partners’, has become the prevailing discursive norm, as they also began taking part 
in E/CSDP missions and operations themselves in collaboration with the EU (Ashton, 2013c: 
6). As such, this moment marks a change in the EU’s discourse towards greater inclusiveness 
and less apparent hierarchization: 
 
The EU will continue to support local, regional, international partners, relevant non-
governmental organisations and institutions for conflict prevention and resolution and the 
strengthening of peace efforts, as appropriate (Council of the EU, 2011: 2). 
 
This is noticeable even in cases where missions / operations might have been envisaged by the 
EU, like EUSSR Guinea-Bissau, which “was conducted in partnership with the Republic of 
Guinea Bissau, which maintains ownership of the security sector reform (SSR) process” 
(EEAS, 2010: 1). Yet, there remain cases where treatment of the host countries is, at best, 
ambiguous, such as the case of EUSEC RD Congo, where the EU provides ‘practical support 
for security sector reform in the DRC by giving advice and assistance directly to the Congolese 
authorities’, but at the same time ‘works closely with the other contributing members of the 
international community’ (EEAS, 2012: 1). While the EU’s description of EUSEC RD Congo 
does not identify which actors are the EU’s partners, there is a sense of parity vis-à-vis the 
‘other members of the international community’ (alongside the EU), and an apparent lower 
positioning of Congo, while at the same time referring directly to Congolese authorities. This 
ambiguity, and especially the oscillation in the treatment of host countries as ‘partners’ and an 
inferior hierarchical placing of the latter vis-à-vis the EU, reveals a lack of uniformity that 
reflects the discursive struggles underlying the EU’s discourse. 
 Even in 2015 we notice instances of the prevailing hierarchization discernible in the 
E/CSDP’s earlier years, even when host countries are clearly identified (as opposed to being 
omitted), in particular in referring to EU-UN close cooperation ‘in’ rather than ‘with’ these 
countries: 
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EU-UN relations remain the cornerstone of the EU support to effective multilateralism and 
translate into close operational cooperation inter alia in Mali, Central African Republic, 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Somalia and Afghanistan (Mogherini, 2015a: 6). 
 
Overall, the EU professes as its ‘long-term objective’ the “enabling of partner countries and 
regional organizations to take responsibility for their own security, so they can increasingly 
prevent and manage crises by themselves” (ibid.: 4; European Council, 2015: 6). There is 
always the ‘enabling’ part, which remains the same as in 2001 or 2003: the basic idea that EU 
values, norms, and standards are ‘superior’, ‘normal’, ‘natural’, ‘desired’, and that, through 
these, the EU can enable its ‘partners’ to get themselves out of a crisis situation. The 
aforementioned oscillation in the treatment of host countries as ‘partners’ and an inferior 
hierarchical placing of the latter vis-à-vis the EU is visible oftentimes in the same document 
(e.g. Mogherini, 2015a), as mentioned before, reflecting the inherent struggles that mark the 
EU’s composite and fragmented discourse.  
The overall tendency towards a more inclusive treatment of the EU’s interlocutors is 
visible not only in the attribution of the ‘partner’ epithet, but also in the acknowledgement of 
the interlocutors’ ‘willingness’ to collaborate with the EU in its foreign policy ventures (e.g. 
Council, 2015: 7), as well as the increasingly frequent mention of ‘ownership’. Much like other 
concepts such as ‘strategic partnerships’ or even ‘crisis’, the EU’s discourse does not offer a 
clear definition of ‘ownership’ in matters of crisis management, and, in addition, it has not been 
extensively studied in academic circles. In broad terms, “local ownership is a principle of peace- 
and state-building based on the premise that international interventions can lead to sustainable 
results only if there is a sufficient degree of local input, participation, and control” (Ejdus, 2017: 
463). As such, ownership in the area of EU crisis management has evolved from mostly a top-
down mechanism that essentially merely entailed local buy-in, to an idea of appropriation, by 
local actors in E/CSDP host countries, of the objectives and principles of the mission / 
operation, in a more balanced ‘middle ground’ that seeks to incorporate local authorities and 
assets into the missions (ibid.: 465). This middle ground approach to ‘partnership’ and 
‘ownership’, in addition to the EU’s increasing focus on ‘stability’ means that local actors that 
may not partake in the EU’s values, norms, and standards may nonetheless be considered 
‘partners’, which is not bereft of consequences, as discussed before. 
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5.7.3 - EU Member States and targets of the EU’s discourse 
 
In addition to the EU’s ‘strategic’ and ‘international’ partners and E/CSDP host countries and 
potential host countries, the EU’s main interlocutors in the context of its crisis management 
normative justification discourse are the EU Member States themselves. Even though this idea 
may appear paradoxical, as EU Member States are an integral part of the EU, there are many 
instances where the complexity of the EU’s autonomy as an actor is put in evidence, such as 
when its discourse is directed at the Member States or Member State representatives, or the 
latter are referred to with some degree of separateness from the EU, thus highlighting the latter’s 
autonomy (e.g. European Council, 1999b, 2000a, 2001b, 2001c; 2001d, 2010, 2013; Council, 
2001d, 2004b, 2007b, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2015; EP, 2000, 2002a, 2013, 2015a, 2015b; 
Commission, 2006, 2015b; Ashton, 2013a; Mogherini, 2015a; Solana, 2004, 2007; EU, 2016; 
PSC, 2007). 
Even though there is not always a clear target for the EU’s normative justification 
discourse as a crisis management actor, and considering the aforementioned hierarchization of 
the EU’s ‘partners’, we can argue that there are two main groups of actors that are being 
considered: one group comprising EU institutions, and especially Member State 
representatives, and the EU’s ‘international’ and ‘strategic’ partners (including international 
institutions and organisations, such as the UN or NATO). This distinction between types of 
partners, paired with the apparent increasing tendency to emphasise the importance of the 
Member States, indicates that the EU’s normative justification discourse may not have been, 
until recently, so much directed at the potential E/CSDP host countries, but rather at EU actors 
and the ‘international’ and ‘strategic’ partners identified in chapter 5.7.1.  
The likelihood that the main target of the EU’s normative justification discourse is its 
Member States somehow reflects the paradox and complexity identified by Jupille and 
Caporaso (1998) with regard to the analysis of the EU’s authority and autonomy as an 
international actor. This is because the European Council and the Council and the Member 
States are not entirely distinct entities, since the former institutions are composed of 
representatives of the latter and have been delegated authority to be the main deciders in the 
area of crisis management, and simultaneously partake in the construction of the EU’s crisis 
management normative justification discourse amply directed at the Member States. Another 
aspect of this complexity stems from the close link between domestic and external legitimation 
that converges in the institutional figure of the Council because it is made up of Member State 
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representatives (who concurrently assume national and EU functions and defend national 
interests while in EU functions) and is the main decision-maker in this area.  
The EU appears to primarily direct its discourse at actors within the EU – to ensure both 
domestic validation/authority as well as instruments and capabilities to carry out its 
‘responsibilities’ – and at its ‘international partners,’ in order to ensure recognition of its value-
added and worth as an actor. EU discourses until the Maastricht Treaty mention the Member 
States more than the EC; following the creation of the EU and the launch of the CFSP with the 
Amsterdam Treaty, EU discourses increasingly refer to the EU per se or as a metonym for the 
EU + Member States, in what we identify as a discursive construction of the EU’s collective 
identity. Occasionally, in discourses that refer to the military aspects of crisis management, the 
Member States are referred to independently, but mostly we notice that there has been a 
growing concern, following the Lisbon Treaty (but already present since the beginning of the 
ESDP), to distinguish between the EU and the Member States as ‘independent’ entities.  
 
Within the framework of the principles and objectives of its external action, the Union shall 
conduct, define and implement a common foreign and security policy, based on the 
development of mutual political solidarity among Member States, the identification of 
questions of general interest and the achievement of an ever-increasing degree of 
convergence of Member States’ actions (TEU article 24.2). 
 
In other words, in the EU’s discourses, the main actor appears to be the EU as such (‘the EU 
is’, ‘the EU can’, ‘the EU strengthens’, ‘the EU should’, ‘the Union shall’, etc.) but there is also 
frequent mention of the EU Ministers or Member States, and both the EU and the Member 
States are treated as the main actors in the discourse, reiterating the intergovernmental nature 
of this policy.  
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CHAPTER 6 - CONCLUSION 
 
The overall goal of this thesis was to conduct a post-structuralism-inspired CDA of the EU’s 
normative justification narratives as a central element in its legitimation efforts as a crisis 
management actor since the creation of the CFSP and the ESDP in the 1990s, up until the launch 
of the 2016 EU Global Strategy.  
 As we meant to study the EU’s legitimation efforts, we began by exploring the scholarly 
debate concerning EU legitimacy. The purpose of this exploration was the identification of 
what had been analysed and written about this issue, the definitions and benchmarks proposed 
for such analyses, and the gaps left unexplored. We found that the debate is vast, but it lacks 
consensus on how to assess the EU’s legitimacy at both the domestic and external levels. There 
is a tendency to prescribe a certain type of legitimation model, namely of the liberal-democratic 
type, borrowed from the (EUropean) state level onto the EU level and onto the EU’s external 
level as well, but at the same time no clear definition of legitimacy is presented. With these 
problems in mind, we then sought to investigate if the EU could be considered a crisis 
management actor by examining the evolution of the scholarly debate concerning EU actorness 
and to try to understand how (if at all) legitimacy played a role in this particular debate. We 
concluded, after going through different conceptualisations and specific criteria, that it is 
possible to claim that the EU possesses actorness features in the area of crisis management – 
thus answering our first research question. We have ascertained, however, that the EU’s 
actorness is multidimensional and complex, as the EU acts simultaneously as a security 
provider and consumer, and its actorness is very much linked to both discourse and practice. 
Legitimacy seems to play a somewhat peripheral role in the actorness scholarly debate, as it is 
primarily referred to in terms of democratic legitimacy and the domestic capacity for a unit to 
become an actor.  
We delved deeper into the legitimacy debate by considering the concept in isolation 
from specific political objects (such as the EU) and chose David Beetham’s conceptualisation 
to apply to our study. By examining the most prevalent actorness conceptualisations together 
with Beetham’s legitimacy principles, we sought to understand how the EU’s normative 
justification discourse relates to its (crisis management) actorness – thus answering our second 
research question. We concluded that the first principle, legal authority, is mostly connected 
with the domestic actorness dimensions (which focus on structural capabilities to act), and that 
the third principle, performative endorsement, is mostly connected with the external dimensions 
of actorness (which focus primarily on recognition and engagement with other actors). We 
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concluded that the link between the first and the third principle, normative justification, is 
particularly important for achieving legitimacy in a context such as the international arena, 
where coercion is not the norm, thus making it our analytical focus. In addition, a branch of the 
actorness scholarly debate focused on constructivist-inspired power related role conceptions 
(both attributed to the EU and assumed by the latter as part of its identity) also gave particular 
importance to normative justification as a means for the EU to ensure legitimacy as an 
international actor, thus reinforcing our choice. 
Having determined that our analytical focus would fall on the EU’s normative 
justification due to its central role in an actor’s legitimation process and having established that 
normative justification was primarily a discursive effort, we moved on to building our 
framework of analysis. We set out the main post-structuralist practices that we sought to engage 
in, namely a Derridean-inspired deconstruction and a Foucauldian-inspired critique of 
concealed power asymmetries, and we laid out our research questions and the CDA principles 
and techniques that we would use to answer them. 
We began our CDA by identifying the network of social practices where the problem is 
rooted in and by identifying the discourses that constitute the normative justification of the 
EU’s crisis management actorness – thus answering two more research questions. As such, we 
explored the characteristics of EUFP discourses, namely their multi-layered nature, as well as 
the discursive struggles, heterogeneity, and fragmentation that take place therein. We selected 
a discursive corpus that included all available discourses that met certain criteria which fit into 
to our specific objectives, namely composed of discourses that contained elements of normative 
justification and substantiation of the EU’s actorness ambitions, actions, and identity in the 
policy field of crisis management, drafted or uttered at the highest possible political official EU 
level, which preferably formed a basis for policy development. We gave primacy to (and thus 
included all) European Council and Council discourses (i.e. the highest possible political 
official EU level) that met these criteria. To these we added discourses produced by other EU 
institutions and organs that were relevant for our study’s goals, and we also added relevant 
discourses produced by Member State representatives that met the criteria. 
We then engaged in a historical and semiotic analysis of the EU’s crisis management 
policy and discourses throughout our chosen timeframe, setting out to answer seven more 
research questions, namely: how and why the EU came to develop a crisis management policy; 
identifying the historical and social contexts underlying the EU’s discourses; understanding 
how the EU’s discourses as a crisis management actor relate with the practical implementation 
of the CSDP; exploring how the EU frames / constructs and justifies normatively its perceived 
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crisis management actorness; identifying the words, concepts, and assumptions that constitute 
the EU’s discursive framework for speaking about crisis management and its projected role 
therein; identifying the key semiotic and linguistic features of the EU’s discourses; as well as 
pointing out eventual discursive continuities and discontinuities. Ultimately, chapter 4 resulted 
in the identification of the EU’s main discursive patterns, hierarchies, discursive continuities 
and discontinuities, omissions, emphases, absences, contradictions, and discrepancies, which 
were further explored in the subsequent chapter.  
In chapter 5 we concluded that the EU’s identity is substantially rooted in a discursive 
construction marked by a self-focus and a curated image (thus corroborating a claim in the 
scholarly debate), where an institutional ‘personification’ of the EU is the norm. We have 
concluded that not only is the EU always ‘represented’ discursively, but it is mainly presented 
in a positive or optimistic light, which magnifies an incongruity between narratives and 
practice, leading to a consequent continuous adjustment between the latter. We have also 
concluded that EU’s main narratives have different origins and purposes, concerning aspects of 
what it is, what it does, and why it acts. Throughout chapter 5 we sought to answer the research 
question that asked if there is a discursive hierarchy, and to identify both the dominant and the 
marginalised or concealed discourses and narratives. 
We found that there are several interconnected main narratives propagated by the EU. 
One such narrative links the idea of the ‘EU as a model’ with the idea of the EU as a ‘promoter 
of peace,’ driven by the EU’s historical experience as a democratic peace project validated as 
a positive and legitimating experiment. In other words, the achievement of the EC/EU’s primary 
goal (peace) lead to the inherent assumption of a concurrence between the EU’s nature and 
finalité as a democratic peace project, and its success was understood as a model that needs to 
be reproduced and spread to other parts of the world. Another narrative identified in our analysis 
corroborates the EU’s self-identification as a security actor, which is explained by its individual 
characteristics and value-added. This narrative is particularly visible when the EU mentions 
NATO, as it serves the twofold purpose of emphasising the importance of the transatlantic 
community of values and ideals (which ensures ‘Western’ dominance) and the identification of 
a gap that needs to be filled by an actor that has specific instruments and skills beyond NATO’s 
military focus. With this value-added narrative, NATO’s purpose is validated, and the EU’s 
complementarity is shown to be necessary. 
We also sought to explore the elements that indicated a ‘civilising’ attitude on behalf of 
the EU, in line with claims made in the scholarly debates. We found that there is a 
‘normalisation’ narrative that indicates the presence of a ‘civilising’ attitude, visible in the 
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attempts of reproduction of the EU model through EU-led institution building. The 
‘normalisation’ aspect of this narrative stems from the EU’s efforts to make others ‘normal’ or 
‘in order’, according to EU standards. Linked to this narrative is an important discursive 
omission, namely concerning the European colonial past and the asymmetries generated 
therein, as well as another narrative that promotes the link between development and security, 
increasingly visible in the EU’s discourses and practices through the progressive practical 
implementation of comprehensive and integrated approaches to security.  
Another key narrative that marks the EU’s normative justification discourse as a crisis 
management actor is the EU’s assumption of the primacy and universality of the values, 
principles, and norms that it exports in this and other policy fields. One of the most relevant 
features of this narrative is the EU’s assumption of its values, norms, and principles’ legitimacy, 
which in turn stems from the assumption of their universality, reflecting the criticisms made to 
the proponents of the NPE concept discussed earlier in this study. We concluded that when 
E/CSDP host countries validate the EU’s presence and assistance in crisis management, they 
also end up validating the latter’s normative qualities, thus rendering some legitimacy to the 
EU’s claims. Ultimately, the legitimation that results from the EU’s discourses and action on 
the ground is partial and one sided in the sense that it diminishes other actors, especially those 
for whom the policy is meant. The latter legitimate the EU’s help and the terms that are attached 
to it, but it is not possible to discern if they do so due to a belief in the EU’s appropriateness 
and validity, or because the crisis that they are allegedly in (as oftentimes it is the EU that 
decides what a crisis is) is more detrimental than accepting or requesting the EU’s assistance 
on the EU’s terms. In other words, normative justification works as a legitimation tool in the 
EU’s eyes, but not necessarily in the E/CSDP host countries’ eyes. 
Additional goals, formulated as a research questions, were to understand how actors, 
including the EU, E/CSDP host countries, and other actors, are represented in the EU’s 
discourses, as well as understanding how, and for whom the EU’s crisis management discourses 
are disseminated. These goals were also directed at corroborating or refuting a claim in the 
scholarly literature that argued that the EU places itself in a superior hierarchical positioning 
vis-à-vis those for whom the policy is meant. We found that, in addition to a constant 
hierarchization of the EU’s interlocutors, the attribution of the epithet ‘partner’ or ‘strategic 
partner’ changes throughout time and is marked by inconsistencies. Since the establishment of 
the EU, the CFPS, and the ESDP, up until around 2013, this classification was primarily 
attributed to non-EU European or North-American countries and international organisations, 
including NATO, the UN, the US, the OSCE, or the Council of Europe. Only after the Lisbon 
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Treaty and the institutionalisation of the concept of comprehensive approach to external 
conflicts and crises did the EU begin to refer to CSDP host countries as such, alongside ideas 
of local ownership and capacity building, reflecting a seeming decrease in the EU’s external 
normative ambitions. The Member States are central in the EU’s discourses as both builders 
and targets thereof, echoing the intergovernmental nature of this policy field and also bringing 
attention to the conceptual and analytical difficulties that stem from assessing the EU’s 
autonomy and authority as an actor, as discussed in the literature review. 
The profound social transformations that the EU and its surroundings have experienced 
throughout the years have shaped the EU’s discourse, making it progressively less markedly 
asymmetric. We observe a decrease in what is often deemed a ‘condescending’ or ‘patronising’ 
rhetoric of reproduction of asymmetric relations between the EU and its interlocutors - 
especially the countries and regions that host crisis management missions, but also the EU’s 
ENP partners (which oftentimes coincide) - as the EU’s focus shifts more towards its own 
ideological and territorial security than previously, as well as towards stabilisation, local 
ownership, and resilience. Yet, the EU’s normative ambitions in the field of crisis management 
did not necessarily subsume, but were, in fact, replaced by a different paradigm marked by 
‘principled pragmatism’.  
Ultimately, throughout the study, we have associated discourse and policy development, 
while contextualising both historically and socially, and we have analysed how the EU’s main 
narratives as a crisis management actor structure its ambitions and positions in the international 
system, and shape representations therein. Without the definiteness and exactitude of a ‘truth’-
seeking positivist scientific endeavour, our post-structuralism-inspired post-positivist critical 
discourse analysis led us to the conclusion that all three claims that we set out to confirm, based 
on the prevailing scholarly literature can be verified in the EU’s discourse and supported by our 
analytical efforts, thus contributing to the advancement of the debate. 
We conclude our study by stressing the importance of an actor’s normative justification 
in the context of foreign policy, as a means of justifying the latter, as legitimacy remains the 
most important mechanism, in the absence of coercion, for international actors and institutions 
to ensure compliance and overall endorsement. Our analytical focus on the EU’s normative 
justification discourses as a crisis management actor has been motivated by a necessity to 
understand what constitutes the discursive framework that the EU uses in communicating crisis 
management and its projected role therein and how this framework evolved, as we assume that 
discourse and practice are mutually constitutive, and, as such, discourse has a fundamental role 
in justifying and constructing the meaning of crisis management and in reinforcing the EU’s 
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identity as an actor. It has also been motivated by a necessity to understand how and why the 
EU deems itself an appropriate actor to engage in this policy area in the name, and in defence 
of common purposes and values (allegedly shared among its ‘strategic partners’) and following 
procedures that the EU both understands and projects as being accepted as reasonable, 
necessary, and appropriate.  
Our post-structuralist inspiration served the purpose of highlighting the ‘normalisation’ 
of discourses and narratives – that is, the assumption that they are normal, natural, objective, or 
expected. This ‘normalisation’ is something that happens permanently in the social world. Our 
goal was not to make value judgements about any specific narrative (even though this is quite 
inevitable), nor do we find that there is anything inherently wrong with normatively charged 
discourses that defend the spread of democracy, human rights, or the rule of law, as the EU’s 
discourse does. The problem that stems from these – and the problem that our analysis meant 
to uncover – is simply the assumption that some discourses are normal or natural, as all 
discourse is, in fact, artificial and constructed. The danger that lies in reifying or normalising 
certain discourses (e.g. the EU is an ideal model, autocratic governments are not legitimate, 
security is inherently linked with development…) is that, when acquiesced by its intended 
audience, discourse becomes a form of power that is potentially more powerful and sustainable 
than coercion; and the power asymmetries underlying certain narratives become entrenched and 
eventually established as real, and taken for granted to the detriment of actors or groups in 
disadvantage. While some discourses are more curated than others, discourse is always 
contingent upon context and circumstance. As such, assuming that EUropean dominance is 
normal or natural is taking a normative position masked by false objectiveness.  
 
6.1 - Possible avenues for future research 
 
The most likely continuation of the research developed in this thesis concerns the further 
exploration of the differences between the various institutional voices that speak on the EU’s 
behalf in this policy field, from both an institutional and historical point of view, as this is quite 
underdeveloped in the scholarly literature, as mentioned before.  
Another opportunity for future research concerns an extension of the analysis to other 
official EU means of communication (such as institutional websites or micro-blogging 
platforms like Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, etc.). However, the results of such efforts are likely 
to reflect the replication of the results of the present study, since we focused primarily on texts 
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that have been mostly agreed upon by all Member States and representatives within each 
institution. In this sense, additional communication efforts made by the EU are likely to reflect 
the convergences and agreements between national and institutional actors that form the core 
of the policy’s development, meaning that they would most likely not represent any sort of 
significant break or discontinuity from the main narratives found in our analysis, nor the 
creation of new narratives. 
Another research opportunity is an extension of the period of analysis both back to the 
late 1940s and 1950s, in order to include the establishment of the Western Union and the 
Western European Union, as well as the failed attempt at creating a European Defence 
Community. In addition, an extension of the period of analysis further ahead in time, to include 
the most recent developments in this policy field, such as the development of the PESCO 
projects, would be very beneficial for understanding the direction that the EU is headed in. 
Other dimensions of the analysis that are also important to explore in future research 
concern the reception of the EU’s normative justification strategic narratives as a crisis 
management actor (in the context of a growing field of research on external perceptions of the 
EU conducted by authors like Lucarelli and Fioramonti, 2011; Chaban and Holland, 2014; 
Elgström, 2015; or Bachmann and Müller, 2015), as well as the intentionality dimension, for 
example by conducting interviews with policy-makers in Brussels, and also continuing an 
extension of the overall analysis into the Member State level, so as to better understand the 
articulation between EU-level discourse and policy-making and national Member State 
interests and preferences. 
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